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*Ignacio Nieto Fernández**

The influence of heuristics on decision-making in the Ukraine Conflict

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Abstract:

The conflict in Ukraine has gone through different phases, all shaped by decisions that have at times been surprising and even fall outside the prudence that usually guides the foreign policy of European countries. One reason for this is that, at the political level, decisions are heavily influenced by heuristic factors in which elements such as emotions, intuition, or perception play a role that is at times more important than the linear analytical process that typically supports decision-making at the political level.

There are numerous heuristic factors that have played key roles in decisions related to the conflict in Ukraine; this is not an anomaly, as it has been a constant feature in international relations. However, it is advisable to control these factors within the decision-making process to mitigate the unfavourable effects these may sometimes have, especially in matters of vital importance for a nation.

Keywords:

Decision making, Ukraine conflict, biases, heuristic, cognitive.

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Introduction

The conflict in Ukraine has gone through several phases, each shaped by decision-making at every level (political, strategic, operational and tactical). Some of these decisions, particularly at the political level, have been quite surprising; some appear to stretch the limits of prudence, and others even of common sense. A clear example is the breaking of the Kremlin's alleged "Red Lines"[1]. A red line is understood as an action taken by one party that causes the conflict to escalate to a new dimension, whether vertically or horizontally[2].

Perhaps the most significant and widely recognized breach of a red line has been the continuous and increasingly substantial supply of weapons by western countries[3]. This is an action that, interestingly, has never escalated the conflict in intensity[4]. Other breaches have also shaped the course of the war, such as the provision of military intelligence or the cyber capabilities supplied by the United States[5]. At present, we are witnessing a decision that could break yet another red line: the potential deployment of troops to Ukraine, which the Russian Federation has described as "a foreign intervention that poses a direct threat not only to Russia, but also to other European countries"[6].

It is therefore compelling to examine the methods used (particularly at the political level) to make decisions of such magnitude, decisions that could ultimately lead to open conflict. At times, it may seem that these decisions are not the result of a rational analytical process, and that other, less visible factors may be driving them. It is obvious that decision-making in these domains is extraordinarily complex, especially due to the

[1] Nobody has never known the real Kremlin's red lines since are, obviously, not publicly shared.
[2] JORDÁN, J. (2020). *La escalada en las estrategias híbridas y en el conflicto en la zona gris*. Global Strategy Report, (11), 1–15. https://global-strategy.org/escalada-estrategias-hibridas-zona-gris/.
[3] ALISSON, R. (2025). *Averting acute escalation in Russia's war against Ukraine*. International Affairs, 101(5), 1769–1791.https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaf137.
[4] At least with regard to the intensity of actions in the physical dimension, since in the cognitive dimension or in the information environment there have indeed been verbal escalations by certain leaders—for example, the First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, on numerous occasions.
[5] It is important to note that neither the Geneva Convention nor the United Nations Charter contains any provision from which it can be inferred that the sale of weapons makes the seller a party to the conflict or an adversary. However, the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1999), *Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić* (Appeals Chamber Judgment), Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, held that the coordination of military activities constituted participation in the conflict. Certain actions by Western countries—primarily the United States—could be considered as elements of coordination of military action, such as the provision of intelligence for the targeting process.
[6] EFE. (2026, January 8). *Rusia considerará una amenaza el envío de tropas aliadas a Ucrania*. EFE. https://efe.com/mundo/2026-01-08/rusia-considera-amenaza-tropas-extranjeras-ucrania.

convergence of factors of different natures. This complexity is often mitigated by the shortcuts made by the decisionmaker, as they must assume responsibility for the consequences of the decision. As a rule, decision-makers resort to heuristic methods as a mechanism to simplify and speed up the decision-making process.

The Decision-Making Process

Military decision-making processes that support political decisions are generally rational and linear in nature[7]. They are governed by the analysis of information that provides situational awareness for the selection of courses of action, which are subsequently subjected to experimental scrutiny. These processes are influenced by the experience of the analysts and structured in phases[8] in which the analytical method remains present throughout. They are typically autarkic processes that do not consider exogenous factors from the broader strategic environment. In other words, they seek objectivity by avoiding the influence of factors that are difficult to quantify or that might be perceived as undermining the rigor of the process.

