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Strategic Autonomy or Allied Dependence: the Debate Europe cannot postpone

The Defence of Europe

For over 75 years, the Atlantic Alliance, through NATO, has been the cornerstone of its members' collective defence, playing a crucial role in maintaining security and stability in Europe and the North Atlantic region. NATO is founded on the principle that an armed attack against one ally is considered an attack against all, a principle enshrined in Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. The allies share a commitment to provide mutual assistance, in accordance with the right to individual and collective self-defence, as recognised in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. This obligation is binding but flexible: each ally decides what measures it deems necessary, from the use of armed force to the provision of intelligence, military capabilities, or the application of sanctions against the aggressor.

NATO supports Article 5 with permanent command structures, integrated military planning, and national and multinational forces, some of which are permanent, such as the Standing Naval Forces and the AWACS squadron. The U.S. nuclear umbrella has served as a deterrent against nuclear threats for decades. NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept reaffirms that "NATO's deterrence and defence posture is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities."

NATO explicitly presents itself as an alliance based on shared values, not just common threats or interests. The North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) states that the Allies are determined to safeguard their "freedom, common heritage, and civilization," grounded in democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. The Strategic Concept 2022 reaffirms that NATO is based on shared democratic values and a vision of a world where sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights, and international law are respected ("We will remain the bastion of the rules-based international order"). These values are the foundation of the transatlantic alliance.

A series of political and military events in recent years have drastically changed the security environment in the Euro-Atlantic space:

- Direct and persistent threat from Russia: war against Ukraine, hybrid attacks, cyber warfare, sabotage of critical infrastructure, airspace violations, cognitive warfare, and even repeated threats to use nuclear weapons against Allies.

- Loss of reliability of the main ally, the US. The Trump administration deprioritized Europe and unilaterally imposed tariffs on European Allies (August 2025) in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union. Article 2 of the NATO Treaty ("The Parties [...] shall endeavor to eliminate conflicts in their international economic policies and to encourage economic cooperation between any or all of them") and its WTO commitments, published (December 2025) a National Security Strategy highly critical of Europe, which no longer mentions shared values. It threatened the use of force against Denmark, a NATO ally, to force it to cede sovereignty over Greenland, and urged Canada to join the US as the 51st state. Trump has recently threatened to withdraw from NATO (although this would require a two-thirds majority in the Senate, 100 seats), which he despises, calling it a "paper tiger." The Trump administration treats its NATO allies as subordinates, not partners.
- Instability in the south: Conflicts in the Middle East, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and the Sahel directly and indirectly affect Europe and its allies, threatening to trigger renewed mass migrations and disrupt energy supplies (such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz).

In this challenging scenario, what role can the European Union play, and how should it interact with NATO?

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

Like NATO, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) establishes that the Union's actions in the international arena will be governed by the principles of democracy, the rule of law, the universality of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law, and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations (Articles 2, 3.5, and 21).

The provisions relating to defence are included in the Treaty, in Title V, "General provisions on the Union's external action and specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy." The Treaty on European Union (TEU) introduced the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP, Articles 42 to 46) to provide the EU with operational capabilities through the civilian and military resources made available to it by its Member States.

Unlike NATO, the CSDP has been primarily focused on crisis management operations

conducted outside the EU's territory. These operations, known as "Petersberg Missions," include peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, and stabilization operations. According to the Treaty, the CSDP will provide the EU with an operational capability based on the civilian and military resources of the Member States.¹

Article 4.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State, meaning that territorial defence is the responsibility of the Member States and, for most of them (23 out of 27), which are also NATO members, of the Atlantic Alliance.

The Mutual Assistance Clause

However, Article 42(7) of the Treaty establishes a mutual assistance clause. According to this provision, if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States have an obligation to provide it with aid and assistance by all means at their disposal, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. It adds (second paragraph) that this is without prejudice to certain Member States maintaining a specific security policy and that commitments will be aligned with NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members.

