



## **Introduction. A world in conflict... in Africa too?**

It is clear to everyone that the planet is undergoing a geopolitical reconfiguration, with old and new powers vying to obtain and achieve their interests and objectives, in an era in which the so-called "world order" seems to have been sidelined and replaced by purely realistic approaches, in a context of constant wars and apparent chaos and disorder, in the search, as in other periods of history, for a new balance of power (Sánchez Herráez, 2023).

In this global reconfiguration, Africa has a renewed and growing interest, due to its wealth, its geographical position—conditioning maritime routes between Asia and Europe, for example—its human capabilities... and its governance gaps, which make it more feasible for other powers to occupy those spaces outside state control (VV. AA., 2023) or non-state actors, who are increasingly present on the continent.

This action takes different forms, employing, as in any strategic plan, different means and methods to achieve the intended ends. If we add to this the fact that the 'world order' is, to say the least, highly contested, old and new powers, in their search for spaces and territories, areas of influence and resources, securing key areas and denying them to their adversaries, sometimes give the impression (Sánchez Herráez, 2025b) that we are returning to a neo-imperial era.

For this reason, during the 21ST century, there has been a growing presence of foreign actors in Africa, interacting in different ways with African countries and other African actors. However, in addition to the Western powers, in many cases former colonial powers on the continent, countries such as China, Japan, Russia, India and even regional powers in the Middle East, such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iran and even Israel, are attempting, through various means and channels — from offering low-interest loans, financing investments and infrastructure, or offering certain services and resources, among other things—to gain advantageous positions and growing influence over the continent's vast natural resources , over its potential role as a market—given the region's high population—or, as has been pointed out, to have an active presence in strategic positions from the point of view of controlling the land and sea routes that are so important in this global world.

And Turkey, the government in Ankara, formerly known as the 'Sublime Porte' during the Ottoman Empire, is doing the same, using the tools and capabilities of state action and power at its disposal. And, quietly, gradually, without fanfare, Turkey is becoming increasingly present, visible and prominent in Africa (Orakçi, 2022) and is becoming a major player on the continent, in this area that is also part of the global dispute.

### **Background to the conflict. From memories of the past to action in the present?**

Turkey has had a previous presence in Africa (Parens and Plichta, 2025), dating back to the 16<sup>TH</sup> century, and, especially during the Ottoman Empire, it was mainly concentrated in North Africa (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, etc.), in relation to the Mediterranean coast and the Horn of Africa (Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia), also in relation to the Red Sea and access to routes to Islamic holy sites, such as Mecca.

This presence left its mark during the four centuries of the Ottoman Empire's presence in the area, as the dominant power, permeating, to a certain extent, the political, social and religious structures and institutions of these areas, until, after the end of the First World War (1914-1918), the Ottoman Empire, which was on the losing side, disappeared. In 1923, the Turkish Republic was founded by Mustafa Kemal, who sought to usher the country into a new era far removed from its imperial past, leaving behind, to a certain extent, the Ottoman legacy.

The Second World War, the Cold War, Turkey's entry into NATO, the struggle between the superpowers, Ankara's efforts to be part of Europe and the only relative successes in this regard generated a certain particular perception, which led to the constant growth of Ottoman nostalgia, especially since the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Lee, 2025), from the explicit rejection of the Ottoman legacy during the republican era. This has had an impact not only on foreign policy, but also on national identity itself, with its nuances and differences, in a kind of neo-Ottomanism that has been growing since the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Lee, 2025). especially since the end of THE 20<sup>TH</sup> century (Lee, 2025), in a kind of neo-Ottomanism that has an impact not only on foreign policy but also on national identity itself—with its nuances and differences—as well as the support of political Islam for the design of a neo-Ottoman agenda.

And Africa was part of that agenda. Although Ankara's growing interest in Africa initially materialised in the so-called Africa Action Plan, which was designed in 1998, it was when the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in November 2002 that activity and actions on the continent became exponential. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs developed intense activity on the continent, including countries that had previously had little relationship with Ankara.

In line with this upward trend in relations and activity, Turkey designated 2005 as 'the year of Africa' and increased and strengthened its relations with African countries.

Relations with Africa are one of the key policies of Ankara's foreign policy, with constant and intense action and activity. In fact, Turkey achieved observer status in the African Union in 2005 and, continuing along these lines, became a "strategic partner" of Africa at the first Africa-Turkey summit (Bacchi, 2015) held in Istanbul in August 2008.