At higher levels (namely, the political level) decision-making becomes far more complex, as determining the repercussions of a decision itself is extremely challenging. For example, decisions in international organizations are made by consensus among nations, a factor that influences the position of each member, particularly when dissenting attitudes are unwelcome. Assessing, for instance, the repercussions for agriculture or fisheries in a nation that has taken a different stance from the rest on military matters is, undoubtedly, complex. This circumstance introduces factors that are difficult to weigh, yet which also follow heuristic patterns, with biases and perceptions that shape the judgment of the decision maker.

There are two elements that generate a certain degree of anxiety in political-level decision-making. The first, is the extreme uncertainty surrounding factors involved in the decision, as previously discussed. This uncertainty often leads to forecasts that are

[7] ALLEN, C. D., COATES, B. E., & WOODS, G. J. (2012). Strategic decision-making paradigms: A primer for senior leaders. U.S. Army War College. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA595116.pdf.
[8] SHORTLAND, N. D., ALISON, L., & MORAN, J. M. (2019). *Military decision-making: Doctrine, rationality, and field-based approaches*. En N. D. Shortland, L. Alison, & J. M. Moran, Conflict: How Soldiers Make Impossible Decisions (pp. 15–33). Oxford University Press.

unfortunate or simply wrong; historical experience acts as an anchor to the confidence of the decision maker. This is why assessments (particularly military ones) tend to be adorned with estimative language that blurs the degree of certainty: terms such as likely, cannot be ruled out, within the realm of possibility, and many others readily come to mind. This self-protective mechanism in assessments or forecasts is unsurprising, given that we are dealing with post-normal[9] conflicts governed by the three Cs: Complexity, Chaos[10], and Contradictions. In such circumstances, environments evolve faster than predictive models.

The second factor, is the sheer volume of information that must be analyzed during the process. It is a heterogeneous conglomerate of data from which conclusions are often slow to emerge. Unfortunately, the result rarely mitigates uncertainty or risk. In some cases, more information does not improve decision-making. Indeed, "there comes a point at which more is not better, but even harmful"[11].

The decision maker perceives that the level of risk[12] associated with heuristic methods versus analytical methods is similar and, therefore, shifts attention onto other factors. Likewise, the risk-analysis process is heavily conditioned by psychological factors (for example: how the problem is framed, the cognitive shortcuts used to resolve it, excessive simplifications or traits associated with the analyst's personality)[13]. "Risk is not so much the controlled assumption of consequences as the appetite of the decision-maker to assume them"[14], and this is where heuristics come into play.

Furthermore, many contemporary scholars argue that factors such as the morphology of modern conflicts[15], artificial intelligence[16] or the influence of information upon society should transform how decision-support processes are conducted. In environments that

[9] SARDAR, Z. (2010). *Welcome to postnormal times*. Futures, 42(5), 435–444.
[10] In this case, chaos is associated with game theory. It does not mean disorder or a lack of information, but rather that it is impossible to know which information is valid, sufficient, or stable. This can lead to events of little apparent relevance becoming highly consequential, making the foresight process increasingly non-linear.
[11] Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011). *Heuristic decision making*. *Annual Review of Psychology, 62*, p. 453. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346.
[12] AJP3 risk definition *the effect of uncertainty on objectives.*
[13] KNIGHTON, R. J. (2004). The psychology of risk and its role in military decision-making. *Defence Studies, 4*(3), 309–334. https://doi.org/10.1080/1470243042000344786.
[14] BERNSTEIN, P. L. (1996). *Against the gods: The remarkable story of risk*. John Wiley & Sons, p. 188.
[15] BELLAS, D. (2022). *Are linear planning models even more critical as warfare evolves greater complexity?* The Forge – Australian Defence College. https://theforge.defence.gov.au/war-college-papers-2022/are-linear-planning-models-even-more-critical-warfare-evolves-greater-complexity.
[16] LIIKOLA, J., & BLOMVALL, P. (2025). Beyond linear planning: How artificial intelligence multiagent systems can redefine operational art and decision making in warfare. *Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 16*(2). https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20251602008.

are highly volatile and extremely complex, intuition and creativity often yield better results than exhaustive rational analysis[17]. "In general, in such environments, leaders tend to distrust the process and instead rely on implicit experience based on learned patterns, hunches, or intuition"[18]. The exclusively rational pattern is thus replaced by one with a greater intuitive component.