This clause originates in Article V of the Amended Brussels Treaty (1954), which established the now-dissolved Western European Union. According to some analysts, Article 42(7) creates a stronger legal obligation than NATO Article 5, which allows Member States to provide assistance to the State concerned by "such measures as they deem necessary," since the Treaty on European Union (TEU) requires that assistance to the attacked Member State be provided by the other Member States using "all means at their disposal."

This provision also recognizes the specific status of neutral Member States, such as Austria, Ireland, and Malta (Cyprus is a non-aligned State and is not even a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace²), allowing them to interpret their obligation to provide assistance in accordance with their national policies (but they are still required to provide

¹ Furthermore, when some Member States form multinational forces among themselves, they may make them available to the CSDP (Article 42.3).

² This is primarily due to the division of the island and Turkey's veto, not to a formal neutrality status. In March 2026, when Cyprus was attacked by drones from pro-Iranian militias, several member states (including Spain) deployed forces to the eastern Mediterranean in solidarity with that ally.

assistance). In the event of an attack on themselves, the other member states must provide them with assistance just as they would the other 23.

However, some analysts argue that military aid cannot be given to those unwilling to commit to helping others; if they want military assistance, they should join NATO.

Regarding the second paragraph of Article 42.7, this clause was introduced by the United Kingdom and Denmark to preserve NATO's primacy in collective defence. However, Denmark opted out when it agreed to participate in the CSDP following the 2002 referendum. As for the United Kingdom, it is no longer an EU member after Brexit. Therefore, this latter clause appears redundant and could be removed.

The framework of Article 42(7) could be adapted to broader threats, such as hybrid attacks, and not just "armed aggression." French President Hollande invoked it after the terrorist attacks in Paris and Nice in November 2015, but the assistance was provided bilaterally by some member states, not collectively.

Legal expert Claude Blumann argues that the mutual assistance clause in Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is legally vaguer than Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This is because the EU is not a full-fledged military alliance; it must accommodate the neutrality of some states and coexist with NATO, whereas Article 5 was specifically designed for collective defence³. In our view, the difference lies not so much in the legal aspect, but in the fact that NATO currently has greater actual military capabilities, largely due to its structure.

Towards a Common European Defence

The Treaty on European Union (Article 42.2) provides for the "progressive development" of a Common Security and Defence Policy, which could evolve into a full Common Defence if the European Council so decides unanimously and if the Member States approve it in accordance with their constitutional procedures. The Treaty again reiterates that NATO obligations for Member States of both organizations and the special status of neutral Member States must be respected.

Article 42.2 does not define what is meant by "common defence," but it appears to refer

³ Blumann, Claude: "Guerre en Ukraine : l'Europe de la défense à la peine". *Revue du droit de l'Union européenne* (RDUE). Volume / Numéro : n° 4 / 2022. Pages 7-13

to collective defence, since Articles 42.1 and 43 allude to the Petersberg missions carried out outside the EU.

However, the unanimity requirement means that all Member States must agree, and national constitutional limitations could further complicate the process. Moreover, the EU currently lacks the operational structures necessary to independently conduct large-scale collective defence.

An autonomous European defence requires:

- Reorganizing the hierarchical structure of the EU Military Committee (EUMC)—currently under the General Secretariat of the Council—and placing it under the authority of a responsible political body within the Council (either the Council itself or the Political and Security Committee - PSC).
- The EU International Military Staff (EUMS) should also return to the Council and serve exclusively the EUMC as its General Staff, relinquishing the command responsibilities recently acquired under the European External Action Service (EEAS), such as the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC).
- Establishing, under the EUMC, an integrated European military command structure, with a headquarters capable of planning based on hypothesis and at least one operational headquarters modelled on NATO's Joint Command Headquarters (JFCs).
- Establishing permanent links with the numerous existing European multinational forces at the disposal of the EU and NATO, integrating them into a unified force structure. Increase their level of readiness wherever possible. Encourage national forces to become increasingly integrated into existing or new multinational forces.
- Equip ourselves with the necessary capabilities to operate autonomously (including strategic enablers, missile defence, etc.), whether nationally or jointly owned, which have so far been provided by NATO under the Berlin Plus agreements. Strategic autonomy cannot be claimed without critical European-owned capabilities.
- Invest more, better, and more jointly in defence. Collectively, wherever possible, in line with operational needs and linked to European industrial consolidation.
- Political authority: its absence deprives unified command of legitimacy, multiplies national reluctance, and strategic coherence disintegrates.