The use of "soft power" tools is constant, and terms such as "common future," "cooperation," and "solidarity" (Parens and Plichta, 2025) were dominant in the speeches of both African and Turkish leaders, where agreements were reached to implement specific programmes guided by equality, respect and mutual benefit.

Initiatives, summits, forums and meetings will continue; the second Africa-Turkey summit was held in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea) in 2014, where progress was made on agreements and trade and other relations, including a joint implementation plan.

Ankara's action is not limited to regular summits and forums, but also makes extensive use of high-level visits and the physical presence of President Erdogan and Turkish government leaders in Africa. In fact, the president has visited some 30 African countries in recent years, clearly demonstrating Turkey's interest in Africa. Similarly, two decades ago, Turkey had only a dozen embassies on the continent, compared to more than 40 today (Sánchez Wilder and Morgan, 2022).

Activity in all areas has been so intense that, while Africa was considered by the Turks to be a place of poverty and conflict just over a decade ago, it is now largely seen as a place of hope and a significant economic and political partner (Özkan, 2021).

All of this must be viewed from a global perspective, from the perspective of the struggle between the powers — and the narratives used or applied to and by each of them — such

that the West—and perhaps that 'old order'—is, to a large extent, being invited to leave parts of Africa, from France as a nation to United Nations missions such as MINUSMA or the European Union—EUTM Mali—in this African nation, spaces and voids that are being filled by other nations, by other powers... (Sánchez Herráez, 2025a) and the Ottoman imprint seems to a large extent to be seeking to capitalise on this.

The case of Turkey stands out in a special way, as it is not, apparently, just another country investing and expanding, because the process it is employing is very proactive, apparently different from that employed by other nations, and it is obtaining great returns in a very short space of time, especially in economic matters—as well as in other aspects— (Özkan, 2021).

To this end, the use of soft power has become a key tool for Ankara (Siradagi, 2022) —including the legacy of the Ottoman past— which has allowed it to gradually increase its presence and action in other fields and areas as the African continent is of paramount strategic importance to Ankara...

...on a planet undergoing radical reconfiguration, and where Africa has a powerful role to play.

### **Current situation of the conflict. Turkey, a power in Africa?**

Every nation uses its tools of power to achieve its objectives; these tools of power are usually summarised by the acronym DIME (Baqués, 2021) (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic), although there are, of course, variations and derivatives. Turkey has been focusing its activity (Parlar and Dipama, 2023) on various areas in a highly orchestrated manner.

#### ***Turkey, a diplomatic and informational power in Africa!***

Turkey has been able to use its soft power tools—humanitarian aid, education, religion, diplomacy, etc.—very efficiently and has offered an alternative, a different path to that of the traditional powers present and active in Africa, such as the Western powers, Russia and China itself. In fact, it has already been pointed out that diplomatic missions have

practically quadrupled in a few years (Vial and Bouvier, 2025a), as a clear sign of Ankara's interest in Africa.

President Erdogan himself (2021), in his work *A More Just World is Possible*, not only points out that the world is bigger than five nations (Natz, 2024)—referring to the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—but also that current institutions are ineffective, making it necessary to create another, more multicultural world order. And this is where Ankara comes in, especially in Africa, as the pole, the focus for leading this option against the 'Western' world order.

Thus, for example, in Somalia, a country ravaged by a multitude of calamities, in 2011 Turkey became involved —and in a constant manner— in humanitarian actions to alleviate the human suffering of the population, including a visit by President Erdogan and Turkish action by the government, companies and non-governmental organisations increased in sectors such as education, agriculture and health —without asking for anything in return—which contributed to creating a climate of closeness and trust between the Somali population and Ankara, a perception reinforced by historical and religious ties. Years later —this issue will be addressed later—this would even lead to the authorisation of the establishment of a large military base where Somali military and police forces are trained, while Western nations lament the low level of coordination with the country and point out (Wasuge, 2016) that Turkey is more visible and quicker to act than they are, that Turkey is the power of reference in this nation. The appropriate use of soft power undoubtedly facilitates the creation of subsequent relationships that could be framed within hard power, such as military power.