This breakdown of the rational decision-making process has been a constant feature of international conflicts[19]. The current issue is that operational environments shaped by the morphology of contemporary conflicts render the rational method less effective and decision makers increasingly resort to faster, more agile processes with a strong intuitive and heuristic component as well as experience. This gives rise to biases of various kinds that may be exploited by the adversary yet another tool for achieving its political objectives[20].

A first approximation of heuristics may be found in Laver's observation that "in decision-making, the rule of thumb may be highly effective in practice, but it will never be formally demonstrated to be the best response for any given country"[21].

Heuristics and Decision Making

Modern heuristics emerged through the work of the Israeli psychologists Tversky and Kahneman, who in 1974[22] published an influential study that systematized the biases derived from applying heuristics in decision-making. In essence, their research sought to demonstrate that human beings are not as rational in their decisions as we might assume. When confronted with complex choices, individuals do not typically process information in a logical and objective manner. They move away from the rational method and instead apply heuristic strategies which, although useful, can lead to systematic biases and

[17] DANE, E., & PRATT, M. G. (2007). *Exploring intuition and its role in managerial decision making*. Academy of Management Review, 32(1), 33–54. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2007.23463682.
[18] KERR, N. L. (1996). "Intuitive decision making." *Military Review, 76*(6), 15–23.
[19] HEREK, G. M., JANIS, I. L., & HUTH, P. (1987). *Decision making during international crises: Is quality of process related to outcome?* Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31(2), 203–226. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002787031002001.
[20] WAHLERT, M. H. (2012). *The "motivated bias" dilemma in warfare and intelligence*. Defense & Security Analysis, 28(3), 247–259. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2012.708596.
[21] LAVER M, SERGENTI E (2012) *Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[22] TVERSKY, A., & KAHNEMAN, D. (1974). *Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases*. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131.

predictable errors[23]. Moreover, decision-making is shaped not only by cognitive biases but also by the emotions of the decision-maker.

These early inquiries laid the foundation for Prospect Theory, whose international recognition was confirmed when Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for establishing the basis of behavioural economics[24] - a field that seeks to explain the gap between real decision-making and the optimal decisions predicted by rational models. Both authors define modern heuristics as those cognitive rules that every human being unconsciously applies when processing external information, allowing complex tasks such as assigning probabilities or predicting outcomes to be reduced to simpler judgment operations.

In recent years, scholars of international relations have increasingly recognized the influence of cognitive and psychological biases in crucial aspects of global affairs. It is evident that military decision-making processes (and others theoretically more immune, such as legal processes) are influenced by heuristics and by both cognitive and psychological biases. The arms race is particularly vulnerable, as elements such as military obedience or certain leadership styles permeate the entire decision-making process and appear to reinforce the leader's own biases.

In the context of the war in Ukraine, the influence of perception (especially threat perception) on decision-making is particularly striking. For example, Eastern European countries that lived under communist rule tend to adopt more drastic positions in the conflict with the Russian Federation. This is a clear example of biased decision-making, as the analysis of factors leads to different conclusions shaped by the historical biases of some members of international institutions.

It is evident that the decisions of many Western leaders in the lead-up to the war were marked by biases and by errors in perceiving and evaluating the Kremlin's courses of action. Robert Jervis[25], in his well-known article highlights several problems in threat perception, such as the idea that "deterrence works when the expected cost of challenging the status quo is higher than that of accepting it." After four years of conflict,

[23] This predictability is one of the foundations of Russian reflexive control, which relies in part on introducing elements into the adversary's decision-making process by exploiting its known biases.
[24] Kahneman and Tversky showed that our decisions depend on how the options are presented—that is, the 'perspective' from which we view them.
[25] JERVIS, R. (1982). *Deterrence and perception*. International Security, 7(3), 3–30.

we should reflect on whether the liberal international order has been weakened to our detriment because of the war in Ukraine.