Institutional avenues of action

Revising or amending the Treaties to move towards a common defence seems virtually impossible at present from a political standpoint. Therefore, to achieve genuine strategic autonomy, we must resort to the instruments provided by the Treaties in their current form.

- Enhanced cooperation (Articles 20 TEU, 326-334 TFEU) allows a group of at least nine States to move forward in this direction, although, given that it concerns defence policy, unanimity is required to initiate it (the “constructive abstention” clause could considerably facilitate this requirement).
- Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO, Articles 42.6 and 46 TEU and Protocol 10), which allows participating States to make binding commitments to strengthen their defence capabilities and cooperate more closely with each other. However, PESCO projects focus on capability development rather than operational issues and remain subject to the consensus of the 26 participants. To overcome the fragmented capability planning framework among Member States, a less inclusive and more ambitious PESCO 2.0 might be necessary.
- Establishment of a European Defence Union (EDU) through an intergovernmental agreement: This approach, modelled on the 1985 Schengen Agreement, could circumvent the remaining obstacles in the TEU. It would allow for the widespread adoption of qualified majority voting if preferred to consensus, the creation of a “European Security Council” as a political body exercising collective authority over unified command (including political control and strategic direction of military operations), and the inclusion of non-EU Allies wishing to participate, such as the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, and possibly Ukraine. However, creating a new organization would require significant financial resources and a substantial political effort, so it is most likely that it would only be done at the end of a process.
- A fourth model would be to try to move forward by establishing an informal body outside the EU institutions. In practice, this already exists. In recent months, European leaders have met in various formats to discuss security issues affecting Europe. The most prominent is the E5, comprising France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom, often with the participation of EU institutions and the NATO Secretary General.

EU-NATO Cooperation: The European Pillar

The Common Defence Policy, which can lead to a Common Defence, and the creation of a European Pillar within NATO are two sides of the same coin: Europe's effort to assume greater responsibility for its own security. In 2026, the shift from a theoretical debate to an urgent institutional and military reform, driven by Donald Trump's anti-European foreign policy, the Russian threat, and the wars in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

The "European Pillar" aims to have Europe's allied countries act as a strategic unit within the Alliance, rather than as a collection of independent national participants. Its objective is the "Europeanization" of NATO, in which Europeans provide the majority of conventional forces for the continent's defence, develop stronger capabilities, and promote more coherent decision-making within the Alliance. This requires fulfilling the commitments made at the 2025 Hague Summit, particularly achieving defence spending equivalent to 5% of GDP by 2035 (3.5% on defence capabilities and 1.5% on security-related investments). The goal is to ensure that, even if the US shifts its focus to the Indo-Pacific or becomes embroiled in wars in the Middle East, European conventional deterrence remains credible. An assessment based on the strategic context at that time will be conducted in 2029.

Currently, the Pillar remains insufficient because European defence spending, force readiness, key enablers (air transport, ISR⁴, air and missile defence, munitions), and political cohesion are still not up to the task of enabling European allies to assume greater responsibility within NATO. But European nations, and the EU itself, are already making progress. We are increasing our defence spending, spending better, and in a more joint and coordinated manner. We are supporting Ukraine, both militarily and economically, even though our US ally has distanced itself from this war and what it represents for European security. We must give top priority to developing the capabilities we lack (such as strategic enablers), because relying on US resources without any guarantee of their availability is a major risk.