Development aid and humanitarian aid (Parens and Plichta, 2025) are therefore an essential pillar of Turkey's presence on the continent, given the low level of development in many African countries. Access to drinking water and electricity is a key issue for a large part of Africa's population, which is why Ankara pays special attention to the development of projects of this type on the continent, in addition to building hospitals, schools, etc. These centres directly and noticeably improve the quality of life of the African population, which substantially improves the host country's and the population's perception of Turkey and increases Ankara's influence in all necessary areas of action.

As a simple example, the fact that a hospital in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia (The Economist, 2022), bears Erdogan's name is a powerful tool of influence.

The education sector has also been an area in which Ankara has been actively involved in Africa. Through a state foundation, the Maarif Foundation, it has supported 70,000 students from 55 countries in recent years (Daily Sabah, 2025) and has similarly increased opportunities for higher education for African students. In fact, it is estimated (Parens and Plichta, 2025) that some 15,000 African students have obtained scholarships from the Turkish state, so that instead of heading to Europe for higher education, the path to Turkey is becoming increasingly common. And it is a two-way street, as the flow of people, businesspeople, tourists, migrants (Orakçi, 2022), etc. travelling from Africa and to Africa from Turkey is growing, generating a very positive trend for the establishment and maintenance of all kinds of relationships.

In addition, Turkey is gradually deploying its news agency, the Anadolu Agency, in different African countries (Ethiosports, 2014) in a gradual manner, allowing it to provide its own information and images without relying on those supplied by major global networks such as the BBC or France 24, as well as organising courses and various activities to increase the level of training of African journalists, which has a direct impact on the narratives that are disseminated.

And although Turkey is a secular country, it does not rule out the use of religion as an element of *soft power*, building and financing the creation of mosques in Africa in an attempt to achieve relevance in the different existing currents of Islam vis-à-vis other nations. In fact, Saudi Arabia has exerted great influence and action in this field, building mosques in Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Mali; Iran has also built mosques in Senegal, Ivory Coast and Guinea, and Turkey has been very active in Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Ghana and Mali. In fact, in 2019, it inaugurated the largest mosque in Djibouti, and during the opening ceremony, the Turkish government representative present at the event pointed out that the construction would serve to strengthen the ties of "our religion, culture and brotherhood" (TRT World, 2019). In 2021, Ankara inaugurated a large mosque in Ghana, which also serves as a cultural complex and is intended to demonstrate religious harmony between Muslims and Christians (AA, 2021b), in many cases using historiography and symbolism from the Ottoman past.

All of this contributes to Africa's view of Ankara being very positive for the time being and to the narrative that the presence, action — and even the deployment of military forces, which is discussed below — is beneficial for everyone, especially for the African host nations. This enables Ankara to take the lead in supporting these nations over other powers whose narratives, rightly or wrongly, position them as colonialist or exploitative. This provides Turkey with a substantial advantage in undertaking all kinds of activities.

And among these activities, as another factor in a state's actions, is the economy.

### ***Turkey, an economic powerhouse in Africa!***

With regard to economic cooperation (Parens and Plichta, 2025) and trade relations, these have become one of Ankara's main priorities on the continent. In fact, Turkey regularly organises economic forums and various activities that have enabled trade to increase from three billion dollars in 2003 to twenty-six billion dollars in 2021, in addition to Turkey's direct investment in Africa, which is close to ten billion dollars. These figures show that a large number of Turkish private companies are investing in different African countries. In fact, as a sign of this growing relationship, it is significant that the Turkish flag carrier Turkish Airlines offers 61 different destinations to 40 African countries.

In the field of infrastructure development, Turkish companies are expanding rapidly across the continent, meaning, and this is part of the narrative constantly used by Turkey (AA, 2024), that these projects and developments create employment opportunities for hundreds of thousands of Africans and the total amount of investment is significant; in 2023, Turkish companies carried out a total of 1,864 projects in Africa, with an investment of \$85.4 billion. For example, Ankara is financing major infrastructure projects such as the new airport in Addis Ababa, the port and several roads in Senegal (Parens and Plichta, 2025).

It is important to remember the great interest aroused by Africa's natural resources – not only oil and hydrocarbons, but also uranium, gold and, increasingly, strategic minerals – and it is also necessary to remember that Turkey needs to import about three-quarters of the energy it requires (Republic Of Türkiye, n.d.) and wishes to achieve a greater degree of independence in this regard.