"It is an illusion to think that perceptions are governed by rational processes rather than by beliefs, past experiences, and stereotypes"[26]. A clear example is the skepticism of the international community toward U.S. intelligence reports during the Iraq conflict, following the fiasco surrounding the justification for the Iraq War. These perceptions become embedded not only in individual imaginaries but also in collective ones, shaping pressure groups that influence political leaders.

Although there are numerous heuristic biases, we will focus on only a few—perhaps those most relevant to the conflict in Ukraine—such as availability heuristics, cognitive dissonance, mirror imaging, and representativeness heuristics.

Availability Heuristics

"The availability heuristic is the simplification derived from the influence exerted on our decision by the images that first come to mind when judging a situation"[27]. Essentially, it means that the images that reverberate first have a greater impact on the decision we ultimately make. For example, if we ask ourselves which mode of transport is riskier (flying or travelling by train) most people would likely answer "flying," even though air travel has the lowest accident rate. However, aviation accidents tend to linger more vividly in our memory due to the severity of the images associated with them. When hearing the question, individuals subconsciously evoke images of plane crashes, which condition their response and lead them to select air travel as the riskier option. Yet, if we pose the same question to a population living near the site of a catastrophic train accident, the majority will likely choose rail transport as the riskier option.

In the lead-up to the Ukraine crisis, the likelihood of a large-scale invasion was downplayed, partly because there was no recent event that could serve as a reference point. On many occasions, the massive movement of troops was interpreted as a

[26] JERVIS, R. (1985). *Perceiving and coping with threat*. En R. Jervis, R. N. Lebow, & J. G. Stein (Eds.), Psychology and Deterrence (pp. 13–33). Johns Hopkins University Press.
[27] SCHWARZ, N., BLESS, H., STRACK, F., KLUMPP, G., RITTENAUER-SCHATKA, H., & SIMONS, A. (1991). *Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic*. Journal of Personality and Social psychology, 61(2), 195.

deterrent measure intended to achieve other political objectives—this being the first judgment that reverberated when confronted with the deployment of 130 battalion tactical groups along the Ukrainian border.

Leaders (particularly those in Western Europe) considered an invasion unlikely because they lacked historical precedents to draw upon, in addition to having limited experience in analysing high-intensity warfare on European soil. As noted in the report by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, "many policymakers and political strategists had no experience with war; the possibility of a Russian invasion was difficult to imagine, which made them inclined to dismiss signals of a potential attack."

The availability heuristic is shaped within audiences by the information they receive, primarily through the media. The flow of information that reaches individuals is a decisive factor if one seeks to influence the decision-making of both political leaders and the general population. A major case study of the availability heuristic is the so-called "Black Legend" of Spain in the Americas, where false information about Spain conditioned European perceptions of Spanish activity in those territories.

This case also falls within the next cognitive bias: cognitive dissonance. Reality (there are many individuals with indigenous features in regions where the Spanish were present, but not in former English or other European colonies) differs substantially from what circulates in the information society, where narratives claim that "the Spanish committed multiple genocides, unlike other nations."

Cognitive Dissonance

The concept was introduced by the psychologist Leon Festinger, who published his theory in his 1957 book *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*[28]. The theory can be summarized as a three-stage process. The first stage occurs when an individual is confronted with two inconsistent cognitions (that is: when their beliefs do not align with the reality they perceive). This situation leads to a state of psychological discomfort (a state of cognitive dissonance). "This condition motivates the individual to employ strategies to restore a satisfactory state"[29].

[28] FESTINGER, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Stanford University Press.
[29] BRAN, A., & VAIDIS, D. C. (2022). *Nuevos horizontes sobre la disonancia cognitiva: desarrollos recientes,*

The satisfactory state is usually achieved by eliminating the dissonance, meaning the elements that contradict one's beliefs. To achieve this, decision makers may take a variety of actions, most notably avoiding new information that challenges their existing beliefs or disregarding research findings[30] - or even intelligence reports.