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) makes constant reference to NATO in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Due to resource scarcity and the need for maximum efficiency, EU-NATO cooperation should be a

⁴ ISR: *Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance*

strategic priority. However, this cooperation and coordination remain quite limited to date. NATO-EU cooperation is based on a few formal agreements and some political declarations. The Berlin Plus agreements (2003) allowed the EU to draw on NATO planning, assets and capabilities for EU-led operations, under certain conditions, when NATO is not militarily involved. The application of these agreements is limited to EU Member States that are also NATO members and those that have signed the Partnership for Peace agreement (all except Cyprus due to Turkey's veto). Berlin Plus has seen limited use, but it could be employed if the EU or a Coalition of the Willing (CoW), acting independently of NATO, undertakes a Petersberg-type operation (peace enforcement, security guarantee) in Ukraine following a ceasefire or peace agreement and needs to borrow assets, such as a headquarters to direct the operation, or capabilities (intelligence, AWACS) to support it. Most NATO assets and capabilities in Europe are European, and NATO permission is not required to use them (the AWACS squadron is a significant exception, as it is the only force owned by NATO, not by the Allies).

In addition to Berlin Plus, several Joint Declarations adopted in 2016, 2018, and 2023 established a broad cooperation agenda covering areas such as hybrid and cyber threats, military mobility, defence capability development, counterterrorism, and joint exercises.

Sources of friction between the EU and NATO

Despite these agreements, several problems continue to hinder deeper coordination between the EU and NATO:

- Political veto. The conflict between Cyprus and Turkey restricts information sharing and complicates institutional cooperation between the two organizations.
- Little or no alignment between EU defence initiatives—such as CARD, PESCO, or the European Defence Fund—and NATO's defence planning process (NDPP). Without a fully integrated approach to identifying and addressing capability gaps, there is a risk of duplication and inefficiency. Political difficulties (such as the Cyprus conflict) prevent the EU from accessing classified NATO information.
- The debate on European strategic autonomy. Some non-European allies disagree on the extent of EU autonomy and the conditions under which it should be exercised. They point out that if the EU creates parallel command structures or standards that are not aligned with NATO's, this could harm interoperability

between militaries and, in a crisis, lead to two chains of command, with the risk of confusion and inefficiency. An example of this can be seen in the important issue of military mobility (facilitating the movement of forces and equipment across the European continent): the EU promotes the development of appropriate infrastructure and the adoption of regulations that allow the passage of equipment and forces across borders; NATO defines the operational requirements. Cooperation has improved, but legal, budgetary, and national constraints currently hinder the smooth movement of forces.

- Differences in defence industrial policies. EU initiatives to strengthen European industry (for example, the SAFE Regulation) require a high percentage of production within the EU (or in Norway and Ukraine). Some non-EU allies have criticized these provisions, labelling them as disguised protectionism and an obstacle to interoperability within the Alliance. In light of this, it is worth noting that currently almost 64% of European arms purchases come from the US, and that Washington has been applying for decades the "Buy American" clause in tenders for military equipment supplies by the Department of Defence.

NATO Command Structures

Within NATO's integrated command structure, leadership positions are distributed among allies through long-standing political agreements. Traditionally, the Secretary General is European, while the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has always been a US officer. Other high-ranking military positions are held by European allies and by Americans. It is noteworthy that the Chairman of the Military Committee and the Director of the International Military Staff (both internally elected, not appointed by their country) have always been European or Canadian, and the Allied Command Transformation is not only European but also French. The Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee (DCMC) is American.

If SACEUR were to become European, a possibility already mentioned in statements by US officials suggesting the relinquishment of key positions in the allied command structure⁵, this would impact other posts. In fact, some changes are already underway,

⁵ At the Berlin Security Conference in November 2025, the US ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, mentioned the possibility that, "within the next 15 years or even sooner," a European general (German, according to the ambassador) could assume the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). This post has always been held by an American since General Dwight Eisenhower first held it in 1951. Currently, the SACEUR is US Air

such as the three Joint Force Commands (JFC Brunssum, JFC Naples, and JFC Norfolk) becoming European (previously only one was) and the three single-service commands (LANDCOM Izmir, AIRCOM Ramstein, and MARCOM Northwood) becoming American (previously two). The apparent objective is to achieve a better balance (three and three instead of four and two) and better adapt to the long-ignored fact that US commands (except for the DCMC) also have national responsibilities for American forces in Europe (double-hatted), while European commands only have their assigned NATO responsibility.