Ankara imports oil and liquefied natural gas from African countries such as Algeria, which has become one of the main exporters of gas to Turkey; 90% of bilateral trade between Nigeria and Turkey consists of imports of liquefied natural gas. Chad, a mineral-rich country, has shown its willingness to invite Turkish companies to establish themselves in the country, as did Somalia, so that Turkey could exploit the oil off its coast. And so, in the energy sector, which is key for Africa—and for Turkey—innovative projects have been developed by companies such as Turkey's Karpowership<sup>1</sup>, which specialises in the development of floating gas plants—such as those in the large African cities of Dakar and Freetown, among others—making this Turkish company a key energy supplier for many African countries.

But it is not only hydrocarbon-related issues that are being addressed; in its quest for greater proactive energy capacity, Ankara aims to achieve this through the development of a nuclear power plant programme, for which it is relying on Russia and its company Rosatom to provide the necessary fuel for the planned reactors... but which, in the context of the sanctions imposed on Moscow for the current war in Ukraine, is motivating Ankara to seek potential alternative sources of uranium for this project, thereby increasing interest in this resource... and Niger (Parens and Plichta, 2025) is a country rich in uranium.

Trade relations are growing, the narrative of mutual benefit continues to be successful, and trade relations and agreements are increasing. This is true both and so much so that it can be stated unequivocally that Turkey is a new power in Africa, also in economic terms (Vial and Bouvier, 2025b). In fact, Ankara has signed a multitude of free trade agreements with several African countries, resulting, as indicated above, in mutual trade growth... although, for example, Morocco is seeking to renegotiate its free trade agreement with Turkey, concerned to some extent by the existing trade deficit (Walaw, 2025).

It is also necessary to remember that resource-rich areas are not always found in stable countries or regions – and in Africa, less and less so – which greatly complicates the extraction and export of these resources and requires a growing demand for security to keep the supply chain secure. And that is where military force comes into play.

---

<sup>1</sup> The company's projects in Africa can be consulted on its website: <https://karpowership.com/africa>

### ***Turkey, a military power in Africa!***

In relation to the military and security sector (Parens and Plichta, 2025), in Libya and Somalia, the Turkish Armed Forces have implemented training programmes for the armies of these countries, among others<sup>2</sup>, and Turkish forces have participated in peacekeeping missions in Central Africa and Mali.

However, one of Ankara's main achievements in the security sector has been the construction of a military training centre called TURKSOM in Mogadishu in 2017 to train the Somali National Army. At this centre, more than 15,000 Somali troops have been trained by Turkish military personnel, and specific special forces training capabilities have also been provided to some units of the Somali Army (AA, 2021a).

Furthermore, considering Ankara's interest in the Horn of Africa (Parens and Plichta, 2025), due to the region's crucial importance for global trade and access to the Indian Ocean, this base provides Turkey with access to the Indian Ocean, as well as various types of support for the Somali government, and also raises a certain rivalry with the United Arab Emirates, which also has an interest in the complex situation in Somalia.

In any case, Turkey's presence and action in Somalia — as in many other African countries — is growing. In fact, in 2024, it signed a memorandum of understanding with this nation to strengthen the Somali Navy (Agenzia Fides, 2024) and, in return, Turkey will receive 30% of the revenue from Somalia's exclusive economic zone, which also allowed Ankara to have a permanent naval presence in the Red Sea.

However, it is not only the Turkish Armed Forces that are involved in this area; military contractors are also employed. Thus, the Turkish company SADAT<sup>3</sup>, which is sometimes referred to as Ankara's version of the Russian Wagner Group, is a private security company but operates largely under the dictates of the state (Parens and Plichta, 2025), although it formally maintains some separation. This company emerged in 2012, in the context of the Libyan civil war, and since then, the company has grown and expanded into different areas of Africa, providing not only training services to soldiers, but also direct security services, protection of authorities and counter-terrorism operations, in exchange

---

<sup>2</sup> A detailed study on this subject can be found at Vial and Bouvier (2025c). Available at <https://www.lescledumoyenorient.com/Turkiye-the-new-regional-power-in-Africa-3-3-A-military-presence-that-is-now.html>

<sup>3</sup> SADAT, International Defence Consultancy. Available at: <https://sadat.com.tr/en/>

for guarantees for the extraction of resources by the host nations, such as in certain areas of the Sahel. In a show of Ankara's pragmatism, both the Turkish and Russian companies coincide in certain scenarios in the Sahel, while in Libya they are on opposing sides.