In Europe, political leaders experienced significant cognitive dissonance between Russia's actions, which clearly pointed toward a large-scale invasion, and what they preferred to believe (namely, that it was merely a manoeuvre to gain strategic advantage)[31]. This dissonance was less pronounced across the Atlantic. However, American intelligence reports were met with availability-heuristic bias among European leaders, as the glaring intelligence failure in the Iraq conflict resurfaced vividly in their minds.

Ultimately, leaders in Western Europe (primarily Germany and France) believed that peace was guaranteed by the basic principles of liberalism, namely the strength of diplomatic relations grounded in close commercial interdependence. They assumed that this logic would also apply to the Russian Federation.

Another example of cognitive dissonance concerns the sanctions imposed on Russia. Initially, it was believed that the sanctions would have devastating effects[32] on the Russian economy shortly before the invasion. Later, the narrative shifted toward the need for strategic patience to observe the impact of the European Union's sanctions. The High Representative stated[33], only a few months later, that "sanctions require strategic patience because they may take a long time to achieve the desired effect." Four years into the conflict, we continue to uphold the notion that sanctions remain an effective tool to curb aggression.

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modelos integradores y vías de investigación. L'Année Psychologique, 122(1), 149–183. https://shs.cairn.info/revista-l-annee-psychologique-2022-1-page-149?lang=es.

[30] Medical News Today. (2024). *Disonancia cognitiva: Definición, efectos y ejemplos*. https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/es/disonancia-cognitiva.

[31] Taylor, A. (2022, January 25). *Is Putin bluffing on Ukraine? Allies in the US and Europe are divided.* Stars and Stripes / The Washington Post. https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2022-01-25/putin-bluffing-ukraine-allies-divided-4411138.html.

[32] Suanzes, P. R. (2022, 21 February). *Josep Borrell: La UE aplicará "sanciones devastadoras" si Rusia se anexiona las regiones separatistas de Ucrania*. El Mundo. https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2022/02/21/6213d31521efa014648b457c.html

[33] Borrell, J. (2022, July 16). *The sanctions against Russia are working*. European External Action Service (EEAS). https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/sanctions-against-russia-are-working_en.

Mirror Imaging

This is one of the most significant biases used in contemporary conflicts to polarize society and thereby secure political support for a given campaign. It consists of assuming that the adversary thinks, decides, and evaluates situations in the same way we do, while also attributing to them characteristics or behaviours that are inaccurate and often exaggerated. A key element of this mindset is assessing the adversary using the same parameters one applies to oneself.

As the conflict has evolved, the level of aggressiveness and polarization directed against the Russian Federation has steadily increased. For years, any form of political contact or negotiation with the Russian president was discouraged, as he was assigned the traits most detested by the West.

In decision-making, Western leaders projected their own logic onto Putin, assuming that entering a conflict of such intensity would not be worthwhile for him. Central to this was the cost-benefit calculus that dominates Western thinking (particularly regarding potential casualties, a factor that has far less influence on Russian strategic culture). Added to this were the declared sanctions that the European Union and other countries intended to impose should Russia choose to invade. Expectations about Russian behaviour were therefore conditioned by Western assumptions, under the mistaken belief that the Kremlin[34] would operate according to Western parameters and logic.

Confirmation Heuristics

This is perhaps the best-known bias and occurs when we interpret or seek information that confirms what we already believe. It manifests both in suppressing unfavourable information and in amplifying or distorting information that supports our views, beliefs, or assumptions. Distorting a fact to validate one's position is a form of disinformation (that is: manipulating a true event to reinforce one's own narrative).

Confirmation bias creates cohesion between the decision maker and their audiences, especially when the bias aligns with socially positive beliefs. This benefits both the individual and the group, facilitating the spread[35] and consolidation of the narrative. It

[34] JERVIS, *Deterrence and perception*, 5-8 Stern; Building Politics into Psycology, 249-51.
[35] PETERS, U. (2022). *What is the function of confirmation bias?* Erkenntnis, 87(3), 1351–1376.

produces alignment between leaders and their audiences and provides arguments that are extremely difficult to counter.