In response to President Trump's threats to reduce troop levels in Europe and his suggestion of relinquishing the SACEUR post, the 2026 National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA), which covers the period from October 2025 to September 2026, limits the President's authority by prohibiting the use of funds to reduce U.S. forces in Europe below 76,000 troops, withdraw critical equipment, or relinquish the SACEUR post without a detailed report certifying that these decisions were made in consultation with allies and are consistent with U.S. national interests.

The nuclear dimension of strategic autonomy

Currently, Russia remains a nuclear power with a large strategic and tactical arsenal (4,380 warheads in total, of which 1,710 are deployed, compared to the United States' 3,708, of which 1,770 are deployed)⁶. In a high-intensity confrontation scenario in Europe, the nuclear dimension continues to be the last line of deterrence. While NATO officially declares itself a "nuclear alliance", it does not possess nuclear weapons of its own. The Strategic Concept 2022 states that: "The Alliance's strategic nuclear forces, particularly those of the United States, are the ultimate guarantee of the Alliance's security."

NATO's nuclear deterrence posture also relies on the US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. A small number of warheads (approximately 100) are held in the custody of the United States Air Force at six air bases in five European countries (Belgium, the

Force General Alexis Grynkewich.

⁶ However, there is an important difference between the two arsenals that is not usually mentioned: while of those totals, some 200 US warheads are considered tactical or theater warheads, 100 of them deployed in Europe, no fewer than 1,558 Russian warheads are tactical (typically, tactical warheads have a yield of up to 15 kilotons, while strategic warheads are one megaton = 1,000 kilotons). The significance of this fact is twofold: it is clear that Russia anticipates a nuclear war in the European theatre of operations, while the US seems to view nuclear confrontation from an intercontinental perspective, and the threshold for the use of tactical warheads is generally considered lower than that of strategic warheads.

Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and Turkey), ready to be launched by their respective national (dual-capable) fighter jets. However, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes used to arm these warheads remain in US hands.

The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France play their own deterrent role and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance, as indicated in NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept. Without the US nuclear umbrella, European nuclear deterrence relies on Great Britain (225 warheads) and France (290 warheads), which, while fully capable, do not match the comprehensive coverage provided by the United States.

The UK's Continuously At Sea (CASD) nuclear deterrent system consists of submarine-launched *Trident II D-5* missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. The Royal Navy deploys these weapons with its fleet of *Vanguard*-class ballistic missile submarines (currently undergoing modernization). At least one of these submarines is on permanent patrol, and two others are ready for rapid deployment. Missiles not currently deployed are stored in a common depot at the US Strategic Weapons Facility in Kings Bay, Georgia, where they receive regular maintenance and operational support. The UK retains full operational control of its nuclear deterrent capability. Recently, France has deepened its coordination on nuclear issues with the United Kingdom through the 2025 Norwood Declaration.

The French nuclear arsenal can be launched from fighter jets (both land-based *Rafale* B/Cs and *Rafale* Ms deployed on the aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle*) and from submarines (*Triomphant*-class SSBNs), operating continuously at sea. Both components have been modernized over the past decade, and the French government has plans to expand and further modernize its nuclear force.

The UK's nuclear deterrent capability is already committed to NATO and is therefore part of its Article 5 obligations. France does not participate in NATO's nuclear planning mechanisms, and its forces are not formally assigned to NATO. President Macron recently announced that French *Rafale* multirole fighters, armed with nuclear weapons, could be temporarily deployed to bases in Germany as part of an initiative to strengthen European deterrence. This plan, and the cooperation with other European countries such as the Netherlands, Poland, Belgium, Sweden, Greece, and Denmark, represents a significant shift in France's position, which previously considered its nuclear arsenal a

deterrent force exclusively for France and not for its European allies. However, France has excluded the participation of other partners in the planning or decision-making regarding the use of French nuclear force.

The growing ambiguity surrounding the United States' intentions regarding its extended nuclear deterrence policy in Europe raises the crucial question of whether the Americans would honour their nuclear security commitments under all circumstances or adopt a more limited role due to changes in Washington's political priorities. Uncertainty persists regarding US nuclear warheads stored in Europe, particularly whether they could be transferred to European control in the event of a US withdrawal. French and British nuclear forces currently complement US extended deterrence, but it is unclear whether they constitute a viable solution if the US nuclear umbrella is eliminated or the US commitment weakens.