The importance of the religious factor in this company should not be overlooked (Valdés de Olives, 2025: 34-40). Its founder, a Turkish army general, became an advisor to President Erdogan in his cabinet, which is why promoted and encouraged intra-Muslim cooperation and gave SADAT a powerful link to religion, as even the name of the company comes from the name given to notable families who were descendants of the prophet (Venere, n.d.). And while the use of these ideals wins supporters, it is no less true that, for example, in the Sahel, where they have to fight against jihadist groups—also Muslim—it sometimes causes some dysfunction in these alignments, as well as occasional friction between Russian and Turkish contractors.

Another activity in this field is the sale of arms, and although Turkey is not a major seller on a global scale, its activity in Africa has led it to become the fourth largest exporter of military equipment to the continent, and the demand for Turkish arms and military equipment is growing steadily (Parens and Plichta, 2025), as efficiency parameters and cost-effectiveness are highly valued, especially in these countries, which in many cases have very limited budgets.

In fact, arms sales are one of the pillars of Turkish expansion in many African countries, which, especially in those engaged in fierce struggles against terrorism, greatly enhances Ankara's actions and presence. Thus, after a first batch of Bayraktar TB2 drones purchased by Bamako and delivered in December 2022, in mid-February 2023, Mali received a second batch of drones (Ecsaharai, 2023) of the same type, which were deployed in the city of Gao, in the north of the country.

Drones constitute a very substantial part of Turkish arms sales in Africa, where they are used for both intelligence missions and air support. In addition, Turkey also exports light weapons, training aircraft, helicopters and armoured vehicles to a growing number of countries across Africa.

Turkey is therefore a diplomatic, informational, military and economic power in Africa... but what do the other powers think about this?

### **Role of external actors. Room for everyone or points of friction?**

Turkey is not the most important power in Africa, as other nations have greater capacity and presence on the continent (Parens and Plichta, 2025). However, it is necessary to consider that, on occasions, not being identified as a major power provides a number of advantages, as a lower level of ambition or presence than that sought by the United States, China, Russia or the European Union itself means that it is much easier for that other nation—in this case, Turkey—to be able to manoeuvre appropriately to exert influence and act in a way that pursues its national interests, in principle, in a 'discreet' manner.

Even despite being a member of NATO—and having a long-standing rivalry with Moscow—and even having been present in certain areas of Africa as the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has been able to position itself both as a nation and through its companies and agencies, and has developed an attitude and narrative of a neutral actor on the sidelines of the competition between powers. And so, while there is concern about the positions being taken in Africa by Russia, China, or the role of the United States or the European Union, Turkey has so far been able to reap benefits in all areas without arousing the suspicion of the major powers.

The interests of the major powers in Africa, a disputed continent in a globally contested world, are diverse: raw materials, security spaces, the installation of Atlantic naval bases, control of strategic mineral resources<sup>4</sup> ... and, so far, Turkey has not only been able to manoeuvre adeptly in Africa, but also within the framework of the global dispute, as it is a NATO country but one that repeatedly points to and targets the global south, offering tactical and specific alliances and support when necessary, even with strategic adversaries — as in the case of Russia — and which, thanks to a narrative that is appropriate and widely accepted by most African countries, has been increasingly positioning itself.

---

<sup>4</sup> An analysis of the interests of the major powers in Africa can be found in Chapter 1 of the book "Africa: the ambition of world powers on the continent." Available at: <https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/cuaderno-de-estrategia-221-copiar->

This growing position could cause problems with the major powers... but it is already causing problems with the middle powers of the East, which are watching Ankara establish itself in key areas such as the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, with significant specific weight.

At the moment, it seems unlikely (Parens and Plichta, 2025) that Ankara will have major disputes with the United States, Russia or China, so, in principle and for the time being, these nations are not taking too much action against Turkish activities in Africa. However, the situation could change if trade disputes arise in certain areas with China—over the construction of certain infrastructure, for example—or competition in certain areas between Russian and Turkish private military companies, or over certain natural resources.

*A priori*, Turkey's biggest rival in Africa appears to be the United Arab Emirates; in fact, they are on opposing sides in Libya and Somalia. And although the United Arab Emirates does not have a similar deployment of capabilities to Ankara, it can be very active through elements related to the financing of certain actions, such as the sale of arms or support for certain groups and factions.

However, recently (July 2025), the first meeting of the so-called 'High-Level Strategic Council' (African Initiative, 2024) took place in Ankara between Turkey and the UAE, with the aim of turning the intense competition between the two nations in Africa into a kind of strategic partnership.