When the Nord Stream sabotage occurred, Russia was immediately blamed. This was the most logical and straightforward conclusion and conveniently reinforced Western narratives about Putin's malign intent. However, three years after the incident, Denmark and Sweden closed their investigations without public results. Germany continues its own investigation; no overall conclusions are known, but it has arrested and imprisoned a Ukrainian national, accusing him of carrying out the sabotage[36] (though it is questionable whether such an act could have been conducted without state support). Interestingly, the initial news of the sabotage received enormous attention in the information space, whereas the arrest of the Ukrainian received almost none. In the Spanish public imagination, Russia remains the presumed culprit.

The difficulty of countering confirmation bias is also evident in the narratives surrounding the reasons for the invasion of Ukraine. A common claim is that Russia was forced to act due to NATO's five rounds of enlargement, which allegedly violated a promise by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker[37] that NATO would not expand "one inch eastward." These enlargements are presented as a breach of an agreement (no such agreement exists) and as a degradation of Russia's security buffer. It is true that NATO has expanded five times, all toward the east. The rest of the narrative is false - a distortion of reality. It is also true that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act affirmed the right of any state to join the international organizations of its choosing. Furthermore, the Budapest Memorandum[38]—signed by Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, the United Kingdom, and the United States—guaranteed Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty in exchange for transferring 5,000 nuclear warheads to Russia.

This narrative, which validates a falsehood, generates cohesion among Russian audiences but, more worryingly, also resonates with certain Western audiences,

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-020-00252-1.

[36] RTVE. (2025, 21 August). *Italia detiene a un ciudadano ucraniano sospechoso del sabotaje contra el gasoducto ruso Nord Stream*. https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20250821/italia-detiene-ciudadano-ucraniano-sospechoso-sabotaje-gasoducto-ruso-nord-stream/16702967.shtml.

[37] The sentence was "We understand that not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well, it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO's present military jurisdiction will spread eastward".

[38] https://web.archive.org/web/20140317182201/http://www.cfr.org/arms-control-disarmament-and-nonproliferation/budapest-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/p32484.

providing justification for Russian actions. Such disinformation is difficult to refute because doing so requires knowledge of specific facts—knowledge that few possess. The result is that the falsehood spreads more effectively than the truth.

Conclusions

The conflict in Ukraine clearly illustrates the repeated violation of rational, analytical decision-making processes due to heuristic factors. This is a reality we must acknowledge; it is not a historical anomaly. On the contrary, at higher levels of decision-making, leader biases often outweigh traditional analytical methods.

Rather than viewing this as an undesirable imponderable, perhaps the correct approach is to understand these factors that influence decision-makers and address them appropriately, as doing so may yield satisfactory results. This is particularly evident in highly complex conflict environments where predictive accuracy is low.

In such cases, it may be advisable to accept the risk of relying on heuristics, as they offer a response to the rapid pace of change in the strategic environment—forcing decisions to be made with little time to validate the entire advisory process. Heuristics can serve as an adaptive mechanism to match the speed of modern conflicts. This is a key aspect of the cognitive domain (specifically decision superiority), which traditionally relies upon excellence in information analysis. Yet today, we may need to migrate toward hybrid models that incorporate heuristics to improve the process.

All of this must be balanced with the need to mitigate the negative consequences of decisions overly influenced by political leaders' biases. As such, decisions are often poor guides when dealing with matters of national importance. This is no easy task.

Ultimately, the proposal should be to evaluate the better of two options: a decision informed by heuristics, or no decision made in time. In peacetime, the latter may be acceptable; in turbulent times approaching conflict (or during conflict), the former becomes necessary. Perhaps the key lies in bringing heuristics closer to the decision maker's intuitive processes by providing situational understanding that allows them to make effective use of the brain's remarkable capabilities. But that, I fear, is a topic for another article.

*Ignacio Nieto Fernández**

Trimagister in Security and Defence Studies