A key challenge is Russian perception: Moscow might place less credibility on a purely European deterrent. The UK and France possess far fewer nuclear warheads than Russia, and their simultaneous launch capability is also much smaller. Even so, experts consider both to have enormous destructive capacity, thus constituting a powerful deterrent. However, the serious discrepancy, noted earlier (Note 6), between Russia's extensive theatre or tactical arsenal and the non-existent European tactical nuclear arsenal (with the exception of the 100 American warheads in Europe) is a major source of concern due to the imbalance it reflects in nuclear deterrence capabilities between Russia and its European allies.

Conclusions

The growing international instability, the unpredictability of our American allies' actions, the outbreak of major wars in our eastern and southern neighbourhoods, and the collapse of the rules-based international order demonstrate the urgent need for Europe to equip itself with the military capabilities, forces, and operational capacity necessary to act with full strategic autonomy. The development of a robust European industrial and technological base is a crucial prerequisite, as are firm political will and clear leadership.

For more than 70 years, the United States played the role of guarantor of the liberal international order that it itself helped to create. Europe was thus able to present itself as a normative power, focused on creating a large market, political and economic integration, developing a common legal framework, and respecting the rule of law, because

its ultimate security was based on a largely external strategic guarantee. But now the United States is clearly showing that it no longer wishes to play that role of guarantor. Moreover, the unilateral actions of the Trump Administration, from imposing tariffs on its allies to starting a war that profoundly affects European economies (and the ignored demand that Europeans cooperate in some military operations related to that war), will cause trust between the two sides of the Atlantic to deteriorate almost irreversibly.

In a world governed by power politics, military power remains crucial for deterring adversaries, responding to coercion, and transforming economic influence into strategic capability. Europe remains a significant economic and regulatory power, but it has not yet resolved its military dependence. Defence remains an intergovernmental domain and, therefore, the responsibility of the member states. The EU can finance, coordinate, and promote the development of a common market, but it cannot decide who fights, who commands, or who bears the political and strategic costs of the use of force. Furthermore, EU funds (which primarily consist of credit mechanisms) are useful from a fiscal perspective, but they will not replace the difficult budgetary decisions that governments face (Pszczel, 2026).

Moreover, the indispensable financial effort required to equip us with the military capabilities we currently lack, coupled with the increased energy costs caused by the war against Iran, will cause European countries' budget deficits to skyrocket, increasing debt, inflation, and interest rates, thus putting pressure on European economies. Hence the need for high efficiency in developing these military capabilities that the geopolitical situation demands.

The Treaties already provide for mechanisms that could lead to a common defence in the EU, but the difficulty in reaching consensus on defence matters prevents adequate progress with the urgency that the situation requires. Therefore, some states may seek flexible agreements or intergovernmental initiatives outside the Treaties to advance integration in the area of defence. In parallel, the development of a European pillar within NATO represents a complementary effort to rebalance responsibilities within the Alliance. This implies that European Allies will have to assume the main burden of the continent's conventional defence, equipping themselves with the necessary capabilities and military forces.

Close coordination between the EU and NATO is essential to avoid duplication, maximize

synergies, and guarantee Europe's long-term security. We must overcome the political obstacles that hinder this cooperation. The role that non-EU allies can play is crucial to this, and closer dialogue and cooperation with Turkey are also necessary.

When we developed the CSDP in the Treaties, we adopted a limited approach, partly due to the idea that security and stability in Europe would be permanent and that we could rely on the security guarantees offered by NATO (and the United States). Now Europe must adapt to protect its interests and not simply follow Washington's directives. We must demonstrate our strength, act together, and use the tools at our disposal to defend our interests. As Canadian Prime Minister Marc Carney said in Davos: "The power of legitimacy, integrity, and norms will remain strong if we choose to wield it together."

Manuel de la Cámara – Ambassador (R)

Fernando del Pozo – Admiral (R)