The existing disputes between the two nations, both in some of the active conflicts on the continent and in its "hot spots" — North Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Sudan and the Red Sea coast — but especially in Libya, where they support opposing sides—and with a situation that is very complex to resolve—have been put on the table, with Ankara seeking to achieve greater efficiency in the use of its resources by reducing disputes with Abu Dhabi, which would allow for greater capacity for action in Africa and in Turkey itself.

With the West largely displaced from much of Africa and the anti-colonial narrative of South-South cooperation and mutual support triumphant, Turkey will apparently be able to continue increasing its presence and action on the continent... until some major power feels its interests threatened and says "enough is enough"?

### **Conclusions and outlook. A new dispute on the horizon?**

On a planet undergoing geopolitical reconfiguration, where old and new powers are vying for a position that will allow them to pursue their national aspirations and interests, Turkey has made a strong commitment to Africa, among other areas.

To this end, it has applied its tools of national power in a very intelligent and active manner and, so far, without causing serious disruption to any other power, large or medium-sized, on the African continent.

Depending on how the situation on the continent and globally develops, Turkey's presence and actions could become an impediment to the interests of another power in some respects, which would most likely lead to friction that could generate conflict.

The world, the world order, is changing and being questioned. No space, power or nation can feel free from facing some kind of conflict. This is even more so if it is a medium-sized, expansionist power such as Turkey has been in Africa until now.

The future is not written, although similar trends tend to lead to similar results. Perhaps the Sublime Porte will face some challenge in the near future. Or perhaps not.

## APPENDIX

### Chronology of the conflict and geopolitical indicators

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CONFLICT	
DATE	EVENTS
16TH century	Ottoman Empire makes its presence felt in Africa
1922	The Ottoman Empire disappears
1923	The Republic of Turkey is born
1952	Turkey joins NATO.
1989	The Berlin Wall falls. The Cold War comes to an end.
1998	Turkey designs Action Plan in Africa
2002	AKP (Justice and Development Party) comes to power.
2005	Turkey designates this year as 'the year of Africa'
2005	Turkey obtains observer status in the African Union
2008	Turkey becomes a 'strategic partner' of Africa at the first Africa-Turkey summit held in Istanbul in August 2008
2011	Massive support from Turkey to Somalia
2012	SADAT Private Military Company is founded.
20	Second Africa-Turkey Summit held in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea)
2017	Turkey opens a military training centre called TURKSOM in Mogadishu (Somalia)
2019	Turkey inaugurates the largest mosque in Djibouti
2022	Turkey delivers drones to Mali
July	The first meeting of the so-called "High-Level Strategic Council" between Turkey and the United Arab Emirates took place in Ankara.

### Table of geopolitical indicators

In the tables below, data is from 2025 unless otherwise stated.

Source: CIA, The World Factbook

		TURKEY
Area (km <sup>2</sup> )		783,562
GDP in billions of dollars		1323 (2024 est.)
GDP structure	Agriculture	5.6
	Industry	25.9
	Services	56.8 (2024 est.) NOTE: The figures do not add up to 100% due to a lack of access to certain data for each sector.
GDP per capita (dollars)		35,300 (2024 est.)
GDP growth rate		3.2 (2024 est.)
Exports: in billions of dollars		372,756 (2024 est.)
Imports: in billions of dollars		367,022 (2024 est.)
Population		84,119,531 (2024 est.)

Age structure	0–14	21.7
	15	68.6
	Over 65	9.6 (2024 est.)
Population growth rate		0.61 (2024 est.)
Ethnic groups		Turks 70-75% Kurds 19% Other minority groups 6–11% (2016 est.)
Religions		Muslims 99.8% (mostly Sunni) Others 0.2% (mostly Christian and Jewish)
Languages		Turkish (official), Kurdish, other minority languages
Literacy rate		97 (2021)
Population below the poverty line		13.9 (2022 est.)
Military expenditure as % of GDP		2.3% (2025 est.)

## Bibliography

- AA. (2021a). Turkey provides commando training to Somali soldiers [online]. AA. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-provides-commando-training-to-somali-soldiers/2099383>
- AA. (2021b). Turkish-built mosque in Ghana opened to worshippers [online]. AA. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkish-built-mosque-in-ghana-opened-to-worshippers/2307135>
- AA. (2024). Turkish companies winning African infrastructure, superstructure project [online]. AA. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkish-companies-wining-african-infrastructure-superstructure-projects/3108216>
- African Initiative. (2024). Ankara instead of Moscow? What the strategic partnership between Turkey and the United Arab Emirates for Africa will look like [online]. *African Initiative*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://afrinz.ru/es/2025/07/ankara-en-lugar-de-moscu-como-sera-la-asociacion-estrategica-entre-turquia-y-los-emiratos-arabes-unidos-para-africa/>
- Agenzia Fides. (2024). Naval agreement between Somalia and Turkey to counter that of Ethiopia and Somaliland? [online]. *Agenzia Fides*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: [https://www.fides.org/es/news/74754-AFRICA\\_SOMALIA\\_Acuerdo\\_naval\\_entre\\_Somalia\\_y\\_Turquia\\_para\\_contrarrestar\\_el\\_de\\_Etiopia\\_y\\_Somalilandia](https://www.fides.org/es/news/74754-AFRICA_SOMALIA_Acuerdo_naval_entre_Somalia_y_Turquia_para_contrarrestar_el_de_Etiopia_y_Somalilandia)
- Bacchi, E. (2015). A timeline of Turkish Africa policy [online]. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at <https://ovipot.hypotheses.org/13639>
- Baqués, J. (2021). TELL ME... mirror, mirror... am I the fairest in the land: analysis of the instruments of power in today's world [online]. *Global Strategy*. [Accessed: 2021]. Available at: <https://global-strategy.org/analysis-dime/>
- Daily Sabah. (2025). Turkish Maarif Foundation ranks among top 5 global education networks [online]. *Daily Sabah*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at:

<https://www.dailysabah.com/turkiye/turkish-maarif-foundation-ranks-among-top-5-global-education-networks/news>

Ecsaharai. (2023). Mali receives a new batch of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones [online].

*Ecsaharai*. [Accessed: 2025].

Erdoğan, R. T. (2021). *A Fairer World is Possible*. Turkuvaz Kitap.

Ethiosports. (2014). Turkey's Anadolu Agency opens new bureau in Ethiopia [online].

*Ethiosports*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at:

<https://www.ethiosports.com/2014/05/12/turkeys-anadolu-agency-opens-new-bureau-in-ethiopia/>

Lee, S. (2025) Neo-Ottomanism in modern Turkey [online]. *Number Analytics*.

[Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://www.numberanalytics.com/blog/neo-ottomanism-in-modern-turkey>

Natz Balkiz, K. (2024) This is why Turkish president Erdogan is calling for a new world order [online]. *TRT Global*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at:

<https://trt.global/world/article/18211683>

Orakçi, S. (2022). The rise of Turkey in Africa, Aljazeera Centre for Studies [online].

Aljazeera Centre for Studies. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at:

<https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/rise-turkey-africa>

Özkan, M. (2021). Turkey's rising role in Africa [online]. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*. 9(4).

[Accessed: 2025]. Available at:

[https://ozkanmehmet.com/yhoamsoo/2021/05/2011\\_Turkeys-Rising-Role-in-Africa.pdf](https://ozkanmehmet.com/yhoamsoo/2021/05/2011_Turkeys-Rising-Role-in-Africa.pdf)

Parens, R. and Plichta, M. (2025). Turkey's return to Africa [online]. Foreign Policy Research Institute. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at:

<https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/turkeys-return-to-africa/>

Parlar Dal, E. and Dipama, S. (2023). Assessing Turkey's Africa engagements [online]. Africa Policy Research Institute. Policy Brief. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at <https://afripoli.org/assessing-turkey-africa-engagements>

Republic Of Türkiye . (n.d.), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Türkiye's International Energy Strategy. Available at: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa>

Sánchez Herráez, P. (2023). The new struggle between the powers: World War 3.0 or Cold War 2.0? [online]. *Analysis Document*. Ministry of Defence, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies. 28/2023. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/la-nueva-pugna-de-las-potencias-guerra-mundial-3.0-o-guerra-fria-2.0->

Sánchez Herráez, P. (2025a). 21ST century, geopolitical reconfiguration!: And the Sahel as its forward detachment? [online]. *Analysis Document*. Ministry of Defence, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies. 02/2025. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: [https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/siglo\\_xxi\\_reconfiguracion\\_geopolitica\\_y\\_el\\_sahel\\_destacamento\\_avanzado\\_de\\_l\\_a\\_misma](https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/siglo_xxi_reconfiguracion_geopolitica_y_el_sahel_destacamento_avanzado_de_l_a_misma)

Sánchez Herráez, P. (2025b). 21ST century: The return of empires? [online]. *Analysis Document*. Ministry of Defence, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies. 29/2025. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: [https://www.defensa.gob.es/documents/2073105/2519511/siglo\\_xxi\\_el\\_retorno\\_d\\_e\\_los\\_imperios\\_2025\\_dieeea29.pdf/f3b5fefa-e3d7-08da-e28b-c84cd263e591?t=1745222453749](https://www.defensa.gob.es/documents/2073105/2519511/siglo_xxi_el_retorno_d_e_los_imperios_2025_dieeea29.pdf/f3b5fefa-e3d7-08da-e28b-c84cd263e591?t=1745222453749)

Sánchez Wilder, A. and Morgan, S. (2022). Turkey's President Erdogan visits Africa: a commentary [online]. *Geopolitical Monitor*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/turkeys-president-erdogan-visits-africa-a-commentary/>

Siradagi, A. (2022). The rise of Turkey's soft power in Africa: Reasons, dynamics and constraints [online]. *International Journal of Political Studies*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at:

<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363154335> The Rise of Turkey's Soft Power in Africa Reasons Dynamics and Constraints

- The Economist. (2022). Turkey is making a big diplomatic and corporate push into Africa [online]. *The Economist*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/04/23/turkey-is-making-a-big-diplomatic-and-corporate-push-into-africa>
- TRT World. (2019). Djibouti's biggest mosque built by Turkey opens to public [online]. *TRT World*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://www.trtworld.com/article/12737811>
- Valdés de Olives, J. M. (2025). Private military companies as a vector of influence: Turkey's strategy in Africa [online]. *Army*. Ministry of Defence. No. 996, pp. 34-40. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://publicaciones.defensa.gob.es/media/downloadable/files/links/r/e/revista-ejercito-996.pdf>
- Venere. (n.d.). The meaning and history of the name Sadat [online]. *Venere*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://venere.it/es/el-significado-y-la-historia-del-nombre-sadat/>
- Vial, A. S. and Bouvier, E. (2025a). Türkiye, the new regional power in Africa (1/3) [online]. *Les clés du Moyen Orient*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Turkiye-the-new-regional-power-in-Africa-1-3-African-solutions-for-African.html>
- Vial, A. S. and Bouvier, E. (2025b). Türkiye, the new regional power in Africa (2/3) [online]. *Les clés du Moyen Orient*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Turkiye-the-new-regional-power-in-Africa-2-3-A-Turkish-economic-presence.html>
- Vial, A. S. and Bouvier, E. (2025c). Türkiye, the new regional power in Africa (3/3) [online]. *Les clés du Moyen Orient*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at:

<https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Turkiye-the-new-regional-power-in-Africa-3-3-A-military-presence-that-is-now.html>

Various authors (2023). Africa: the ambition of world powers on the continent [online]. *Strategy Notebook*. Ministry of Defence, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies. 220. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: <https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/cuaderno-de-estrategia-221-copiar->

Walaw. (2025). Morocco to renegotiate free trade agreement with Turkey amid concerns over trade deficit [online]. *Walaw*. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at: [https://es.walaw.press/country/turkiye/GQPWWRL/articles/marruecos\\_renegociara\\_el\\_acuerdo\\_de\\_libre\\_comercio\\_con\\_turquia\\_ante\\_preocupaciones\\_por\\_el\\_deficit\\_comercial/GMRXQQPXSMXP](https://es.walaw.press/country/turkiye/GQPWWRL/articles/marruecos_renegociara_el_acuerdo_de_libre_comercio_con_turquia_ante_preocupaciones_por_el_deficit_comercial/GMRXQQPXSMXP)

Wasuge, M. (2016). *Turkey's Assistance Model in Somalia: Achieving Much With Little* [online]. Heritage Institute for Policy Studies. Mogadishu. [Accessed: 2025]. Available at <https://heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Turkeys-Assistance-Model-in-Somalia-Achieving-Much-With-Little1-1.pdf>

*Pedro Sánchez Herráez\**  
Coronel del Ejército de Tierra  
Doctor en Paz y Seguridad Internacional  
Analista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos