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Brigadier General Francisco José DACOBA CERVIÑO
Director of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies

Launch of issue 18 of the Journal

Welcome, once again, to this 18th issue of the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (IEEE) Journal. On this occasion, we are back for another six-month period with fourteen articles of great interest and on a variety of subjects, but always related, in one way or another, to Spanish Security and Defence. Five of the proposed articles have been grouped together in a **Technology Special**, which we hope you will enjoy.

The IEEE has been paying special attention to the evolution of the situation in the sister countries of the Ibero-American community. The article '**Results vs Capabilities? Theoretical Perspectives on Security Planning in South America**' by Jorge Mauro Vega explores the process of national security policy planning in South America, combining theoretical and methodological perspectives with empirical case study analysis: Chile and Peru represent dissimilar conceptions of the scope and organisation of the security and defence sector.

Starting with the concept of 'Defence planning', a process inherent to Defence policy, Juan Carlos Castilla Barea addresses in '**Little Red Riding Hood asks about defence planning. Some answers and the NATO case**' scenario-based planning scenarios for dealing with future risk. Of the four types of planning, the 'NATO Defence Planning Process' is given as an example of the Portfolio type, and guidelines are provided on shaping future scenarios based on the '*NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept*'.

It is inevitable to return, time and again, to the cross-border scourge of terrorism, and we do so with up to four articles on this occasion. María Fernanda Noboa González offers a methodological reflection on the mutation of the National Liberation Army's tactical actions in Colombia with her proposal '**A reversal of security relations. New scenarios of tension and trajectories: the case of the ELN**'. The aim is to understand the new trajectories of this *guerrilla* group for the next decade, especially on the borders with Ecuador and Venezuela, and to conclude that new analytical approaches must be proposed to understand this problem more comprehensively.

'**Description and analysis of a terrorist group: Boko Haram.** Rubén Fuster Leal's '**The (inter)national risks produced by a breakable state and a terrorist threat**' analyses Boko Haram, a group linked to Nigeria, focusing on the context in which it was born, as well as a description of its origins, ideology, structure, leadership, attacks perpetrated and victims. This group's insertion into Salafist jihadist terrorism, and its ongoing dissemination, has the potential to further destabilise the fragile Western Sahel region.

Leonardo Salvador Sánchez Peláez, '**COSI, a decade devoted to the European Union's internal security policy**', examines the ten years of COSI's existence during which it has been strengthening and expanding its responsibilities (judicial and police cooperation, implementation of the strategic lines of internal security, the fight against organised crime, issues related to the fight against terrorism, etc.). Its ambition, adaptability, and flexibility have ensured it a relevant position in the field of EU internal security.

The article '**Spanish Armed Forces in the fight against terrorism**' is a choral contribution by Jacobo Salvador Micó Faus, Sergio Almaraz Sánchez and Pino Penilla Marquínez. International terrorism has become a priority threat and the international community, with the combined efforts of States and International Security and Defence Organisations, has adopted multiple strategic and operational measures to combat it. Spain maintains an active commitment to this fight by deploying its Armed Forces, both in its participation in international missions and on national territory, coordinated in this case with the FCSE.

'**Psychopathography of leadership**', by Pilar Bardera Mora, presents an analysis of the incidence of mental health problems in the exercise of leadership: personality disorders or circumstances associated with stress. The author refers to the 'Hubris syndrome', related to the narcissistic personality in leaders, which is associated with ineffective, or malign, performance of power. Another possible problem is that of depression, the negative impact of which on leadership is not fully accepted, as some leaders affected by depression can nevertheless be very effective.

The revived proliferation of nuclear weapons makes Ignacio Losada Sanjuán's proposal, '**The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the Light of IHL:: An Advancement in Nuclear Disarmament?**'. The author reflects on this type of weapon, one of the main concerns of the authors of IHL, taking as a reference the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which raises numerous questions that will be answered in the body of the article.

Russia's assertiveness in its relations with the EU and in its interventions in the immediate regional environment justifies the relevance of Sofiya Hapchyn's article, '**Russia's strategic personality and its influence on the relationship with the West**'. The author analyses the main Russian and Western schools of thought, contrasting them in order to explain, from the neoclassical Realism approach, Moscow's perception and behaviour in relation to Western countries at different stages in the global arena.

In the **Technology Special** you will find several proposals on the decisive importance of new technologies, their application in the field of security and defence, as well as the struggle between the various powers for leadership in these areas. Miguel Ivorra Ruiz, '**A2/AD Capabilities. The awakening of the West in the face of the Dragon's nest**' analyses the A2/AD concept, both its capabilities and the challenges it represents, complemented by a historical overview of operational concepts, strategic orientation and possible responses. As a case study, it catalogues China's A2/AD from strategic, doctrinal and operational perspectives, all through the lens of aerospace power employment.

Carmen Ruiz Arellano studies the Spanish Defence industry (considering the years 2012 and 2016) in '**Financial analysis of the Spanish Defence industry**', in which an economic-financial approach to this industry is made in order to deepen the knowledge of its structure, conduct and results, and thus show the changes produced with the exit of the economic crisis. Ramón Alarcón Sánchez returns to the subject of terrorism with '**Technological modernity and terrorist propaganda: proposal of a discursive analysis to face the messages of terrorism in the digital age**' and analyses the phenomenon of terrorism from the perspective of technological modernity. This analysis is considered essential for the media and the public, as the internet enables the globalisation of terrorist messages.

The debate on the scope of the concept of technological sovereignty, as well as its implications, has gained momentum in the EU to ensure the concept of 'strategic autonomy', which is key to strengthening the bloc's position in the world. However, it has not been translated into defined objectives. Gonzalo León and Aureliano da Ponte, in their article '**Technological sovereignty**. **Smart power and political instability**' frames this debate in the conditions of current geopolitical instability and discusses the rationality of the notion of 'smart power' as a strategic option for the EU. On this basis, China's presence in Africa and its potential impact on European strategic autonomy is analysed.

We complete this issue with a review of Sagrario Morán Blanco's book '**Fight against drug trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean. The work of the Organization of the American States (OAS)**'. From different analytical perspectives, the book immerses us in the complex reality of the American continent regarding the fight against drug trafficking.

We hope that this semester's offerings will be to your liking and as useful as possible.

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Psychopathography of leadership

Abstract

This paper aims to analyse how mental health problems impact leadership. Beyond the repercussions certain personality types have on the effectiveness of leadership, the factors that cause it to emerge are also studied.

A number of historical leaders have had documented mental health problems, sometimes related to personality disorders. Many have been chosen by their supporters precisely because of the traits that identify these disorders. On other occasions, the stressful circumstances associated with leadership have led to various symptoms.

One syndrome associated with ineffective and 'malign' leadership performance is 'Hubris Syndrome'. This has been related, and even assimilated, to narcissistic personality in leaders. This personality type leads to impulsive and risk-taking behaviour, with overestimation of resources, as history attributed, for example, to Hitler.

There are, however, other mental health problems, such as depression, whose negative impact on leadership is not fully accepted, as some authors consider that these leaders can be effective in crisis management. They also tend to be easily chosen by their followers due to their empathetic character, which builds trust. In organisations, however, they do not pass exhaustive selection processes due to the stigma associated with this type of trait.

Different theses have been put forward to explain the behaviour of leaders, but rarely from this psychopathographic approach.

Keywords

Leadership, personality, psychopathography, Hubris syndrome, narcissism, decision-making.

Cite this article:

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Introduction

For centuries, experts in different fields have studied the qualities of the most relevant leaders of all time in order to discover what sets them apart, what awakens in their supporters the desire and motivation to follow them. In this endeavour, the positive qualities of leaders in different contexts have been identified, forgetting the negative qualities, that 'dark side' that can be as decisive in their leadership as the rest of their personality. In fact, leadership failure is often more related to the negative qualities that the leader possesses than the positive qualities that he or she does not possess[1]. Recruitment tools often assess these positive aspects, when, for example, people with narcissistic traits and those with psychopathic traits score well in recruitment processes, as they are 'experts' in creating immediate favourable impressions[2].

Paulhus and Williams[3] identified three destructive personality types, collectively referred to as the 'Dark Triad', consisting of 'clinical' and 'subclinical' forms of narcissism (defined by a sense of vanity, superiority, dominance, and a need for agency), Machiavellianism (described by the use of charm, manipulation, strategy, or misrepresentation towards others) and psychopathy (defined by impulsiveness, emotional coldness, aggressiveness or lack of empathy). The combination of any of these personality types with power can create social and business disasters, according to these authors.

Some classic social psychology studies, as conducted by Zimbardo at Stanford University for example[4], showed how 'normal' people who are given power can become emotionally cold and distant, less empathetic and more self-centred. It is therefore not difficult to think of what happens to narcissistic, antisocial (people who tend to harass,

1 Hogan, R. and Hogan, J. (2001). Assessing leadership: A view from the dark side. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment,* no. 9(1-2). Pp. 40-51.

2 Hogan, R. and Kaiser, R.B. (2005). What we know about leadership. *Review of General Psychology*, no. 9, pp.169-180.

3 Paulhus, D.L. and Williams, K.M. (2002). The dark triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. *Journal of Research in Personality*, no. 36, pp. 556-563. Accessible at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0092656602005056

4 The Stanford prison experiment owes its name to the fact that this simulated prison was built in the basement of Stanford University's School of Psychology. One group of people was randomly assigned to the role of guard and others to the role of prisoner. A video recording meant everything that was happening could be continuously observed. The experience was initially planned to last two weeks, but the violence of the guards' behaviour towards the prisoners made it advisable to interrupt it before the end of the first week. The behaviours observed in both roles (guard and prisoner) have been interpreted by many authors as 'prescribed role behaviour'. A full description of the original experiment can be found in: Zimbardo, P.G. (1971). The power and pathology of imprisonment. *Congressional Record,* No. 15. 25 October. The article can be accessed at: http://pdf.prisonexp.org/congress.pdf. And the experiment is accessible at: https://www.prisonexp.org/spanish/conclusion

manipulate or treat others with cruelty and indifference, without guilt or remorse) or histrionic (theatrical people, who use dramatisation to be the centre of attention) personalities, who are in positions of leadership.

But also psychological pressure from aspects such as loneliness of command, addiction to power or fear of envy can contribute to dysfunctional behaviour in the leader, causing stress, anxiety or depression, which in turn can lead to irresponsible and irrational behaviour that affects the culture and decision-making patterns of an organisation[5].

A historic event recorded by George Washington's biographers tells of his attempt to commit suicide after a nervous breakdown when he saw militiamen fleeing in panic at Kip's Bay. The then Commander Washington was paralysed as dozens of British soldiers attacked him; it was his aides who rescued him. One of his generals later said that Washington was so upset by the conduct of his troops that he sought death[6]. The nervous breakdown of this historic figure may illustrate the extent to which brilliant leaders can freeze under pressure.

However, some authors argue that in times of crisis, the best leaders are not precisely those with the best mental health[7]. In his book *A First Rate Madness*, psychiatrist Nassir Gahemi maintains that some types of psychopathologies, such as depression, have positive effects on exercising leadership, as they are usually accompanied by empathy, creativity, resilience and realism. According to this author, the stigma attached to depression and other mental disorders prevents people from seeing their positive side. While people with psychopathic and narcissistic personalities, whose leadership can be devastating, are easily selected in recruitment processes, people with melancholic or depressive personalities are discarded, especially for positions of responsibility.

In the same vein, Roy Porter[8] notes that, between 1776 and 1974, 49% of US presidents had suffered from some mental disorder (24 had depression, 8 had bipolar disorder, and 8 alcoholism). They include: Abraham Lincoln (with psychotic depression), Theodore Roosevelt (with bipolar disorder), Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson (these last two with depression).

At this point, it may be interesting to briefly reflect on how different heuristics (understood as the search for problem-solving through non-rigorous methods) affect

5 Kets de Vries, M. (2004). Dysfunctional Leadership. In George R. Goethals, Georgia J. Sorenson and James Macgregor Burns (eds.). *Encyclopedia of Leadership, Volume 1*. London, SAGE Publications. Pp. 368-372.

6 SchenawolF, H. (2015). Battle of Kip's Bay: An American Disaster that Nearly Cost Washington's Life. *Revolutionary War Journal,* 3 April. Available at: http://www.revolutionarywarjournal.com/kips-bay/

7 Gahemi, N.A. (2011). *First-Rate Madness*. New York, The Penguin Press.

8 Porter, R.A. (1999). *Social History Madness: The World Through the Eyes of the Insane*. London, Orion Publishing.

decision-making, according to narcissistic or depressive personality styles or patterns. Table 1 presents these personality patterns together with the decisional biases that could be attributed to them[9]. In both cases, biases occur by exaltation or minimisation, as a quick way to resolve situations, using short-cuts to reduce uncertainty and anxiety.

Generally speaking, narcissistic personalities tend to rush into decisions without considering all the information, interpreting data according to their own convenience. These risky decisions would rely on biases such as overconfidence, perceptual selection, confirmation bias, optimistic illusion or illusion of control.

TABLE 1. DECISIONAL BIASES IN NARCISSISTIC AND DEPRESSIVE PERSONALITY PATTERNS

HEURISTIC / COGNITIVE BIAS	NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY	PERSONALITY WITH A DEPRESSIVE TENDENCY
Representativeness heuristic (related to selective abstraction).	They will only take into account data that are in their interests and/or strengthen their image. Decision-making will be flawed because it is based on the wrong data.	Propensity to make negative generalisations about the present and future, based on past misfortunes. This leads to passivity and inaction in decision-making.
Insensitivity to the prior likelihood of outcomes (related to polarised thinking)	Overlook prior likelihood, and objective data in general, because they have an overly optimistic view, which always biases data towards the option that is most favourable to their interests. Their decision-making is therefore not based on objective data and will be overestimated.	Overlook prior likelihood, and objective data in general, as they have a pessimistic view that always biases data towards the worst probability. Their decision-making is therefore not data-driven, considering only worst-case scenarios, which slows down the implementation of initiatives but which in crisis situations may be desirable.
Law of 'small' numbers (related to overgeneralisation).	Little data will be enough for them to dismiss negative forecasts, taking risky decisions.	Overestimation of the extent to which small samples are representative of the population. Because of their pessimism, with small incidents they will take precautionary measures, which can sometimes block the course of negotiations or initiatives, but which in crisis situations is useful as they anticipate problems, taking precautionary measures very early.

9 Table 1 is an adaptation by the author, based on the two personality types, following the heuristics and biases proposed by Urra, J.A., Medina, A.F. and Acosta, A.A. (2011). Heurísticos y sesgos cognitivos en la dirección de empresas: un metaanálisis [Heuristics and cognitive biases in business management: a meta-analysis]. *Rev. Venezolana de Gerencia,* No. 55. Pp. 390-419. Accessible at: https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/290/29020561004.pdf

Regression effects	They interpret a causal relationship, in things that are related, without one influencing the other, but which supports arguments to move forward in action, given the impulsiveness and low reflection of these people.	A causal relationship can be interpreted to give a negative and pessimistic explanation of things. Decision-making based on assumed relationships between variables will lead to significant errors.
Chance effects	They do not consider chance in their decisions, they drive the situation.	Estimating a random sequence as representative, as they present external locus of control, i.e. they do not perceive control over what happens to them and suffer from helplessness. Their decision-making will be based more on chance than on real probabilities.
Availability heuristic and proximity bias	Only use quick, recent and easily accessible information that supports rapid decision making.	They are not affected by this heuristic. Even with a negative bias, they analyse everything many times.
Confirmation bias	They will always seek information that confirms the decisions they have already taken.	Tendency to seek information that confirms previous views. So decision making will always confirm the worst-case scenario (this can be useful in crisis situations).
Illusory correlations	Tendency to relate unrelated events under illusion.	They are not affected by this bias
Anchoring and adjustment heuristic	Adjusting estimates based on a baseline estimate, which may be wrong, but which is in their interest to keep in order to maintain their forecasts and decisions as they do not accept errors.	Adjustment is viewed as negative.
Conservatism bias (related to labelling)	Similarly, they do not review new information so as not to have to acknowledge mistakes or change decision-making.	Estimates are not revised based on new information. So decision-making was prejudiced.
Overconfidence	Overestimation of one's own abilities. They will confidently make decisions, even when strongly discouraged by others.	They are not affected by overconfidence, quite the opposite. Hesitating to make decisions.
Illusion of control	Maintaining an expectation of success higher than the objective probability.	They have no illusion of control.
Optimistic illusion	Tendency to maintain unrealistic optimism about the future. Decision-making under this prism will not consider the associated risks or negative consequences.	They have no illusion of optimism.
Selective perception (related to the representativeness heuristic)	They only perceive what is of interest to them.	Beliefs and schemas that filter perception, only paying attention to negative aspects. Decision-making does not, therefore, cover all possible options.

Illusion of personal identification	Overestimation of level of control over outcomes.	They generalise their thoughts and feelings to others. Decision-making will not contemplate that the outcomes will affect others differently from themselves.
Hindsight bias	They are not affected.	Tendency to rationalise past events, which can make decision-making very difficult.

People in a depressed state of mind, however, lack this confidence, have a negative view of the world and analyse everything a lot, take longer to decide; they do not rush, but are very cautious, so cautious that they can sometimes paralyse action.

In crisis situations that may cause stress or uncertainty, the response will tend to be more instinctive and less rational[10]. Along these lines, research[11] has shown that stress impairs overall decision-making performance through reward-seeking mechanisms, i.e. dopamine production (a neurotransmitter that stimulates areas of the brain linked to instinctive response and leads to dependence on immediate rewards, thus increasing willingness to take risks)[12]. It is at these moments that the personality can become unbalanced and lose control, sharpening its traits[13]. Therefore, in uncertain environments, people with narcissistic traits will show more than ever their arrogance; people with depressive tendencies their pessimism; people

10 Morgado, P., Sousa, N. and Cerqueira, J.J. (2015). The impact of Stress in Decision Making in the Context of Uncertainty. *Journal of Neuroscience Research*, No. 93. Pp. 839-847. Accessible at: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/154273759.pdf

11 See: Starcke, K. and Brand, M. (2016). Effects of Stress on Decisions Under Uncertainty: A Meta-Analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol.142, No.9, pp. 900-933.

12 For a review of biological bases, see: HERMANS, E.J., *et al.* Dynamic Adaptation of Large-Scale Brain Networks in Response to Acute Stressors. *Trends in Neurosciences,* Vol. 7, No. 6, pp. 304-314.

13 As Esbec and Echreburúa state, personality traits are defined as 'persistent patterns of ways of perceiving, relating to and thinking about the environment and oneself, which are manifested in a wide range of social and personal contexts'. 'Personality traits only become personality disorders when they are inflexible and maladaptive, pervasive, early-onset, resistant to change and cause significant functional impairment'. It should be noted that, although previous editions of the diagnostic reference manual published by the APA included 'Depressive personality disorder' as a criterion for further study, the current manual — DSM 5 — does not include it. The personality disorders included in DSM 5 are: paranoid, schizoid, schizotypal, antisocial, borderline, histrionic, narcissistic, avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and unspecified (which includes pathological traits of negative affectivity). On the other hand, depressive disorders are a separate diagnostic category according to this manual. For a more comprehensive review, see: American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic criteria from DSM-5. Washington, DC: APA. Esbec, E. and Ec Heburúa E. (2011). La reformulación de los trastornos de la personalidad en el DSM-V [The reformulation of personality disorders in the DSM-V]. *Actas Esp. Psiquiatría,* No. 39(1), pp. 1-11.

with histrionic traits their theatricality; and those with psychopathic traits their malignance[14].

For all of the above reasons, the psychopathography of leadership, understood as the description of mental illnesses in leaders, is of great interest when it comes to being able to delimit the repercussions of the behaviour of some leaders with certain personality types, especially in situations of stress and crisis.

The mental health problems of historic leaders

As mentioned, in studying the biographies of great leaders in history, Gahemi and Porter have found that a high percentage of them suffered from mental health problems, in many cases prior to their leadership. They include Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King or John F. Kennedy, as well as those considered among the best presidents of the United States, such as Lincoln and F. D. Roosevelt. It is said of Gandhi, for example, that as a young man he was anxious and shy, adapting these characteristics to his ideals so that he understood pain and his opponents.

In the same vein, one of the most relevant episodes of the 20th century stands out, between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, as presidents of the governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively, in February 1945 during the Yalta Conference to reach the agreements that would eventually be considered the beginning of the Cold War. The future of a large part of the world was thus left in the hands of three political leaders, whose mental and physical health problems are documented in various sources.

According to Roy Porter[15], Churchill suffered from bipolar disorder (a mental illness that causes extreme mood swings, ranging from mania to depression, which had earned him a reputation as grumpy and bad-tempered) and Roosevelt from depressive disorder (characterised by constant sadness, affecting emotions, thoughts and behaviour), while Stalin suffered from paranoid disorder (characterised by a pattern of mistrust and suspicion, which made him believe that he was being targeted for assassination). For all these reasons, some historians believe that the first two ceded too many conditions to the third during the aforementioned Conference.

However, despite his alleged depression, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the only US president to win the presidential election four times. Diagnosed with polio caused from an infection contracted while swimming in Lake Maine, aged 39. His biographers say that his character changed as a result of his illness and mobility problems, allowing

14 Leading authors in psychology identify several types of psychopathy, one of which is related to malignant and destructive behaviour. See: Millon, T. and Davis, R.D. (1998). Ten subtypes of psychopathy. In T. Millon, E. Simonsen, M. Birket-Smith, & R. D. Davis (eds.). *Psychopathy: Antisocial, criminal, and violent behaviour*. The Guilford Press. Pp. 161-170.

15 Porter, R. *Op. cit.*

arrogance to give way to empathy and melancholy. At the age of 50, F.D. Roosevelt became the 32nd President of the United States. In those years he already had problems with blood pressure, which would eventually degenerate into the cerebrovascular disease that would cause his death a few months after the Yalta Conference, and a few days before the end of World War II. We now know that people exposed to a high level of stress are more likely to develop vascular diseases[16].

One might ask why such leaders are elected in difficult times. The answer may be that they generate trust given their high degree of empathy and sensitivity to the problems of others. But equally, one might ask why people with this type of profile are seduced by leadership: the explanation may lie in biochemistry. As already discussed, social recognition would act as a reward, boosting the production of dopamine, a feel-good neurotransmitter that in people with depression is a good hook for this type of behaviour. It is conceivable that dopamine rises for an unexpected reward, for an expected reward, dopamine secretion in the brain is unaffected, and for a missed expected reward, dopamine falls. Dopamine released in the brain produces a feeling of pleasure, so we could think that in situations of unexpected recognition and reward, people with depression experience a well-being that they do not usually enjoy due to their psychological imbalances. Dopamine production in subjects with narcissistic traits, however, may eventually lead to megalomania, as will be discussed below.

On the other hand, and despite Gahemi's thesis on the effectiveness of depressive personalities in crisis situations, the depletion of resources and ego would be conceptually incompatible with some dimensions of leadership. Leading authors [17]state that subordinates report abusive supervision in bosses with depression and non-clinically manifested anxiety. The uncertainty and ambiguity generated by anxiety in such leaders could lead to unethical behaviour[18].

Psychopathy and Leadership: Hubris Syndrome

Certain leadership styles have sometimes been linked to psychopathic behaviour, given the questionable ethics of some organisational managers[19]. It seems logical to

16 Ramírez-Moreno, J.M. and Millán-Núñez, M.V. (2017). Franklin D. Roosevelt. Un enemigo silencioso y el curso de la historia [Franklin D. Roosevelt. A Silent Enemy and the Course of History]. *Neurosciences and History*, No. 5 (4), pp.128-135. Accessible at: http://nah.sen.es/vmfiles/abstract/NAHV5N42017128_135ES.pdf

17 BYRNE, A., *et al.* (2014). The depleted leader: The influence of leaders' diminished psychological resources on leadership behaviors. *Leadership Quarterly*, No. 25, pp. 344-35.

18 Barling, J. and Cloutier, A. (2017). Leaders' Mental Health at Work: Empirical, Methodological, and Policy Directions. *Journal of Occupational Health Psychology*, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 394-406.

19 One of the authors with most research into this topic is Clive R. Boddy, who has found empirical evidence of the behaviour of organisational psychopaths, including bullying, fraud and general unethical behaviour. For a review of his findings see: Boddy, C.R. (2015). Organisational Psychopaths: A Ten Year Update. *Management Decision*, Vol. 53, No. 10, pp. 2407-2432.

think that bad things are caused by bad people, but is there empirical evidence for this?

As Clive Boddy[20] notes, psychopaths have no conscience or empathy, they are manipulative, lying, ruthless, calculating and remorseless, and use arrogance and charm to climb the organisational hierarchy using their networking skills. The charisma and charm of people with such traits can be attractive and, as Babiak and Hare maintain[21], psychotic behaviour can appear to have leadership qualities (taking charge, making decisions and getting others to do what you want). On the other hand, high-risk and fast-paced environments are particularly attractive to psychopaths. These authors also point out that psychopaths can slip into corporate structures and remain undetected for a long time. During this period, they can become quite powerful and do a lot of damage.

Psychopaths represent approximately 15% of the prison population and can be described as sociopaths or as having an antisocial personality disorder, similar to and often confused with, psychopathy[22]. Babiak, Neuman and Hare[23] found that 3.9% of executives at seven international companies had psychopathic traits, when prevalence in the general population is 1%. The authors maintain that the ability to charm, manipulate and deceive others allowed leaders with more psychopathic traits to achieve apparent success in their careers despite negative performance ratings and potentially damaging behaviours for the organisation.

However, despite popular studies such as those cited above, there is no consensus on psychopathic behaviour and leadership, mainly due to the number of variables that moderate this relationship.

In 2008, neurologist David Owen[24] coined the term 'Hubris Syndrome' to describe leaders with a tendency towards grandiosity and omnipotence. The word 'hubris'

20 Boddy, C.R. (2006). The Dark Side of Management Decisions: Organizational Psychopaths. *Management Decision*, Vol. 44, No. 10. 2006, pp. 1461-1475.

21 Babiak, P. and Hare, R.D. (2006). *Snakes in Suits - When Psychopaths Go to Work*. California, Harper Business.

22 In the review by Dujo and Horcajo, the prevalence of psychopathy in the Spanish prison population is reported to be 18%, higher than in other countries, with the exception of the USA where it is higher. The authors address the terminological confusion of psychopathy and review the origin, assessment and treatment of psychopathy. For the full study, see: Dujo, V. and Horcajo, P.J. (2017). La Psicopatía en la actualidad: abordaje clínico-legal y repercusiones forenses en el ámbito penal [Psychopathy today: clinical-legal approach and forensic repercussions in the criminal field]. *Psicopatología Clínica, Legal y Forense,* Vol 17, pp. 69-88.

23 Babiak, P., Neuman N.C.S. and Hare, R.D. (2010). Corporate psychopathy: Talking the walk. *Behavioral Sciences & the Law,* No. 28, pp. 174-193. Accessible at: https://www.sakkyndig.com/psykologi/artvit/babiak2010.pdf

24 Owen, D. (2011). *In Sickness and Power. Illnesses of Heads of Government During the Last 100 Years.* Madrid, Ed. Siruela.

comes from the Greek *(hybris*) and means 'arrogance'. It alludes to a disproportionate ego and a sense of omnipotence. In this case it would not be a personality style, but an acquired and reversible disorder (when power is no longer held).

In 2009, Owen, together with psychiatrist Jonathan Davidson[25], proposed that 'Hubris Syndrome' be considered a psychiatric disorder characterised by five specific symptoms, one common to antisocial personality disorder, one to histrionic disorder and seven to narcissistic disorder. This never came to pass, even with controversy, given its similarity to narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). In order to present this parallelism, table 2 shows the criteria established by the authors for 'Hubris Syndrome' and those established in the DSM 5[26] for NPT.

TABLE 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF 'HUBRIS SYNDROME' AND 'NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER'

HUBRIS SYNDROME	NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER
15. Narcissistic propensity to see the world as a stage on which to exercise power and seek glory. 16. Tendency to take actions for self-glorification, self-aggrandisement and to enhance self-image. 17. Inordinate concern for image and presentation. 18. Messianic way of talking about current affairs and tendency to exaltation. 19. Identification with the nation, the state and the organisation. 20. Tendency to speak of oneself in the third person and use the regal form of we. 21. Overconfidence in their own judgement and disregard for the judgement of others. 22. Exaggerated self-confidence, tendency to omnipotence. 23. Belief that they are accountable not to their peers, colleagues or society, but to higher instances: history or God. 24. Firm belief that the court will acquit them. 25. Loss of contact with reality: progressive isolation. 26. Restlessness, recklessness, impulsiveness 27. Convinced of the moral rectitude of their proposals while ignoring the costs. 28. Incompetence due to excessive self-confidence and lack of attention to detail.	10. **Feelings of grandeur and arrogance** (e.g. exaggerates achievements and talents, expects to be recognised as superior without corresponding successes). 11. **Absorbed in fantasies of success, power**, brilliance, beauty or unlimited ideal love. 12. Believes that he/she is **'special' and unique**, and can only be understood by or relate to other special or high status people (or institutions). 13. Excessive need for admiration. 14. Displays **a sense of privilege** (i.e. unreasonable expectations of particularly favourable treatment or automatic fulfilment of their expectations). 15. Exploits interpersonal relationships (i.e. takes advantage of others for his or her own ends). 16. **Lacks empathy**: unwilling to recognise or empathise with the feelings and needs of others. 17. Often envies others or believes that others are envious of him/her. 18. Displays **arrogant, superior** behaviour or attitudes.

As can be seen, the pattern is very similar, in fact, it is not difficult to find authors who agree in assigning 'Hubris Syndrome' or NPT to the same leaders. Political

25 Owen, D. and Davidson, J. (2009). Hubris syndrome: An acquired personality disorder? A study of US Presidents and UK Prime Ministers over the last 100 years. *Brain*, no. 132(5), pp. 1396-1406. Accessible at: https://academic.oup.com/brain/article/132/5/1396/354862

26 American Psychiatric Association (APA) (2014). *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).* Madrid, Ed. Médica Panamericana.

leaders such as Hitler, Slobodan Milošević, Saddam Hussein[27], Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Mao[28] or Donald Trump[29] [30], but also football managers like Jose Mourinho or financial figures, as was the case with the leaders of Lehman Brothers and the Royal Bank of Scotland[31], have been placed in one category or the other (Hubris-NPD) indistinctly, depending on the source.

Relationship between leadership styles and personality traits

Many leadership models and theories have been defended throughout history, and this document does not aim to review them, although for the subject that concerns us, it is worth highlighting the evident relational focus of contemporary models, such as the transactional, transformational or transcendent focus. They all include a relationship of exchange and influence.

The transactional model features constructive and corrective transactions, with rewards and punishments, so that leadership works according to stimulus-response conditioning (subordinates learn which types of behaviour are rewarded and which are punished). There is a bond of commitment between leader and followers in the transformational approach, an emotional vehicle for the relationship. In the transcendent, both are driven by the common good, and values and ethics play a very significant role.

This relational approach posits leadership behaviour as the result of a mediation of emotions, attitudes, values or context. The relationship of the biological and its interaction with the context ultimately gives rise to the leader's emergence and effectiveness.

From a biological point of view, the team led by De Neve[32] recently identified a gene, RS4950, present in 24% of those in leadership roles. The same authors argue that

27 Owen, D. and Davidson, J. *Op. cit.*

28 A good review can be found in Aguirre, P.A. (2014). *Historia mundial de la megalomanía: desmesuras, desvaríos y fantasías del culto a la personalidad en la política [World History of Megalomania: Excesses, Ravings and Fantasies of the Cult of Personality in Politics]*. Madrid, Debate Editorial.

29 A mental health analysis of D. Trump can be found at: Bandy Lee, M.D. (2017). *The dangerous case of Donald Trump: 27 Psychiatrists and Mental Health Professionals Assess a President*. London, Macmillan Publishers.

30 From a psychological point of view, see: Caballo, V. (2017). A psychological analysis of Donald Trump. *Behavioral Psychology / Psicología Conductual.* No. 25, (1), pp. 227-249. Accessible at: https://www.behavioralpsycho.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/13.Caballo_25-1.pdf

31 Wray, T. (2016). The Role of Leader Hubris in the Decline of RBS and Lehman Brothers. In Garrard, P. and Robinson, G. (eds.). *The intoxication of power*. London, Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. 229-51.

32 DE NEVE J.E., *et al.* (2013). Born to lead? A twin design and genetic association study of leadership role occupancy. *The Leadership Quarterly,* no. 24, pp. 45-60. Document accessible at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1048984312000811

the fact that this gene influences holding leadership-related roles could be because of traits such as impulsiveness, i.e. people would occupy leadership roles as a result of the complex interaction between genetics and environment.

As discussed above, impulsive behaviour has also been linked to the release of dopamine (a neurotransmitter associated with expectation and reward, immediate gratification and therefore addiction)[33]. But the causal pathway between RS4950 and dopamine production for occupying a leadership role is unknown. The identified gene may be affecting the development of individual attributes that predispose to leadership, such as personality traits. Its influence on leadership may also derive from people's choice of specific environments that are more favourable for developing that role.

Regarding the relationship between leadership and personality, reference literature[34] indicates that, except for self-confidence, the many studies published do not point to other common traits. The Big Five personality traits model[35] has been used to overcome some methodological errors of these reviews. The five mentioned are: neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness and conscientiousness. Put briefly, neuroticism would be related to emotional maladjustment (anxiety, insecurity); extraversion to sociability; openness to experience to creativity and autonomy; agreeableness to trust and obedience; and conscientiousness to achievement and reliability.

To continue reflecting on the personality-leadership relationship, we must consider that the emergence of leadership is one thing and its effectiveness is another. In other words, it is one thing to be perceived as a leader, and quite another to effectively guide a group of people towards a goal. Some personality traits may be conducive to the emergence of leadership but are nevertheless ineffective in that role, for example, narcissistic personalities, as has already been discussed. In this sense, the meta-analysis by Judge et al. found that these five factors had a statistically significant positive relationship with leadership effectiveness, except in the case of neuroticism, which was negative, i.e. the more extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness, the more effective the leadership, and the higher the score on neuroticism, the lower the leadership effectiveness. As for the emergence of leadership, it seems that subjects who are more stable (scoring lower on neuroticism), more extraverted, more open and more conscientious are chosen as leaders; however, contrary to what might be thought, agreeableness did not predict the emergence of the leader.

The authors of this meta-analysis wanted to verify the consistency of these results in different contexts, such as the business environment, politics and military, and the

33 Hermans, *et al. Op. cit.*

34 JUDGE, T.A., *et al.* (2002). Personality and leadership: A qualitative and quantitative review. *Journal of Applied Psychology,* no. 87(4), pp. 765-780. Document accessible at: http://www.timothy-judge.com/Judge,%20Bono,%20Ilies,%20&%20Gerhardt.pdf

35 Goldberg, L.R. (1990). An Alternative Description of Personality: The Big-Five Factor Structure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, no. 59, pp. 1216-1229.

student population. They found that extraversion and neuroticism were identical in all three contexts. Openness proved to be predictive in business and student settings, but not in political or military settings; and conscientiousness was shown to be related to leadership in student, military and political settings, but not in business settings. This leads to a new reflection on the appropriateness or otherwise of the presence of certain personality traits in a leader, depending on the context.

Another meta-analysis by Landay, Harms and Credé[36] examined the links between psychopathy and leadership emergence in detail, again differentiating between emergence (when a leader is identified or perceived as a leader) and leadership effectiveness (actual performance of the team and the leader's perceived effectiveness). After selecting and reviewing 92 independent study samples, the authors found a positive relationship between psychopathic tendencies and leadership emergence, and a negative relationship for psychopathic tendencies and leadership effectiveness. This study also revealed a negative relationship between psychopathic tendencies and transformational leadership, which is logical, given the great weight of emotional intelligence and empathy in transformational leadership.

Psychopathy, in particular —and its interpersonal components—, is positively associated with internal company ratings of Charisma/Presentation style (creativity, strategic thinking and communication skills) and negatively with ratings of Responsibility/Performance (leadership and management skills, and overall achievement)[37]. Psychopathy has thus been positively correlated with passive leadership behaviour (management by exception, passive leadership and laissez-faire) and negatively correlated with individual consideration (a subscale of transformational leadership). Therefore, it seems logical that narcissistic and psychopathic personalities have little to do with transformational leadership styles and much to do with authoritarian and laissez-faire leadership styles[38].

Undoubtedly, when it comes to autocratic leadership, the quintessential example seems to be Adolf Hitler. Many books and articles have been written about him, and his psychopathic personality has been analysed from all angles. According to Kets de Vries, some of Freud's biographies state that the Hitler family doctor, Dr. Bloch, consulted him several times about little Adolf. After analysing the case, Freud recommended that the child be admitted to a children's mental health centre so that he could be treated. Although his mother agreed, his father would not allow it and the child was not treated. It seems that the father was an intransigent man, who subjected him to humiliation and ill-treatment[39].

36 Landay, K., Harms, P.D. and Credé, M. (2019). Shall we serve the dark lords? A meta-analytic review of psychopathy and leadership. *Journal of Applied Psychology,* no. 104(1), pp. 183-196.

37 Babiak, P., Neuman, C.S. and Hare, R.D. *Op. cit.*

38 Westerlaken, K.M. and Woods, P.R. (2013). The relationship between psychopathy and the Full Range Leadership Model. *Personality and Individual Differences* no. 54, pp. 41-46.

39 The *Encyclopedia of Leadership* (*Op. cit.*) mentions this event, on page 669.

Several studies have linked psychological and physical aggression in childhood to abusive forms of supervision over subordinates[40]. The quality of family relationships in childhood influences leadership development in adulthood.

Discussion and final considerations

A core aim of this paper is to draw attention to qualities and traits that are little studied in leaders, but which may play an important role in explaining their behaviour and relationship with their followers. Qualities and traits which, when they represent permanent or temporary mental disorders, are difficult to attribute to successful people. Overcoming the stigma attached to individuals with such pathologies can be seen as an implicit objective of this document.

Most studies related to psychopathology and leadership focus on personality disorders, but also on the manifestations of symptoms of depression or anxiety, especially in situations of crisis or stress. Personality traits can constitute disorders, those most widely studied in relation to leadership are: narcissistic disorder (people with a sense of vanity, superiority, dominance, and need for prominence); antisocial disorder (people who tend to harass, manipulate or treat others with cruelty and indifference, without guilt or remorse); and histrionic disorder (theatrical people, who use dramatisation to be the centre of attention).

Combined features of narcissistic, antisocial and histrionic personality disorders have been considered by authors such as Owen or Davidson as the 'Hubris Syndrome', identified in ego-driven leaders. However, experts do not seem to agree on considering this syndrome as a pathology. In fact, the aspects that describe individuals who manifest 'Hubris Syndrome' could not only be attributable to the three personality disorders mentioned above, but would be closely related to psychopathic behaviours. Psychopathy is not considered a mental disorder, although it is often confused with antisocial personality disorder. According to Boddy, psychopaths would have no conscience or empathy, they would engage in unethical behaviour when in leadership roles in organisations. As Hogan and his collaborators argue, poor leadership negatively affects all those under its influence. If, as Babiak, Neuman and Hare found, 3.9% of executives in the companies they analysed had psychopathic traits, and these could lead to consequences for employees and for the organisation, the approach to human resource management would have to change both in recruitment processes and in the performance evaluations that allow this type of person to move up in the organisational hierarchy.

There is no doubt about the relationship between personality traits and leadership behaviours, although in the studies analysed in this document no common trait has

40 García, P.R.J.M., *et al.* (2014). Roots run deep: Investigating psychological mechanisms between history of family aggression and abusive supervision. *Journal of Applied Psychology,* no. 99, pp. 883-897.

been found among leaders, except for self-confidence, and this can be present in emotionally-adjusted people, but also in those who are not.

The literature discussed in this text suggests differentiating between leadership emergence and leadership effectiveness. People with antisocial, narcissistic or psychopathic traits seem to favour leadership emergency, as they are easily perceived or identified in this type of role, however, they are not the most effective. Interpersonal components play a fundamental role in leadership performance, especially in relational models, where the three personality types mentioned above stand out for their charisma, creativity and communication skills, as stated by Babiak, Neuman and Hare, for example. However, these personality types do not score highest in performance and management, i.e. leadership effectiveness. Lack of effectiveness in leadership is also related to decision-making biases, which in these personality types could lead to excessive risk-taking due to overconfidence, perceptual selection, optimistic illusion or illusion of control, among others. In contexts likely to generate stress, personality traits may be unbalanced or exacerbated, so that the possibility of such decisional biases is very likely in crisis situations.

As for depressive-type traits, as well as temporary or permanent mood swings, literature is scarcer and more confusing. Although authors such as Gahemi attribute positive characteristics for leadership performance, such as empathy, creativity, resilience and realism, to people with melancholic and depressive traits (people who manifest a constant sadness that affects emotions, thoughts and behaviour); others such as Byrne *et al*, or Barling and Cloutier, report that subordinates report abusive supervision in this type of leader, and suggest that depressive people in crisis situations experience a depletion of resources and of their own ego, incompatible with the exercise of leadership. Delimiting exactly the type of traits and disorders addressed in this type of studies could help to clarify these controversies, since depressive disorders encompass a wide range of symptoms, with very different temporalities.

Finally, it should be noted that context is an important modulator in the emergence and effectiveness of leadership, which can lead to the emergence of a leadership figure with one personality style or another, just as one leadership style or another can be effective or not, depending on the context. Therefore, there is a suggested need for studies such as those compiled by Judge *et al*, which relate not only the dimensions of successful personality in one or another context, but also personality traits such as those outlined here. It would be interesting to have studies that analyse effectiveness in management and leadership tasks, by people with different personality types, in different types of organisation, but also in the context of specific crises.

Although we are often able to identify people with leadership qualities, the complexity of the concept is also accepted. The leader has weaknesses and strengths, which must be known and examined, because they all contribute to his or her emergence and effectiveness.

The study of the psychopathography of leadership may require more attention from researchers in light of the increasing prevalence of certain disorders in the population. Such is the case of depressive disorders, which affect more than 300 million people

worldwide, according to the WHO[41]. Although the category of depressive disorders is extremely generic, it would be necessary to determine to what extent they are limiting for the performance of this type of role, and in what specific contexts, which would be a great contribution to talent management in organisations. Specifically, it would be necessary to answer the question of what works best in a crisis and what does not, by analysing in depth expected reactions according to traits in this type of situation.

This means changing the approach, revising some of the current parameters that systematically exclude people with mental disorders from any kind of job or task, and especially those that involve responsibility for property or people. Many organisational decisions may be biased by prejudices and stereotypes, which overlook certainties such as that not all mental illnesses are identical, they do not have the same limitations, and do not pose the same risks. History has shown that people with explicit psychopathologies can be brilliant leaders.

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Results vs capabilities? Theoretical perspectives on security planning in South America

Abstract

The article explores the national security policy planning process in South America, combining a theoretical approach of methodological perspectives with an empiric analysis of case studies. To this end, firstly inquiries about the conceptual relation between regional dominant models applied to sustainable development planning in general and specifically to national security. Then, analyses the practical application of sustainable development planning standards in the national security systems of Chile and Peru, selected as unities of analysis because they represent diverse regional conceptions of the scope and organization of security and defense sector. Among its findings stands out the technical compatibility between both planning models and, as consequence, the applicability of good practices in results-based management for sustainable development as a valid methodological reference for national security policy planning.

Keywords

National security; sustainable development; results-based management; strategic planning; South America.

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Introduction

Planning re-emerged as an instrument for development in Latin America and the Caribbean at the dawn of the 21st century, in a sort of 'return to the future' according to Cuervo and Mattar[1] which positions it as a valid means to account for the public policy needs demanded by the political, economic, social and institutional environment of the time. We refer to a contemporary version of planning that distances itself from its traditional normative-indicative approach by incorporating strategic conceptions, participatory formulas and visions of the future[2]. This new planning is tributary to public management, with both being understood as 'pieces of a complex whole'[3] whose integration seeks to achieve sustainable development results in a holistic and not only economic perspective.

A consequence of this synergetic link between planning and management are the state modernisation initiatives that have proliferated throughout the region in recent decades. In general, they were structured on the basis of results-oriented public administration standards, operating as a «conceptual framework designed to optimise the process of creating public value in public organisations, ensuring the maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and efficiency of their performance, the achievement of government objectives and the continuous improvement of institutions»[4]. In fact, planning is one of the basic systems underpinning the management for results (MfDR) model[5] promoted by the United Nations (for example, through ECLAC and UNDP) and the main specialised regional bodies (IDB, CLAD, among others). Although there is no uniformity of methodological criteria among them, they do agree on the weighting of the model as the ideal toolbox for improving government effectiveness.

For the Management for Development Results (MfDR) approach sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), planning is precisely the first pillar of the model. Conceptually, this encompasses its strategic, operational and participatory dimensions[6]. Results-focused planning (RfP) thus understood takes the form of

1 Cuervo, L. and Máttar, J. (2014). *Planificación para el desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe: regreso al futuro*. Santiago (Chile), CEPAL. P. 19.

2 Máttar, J. and Perrotti, D. (2014). *La planificación como instrumento de desarrollo con igualdad en América Latina y el Caribe: tendencias y desafíos*. Santiago (Chile), CEPAL. P. 45.

3 Máttar, J. and Cuervo, M. (2017). *Planificación para el desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe: enfoques, experiencias y perspectivas*. Santiago (Chile), CEPAL. Pp. 21-22.

4 Inter-American Development Bank (Idb) and Latin American Centre for Administration and Development (CLAD) (2007). *Open model of managing for results in the public sector*. [s.l.], IDB and CLAD. P. 167.

5 Makón, M. (2014). Algunas reflexiones sobre la gestión por resultados. In Máttar, J. and Perrotti, D. (eds.). *Planificación, prospectiva y gestión pública*. Santiago (Chile), CEPAL. P. 119.

6 Armijo, M. and Sanginés, M. (2015). Planificación orientada a resultados. In Kaufmann, J., Sanginés, M.; García Moreno, M. (eds.) (2015). *Construyendo gobiernos efectivos: logros y retos de la gestión para resultados en América Latina y el Caribe*. Washington DC, IDB. P. 49.

systematised strategic planning exercises (strategic capacity), instruments that translate the strategy into an annual programming of activities and resources (operationality) and mechanisms that incorporate the views of the legislature and civil society into strategic plans (participatory nature)[7].

In this context, the article explores the application of this planning scheme to national security policy, i.e. «where the referent object is the nation-state»[8]. Under a traditional view, this would imply limiting the analysis to the institutional sphere of national defence (national security in the classic sense). However, as the concept has evolved since the end of the 20th century[9], national security management transcends national defence and also includes the coordinated action of other contributing portfolios (e.g. diplomacy and justice), implying a multidimensional, multiagency and multilevel approach[10] (national security in a broad sense). The formal ascription of South American countries to one or the other perspective is disparate, given the underlying presence of different normative-institutional positions on the relationship between external security (national defence) and internal security (state or public)[11].

The motivation for this analysis lies in the dichotomy that seems to exist between the regional reactivation of planning as a suitable management tool applicable throughout the public sector to generate development results and the permanence within some national security systems of endogenous planning criteria, dissociated from such processes and general standards[12]. This disjunction of technical criteria is not exclusive to one or the other position on the concept of national security, but it is accentuated in those cases that ascribe to the aforementioned classic meaning, where it is interpreted from a theoretical standpoint as a watertight policy sector that is alien to state strategies and capacities to generate sustainable development. Under this logic, sustainable development and national security would be independent problems for the public administration, whose management cycle takes place in a compartmentalised manner and with few points of contact.

It should be noted as a contextual factor that the regional organisations specialised in development (ECLAC and IDB, among others) do not consider national secu-

7 Kaufmann, J., Sanginés, M. and García Moreno, M. (eds.) (2015). *Construyendo gobiernos efectivos: logros y retos de la gestión para resultados en América Latina y el Caribe*. Washington DC, IDB. P. xxvii.

8 Laborie Iglesias, M. (2013). Seguridad nacional y estrategia. Escenarios actuales del Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Militares, año 18, n.º 3, p. 5.

9 laborie iglesias, M. (2011). La evolución del concepto de seguridad. *Framework Documents of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies* [online]. No. 5/2011.

10 Arteaga Martín, F. (2011). Propuesta para la implementación de una estrategia de seguridad nacional en España. *Real Instituto Elcano Working Papers* [online]. No. 19, p. 5.

11 Vega, J.M. (2019). Modelos de planeamiento de la seguridad en Iberoamérica. In González Piote, L. (ed.). *Escenarios Emergentes: Asia-Pacífico y Sahel*. Madrid: UNED. P. 326.

12 Vega, J.M. *Op. cit.*, pp. 319-346.

rity as a permanent work topic, intervening only in specific initiatives such as, for example, the design of the standardised methodology for measuring defence spending between Argentina and Chile[13]. This undoubtedly contributes to the fact that in South America, national security planning—and therefore the application of MfDR postulates to this policy sector—is an embryonic subject of scientific research, as is its analysis as public policy[14]. Perhaps one of the few exceptions to this general principle of academic disinterest is the attention given to the capabilities-based planning technique, whose application has proliferated in recent decades in the national defence portfolios of many of the region's countries, not without conceptual differences and methodological variants.

On the basis of the above, the article sets out to explore how national security is planned as public policy in South America. To account for this, we first characterise both perspectives on planning, the developmental perspective coined by international agencies and focused on achieving results, and the national security sectoral perspective, marked by the recent extensive use of the capability-based planning approach in national defence. Second, two case studies are analysed, Chile and Peru, selected for the heterogeneity of their organisation and functioning in both spheres—national security and sustainable development—as proposed by Rial[15] and Vega[16] on security, and by Mattar and Cuervo[17] and Kaufmann, Sanginés and García Moreno[18] on development.

Development planning as a reference

The instrumental relationship between planning (means) and development (end) in Latin America dates back to the middle of the last century, being problematised as «two sides of the same coin»[19] whose first five decades (1950-2000) were characterised by the «ups and downs»[20] suffered by planning as an instrument at the service of development. However, the situation at the dawn of the 21st century is different: planning

13 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2001). *Common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditure*. Santiago (Chile), CEPAL.

14 Vega, J.M. *Op. cit.*, p. 324.

15 Rial, J. (2014). América Latina y sus problemas de seguridad y defensa: incertidumbre en tiempos de cambio constante. In Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE) and General Gutiérrez Mellado University Institute (IUGM) (eds.). *Defence cooperation with Latin America (Strategy Papers 171)*. Madrid, IEEE and IUGM. Pp. 31-55.

16 Vega, J.M. *Op. cit.*

17 Máttar, J. and Cuervo, M. *Op. cit.*

18 Kaufmann, J., Sanginés, M. and García Moreno, M. *Op. cit.*

19 Máttar, J. and Perrotti, D. *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

20 Máttar, J. and Perrotti, D. *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

has recovered the leading role lost since the 1980s as a result of multiple internal, external, conjunctural and structural factors[21], adopting an enriched significance that incorporates novelties in political-institutional practice, such as the construction of long-term development visions and the introduction of foresight as a public policy tool[22].

For this approach, planning is understood as a «political act, a theory and a discipline for the creation of meaning (of belonging and future) and the multi-scale, intersectoral and pluritemporal governance of development»[23], a meaning that takes up the original instrumental aspirations of the idea of planning, while «allowing for the incorporation of new learning and more recent challenges»[24]. Among the many original ingredients of this renewed sense of planning,[25] highlights, on the one hand, its complementary association with public management for development and, on the other hand, its contribution to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—emanating from the United Nations 2030 Agenda—at each level of government.

The integration between planning and management makes it possible to understand its modern practical scope, since the most deeply rooted connotation of planning in the contemporary public sector is as a pillar of the management for results (MfDR) model which, in its various organisational forms, underpins an important part of the agenda of institutional modernisation and state reform in the region. Whether it is understood as a «conceptual framework for organisational management»[26] or an «overall management strategy»[27], MfDR encompasses and links all stages of the public policy cycle, with planning being the initial link from which to define the results to be achieved and then decide on the best combination of inputs, activities and outputs to achieve them[28].

In this perspective, the concept of «result» is key, as it represents the very *raison d'être* of planning as a tool in the service of public administration. For MfDR, the idea of outcome corresponds to the core notion of public value, interpreted as «observable and measurable social changes that the state brings about in response to democratical-

21 Máttar, J. and Perrotti, D. *Op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

22 Cuervo, L. and Máttar, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

23 Máttar, J. and Cuervo, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

24 Cuervo, L. and Máttar, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

25 Máttar, J. and Cuervo, M. *Op. cit.*, pp. 21-31.

26 IDB and CLAD. *Op. cit.*, p., 159.

27 United Nations Development Programme (PNUD) (2009). *Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation of Development Results*. UNDP, New York. P. 10.

28 García López, R. and García Moreno, M. (2010). *La gestión para resultados en el desarrollo: avances y desafíos en América Latina y el Caribe*. Washington DC, BID. P. 8.

ly legitimised social needs or demands»[29]. For Sotelo Maciel[30], it is understood as the change that occurs in social variables and not as the satisfaction of the needs of individual citizens through the consumption of goods or services (products) provided by the state. Planning translates these changes into strategic objectives, with intermediate or final results being their quantified expression[31].

The prolific regional literature on MfDR offers a variety of methodological proposals for putting the premises of results-oriented planning (RfP) into practice. One of the most complete and influential is the one edited by Kaufmann, Sanginés and García Moreno[32], whose proposal for operationalisation lies in the existence and consistency of national and sectoral government plans—and the concordance between both—; in the articulation between plans, programmes and budget; in the link between the medium and the short term; and in the participation of the legislative branch and civil society in the process. Each of these variables has varying degrees of implementation by country, creating a mosaic of national employment scenarios.

Such diversity does not imply the absence of shared implementation deficits, i.e. common unfinished business, including the lack of alignment of administrative rules with MfDR, the inconsistency between sectoral and national planning, and the disarticulation between planning and budgeting[33]. This last point is of perennial academic interest as a condition of success for the model[34]. With a comprehensive view, Mattar and Cuervo[35] group the multiple challenges of planning around four challenges: combining time and deadlines (pluritemporality), coordination between levels (multiscalarity), combining the global and the sectoral (intersectorality), and learning (evaluation and monitoring).

29 García López, R. and García Moreno, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

30 Sotelo Maciel, A. (2012). La cadena de valor público: un principio ordenador que previene la colisión metodológica. *Revista Internacional de Presupuesto Público (ASIP)* [online]. No. 80. [Accessed: 18 October 2020].

31 Martirene, R. (2013). Modelo de integración del plan estratégico institucional a un presupuesto público orientado a resultados. *ASAP Magazine* [online]. No. 52, p. 56. [Accessed: 18 October 2020].

32 Kaufmann, J., Sanginés, M. and García Moreno, M. *Op. cit.*

33 Kaufmann, J., Sanginés, M. and Santiso, C. (2015). Tenencias de la gestión para resultados en el desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe. In Kaufmann, J., Sanginés, M. and García Moreno, M. *Construyendo gobiernos efectivos: logros y retos de la gestión para resultados en América Latina y el Caribe*. Washington DC, IDB. Pp. 43-47.

34 As reflected, for example, in the following publications: Sotelo Maciel, A. (2008). La relación planificación–presupuesto en el marco de la gestión orientada a resultados. *Journal CLAD Reforma y Democracia*. No. 40, pp. 1-15; Martirene, R. *Op. cit.*; and BONARI, D., *et al.* (2015). La vinculación entre planificación y presupuesto como herramienta de la gestión pública por resultados. *Documentos de Políticas Públicas (CIPPEC)* [online]. No. 146.

35 Máttar, J. and Cuervo, M. *Op. cit.*

State of play on security planning

By virtue of the above, a comprehensive diagnosis of national security planning in South America should not exclude the MfDR paradigm and the type of planning it promotes as a contextual variable. Especially because RfP—by definition—has no methodological restrictions to be used across levels of government, policy sectors or types of institutions, and is applicable throughout the public administration. Thus, MfDR reforms, especially those implemented through formal state modernisation initiatives, are often mandatory for the entire level of government from which they emanate (including ministries, autonomous entities and even sub-national governments)[36]. In short, analysing national security planning (like that of any public policy) necessarily entails looking at how well it meets RfP standards.

It should be clarified that the delimitation of national security as a policy sector adopted by the study revolves around the state as the referent object and adopts the broad approach of the term that emerged post-Cold War. To this end, we refer to the conceptualisation by Ballesteros Martín[37] and to the characterisation of the decision-making levels, management processes and intervening institutions presented by Arteaga Martín and Fojón Lagoa[38]. This interpretation of national security is the predominant one in the normative-institutional design of European and North American countries[39], representing the conceptual underpinning from which they formulate their contemporary National Security Strategies. The adoption of the approach has been growing in South America over the last two decades under different models[40], although there are still cases with a *classical* orientation where the architecture of national security management is in line with that of national defence.

The incorporation of the broad notion of national security generates (at least at the theoretical level) favourable institutional conditions for RfP to be seen as an appropriate methodology for planning sectoral policy, given that its management is not limited to the sphere of national defence (or specifically to the military) but involves multilevel coordination of actions between various state portfolios and agencies with direct competencies and specific objectives in the area of sustainable development. However, this process is in its infancy and there are few official and ac-

36 For example, the National Policy for the Modernisation of Public Management to 2021 in Peru (Supreme Decree No. 004-2013-PCM) and the State Modernisation Plan in Argentina (Decree No. 434/2016).

37 Ballesteros Martín, M. (2016). *En busca de una estrategia de seguridad nacional.* Madrid, IEEE. Pp. 57-63

38 Arteaga Martín, F. and Fojón Lagoa, E. (2007). *El planeamiento de la política de defensa y seguridad en España.* Madrid: IUGM.

39 Ballesteros Martín, M. *Op. cit.*

40 Vega, J.M. *Op. cit.*

ademic references on concrete applications, success stories or lessons learned. In fact, as mentioned, the South American literature on national security planning is scarce[41], generally resorting to specialised sources of European and North American origin, with the latter and Spanish sources having the greatest academic and governmental impact in South America.

This scientific apathy is compounded by the absence of methodological positioning on good practices applicable to national security planning as public policy by regional bodies. In this sense, while organisations specialising in development management (e.g. ECLAC and IDB) usually exclude national security from their activities, those competent in security and defence matters (basically, the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the now inactive Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) lack technical proposals in this area. Although this state of affairs represents a limitation for the generation of specialised knowledge and management solutions tailored to the regional reality, it can also be seen as an opportunity to enrich existing international cooperation networks in the short term.

Probably one of the few exceptions to the described disinterest revolves around the sectoral applicability of the Capabilities Based Planning (CbP) approach, introduced by the United States of America at the turn of the century[42] and now the gold standard[43] for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Defence Agency (EDA) and several of their respective member states[44]. Its reception spread in parallel in South America with disparate interpretations, presenting itself at the discursive level as a politically appropriate form of national security planning for a region that defined itself as a zone of peace[45]. This is based on opposing the postulates of the CbP to the threat-based approach (TbA), whose rationality and application is associated with the traditional hypotheses of conflict of a neighbourhood nature once widespread throughout the region and now deconstructed.

In technical terms, the CbP proposal is to endow national defence policy (and, consequently, the national security system) with a management dynamic aimed at developing and maintaining capabilities understood as «generic military capabilities»[46]. By definition, this process is multi-level, as it involves the interaction of different insti-

41 Diagnosis not applicable to other dimensions of security of widespread political and academic interest such as—for example—public, human and citizen security.

42 Revisión Cuadrienal de la Defensa (QDR) (2001).

43 Hales, D. and Chouinard, P. (2011). Implementing Capability Based Planning within the Public Safety and Security Sector: Lessons from the Defence Experience. Canada: Defence R&D Canada—Centre for Security Science.

44 Colom, G. (2017). Una revisión del planeamiento de la defensa por capacidades en España (2005–16). *Papeles de Europa* [online]. vol. 30 (1), p. 50.

45 II Declaration of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (2014).

46 Arteaga Martín, F. and Fojón Lagoa. *Op. cit.*, p. 204.

tutional decision-makers (mainly government, contributing ministries and the armed forces), and is cyclical in nature (e.g. quadrennial), starting *from the top* with policy definitions that guide lower levels[47]. In general, the implementation of the CbP pivots around the defence portfolio and the joint military authority as central decision-makers. Taking the Spanish case as a reference, capacities are disaggregated into groups (capacity areas) to which targets are assigned based on needs (capacity objectives), whose degree of satisfaction is defined through an iterative process between priorities and availability of resources (budget)[48].

At the methodological level, the CbP technique is not by nature incompatible with the postulates promoted by RfP. Thus, there are countries with a long tradition of managing for results within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) whose security sector applies the capability-based approach under NATO standards (e.g. Australia and Canada). However, in South America, the conceptual articulation between both theoretical approaches is incipient, and the sectoral individualisation of a public value chain archetype[49] is a crucial step towards its consolidation. Without ignoring the inherent complexity of measuring pure public goods[50], such research would contribute to the identification of outputs and outcomes based on capacities, areas and their objectives. Purchased analysis of successful extra-regional cases such as those mentioned above is also valuable, especially as a source of lessons learned and good practices.

The growing operational polyvalence of the region's military institutions, materialised in the incorporation of multiple subsidiary missions (for example, community support in disaster situations), also constitutes a contextual condition that favours the sectoral incorporation of RfP, including in an articulated and convergent manner with the postulates of CbP. This is because the aforementioned «capability areas» no longer include not only actions linked to the main mission of the military instrument, but also other subsidiary actions related to addressing issues of the national development agenda, which by nature contribute to the fulfilment of the SDGs. For example, natural disaster support can be understood as contributing to the achievement (at a minimum) of SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation) and SDG 13 (Climate Action). In fact, their results should be measured and incorporated into the voluntary annual reports that countries submit to the UN on the status of implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

47 Puig, M. (2015). Planificación y diseño de la fuerza militar por capacidades: la importancia de una correcta comprensión y aplicación. *Cuadernos de Trabajo del Centro de Estudios Estratégicos (ANEPE)* [online], No. 17/2015, p. 9.

48 García Sierio, J. (2006). Planeamiento por capacidades. *Revista Española de Defensa*. Year 19, No 20, p. 38-43.

49 Sotelo Maciel, A. *Op. cit.*

50 Martirene, R. *Op. cit.*, p. 67.

Practising security planning for results

The following analysis of the practice of national security policy planning in South America, specifically its degree of compliance with RfP standards, is based on a multiple case study with two main units of analysis[51], the national security systems of Chile and Peru, chosen as a representative regional sample of the diversity of existing models and states of affairs on the management of national security and sustainable development. The choice of the method is based on its usefulness for analysing topics with little previous scientific production[52] and responds to a hybrid type of case study whose objective is both to contribute to the confirmation or invalidation of a theory or generality and to lay the foundations for the generation of future working hypotheses on the subject[53].

Under this premise, the first criterion for selecting the units of analysis was to reflect the «disparate views» identified by Rial[54] on the relationship between national defence and public security in Latin America. Specifically, this involved designing a sample that incorporates two types of cases, one that falls into the category of «separate and specific domains» (Chile) and one that falls into the category of «interdependent concepts» (Peru). This methodological decision is based on the conditioning factors that such approaches entail for the delimitation of national security as a policy sector and, according to Vega[55], for the configuration of the normative-institutional model finally used for strategic planning purposes.

Such «disparate views» help to explain the substantive normative and organisational differences in national security as public policy between the two countries. According to the Book of the National Defence of Chile 2017[56] the country maintains a classic vision of security associated with its external dimension (external security), circumscribing its scope as a policy sector to the area of defence (and diplomacy). On the other hand, in terms of its National Security and Defence Policy[57], Peru adheres to a multidimensional meaning associated with national security, exhibiting an institutional scaffolding of «security and defence» that transcends the latter portfolio to encompass other areas (horizontal, multisectoral articulation) and levels of government

51 Yin, R. (1998). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. *Applied Social Research Methods Series*. Newbury Park: Sage. P. 28.

52 Yin, R. *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

53 Ortega Expósito, I. (2012). La naturaleza comparativa de los estudios de caso: una revisión politológica sobre el estado de la cuestión. *Encrucijadas Revista Crítica de Ciencias Sociales*. No. 4, pp. 88-89.

54 Rial, J. *Op. cit.*

55 Vega, J.M. *Op. cit.*, p. 338.

56 Ministry of National Defence. *Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile 2017*, p. 98.

57 Supreme Decree No. 012-2017-DE (points V and VI).

(vertical, multilevel articulation) under the supraministerial guidance of the National Security and Defence Council (Consejo de Seguridad y Defensa Nacional).

The second selection criterion was to compare cases with different types of evolution and progress in the application of RfP standards at the national level according to recent research carried out by ECLAC and the IDB. In this sense, although both countries have raised their rating (from medium to high) in the recent past, Peru did so with a «substantial» degree of progress and Chile «regular»[58]. This disparity is at least partially explained by the nature and temporal scope of their planning instruments, contrasting the existence of a National Development Plan (PND)[59] (long term) in Peru with a Government Programme (medium term) in Chile[60]. It is also due to the greater formal institutionalisation of the process in Peru, with a system (SINAPLAN) and a governing planning body (CEPLAN) created by law[61], both of which are absent in Chile[62].

These differences form a contrasting frame of reference for sectoral planning. While in Chile it revolves around the ministries as the bodies responsible for formulating policy and planning priorities based on the global objectives defined in the government programmes[63], in Peru it is part of a top-down process of definitions by level (national-sectoral-institutional) whose methodological-conceptual articulation is the responsibility of a supra-ministerial entity such as CEPLAN. In this way, the multi-sectoral (PEM) and multi-annual sectoral (PESEM) plans are derived from National Policies (these in turn from the PEDN and the PGG[64]) and are operationalised by means of strategic (PEI) and operational (POI) plans, the dynamics of the preparation, updating, monitoring and evaluation of which are also parameterised by the CEPLAN[65].

The analysis of the case studies draws conceptually and methodologically on the RfP pillar measurement model presented by Kaufmann, Sanginés and García Moreno[66], whose design is framed within the PRODEV Evaluation System (SEP) developed by the IDB to assess the maturity of the state's institutional capacities in MfDR. In line with this, the analysis adopts the planning components identified by the SEP (strategic

58 Armijo, M. and Sanginés, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 58.

59 Plan Estratégico de Desarrollo Nacional Actualizado: Perú hacia 2021 (PEDN).

60 ECLAC (2017). *Overview of public management in Latin America and the Caribbean: citizen-centred open government*. Santiago (Chile), ECLAC. P. 46.

61 The National Strategic Planning System (SINAPLAN) and the National Centre for Strategic Planning (CEPLAN) were created by Legislative Decree No. 1088 (2008).

62 Máttar, J. and Cuervo, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

63 Máttar, J. and Cuervo, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 67.

64 General Government Policy (PGG) (Supreme Decree No. 056-2018-PCM).

65 For example, through the National Policy Guidelines (2018) and Institutional Planning Guidelines (2018).

66 Kaufmann, J., Sanginés, M. and García Moreno, M. *Op. cit.*

capacity, operability and participatory nature) and operationalises them through a simplified matrix of their respective indicators, to which is added the concordance between the sectoral plan (medium term) and the government plan (national level)[67]. This is in order to prioritise the applicability of the model in the face of the limitations that its application in a historically hermetic policy sector such as national security presents for the normative-documentary survey as a technique for gathering information.

The study is then structured on the basis of each of the planning components identified by the SEP using the following indicator matrix as an analytical reference: (1) strategic capacity: (1.1) existence of a medium-term sector plan, (1.2) alignment between the medium-term sector plan and the government's objectives and targets, (1.3) publication of the medium-term sector plan on the internet; (2) operationalisation: (2.1) identification of programmes, outputs and responsible units in the medium-term sector plan, (2.2) articulation between the medium-term sector plan and the budget and (2.3) breakdown of the medium-term sector plan into annual targets; (3) participatory nature: (3.1) participation of the legislative branch in the elaboration of the medium-term sector plan, (3.2) participation of civil society in the elaboration of the medium-term sector plan.

Strategic planning capacity

Sectoral planning in both countries is informed by policy guidelines of presidential origin (prepared at ministerial level) although their nature and linkage to government plans is dissimilar in each case. In Chile, the «Defence Policy» is embodied in the National Defence Book (LDN), an instrument regionally used as a confidence-building measure (CBM)[68] rather than as a trigger for domestic security planning cycles. In fact, the timing of its updating does not usually coincide with the presidential term of office[69]. Peru, on the other hand, systematically prepares the «National Security and Defence Policy» in the context of the SINAPLAN on the basis of the strategic objectives and actions established in the PEDN[70]. It should be noted that both policy documents are public and easily accessible on the internet[71].

67 For the SEP, sector planning (medium-term sector vision) is measured through the pillar «Programme and Project Management» (Kaufmann, Sanginés, García Moreno. *Op. cit.*, p. 69).

68 Un Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LIREC) (2015). *Basic guidelines for the elaboration of Defence White Papers* [online]. Lima: UN-LIREC.

69 The National Defence Books (LDN) were published in Chile in 1997, 2002, 2010 and 2017.

70 The National Security and Defence Policy (2017) references its objectives and guidelines with the provisions contemplated in Strategic Axis No. 3 (State and Governance) of the PEDN.

71 [Accessed: 18 October 2020]. Both documents are available, respectively, at the following links: https://www.defensa.cl/media/LibroDefensa.pdf and https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/normaslegales/decreto-supremo-que-aprueba-la-politica-de-seguridad-y-defen-decreto-supremo-n-012-2017-de-1600032-1/

Both countries have planning directives that operationalise these supra-ministerial orientations[72], which form the basis for a multi-level process of intra-sectoral definitions (Ministry-Joint Chiefs of Staff-Armed Forces). In Chile this is divided into segments (primary and secondary)[73] and its main products are the Strategic Plans for force employment (short term) and capacity building (long term). Peru is organised around the Multiannual Sectoral Plan of the Ministry of Defence (PESEM)[74], from which the institutional Strategic Plans (PEI) and Operational Plans (POI) of the Ministry[75], the Joint Command and the Armed Forces are derived. With the exception of the Peruvian planning directive[76], none of the above-mentioned documents are public. In Peru, however, the legal instruments of approval are secret and are formally classified as secret.

Operationalisation of planning

Restricting public access to the content of planning documents makes it impossible to analyse their operability. However, in Peru, it could be assumed that PESEM, PEI and POI together receive the best practices for this dimension of planning. This is by virtue of the guidelines in this direction contained in CEPLAN's methodological guides and also by examining the content of the plans of other areas available[77], where for each strategic action (classified by objectives and defined in terms of goods and services to be provided) their annualised goals, the responsible organisational units and the contributing investments[78]. In Chile, according to the LDN 2017, the study of the subject should cover the documents of the procurement programming stage in addition to the planning documents[79], especially those related to the defence investment system[80].

72 Defence Planning Directive (DIPLADE) and General Directive on Defence Sector Planning in the Military Field, respectively.

73 Supreme Decree No. 113 (2014) establishing the national defence planning process.

74 For example, the Updated Multiannual Sectoral Strategic Plan—PESEM 2017-2021 from the Ministry of Defence, approved by Ministerial Resolution No. 2054-2017-DE/SG.

75 For example, Institutional Strategic Plan—PEI 2018-2020 from the Ministry of Defence, approved by Ministerial Resolution No. 2084-2017-DE/SG, and Institutional Operational Plan—POI 2018 of the Ministry of Defence, approved by Ministerial Resolution No. 2116-2017-DE/SG.

76 For example, General Directive on Defence Sector Planning in the Military Field 2017-2021, approved by Ministerial Resolution 927-2017-DE/SG.

77 For more information on other sectoral plans, see: https://www.ceplan.gob.pe/

78 The tenth recital of the resolution approving the PESEM 2017-2021 (Ministerial Resolution No. 2054-2017-DE/SG) explains that the plan contains 4 sectoral strategic objectives, 22 strategic actions with their respective goals and military capability indicators.

79 Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB) System.

80 For more information see chapter XVII of the National Defence Sourcebook (LDN) 2017.

In Peru, the issue of programme budget financing is approached methodologically by using the annual operational plan as a tool to articulate the strategic plan with the budget, as understood by the specialised academy[81]. In this sense, the POI includes not only the multi-annual programming of operational activities and investments defined on the basis of the PEI but also their physical, costing and financial programming, thus linking strategic objectives and actions to budget categories. In Chile, the LDN 2017 defines the budget as the final stage of the integrated planning and control scheme (PPB), explaining the duality of existing funding sources[82] and describing the respective procedures and authorities responsible for its formulation and modification[83].

Participatory nature of planning

The scarce progress described by Armijo and Sanginés[84] in the adoption of RfP best practices in this dimension of planning would also apply to the national security sector, given that in the documents analysed in both countries there is almost no mention of the legislative branch's powers in the discussion and monitoring of the planning process. In this way, its participation is limited to the annual approval of the budget without prior involvement in the determination of the objectives and strategic guidelines that should underpin its formulation. The intervention of the Chilean Senate in the discussion on the National Security and Defence Strategy (ENSYD) represents an isolated case, made possible by an *ad-hoc* political decision of the Executive and not as part of a systematic dynamic of legislative participation in the elaboration of documents of this type.

Civil society participation in the planning process is foreseen in both countries. In Chile, the LDN 2017 refers to national legislation on associations and citizen participation in public management, highlighting the consultative role of the Civil Society Council of the Ministry of Defence (COSOC-MINDEF)[85]. In Peru, the very instrument that created the SINAPLAN[86] promotes the generation of synergies between the public sector and civil society, encouraging the coordination of plans through direct

81 Armijo, M. (2011). *Planificación estratégica e indicadores de desempeño en el sector público*. Santiago (Chile), Latin American and Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES). Pp. 21-25; and Berretta, N. and Kaufmann, J. (2011). *Gestión para resultados en el desarrollo en gobiernos subnacionales: m*ódulo 2, la planificación orientada a resultados. [S.l.], PROVED, INDES and IDB. Pp. 35-54.

82 Public Sector Budget Law and Reserved Copper Law (No. 13,196).

83 For more information see chapter XVI of the National Defence Sourcebook (LDN) (2017).

84 Armijo, M. and Sanginés, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

85 Ministry of National Defence. *Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile 2017*, p. 100.

86 Legislative Decree No. 1088 (2008). Article 10.

participation methodologies and opinion polls. The National Security and Defence Policy[87] also mentions the need to involve academia and civil society in the articulation and coordination of its objectives and guidelines. However, the aforementioned opacity of the sector's plans makes it impossible to analyse in depth the extent to which these forecasts have been used in practice.

Final considerations

The theoretical framework of national security planning in South America has not historically corresponded to that applicable to development, with the two evolving along parallel paths with little history of convergence. Thus, international cooperation regimes specialised in development management exclude national security as an area of analysis and use of their initiatives, representing a kind of *non-issue* for the main relevant regional bodies. This disconnect has its origins in the classic characterisation of national security and sustainable development as watertight and competing dimensions of state action—recall the famous economic dichotomy between guns and butter—and is currently manifested, for example, through the incorporation of a specific planning methodology for the national security sector (specifically for defence) such as capability-based planning.

However, in the last two decades this world view has begun to lose its practical relevance with the expansion of security as a policy sector (no longer limited to national defence institutions) and the emergence of multiple concurrent responsibilities of national defence itself with other areas of public policy directly linked to development, as in Chile, where the military instrument contributes to the country's development, for example, in emergency or disaster situations. Another factor that fosters this ongoing paradigm shift lies in the imposition of the results-based management model on national security through cross-cutting state reform and modernisation strategies, a situation that encourages sectoral methodological innovations such as, for example, the technical articulation between results-oriented and capacity-based planning within the specific institutional sphere of national defence.

The study confirms that such a confluence is technically possible as they do not involve methodological proposals that are incompatible by definition, as they are usually classified as such, and are in fact found to be compatible to a greater or lesser degree in the cases analysed. It also demonstrates the instrumental applicability of the results-oriented planning measurement scheme promoted by ECLAC and the IDB to national security in its different institutional configurations (classic or expanded), not without necessary adaptations of scope and content to its particularities, especially in relation to the confidential nature of a large part of its documents. Along these lines, the publication of dissemination versions of the plans could be considered, as in other

87 Supreme Decree No. 012-2017-DE (point VI).

parts of the world, so that the consistency and methodological traceability of the planning process can be evaluated without socialising sensitive information.

The scarce academic production on the subject and the absence of technical standards emanating from the competent international bodies represent a limitation both for the construction of specialised scientific knowledge and for the development of good management practices. This analytical-referential vacuum (only scarcely covered by the local third sector) favours the generation of endogenous responses per country of a more political than technical nature, losing the possibility of finding common solutions to shared problems whose identification could also constitute a measure of regional mutual trust. This should undoubtedly prompt a substantive rethink of regional development cooperation regimes, whose politico-normative rigidity prevents the national provision of solutions that are technically already within reach.

The continuous improvement of such technical assistance solutions should be the convergent vector of academic, non-governmental (think tanks) and intergovernmental efforts of a triangular, north-south and especially south-south nature, with their thematic agenda of work being set in at least two directions. First, in the conceptual articulation between development results and security capacities, identifying a model public value chain for the sector applicable to the different normative-institutional variants adopted by the national security sector in the region. Second, in the design of a methodological matrix for the measurement of *results-oriented security planning*, based on good practices for each of the planning components (strategic capacity, operationality and participatory nature).

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A reversal of security relations. New scenarios of tension and trajectories: the case of the ELN

Abstract

This article constitutes a reflection on the mutation of the tactical actions of the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia and its implications in neighboring countries and in regional dynamics. This discussion revolves around critical positions on security in order to go beyond the State-centric approach and propose the need for strategic and anticipatory balances to understand the exacerbation of tensions and new trajectories of this guerrilla for the next decade. Thus, this article constitutes a theoretical-critical and methodological reflection on security and prospects of a highly sensitive problem, especially on the Colombian-Ecuadorian and Colombian-Venezuelan border. It is committed to unveiling the new ideological and operational rationalities of the ELN, especially on the borders of Colombia and Venezuela.

Preliminary findings show that the regional literature has worked in a limited way on the relationship between security and prospects regarding the change in the operational position of the ELN. It concludes in the need to resize the gaze and propose new analytics that allow us to understand the problem more comprehensively.

Keywords

Critical security studies, border dynamics, critical prospective, criminal ecosystems.

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Introduction

Road to security dissent. The contribution of critical perspectives

The detonation of the car bomb at the General Santander Police School in Bogotá (17 January 2019) is not an isolated event in terms of the new rationalities of a long-standing guerrilla group such as the ELN. This has forced expert researchers and analysts to rethink new theoretical, methodological and analytical approaches to security. In fact, the change in the conception of this group's operational areas and the tactical manoeuvres adopted have revealed a mutation from its own ideological and interest bases. This, among other factors, can be evidenced by the fusion of the various illegal groups that operate along the porous borders, and what several authors consider to be the configuration of complex criminal ecosystems.

Given that so-called mainstream security studies, legitimised and almost carved in stone for several decades, have shown weaknesses and analytical limitations in understanding the new security scenarios of today's world, this article seeks to critically unveil the new security scenarios. The political-strategic management of states requires a framework of social, moral and political responsibility to protect populations from traditional and emerging threats, for which a study with new parameters that allow for the redefinition and tactical mutations of the National Liberation Army is an obligatory task. These redefinitions should be oriented towards the production of inputs of high strategic value, flexible and adaptable to VUCA scenarios[1], in order to broaden and deepen the understanding of the new dynamics of regional security and therefore a systematic reflection of categories associated with security and human rights, such as: protection, continuous strategic anticipation, the construction of early warnings that contribute not only to the state as the sole actor responsible for security, but that guarantee the inclusion of new actors (interagency actions) that in one way or another are involved in the contexts of security management (public and private sector).

The entire foregoing reflection is linked to the need to propose new ways of understanding and designing actions that guarantee better governance in regional security, especially for Colombian-Ecuadorian border relations, without marginalising the component of social responsibility and ethical commitment. For this purpose, several of the postulates of the Welsh School academic Richard Wyn Jones[2] were taken as a reference, in order to demystify the state-centric influence of security that relies on the resolution of security issues through the use of military force. From a critical perspective, the authors propose a systemic understanding of international phenomena beyond the state-military perspective, involving new —non-state—actors and issues of global relevance that must be studied in depth when studying complex and dif-

1 VUCA: Volatile, Uncertain, Changing and Ambiguous.

2 Wyn, R. (1999). *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*. Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Pp. 105.

fuse phenomena, which include domestic, intermestic, international, transnational, trans-regional and other factors.

With this aim in mind, this article takes a brief look at the hegemonic positions on security with their main assumptions and analytical categories, and then contrasts them, exploring the behaviour of the ELN in Colombian territory from a critical security perspective, with the intention of tracing its trajectories and incidences over the last few years and its multi-systemic implications.

Traditional security trajectories

In order to adequately situate the case study of the ELN guerrilla group, it has been considered pertinent to start from the different paradigms, approaches and lines of thought that have coalesced around International Relations and Security Studies as an area of study[3] of their evolution around what from the mainstream were considered 'isms', schools of thought and/or research programmes. Thus, all traditional conceptions have been repeated in most analyses of Colombian conflictology in the region, and have prevented complex and poly metric case studies. From this consideration, starting from a macro-understanding that encompasses foundationalist theoretical positions and orthodox methods grouped around Security Studies, we seek to trace categories and analytical units that transcend the immobility of the hegemonic approaches. For this reason, and by means of what is known as an *iterative movement* of research[4], this analytical exercise has been developed, relevant to the deepening of the case study. Without attempting to delve into the advent of intermediate approaches such as constructivist ones, the orientation of this article is based on some postulates seen as dissident or critical, escaping from onto-epistemic and methodological prisons to enter into new dynamics of research and academic production[5].

Morgenthau, who is considered a seminal author of the realist movement, especially in his *Politics among Nations: the struggle for power and peace*, alludes to the fact that the rationality of statesmen and their actions in terms of national interest are based on the quest for power, on the basis of which heads of state think and act in terms of interest, a condition that is evident in the course of history[6], and shows that realism is based on a Hobbesian view of man. Moreover, the so-called traditional paradigm,

3 In this regard, there is an unresolved debate as to whether Security Studies should be included as part of International Relations or International Studies with a broader and more encompassing vision.

4 Interactivity in security research refers to the movement of permanently contrasting empirical data with theoretical categories, not in a linear fashion but in what Edgar Morin recognises as cognitive recursionloops.

5 Booth, K. (2007)- *Theory of World Security*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

6 Morgenthau, H. (1993). *Politics Among Nations: the struggle for power and peace*. New York, Thompson, McGraw-Hill. Pp.25-26.

based on realist theory, qualifies conceptions of security in that: 1) nation-states, in a 'state-centred' system, are the key actors; 2) domestic politics can be clearly separated from foreign policy; 3) international politics is a struggle for power in an anarchic environment; 4) there are asymmetric gradations of nations' capabilities in a decentralised national system of states possessing legal equality or sovereignty[7]

Realism functionally conceives anarchy as an onto-epistemic form and position to explain International Relations[8]. Ultimately, anarchy is understood as the absence of an authority that motivates agreements or prevents the use of force. It is the nature of the international system that explains why states behave in such a way when seeking security in the international environment.

Moreover, for realists, anarchy produces self-help in the world. The power factor over states implies that the logic of self-help produces competition in the international system, which generates the security dilemma and at the same time problematises the possibilities for collective action[9] [author's translation]. In international studies, the security dilemma still helps to understand how states, despite not intending to attack each other militarily, the fragile context of mistrust, insecurity, fear, uncertainty—together with the central premise of no central political authority—is sufficient for war to find its way recurrently[10]. For example, the regular purchase of arms by the Colombian and Venezuelan armies[11] determined that both states will reinforce their borders in the event of a military conflict between 2014-2016. In this anarchic system, characterised by the absence of hegemonic stability, the international system would be susceptible to a Hobbesian war of 'everyone against everyone'[12] which makes realism a pessimistic approach to state action. In this sense, national interest and policies, as has already been emphasised, are framed in a struggle for the maintenance of power in which individuality and selfishness are at play. From this perspective, security becomes an instrument of protection against the external invasion of military force between states. Therefore, each state is responsible for strengthening its military capabilities to

7 In critical security studies, asymmetric graduations are the disparity between states' design and management of capabilities (which include various dimensions).

8 We have chosen to write International Relations when referring to the discipline; and international relations in lower case when referring to its application.

9 Agius, C. (2013). Social Constructivism. In Allan Collins (ed.). *Contemporary Security Studies*. London, Oxford University Press. Pp. 96.

10 Terradas, N. (2009). El dilema de la seguridad y su importancia para el estudio de las relaciones internacionales. *Letras Internacionales Magazine*. Universidad Ort Uruguay, 88(3), p. 1.

11 Since the implementation of Plan Colombia in 2000, Colombia has received USD 8 billion in aid from the United States for the fight against drug trafficking, while Venezuela has received USD 8 billion since Hugo Chávez came to power. Chávez in 1998 received military aid from China and Russia for deterrence purposes. Both states have had political-diplomatic frictions over their different perceptions of neighbourhood threat.

12 Ripley, B. (1993). Foreign Policy and International Relations Theory. *Political Psychology*, Vol 14, (3), p. 403.

protect its national security, which encompasses sovereignty, territory and population, all of which produce high perceptions of insecurity among states.

Under this consideration, the objective of security, for realism, is the identification of threats, vulnerabilities and risk factors that affect the inhabitants of a geographical space for which military forces would be in charge of preventive and/or dissuasive actions to avoid external attacks[13]. It is worth noting that realism was very popular during the Cold War, as it marks a key moment in which two superpowers competed for military and political power and geopolitical influence in various regions of the world. The United States and the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics became mutual threats to international security from 1949 to 1990. In fact, the realist school of International Relations has predominated in Security and War Studies since Thucydides' Peloponnesian War, including also Machiavelli's Prince, Sun Tzu's Art of War, and Clausewitz's War, which coincide on the themes of balance of power and hegemonic transition, which constitute core conceptual categories in realist studies.[14] These classical authors have been cited in order to understand the matrix from which the influence of Hobbesian philosophical postulates in the construction of the classical view of security is alluded to.

Although there are various theoretical interpretations of realism in explaining the international system and predictions, most authors agree that the core of the school is that the «key actors in world politics are sovereigns acting rationally to maintain their security, power and wealth in a conflictual international system where no supranational authority dominates to regulate conflicts or motivate peace agreements»[15].

During the Cold War, most security studies were about states, strategies, military power and the *status quo*[16] as immutable concepts, which could not be questioned. In the traditional realist approach, all state actors are also concerned with maintaining the balance of power and associating themselves with the preponderant hegemony in their geographical space for 40 years as a survival strategy. During this period, the term *threat* was key to the legitimisation of national security doctrines insofar as the structural conception was homologated by the idea of 'absence of threat', i.e. the reduction of state actors interested in harming another state or 'the low probability of harm in order to reduce power'[17]. In this sense, strategic orientations are circumscribed to the games of power whereby the military marked the rationality.

13 Brauch, H. (2011). Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks. In H.G. Brauch (ed.). *Coping with Global Environment Change, Disasters and Security*. Berlin, Springer. P. 61.

14 Levy, J. (1998). The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1, (1), pp. 139-165.

15 *Ibidem*, pp.155.

16 *Ibidem*, pp.160-161

17 Baldwin, D. (1997). Security Studies and the End of the Cold War. *World Politics*, 48, (1), p. 117.

It is also recognised that this current understands security as prioritising militarism and the culture of the exercise of force to confront other state actors using violence. Moreover, realism marginalises the existence of 'other types of values by identifying threats at the economic (financial crises), environmental (earthquakes or river pollution) or political (crises in democratic models) level'[18].

Likewise, as part of the realist approach, neorealism shows a greater focus on security issues, especially in the priority given to the management of war threats, which was quickly criticised, especially in its position on the management of the security system, the nuclear issue and, in particular, the issue of hegemony[19].

In arguing the Colombian case from a realist perspective—which is the prevailing one in the literature—it can be inferred that the role of the state has been overemphasised and that despite the agreement with the FARC-EP, neither the military forces nor other key security institutions have been able to effectively control or recover the integrity of the territory[20]. Although Alvaro Uribe's Security and Defence Policy (2004), Juan Manuel Santos' Comprehensive Security and Defence Policy for Prosperity (2011) and Iván Duque's Defence and Security Policy (2019) emphasise the strengthening of state institutions, especially in the areas of justice, social development and security, throughout the country, the militarisation of the most marginalised and vulnerable areas continues to be the main solution to any illegal activity. The border areas and certain rural sectors located in the Andes, Amazonia and on the Pacific and Caribbean coasts have weak state institutions and a lack of legitimacy in the conduct of political and developmental affairs, which means that guerrillas, illegal armed groups and criminal gangs operate, albeit clandestinely, with a certain degree of freedom. The reason for this is that the Colombian state has not been able to definitively establish concrete prospective strategic routes to replace illegal activities with legal ones at all border points with Ecuador. For example, projects to replace coca leaf crops in the area of Tumaco (Nariño) and Puerto Ospina (Putumayo) with coffee, potatoes, onions, cocoa and other products fail to compete with the domestic market. In addition, the different illegal groups co-opt the population to insert them into illegal businesses such as smuggling goods and building laboratories for processing cocaine paste[21]. Added to this is the dispute between armed groups to control various strategic geographic spaces or illegal routes in Colombia, which in some cases forces them to form alliances to redefine and mutate their tactical manoeuvres, in symbiotic

18 *Ibidem*, pp, 130.

19 Walt, S. (1998). The Renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies Quarterly. P. 30

20 During the end of Andres Pastrana's government, and the beginning of Alvaro Uribe's government in the first phase, even when mention was made of integrated action between various state actors and institutions, it was only during Alvaro Uribe's second administration that the construction of the inter-agency doctrine and the strengthening of state capacity linked to governance and state capacity were consolidated.

21 UNODC (2018). Report on Coca Crop Monitoring in Colombia. UN. P. 24.

alliances as in the case of the ELN, in order to guarantee better returns on their operations. On the other hand, there is no presence of justice for the resolution of legal or labour conflicts between citizens living in border areas, 'justice or settling of scores by hired killers is quite common'[22]. Colombia has requested assistance from hegemonic countries—the United States and members of the European Union—to strengthen its force and intelligence capabilities; in fact, since the early 2000s the Colombian state has focused on regaining sovereignty through violence, reducing coca leaf cultivation and forcing the guerrillas to negotiate a peace agreement[23].

What is happening between the Colombian state and the ELN from a realist point of view? According to data from the Ministry of Defence in Bogotá, the ELN in 2017 increased by almost 1,000 members to a group with more than 4,000 members - although according to military intelligence it may currently number 2,500 members[24]. Uribe and Santos militarised their response with different nuances in order to weaken the Marxist group on the battlefield and force them to negotiate at the negotiating table. Although in some areas of Colombia the ELN has the characteristics of an irregular army, its armed force is much more diffuse and dynamic, with a horizontal structure among its fronts, great autonomy among them, which has made several of its fronts operate to obtain their own resources and financing in the interior of Venezuela, with groups of drug traffickers in the Caribbean, and in the illegal extraction of natural resources in Chocó and near the border with Ecuador in Nariño.[25]

Liberal security trajectories

While the liberal tradition can be understood from the historical period of the Enlightenment[26], in grassroots thinking the liberal school of thought—with different approaches and nuances—was developed as a reaction to the hegemony of epistemic realism in International Relations and Security Studies. Liberal theorists argue that states live in an anarchic system and behave rationally selfishly; however, they defend the idea that it is not necessary to resort to war or violence to resolve conflicts between

22 Bolaños, E. (2019) El sicariato está acabando con la vida de los exguerrilleros. *El Espectador* newspaper. 23 June.

23 Vargas, A. (2018). La Fuerza Pública: una institución nacional. *Ola Política Magazine*, Opinion Section. 15 December.

24 For further reference, see: *Ministerio de Defensa – Colombia. Política de Defensa y Seguridad.* 2019.

25 Various authors (2020). *Fundación Ideas para la Paz.* ¿Qué hacer con el ELN? *Opciones ante una derrota militar lejana y un diálogo improbable. Notas estratégicas.* Bogotá. January, pp. 1-50.

26 Morgan, P. (2013). Liberalism. In Allan Collins (ed.). *Contemporary Security Studies*. New York, Oxford
University Press. Pp. 28-41.

states[27]. For liberals, it is possible to maintain cooperation between states to discuss and solve global problems. They consider nation-states to be relevant actors in the international system, but not the only ones; there are other key actors such as: international organisations, non-governmental organisations, transnational corporations, the media, civil society, which struggle to gain influence on various issues: the environment, respect for human rights, gender equity and equality, international trade, finance and democracy. For example, several NGOs in Bogotá such as *Fundación Ideas para la Paz* have published analytical publications for the UN, OAS, the European Union, Human Rights Watch and *Periodismo sin Fronteras* to monitor the disappearances of social and indigenous activists in various sectors of the country, as well as to motivate President Iván Duque to reopen the peace talks with the ELN and maintain the agreements with the FARC-EP. In 2019 alone, 118 leaders were assassinated in Colombia[28], victims also include FARC-EP dissidents seeking peace[29].

The behaviour of states is determined by domestic actors with power and influence in decision-making within the framework of their own political culture and not derived from the international system. In this context, foreign policy is domestic with an outward projection[30], i.e. the fixation of the state's identity and its interests on the basis of which its dynamics within the international system are understood is essentialist.

Thus, while realism focuses on the struggle for power and security in an anarchic world, the liberal tradition looks to a benign international society where anarchy does not imply disorder and chaos. States may have conflicts of interest, but in seeking to maximise their economic wealth and maintain security, they are willing to create international institutions to regulate conflict and promote cooperation.[31] All these arguments constitute the main precepts of liberalism, on the basis of which man is considered free by nature. Liberalism focuses on the idea of cooperation for progress liberal political thought has succeeded in bringing a non-military discourse into the security studies debate. States continue to be the main object of reference, but the existence of other dimensions and/or spheres involving the individual, the human being, the citizen as a subject of rights, is also recognised. It is also committed to the possibility of achieving peace by seeking fair and supportive international orders that, through cooperation, can consolidate greater democracy abroad and, therefore, guarantee greater security among them.

In short, while realism «concentrates on explaining and predicting the behaviour of states in the international system, liberalism looks at the state as a unit but prioritises

27 Keohane, R. (1989). *International Institutions and State Power*. Boulder, Westview Press. Pp. 1-15.

28 See data from the report of the Ombudsman's Office in Colombia. January 2020.

29 For further reference, see *The Guardian* newspaper. Front Line Defenders, which describes it as the nation's most bloody region. Semana magazine, 20 August 2019.

30 Morgan, P. *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

31 Levy, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 159.

the analysis and study of the domestic subjects that are in charge of elaborating and discussing the issues on the foreign policy agenda, including security»[32]. It is argued that individuals involved in the decision-making process recognise states as part of international regimes that are «a body of values, principles, laws and rules for the prevention and resolution of conflicts»[33], which further helps to make war or violence the last option in a scenario of clash of interests; consequently, cooperation cannot be difficult between states and, therefore, is optimistic in security matters, avoiding war by promoting trust between state and non-state actors.

This position is shared by Joseph Nye and Lynn-Jones[34] who warns against the risk of focusing Security Studies on the military; in fact, they consider that «it is necessary to widen the lenses of analysis to understand and comprehend international security; therefore, it is not necessary to fall into the militarisation of threats within states or at state borders»[35]. «There are many dangers or risks that can be solved with the support of civil society, political parties, international organisations, NGOs or think tanks. More non-state actors need to be included in decision-making processes to avoid deaths or human rights violations»[36].

The end of the Cold War triggered discussion of new threats once the Iron Curtain ceased to be a problem for the West. In fact, it is considered that issues on the security agenda are no longer handled by the military in Latin America, but rather the topics have broadened to include economic, political, human rights and environmental issues[37]. At the same time, at the beginning of this millennium, a number of regional and hemispheric conferences were held with the participation of various international institutions to discuss the new role of the state in the protection of the individual and society in general[38].

On the other hand, during the last decade, reflections on international security have involved local and provincial/departmental government authorities in order to understand the demands of the population, as in the case of Ecuador and Colombia in the face of the presence of coca leaf crops or criminal groups linked to drug trafficking, which has boosted the participation of various actors in the face of a problem. This is how the security agenda is being demilitarised[39].

32 Williams, P. (2013). Security Studies: an introduction. New York, Routledge. P .4.

33 Ibidem, pp.6.

34 Nye, J. And Lynn-Jones, S. (1988). International Security Studies: a report of a conference on the state and the field. *International Security*, 12, (4), p. 8.

35 *Ibidem*, p. 11.

36 *Ibidem*, p. 12.

37 Rojas, F. (2012). *Seguridad Internacional, el espacio y posición de América Latina.* Buenos Aires, Editorial Teseo. P. 24.

38 Ibidem, p. 25.

39 GarcÍa, B. (2018). Presencia de Carteles de la Droga en Ecuador. Interview on Vision Radio, Wednesday, 19 December.

Security liberals interpret a threat as «an action or sequence of events that is intended to do drastic harm and that affects the quality of life of the population of a State; or, that reduces the survival options available to a government, the private sector, the non-governmental sector (...) among others»[40]. There is also an interplay between freedom and security as «citizens agree to give up their freedom in exchange for more security and protection from the state»[41]. Former US President Barack Obama had already raised the issue in 2014 when discussions began on the surveillance[42] of US citizens by the National Security Agency (NSA) or the National Intelligence Agency (CIA) in order to prevent the Islamic State or Al Qaeda from carrying out terrorist attacks.

From a liberal perspective, Colombia is part of several international organisations committed to fighting human rights violations, drug trafficking and international terrorism. Each year, the Colombian government is accountable to the Organisation of American States (OAS), the United Nations (UN), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) for its achievements in security issues, and policymakers are held accountable to the set of principles, laws, rules and norms that Bogotá has committed to respect. On the other hand, in Bogotá, with the participation of government authorities and civil society, threats have been defined through the drafting of Colombia's Security and Defence Policy.

Now that the talks with the ELN and the Colombian state have broken down under President Duque's government, the possibility of meeting again is becoming increasingly remote for many international organisations. It has been identified that there are two sectors within the Marxist guerrillas: a moderate line that is willing to continue talks with state and international actors; and another, more hardline sector that continues to bet on the armed struggle, which has gained strength. The role with third actors such as Venezuela and Cuba has been weakened by the constant confrontations between Bogotá and Caracas. At present, there are reportedly no channels of communication between the two capitals due to mistrust at diplomatic, military and political levels[43]. International organisations are committed to a solution that involves various civil society actors: academia, the media, regional and local leaders, but their offers are very distant due to the high level of violence in various departments with social movements such as Nariño, Putumayo, Huila, Caquetá, Cauca, among others.

The UN has insisted in several communiqués that the paths towards dialogue, confidence-building measures that contribute to the de-escalation of the armed con-

40 Ullman, R. (2011). Redifining Security. In Christopher Hughes and Yew Ming Lai (eds.). *Security Studies: a reader*. New York, Routledge. P. 17.

41 *Ibidem*, p. 14.

42 This would consist of spying on e-mails, social media accounts, telephone lines of any citizen for national security reasons. The issue was also raised by Snowden in the documentary 'Citizen Four'. Snowden is a former NSA and CIA official.

43 *Fundación Ideas para la Paz. Op. cit.*, pp. 1-50.

frontation and much less the «negotiating» offers between the two actors should not be closed[44]. The multilateral body insists that the possibility of dialogue must be preserved, but for the moment it is a dream. Other actors involved in a peaceful solution between the ELN and the Colombian state are the Catholic Church (Vatican), the governments of Germany, Switzerland, Holland, Italy, Sweden and the International Committee of the Red Cross, who have been insisting since 2019 on resuming the Havana talks. In addition, through communiqués both the UN and the Vatican have called on President Duque to stop declaring Cuba a «country that harbours terrorists».[45]

Constructivist security trajectories

Constructivist security thinking derives from the School of Critical Security Studies which originated in 1989 in England and Denmark in order to question the classical premises of realism and liberalism that explain why states behave the way they do in the international system. Constructivism considers security in a subjective way, i.e. «it is interested in explaining how perceptions of fears, threats, vulnerabilities and risks are constructed among state and non-state actors»[46]; it also refers to the construction of subjective and intersubjective values regarding certain international phenomena; these values are inscribed in the culture and interests of those who construct the sense of security and insecurity[47]. Thus, the meaning of security is socially constructed[48].

Constructivism contributes to security because it focuses on the relational dimensions[49] that give rise to interactions between actors—sharing values, interests, commitments—that result in the construction of identities in the face of conflict resolution or prevention in the international sphere. In this sense, by studying identities it is possible to identify the position of actors or predict their behaviour[50]. Thus: «A gun in the hands of a friend has a different meaning than a gun in the hands of an enemy»[51].

44 International Crisis Group. Gold and Grief in Venezuela's Violent South (2019). Latin America Report No. 73. 24. August, p. 7.

45 See, *El Comercio* newspaper (2019). ELN apela a la ONU y al Vaticano para reanudar diálogo con el gobierno de Colombia. 3 July.

46 Brauch, H. *Op. cit.*, p. 64.

47 *Ibidem*, p. 64.

48 Wendt, A. (1994). Anarchy is What States Make of it: the social construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*, vol 46, (2), p. 394.

49 Agius, C. *Op. cit.*, p. 97.

50 *Ibidem,* p. 98.

51 Wendt, A. *Op. cit.*, p. 394.

Emphasising the issue of identity, for example, White House decision-makers are concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and reactors in Iran, leading to heightened insecurity in the Middle East and Central Asia, but not Israel and India, which also produce nuclear energy. In the second case, the two countries are strategic allies of Washington as a result of security cooperation and mutual trust agreements; while Tehran is not so close to Western principles[52].

On the other hand, recognised experts close to the various critical perspectives have put forward new concepts to redefine security in an evolutionary and adaptive way to the new realities of the world. It is believed that the hegemonic understanding of security proposed by realism «is rather narrow and limited because it is based on the Cold War context».[53] Furthermore, «third world countries must not reproduce the dominant thinking provided by Eurocentrism in the face of conflicts (...) it is necessary to create new doctrines and studies that break with the traditional vision of National Security»[54].

Finally, they insist on situating security phenomena in local and regional coordinates, without restricting themselves to the view of the so-called international system. «Many of the problems have to do with ethnic, cultural or even religious conflicts; therefore, there is no need for military intervention»[55]; the West's approach to conflict resolution in Africa, Central Asia and Southeast Asia has undoubtedly been to use military force.

From a constructivist perspective, the mutation of the ELN's tactical actions is centred on understanding how the interactions between the actors (government agencies) have managed to classify the FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas as terrorists. On the other hand, it is worth analysing the agreement between the state and various sectors of civil society, such as businesses, think tanks, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and the church, on the urgent need to combat coca leaf cultivation, confront criminal groups linked to drug trafficking and reach a peace agreement. However, a version of repression and human rights violations has been constructed in public discourse as one of the strategies applied in the administrations of Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) and Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018)[56]. However, the analysis of these strategies requires a broader vision that allows us to understand how actions have been taken to reduce the areas of influence of armed groups in border departments. However, it is undeniable that there are tensions regarding the construction of a national

52 Williams, P. *Op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

53 Acharya, A. The Third World and Security Studies. In Christopher Hughes and Yew Ming Lai (eds.). *Security Studies: a reader*. New York, Routledge. P. 5.

54 *Ibidem*, pp. 1-10.

55 *Ibidem*, pp.16.

56 This statement corresponds to the review of various media and policy papers from various foundations working on the issue such as: FESCOL and Konrad-Adenauer.

consensus to find peace in a conflict of the nature of the Colombian conflict, given the existence of a crossed framework of perceptions legitimised by official communication channels and digital channels.

According to data analysed by the Colombian Ministry of Defence[57], the ELN guerrillas have stopped obtaining financing through drug trafficking and kidnapping (extortion), and extortion (in the oil sector). Today, they have reportedly diversified their sources into smuggling, illegal mining and money laundering. Regional experts indicate that at the beginning of the current millennium, the ELN was located in sectors close to the construction of the oil pipeline that crosses the departments of Arauca, Sucre, Boyacá, Santander and Bolívar towards the Atlantic coast; also, with the trans-Andean pipeline between Orito (Putumayo) and Tumaco (Nariño), and finally along the route of the pipeline in Antioquia with the aim of kidnapping several officials of national and transnational oil companies. On the other hand, according to the Early Warning System of the Ombudsman's Office in Colombia, both the ELN and the Gulf Clan[58] charge taxes for the entry of gold mining machinery in different regions of the country, and «demand 5% of the daily gold production from the miners, and in others, impose a charge for each illegal mine in use»[59].

Drug trafficking would be profitable in the Caribbean area, particularly in the department of Bolívar, which went from having 1,000 hectares of coca leaf in 2015 to more than 8,000 in 2018, a period that coincides with the recovery of the guerrillas. Finally, another profitable activity would be on the border with Venezuela with the smuggling of gasoline and a long list of goods such as auto parts, food and foreign currency[60]. There is evidence of a mutability of ELN actions with regional mafias and dissident groups of the FARC-EP and paramilitary groups[61].

Despite these changes in the ELN's actions, there are currently splits and internal tensions between a military and a more political line[62] over how to move forward in a new process of negotiation and dialogue with the government of Iván Duque. The political or soft line would be willing to surrender weapons in order to advance the peace process. Both sides are part of the Central Command (COCE) and the National Directorate, where the most moderate and open to peace sector is made up of «Pablo

57 All data and statistics appear in Colombia's various defence plans and policies.

58 Both groups are rivals and are fighting for power in Colombia's coffee-growing region.

59 Ombudsman's office (2017). *Grupos armados ilegales y nuevos escenarios de riesgo en el posacuerdo.* Bogotá. P. 4.

60 See *El Tiempo de Colombia* newspaper. Pablito y Venezuela, los dos dilemas del ELN. www.eltiempo.com

61 For more information, see RCN Radio (2019). Denuncian alianza criminal entre ELN y disidencias en frontera con Venezuela. 10 January. www.rcn-radio.com (margins).

62 *Fundación Ideas para la Paz. Op. cit.*, pp. 1-54.

Beltrán and Gabino», who have differences with the Atlantic and South-western fronts in laying down their arms.

Not all of the ELN leadership was in favour of the decision of the car bomb in Bogotá at the beginning of 2019 that killed 22 cadets and injured 80, and even less so with the armed strike of 14 February (2020) that threatened to attack strategic sectors of the country such as the electricity infrastructure and the heavy crude oil pipeline. The guerrillas, despite their internal division, would have a presence in 10% of the territory, and in 112 municipalities[63]. On a daily basis, it struggles to withdraw into sectors formerly controlled by the FARC-EP, while at the same time confronting the Colombian state military forces, criminal groups, paramilitary groups and dissident groups. While this is happening, the Duque government's strategy continues to be armed confrontation and not to give in to dialogue as long as he is president[64].

The transition from strategic to security-critical studies

Having briefly surveyed realism, liberalism and constructivism, and their views on the concept of security, it is now time to examine the debate on the nature of the field of Security Studies. Although seen as a branch or sub-discipline of International Relations[65], security studies remains at the heart of the discipline[66]. Due to its dynamism and importance in world politics, there have been several contributions to Security Studies since the end of the Cold War[67].

Since the 1990s, an effervescence of positions has emerged to explain the position and decision making of state and non-state actors in the international order, as well as to question the state-centric perspective and its military arm in conflict resolution[68]. Critical perspectives have contributed to a re-imagining of the ontology of security and the issues to be explored or understood within Security Studies. Well-known critical scholars such as Wyn Jones (1999), Cha (2000) and Booth (2005) argue that security studies in the new millennium should not only focus on war, but also on the resolution of conflicts by non-state actors, and how they strive for peace. They insist

63 See *El Tiempo* newspaper (2020). Paro armado del ELN amenaza a Colombia. 14 February.

64 *Fundación Ideas para la Paz. Op. cit.*, p. 27.

65 Wyn, R. *Op. cit.*, pp. 102-103.

66 Booth, K. (2005). Critical Security Studies and World Politics. London, Lynne Rienner Publishers. P. 261.

67 Cha, V.D. (2000). Globalization and the Study of International Security. *Journal of Peace Research*, 37, (1). Pp. 393-394.

68 Wyn, R. *Op. cit.*, p. 110.

on determining the conceptualisation of security studies aimed particularly at defining «the object or subject to be protected or securitised»[69].

As has been insisted, security studies focused on the issues of war, its causes and implications; likewise, attention was concentrated on the high politics of the State oriented towards the «design of defensive and dissuasive strategies against an adversary or enemy»[70]; in short, «they concentrated on conceptualising threats from a military vision for the integrity of the territory and the protection of the sovereignty of a geographic space»[71].

From the above, security studies for the Anglo-Saxon mainstream[72] became strategic studies[73] «to explain military relations between states, to identify hegemonic actors, to explain power relations in the international system which justified state-centrism in security studies»[74]. Despite the continued existence of strategic studies in educational institutions, security questions and criticisms have increased. Several critical security experts agree that once one looks critically at the referent object of security, it is essential to question its nature and scope; thus the state is not the only actor that should be in charge of security, but also non-state actors have the ability to «voice, question and create policies linked to a more humane and less repressive security».[75] Therefore, transcending the military perspective necessarily involves other security actors such as populations and societies in a broader agenda of issues (environment, transnational crime, converging threats, poverty and development, trade, use of light weapons, weapons of mass destruction, among others). The critical perspective also advocates demilitarising solutions to migration, the environment and crimes related to drug trafficking, incorporating the principles of inter-agencyism into security management.

In addition, various critical perspectives have been consolidated through the construction of conceptual innovations that highlight problems linked to security, such as the increase in deaths, illnesses, poverty and oppression of millions of human beings[76]. The idea of *emancipation* as a seminal concept has served to transcend the outmoded paradigms that led humanity to violent events based on race, gender or class. Indeed, emancipation invites theorists and students of critical security studies to «question

69 Collins, A. (2013). *Contemporary Security Studies*. London, Oxford University Press. P. 37.

70 Wyn, R. *Op. cit.*, p. 110.

71 *Ibidem*, p. 111.

72 This involves the US and UK working more on theory and doctrine to strengthen military capabilities, and training decision-makers for war. Wyn (1999).

73 There are many tensions in the academic debate as to when strategic studies became an autonomous discipline.

74 Wyn. *Op. cit.*, pp. 111

75 Booth, K. *Op. cit.*, p. 265.

76 Booth, K. *Op. cit.*, p. 266.

theories and practices that have shaped political life, all in order to safeguard human life»[77].

Emancipation is conceived as an instrument to judge the continuity of classical security paradigms and to invite the scientific community to generate knowledge in favour of the individual, the collective and the coexistence of global citizens[78]; in short, «security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, without power and violence, produces real security»[79].

Prolegomena to a new security challenge. The mutation of the National Liberation Army's tactical actions

Based on the above, and once the theoretical and methodological narrowness of the realist vision[80] of security studies has been identified, this article takes a critical approach to unveil the dynamics and rationalities of non-state actors that threaten regional security, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN). This guerrilla organisation, acting alone along the borders of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela over the last decade, has grown stronger in a tangled web of terrorism, criminal gangs, drug trafficking and transnational organised crime. This particularity has catapulted it as a striking object of study for academics and researchers in the region. In fact, security literature is gradually shifting towards more systemic and complex analyses that question the referent object of security from more heterodox perspectives and propose security governance mechanisms that go beyond the military component. This novel approach seeks to explore in depth the relational dynamics, the impact of contexts, the historical-cultural, political and ideological determinants, and the discursive logics of legitimisation that have influenced ELN's trajectories and projections.

For all these reasons, understanding the ELN's tactical mutation in the context of the Colombian state's conflict requires it to be considered as a non-state actor that, transcending borders, is threatening the entire region. Moreover, their current tactical actions must be properly assessed by continuous anticipation of their possibilities, projections and scenarios on the borders with Venezuela and Ecuador insofar as several experts[81] consider the ELN to have particularities that are not common to criminal gangs or so-called dissidents of the FARC-EP. This is an exercise that demands redefinitions in the writing of the threat, investigating its construction and semantic representation, which were basically configured by the Colombian state and have been

77 Booth, K. *Op. cit.*, p. 266.

78 Booth, K. *Op. cit.*, p. 267.

79 Wyn, R. *Op. cit.*, p. 114.

80 The relevant concepts and positions of such a current have been located.

81 See the writings of journalist Andrés Molano (+), and Gustavo Duncan.

impregnated in the regional imaginary. In this sense, the analytical dimension would encompass notions of power, identity and doctrine-discourse of legitimation.

For this reason, this study also alludes to the postulates of Guillermina Baena's (2015) critical and humanist perspective on prospective,[82], which are synergistic with those of critical security analysed above. It is therefore a matter of creating convergence between the two academic approaches «beyond the margin»[83] by placing power at the centre of the debate as the seminal concept from which the orientation of security and a particular form of threat writing derive. In short, to define the ELN's power structure, which is functional to its identity vis-à-vis itself, the state and others, in the midst of a culture of conflict and specific criminality. Likewise, the intention of this work was to reveal the expected behaviour of such a threat in terms of specific trends and scope in the medium and long term, with the capacity of these actors to influence their own future course and that of the rest of the actors in Colombian and border society.




Figure 1. Disciplinary and conceptual triangulation. Source: prepared by the author

In this way, the triangulation of the sense of power framed in the postulates of prospective and critical security allows us to unveil the identity and doctrinal legitimation in the midst of the representation that the ELN has constructed for itself, the Colombian state and the region, over a timeline of almost six decades. These elements,

82 See Baena, G. (coord.) (2015). *Planeación prospectiva estratégica. Teorías, metodologías y buenas prácticas en América Latina*.

83 It alludes to the instrumentalisation of concepts and analytical lines that transcend rationalism. The debate on foresight as a discipline is an unfinished discussion; they accuse foresight of not having an object of study, insofar as the future does not exist and therefore they do not consider it to be scientific.

taken together, constitute future-bearing facts, which, even with asymmetries and discontinuities, have achieved the sustainability of the guerrilla organisation.

Precisely, the ELN's persistence in its operations and areas of influence, although as a guerrilla group it was always in the shadow of the FARC-EP, shows its resilience.



Map 1. Current ELN presence in Colombia. Source: Telesurtv.net 2016

Although it is not the purpose of this study to make a historical cartography of the ELN since its creation (1964) under the tutelage of the priest Camilo Torres, special emphasis is placed on tracing some lines and factors that indicate its rationality and its forms of action, including as a basis an X-ray of the exercise of its violence. «The emergence of these guerrillas was framed by the global conflict that arose after the Second World War (1949) between a liberal West and a socialist East and encouraged by the impact of the triumph of the 1959 Cuban Revolution»[84]. Some scholars have called it the first *revolutionary wave*, which involved the recurrence of violence, disruption and extreme dysfunctionality in the dynamics of institutional response. This has undermined civil society's credibility in the actions of the Colombian state in its capacity for governance and governability[85]. This deficit has had multiple implications in different dimensions—social, security and political—particularly on the borders,

84 Ramírez, J.G. (2015). Política y guerra sin compasión. In *Contribución al entendimiento del conflicto armado en Colombia, by Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas*. Bogotá, Ediciones desde abajo. Pp. 471-518.

85 This should be added to the actions of FARC-EP, other guerrillas and criminal and illegal groups.

where a «vicious circle of violence» has been installed[86], a space conducive to convergence between groups linked to transnational organised crime and terrorism and the emergence of the most unsuspected forms of action[87].

From its inception, the ELN had at its base groups from the Catholic Church —and liberation theology— social groups and university students sympathetic to revolutionary rhetoric with the support of intellectuals. Several experts investigating the spirit of the ELN derive it from an insurrectional focus generated in Cuba that transferred the struggle to Colombia, derived from the enthusiasm generated by the study of the Cuban revolutionary process, especially the figure of Ernesto «Ché» Guevera. This orientation was nuanced by the position of radical Catholics and intellectuals at the beginning - later others joined in, such as the brothers Fabio and Manuel Vásquez Castaño as founding members.

This movement has gravitated its actions in the midst of ruptures and discontinuities with a strong presence in the Province of Santander; it was consolidated through recruitment in various modalities, prioritising priests of the Catholic Church. They reached nearly 200 members in less than 10 years; these members were eliminated by a military offensive by President Misael Pastrana Borrero of Colombia's conservative wing[88].

After the near elimination of the group, the new leadership was taken over by Manuel Pérez and Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, alias «Gabino», who continued to direct the group's tactical actions, with the same nuances as those with which they began their activities: i.e. ideological reasons, kidnapping in planes, boats and vehicles, extortion, bank robberies and assassinations of members of the Armed Forces, located in the Santander area, operating in rural areas, especially around the areas of critical infrastructure of the Colombian state. Their tactical actions were widely deployed, especially in oil areas, where apart from kidnapping, they had become expert extortionists of oil company employees, avoiding drug trafficking and concentrating on political targets. However, in the 1990s, the ELN already entered the drug business, gaining prominence. They started taxing coca and becoming marijuana growers, operating actively in the province of Bolivar; within this new dynamic the ELN achieved a membership of 5,000 and more than 10,000 sympathisers. It should be noted that after this peak, the number of recruits increased and its position as the second most important guerrilla group in Colombia increased[89].

86 Torrijos, V. (2015). Cartografía del conflicto. Pautas interpretativas sobre la evolución del conflicto irregular colombiano. In *Contribución al entendimiento del conflicto armado en Colombia, by Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas*. Ediciones desde abajo. Pp. 679-728.

87 Farah, D. (2016). Convergence in Criminalized States. The New Paradigm. In Hilary Matfess and Michael Miklaucic. *Beyond Convergence. World Without Order*. Washington D.C., Center for Compex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies. Pp. 179-233.

88 Standford University (2015). Mapping Militant Organization. *National Liberation Army*. Pp. 1-18.

89 The literature emphasises the group's capacity for resistance, based on its ideological strength and ability to legitimise revolutionary discourses that made the web of its illicit economic activities invisible.

It should be stressed that its evolution was not regular from the outset. By 2000, it was legitimising itself in the face of the various illegal groups operating in Colombia with a highly significant economic added value. This is a particular finding: from an initial resistance[90] to getting involved with drug trafficking, they had no choice in the face of the dynamics of the sector where new illegal architectures were already gravitating[91]. This is a first indication of the ELN's convergence with the dynamics of other illegal groups; in short, it was absorbed by the rationality of the drug market. A connectivity had thus been established that was no longer just border and local, but global. However, this finding was not initially made visible due to the opacity of illicit organisations, which is one of their structural characteristics[92], preventing a precise mapping of their dynamics.

In short, it would seem that not only the numbers but also the ELN's genesis discourse ensured its sustainability. However, disruptive factors such as the establishment of the right-wing counter-insurgent paramilitary United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), whose objective was to dismantle the so-called left-wing organisations (FARC-EP and ELN), had an impact on the ELN's reduced operational capacity. This was due to the occupation of the territory where it moved, especially in the province of Bolívar. In fact, its range of action was in 9 of Colombia's 32 provinces[93]. In addition, due to multiple domestic and regional political pressures, the ELN formally began peace talks with President Álvaro Uribe in Mexico and Cuba (2002-2005), which failed.

The aforementioned failure was also associated with an internal fragmentation of the group as several of the units began to align themselves with the drug traffickers in order to ensure their security and survival, bypassing the leadership's orders. This loss of leadership and unity surely contributed to their marginalisation from the peace talks set up between the FARC-EP and President Juan Manuel Santos, and the subsequent deterioration of attempts to open up the peace accords. In this interlude, ELN killed many military personnel (2012-2013) and continued with attacks on the country's critical oil infrastructure.


Faced with this new reality, the government of Juan Manuel Santos since June 2014 and the current government of Iván Duque (2018) since the beginning of his term have failed to define an agenda for the construction of a peace agreement. An example of this is the car bomb explosion at the Police College, which was to set a new course. What is certain is that ELN in a pendulum swing of ELN has been regaining its power in conducting tactical manoeuvres, especially taking advantage of the approach of the

90 It refers to the starting conditions for the construction of the future trend.

91 A kind of criminal ecosystem (Matfess and Miklaucic, 2016).

92 Matfess. H. and Michael M. (2016). Introduction. World Order or Disorder? In *Beyond Convergence. World Without Order*. Washington D.C., Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. P. xviii.

93 They had 43 fronts in rural areas, 10 in urban areas and 22 mobile fronts.



Map 2. ELN tactical empowerment. Source: Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2020

last two governments (Santos and Duque) in the peace agreement and post-agreement with the FARC-EP to try to regain peace for Colombia.

New trajectories, new dilemmas and new strategic paths

From the above, the ELN shows great resilience, structural flexibility and systemic adaptability to more than five decades of offensives by right-wing paramilitary groups, attacks by governments associated with the United States and other criminal groups. This has been made possible through War Fronts that provide the structural framework for their actions in articulation with Minor Units or individual fronts acting as military battalions. Tactical mutations are associated both with the convergence with new criminal groups and the enhancement of operational capabilities, as well as with the expansion and specialisation of their footprint training. The expansion is visible by a large presence on the Colombian-Venezuelan border with uniformed and formal activity actively in five of Venezuela's 24 states[94]. Marking a trend path for the ELN's new actions and interests reveals a redefinition of its own identity, which appears diffuse. In concrete terms, although it has given the movement greater visibility and in concrete terms it has not been able to articulate a concrete relationship with political power and society in a stable and sustainable way. From the scope of critical security its own identity is fluctuating and its expectations diffuse, particularly in the trajectory from an ideological guerrilla to a narco-guerrilla.

94 See McDermott, J.(2019). The ELN as a Colombian-Venezuelan insurgent army. *Análisis Insight Crime*, 22 March.

At the same time, from critical security postulates, the political power's recognition of the threat posed by the ELN led to the organisation and use of military means to neutralise it[95]. Thus, the characterisation of the threat by the various governments, especially those of Álvaro Uribe, Juan Manuel Santos and Iván Duque, corresponds to the transition from guerrilla to terrorism, an imaginary forged as a product of a perceptive subjectivity[96] associated with the ELN's new logics of tactical action and the doctrinaire impact of the global war on terror detonated after 9/11 in the United States. What is more, this guerrilla group, baptised as terrorism anchored in a militarised view of security, allowed the group to maintain itself exclusively in rural areas and provinces, with a medium impact in urban areas, although without achieving the positioning of the FARC-EP.

This is compounded by a weakening of its discursive semiotic practices, especially in its public statements that focus on attracting government attention in order to reposition its image and achieve the peace agreement, which over the last four years seems to have been marginalised.

This argument serves to understand a clear mutation of their tactical actions and the current consolidation of around 4,000 men in arms—today with terrorist overtones—evidenced in the car bomb attack on the General Santander Police School in Bogotá (January 2019), and in the 72-hour armed strike (February 2020)[97] to show their deployment to other FARC-EP territories, generating anxiety among the population, above all by preventing mobilisation by land and rivers in the Santander area. This resulted in the *freezing* of the possibilities of a peace agreement with the Duque government. The ELN is involved in a dispute with the Los Pelusos group, a dissident of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) guerrilla group, for control of the Catatumbo area, the second largest drug crop cultivation area in Colombia.

In a critical prospective view, the *future-bearing facts* such as the structural, doctrinal and ideological redefinition of its actions and its convergence with various criminal groups have given the ELN a new image. While there is a palpable fluctuation in the strength of leadership in the Central Command—the structure in charge of force, financial and international operations—its fragmentation is undeniable, especially at the mid-level of the National Directorate and its fronts. Even so, its strengthening, particularly through the control of rents from illegal economies on the border with Venezuela, shows the high probability of continuity and expansion also due to its relationship with civil organisations, which still see the movement as an ideological guerrilla, with the ideal of representing the majority of Colombians excluded from the state's coverage.

95 This guerrilla group played a secondary role to the importance given to the FARC-EP.

96 Saint-Pierre, H.L. (2003). *Las nuevas amenazas como subjetividad perceptiva*. Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina – RESDAL. Pp. 1-10.

97 Both events have curiously targeted the police.

Between disenchantment and disencounters: What is expected from the ELN? In conclusion

The loss of weight of ideological reasons for the ELN's actions marks a turning point, especially if one considers the attack on the General Santander Police School in the middle of the capital city, with a tragic toll of 10 dead and 27 wounded, a tactical action that managed to break through all security barriers, defying state intelligence, especially police and military intelligence. This attack was described by Colombian expert John Marulanda [98] as an event to put the government on edge in a climate of terror and not a suicide bombing, because neither Latin America nor Colombia has such a vocation. This revealed an emerging and defiant tendency of the ELN towards the government, derived from the formal cessation of peace talks, which also triggered the 72-hour armed strike carried out by this guerrilla group in February 2020.

In the face of these violent actions and their tragic consequences, it is illustrative of the shift in political power, which is sceptical, questioning the viability of negotiations leading to the demobilisation of the ELN, its submission to justice, disarmament and reintegration into civilian life; at the same time, there is no evidence of insistence on resuming these talks on the part of the ELN[99]. The only thing clear in the picture is an offensive militarised response by Duque to national security management.

The various possible and probable futures envisaged for the region and the border areas directly affected is one of permanent disruptive conflict, resulting from the convergence of ELN with other 'criminal' groups in urban areas and with specific actions on the borders; in short, the centre of gravity has shifted. The ideological, discursive and symbolic impacts of the shaping of these new criminal ecosystems in the urban environment are gradually emerging. This complex dynamic has also been altering the declining numbers of terrorist attacks achieved through the inter-agency counter-insurgency policies deployed particularly by the Uribe government - through so-called military strategies to annihilate high-value targets[100].

The failed peace attempt[101] was fraught with ups and downs. During Santos' term of office, he managed to sign the so-called 'Dialogue Agreement for Peace in Colombia' with his agenda on 30 March 2016, signed with the support of six guarantor countries

98 Extract from the interview held by Crnl. (sp) John Marulanda, security expert, on CNN/Colombia, live for Latin America, 17 January 2019 (19:00).

99 Torrijos, V. *Op. cit.*, pp. 679-728.

100 The military strategy of high-value targets is a Colombian version of the strategy adopted by the United States in the framework of the Preventive War, in the 2002 National Security Strategy (high-value target).

101 See the following for more details on the trajectory of the peace talks: https://repository.oim.org.co/bitstream/handle/20.500.11788/1976/22.%20Spotlight%20Proceso%20de%20Paz%20con%20el%20ELN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

(Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela) as a way of initiating talks to end the armed conflict, which later culminated in a bilateral ceasefire between 1 October 2017 and 9 January 2018, which opened a space of hope for achieving the final objective, but since 29 January 2018 the talks have been suspended due to the deployment of countless violent tactical actions by the ELN, in addition to the suspension by President Lenin Moreno of Ecuador as guarantor for these dialogues, nothing has managed to come together definitively and everything remains shrouded in a cloud of uncertainty and insecurity.

There is a space of continuous misunderstandings and dizzying changes, particularly in the sensitive areas of the Colombian-Ecuadorian and Colombian-Venezuelan borders, which demand redefinitions in terms of domestic, border and regional security governance. The configuration of multilevel and multi-actor spaces, of discontinuities and heterogeneity, of synergies and misunderstandings is common; therefore, a framework of dissimilar positions and stances, of breaking points and fissures between state and non-state actors, elites, pressure groups, civil society, is the framework in which an attempt is being made to consolidate a Peace Agreement with the ELN. A spirit of distrust and doubt revolves around the competing power games between negotiators, key negotiating actors and especially civil society regarding the possibility of achieving sustainability as a long-term process[102].

The new rationalities of the ELN have moved the chessboard of political and social relations in an ambivalent way, with heterogeneous signs. Apparently, the goal of seizing political power by force and implementing a socialist model is far from being achieved. However, it must be taken into account that just as they managed to move quickly to the centre of Bogotá, they could well be moving through the Ecuadorian Amazon strategic corridor in the province of Sucumbíos in Ecuador. This is where Ecuador's most significant strategic oil infrastructure is located, in convergence and support with illegal groups linked to drug trafficking. If the ELN made a drastic change, unthinkable in the operational scenario, it is not unreasonable to think that it could have the Ecuadorian oil infrastructure as a key target, prior to recruiting young people and minors to increase its strength.

In fact, the ELN as a threat to the security of the Colombian state with regional projection has *chameleonically* modified its identity and interests in a situational and convenient manner. This is why analytics are needed to understand the emerging rationalities of ELN in complexity and critically beyond the militarised state view and its responses. The new forms of tactical action, their geographical points of penetration and scope must be understood in context, as well as the rearrangements of the response strategies of the various state apparatuses, in an anticipatory, preventive manner, in a dynamic of continuous 'transitionality'. The aim, then, is to design timely and real-time strategic balances of both states and their institutional defence

102 Adler, A. (2016). Securing Peace in the Borderlands. *A Post- Agreement Strategy for Colombia.* Edited by Department of Politics & International Relations. Pp. 1-7.

architectures that must respond to environments of crisis, complexity, contradictions and change.

From a critical approach to security, the challenge is to incorporate multi-systemic and flexible tools of observation and analysis of the threat (ELN) in order to situate it also in the so-called *semantics of emancipation*, i.e., the capacity to unveil the relationship between its real existence and that which is instrumentalised and politicised by domestic political and military elites or by international pressure. This methodological line is very useful for unveiling the writing of threat in a critical sense and not simply as a 'denomination' that legitimises the exercise of state power by prioritising the military response.

The aim is to redefine the role of the state as a means and not an end in security, respect for human beings and their rights, and the role and nature of the discourses that are constructed around the threat 'officially' and the need to rethink them. Challenging the security outlook therefore aims to rethink and re-dimension the volatile and changing present, in order to have key inputs that contribute to the development of a prospective exercise between the state, decision-makers, security operators and other social actors. After all, *freezing the present is useless*. A critical foresight exercise involving multiple actors with social responsibility is needed to construct long-term security responses, given that it is better to anticipate and warn than to try to remedy the often irreversible effects and implications, such as the lives lost in the latest ELN actions.

Critical foresight is useful in that it prioritises high-value responses to complex problems. Thus, in order to consolidate a sustainable peace process with the ELN, it is necessary to think about assistance, support and social development programmes, inter-agency security and defence strategies, and the presence of local and regional actors to participatively build the best space and conditions for sustainable peace, as long as the threat has been understood in its various dimensions, and not seen as *a missing piece* of the great puzzle of conflict in Colombia.

Precisely for this reason, tending towards the construction of multiple scenarios of: order/disorder, of the foreseen/unforeseen, of the regular/irregular, of continuity/rupture in the behaviour of the threat, by considering that this threat is marking unusual patterns of identity that are more flexible and mutant, by way of acts of identification[103], in reference to its tactical actions aligned with the type of organisation (with a line of command) and within a criminal ideological and ecosystemic culture.

Finally, the challenge is on the table. Disciplinary convergence and the theoretical, methodological and analytical possibilities provided by critical perspectives on security and foresight enable a comprehensive understanding of new security phenomena. The definition of priorities, the resolution of tensions, the understanding of muta-

103 Berndt, B. (2016). Revisiting identity in International Relations, from identity as substance to identification in action. *European Journal of International Relations*. Pp. 1-26.

tions, the management of uncertainty, the handling of contemporary nomenclatures, among others, are the best way for academia to support institutional transformation, doctrinal reorientation in security and governance in defence, and in short, to humanise present knowledge in order to build the best possible courses of action in the midst of crisis and permanent change.

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The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the Light of IHL: An Advancement in Nuclear Disarmament?

Abstract

Nuclear weapons have raised not only very important debates in the International Community since his own creation but also a big concern at that time and now. With the new TPAN as reference we can suggest a lot of questions as: Is the use of those weapons compatible with International Humanitarian Law? Could we think about that new international agreement as a decisive element to achieve the effective prohibition of nuclear weapons? Is it compatible with the previous regime? What problems could appear in there application? Does exist a general duty in order to barge nuclear disarmament?

Keywords

Nuclear weapons, TPAN, TNP, DIH.

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Introduction

The significance of the debate on the prohibition of nuclear weapons is of the utmost importance. Looking at the big picture, at the beginning of 2018, nine states—the US, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea—possessed approximately 1,4,465 nuclear weapons, of which 3,750 were deployed with operational forces. Some 2000 of these weapons were on high operational alert[1].

Although the idea of achieving an absolute ban on nuclear weapons, a goal pursued by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the TPNW) seems distant but is hampered by the lack of participation of the countries that possess nuclear weapons, the importance of the debate on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the risks inherent in the existence of this type of weaponry is growing[2].

In this context, this paper aims to answer a number of questions related to nuclear weapons, such as: Is the use of these weapons compatible with the provisions of IHL? Can the new treaty be seen as a decisive element in achieving the effective prohibition of nuclear weapons? is it compatible with the previous regime? what are the problems of implementation? is there a general obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament? To this end, and after reviewing the main conferences on the impact of nuclear weapons, the different views on Article VI of the NPT and the obligation of States Parties to enter into negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race will be analysed.

Having said this, reference will be made to the main reasons traditionally put forward on the subject of prohibition, and especially to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) of 8 July 1996, in order to subsequently analyse the alleged obligation to negotiate in the light of a specific and paradigmatic case on the subject, such as that of the Marshall Islands.

Once the general framework of the issue has been obtained, a legal analysis of some of the relevant provisions of the TPNW in relation to the previous Treaty will be addressed, in order to try to determine the compatibility or incompatibility of both, as well as the problems posed by the new Treaty when it comes to achieving its main objective (especially in view of the different positions held by the main actors on the international scene).

1 SIPRI yearbook 2018. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. P. 10.

2 Hernando Zamanillo, E. (2017). Legalidad, legitimidad e impacto humanitario de las armas nucleares en términos de seguridad: una relación conflictive. *Revista Española de Derecho Militar*, no. 107, Escuela Militar de Estudios Jurídicos. P. 291.

Background. From NPT to TPNW

This chapter will analyse the main conferences adopted on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, such as those of Oslo (March 2013), Nayarit (February 2014) and Vienna (December 2014), as well as the different theses adopted on the international scene that have advocated the need for evolution in relation to the provisions of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (hereinafter NPT). This Treaty is not configured as a disarmament treaty but is aimed, as its name suggests, at curbing the proliferation of this type of weapon. However, it has been considered in some quarters to be of a provisional nature, pending agreement by the nuclear-weapon states on total disarmament[3].

Finally, and before referring to the different Conferences adopted on the subject, it should not be forgotten that the objectives of arms control in general, and therefore applicable to the NPT, have been identified as follows[4]:

- Reduce the likelihood of war by seeking to limit weapons developments and proliferation that could destabilise strategic relationships by encouraging pre-emptive strikes.
- Limit suffering and harm in the event of war.
- Reduce spending on armaments by economising on resources.
- Contribute to conflict resolution, reducing mistrust and helping to create a tension-free climate.

The Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons

In the first instance, it is worth highlighting, as a general background, the 1997 United Nations Conference on Disarmament, which resulted in disagreement between nuclear and non-nuclear countries on how to understand disarmament itself[5]. That said, three major conferences have been held to date on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, all of them with the main objective of contributing to a world free of nuclear weapons and thus of the risks they pose to humanity as a whole.

3 Mc Cormack, T. (1997). A *non liquet* on nuclear weapons - The ICJ avoids the application of general principles of international humanitarian law. *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 22, no. 139, p. 84.

4 Frei, D. (1988). El derecho internacional humanitario y el control de armamentos. *Revista Internacional de la Cruz Roja*, vol. 13, no. 90, p. 521.

5 Asorey, E. (1998). La Conferencia de Desarme de las Naciones Unidas en 1977. *Política Exterior*, vol. 12, no. 62, p. 163.

The Oslo Conference

At the first of these (Norway, 2013) and under the title '*Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons*', presentations were given by a wide range of experts on the various effects caused by nuclear weapons detonations, as well as the humanitarian, environmental and developmental effects in the medium and long term.

In the opinion of the President of the Conference, key conclusions can be drawn from the discussions and presentations made:

- It is unlikely that any State or international body would be able to adequately address the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear weapons detonation and provide sufficient assistance to those affected. Moreover, it would not be possible to establish these capacities even if one tried.
- Historical experience of the use and testing of nuclear weapons has demonstrated their devastating effects. Although political circumstances have changed, the destructive potential of these circumstances remains.
- The effects of a nuclear weapons detonation, regardless of its cause, will not be limited by national borders, but will precisely affect states and individuals in important ways, both regionally and globally.

The main purpose of the Conference was therefore to highlight the humanitarian consequences of a possible detonation of nuclear weapons. During the discussions, several states expressed their interest in further exploring the issue in ways that would ensure global engagement, broadening the discourse on the humanitarian impact of such weapons.

The Nayarit Conference

Nayarit (Mexico, 2014) hosted the second International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, set up as a follow-up to the Oslo conference and aimed at discussing the long-term global consequences of any nuclear detonation. From a 'modern' perspective and including a wide range of issues, such as public health, humanitarian assistance, economics, the environment, climate change, etc.

The following main conclusions can be drawn from the discussions and presentations made by the various actors involved[6]:

- Beyond the obvious consequences, the socio-economic and environmental impact of a possible nuclear detonation should be highlighted.

6 Only those that are new compared to those identified for the Oslo Conference are included.

- Public health risks (including hereditary risks) from radiation exposure should also be highlighted.
- Today, the risk from the use of nuclear weapons is growing globally because of proliferation, the vulnerability of nuclear control elements and the potential access to nuclear weapons by non-state actors (especially terrorist groups).
- The increased deployment of nuclear weapons at combat readiness levels increases the risk of accidental, inadvertent, unauthorised or intentional use.
- The damage that could result from the use of nuclear weapons, the negative impact of the mere possibility of a nuclear explosion and the vast resources allocated to the maintenance and modernisation of nuclear arsenals make the very existence of these weapons absurd, as well as contrary to human dignity.
- Awareness of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons is already changing perceptions in the nuclear weapons debate.
- The entry into force of the TPNW as a fundamental element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a result of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, together with discussions regarding the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, are mutually reinforcing processes.
- The effective elimination of other types of weapons has been achieved only after they have been declared illegal, so this is the way to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, consistent with the obligations of participants under international humanitarian law (hereinafter, IHL).
- Discussions on humanitarian impact should lead to the determination of states and civil society to arrive at new international standards and norms through a binding legal instrument.

The Vienna Conference

At the Vienna Conference (Austria, 2014), the issue of nuclear weapons was discussed from various legal perspectives, concluding that there is no general legal norm that universally prohibits the possession, transfer, manufacture or use of nuclear weapons. However, the experts stressed that new evidence accumulated in the last two years about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons cast further doubt on the possibility that they could ever be used in accordance with international law, and more specifically international humanitarian law (hereafter IHL)[7].

Of particular interest here is the fact that the Vienna Conference «*demonstrated that no State or international body could cope with the immediate humanitarian emergency*

7 See NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 30 of 22 April 2015, para. 13.

and long-term consequences caused by a nuclear detonation or provide adequate assistance to the victims[8]», reinforcing the idea of the necessary elimination of nuclear weapons as the only possible guarantee against the humanitarian consequences of their use.

In any case, the growing participation in this type of international forum on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should not go unmentioned, which reinforces the idea that there is a growing awareness of this issue in the international community as a whole.

The evolutionist thesis on Art. VI of the NPT

Under Article VI of the NPT, all States Parties to the NPT undertake to pursue negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the adoption of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control[9].

It has been pointed out that progress on Article VI issues will give credibility to the Treaty and rectify the implementation imbalance between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The «effective measures» required by Art. VI will also serve to provide the existing Treaty prohibitions with additional normative support[10].

In the working paper presented in 2014 at the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference, the New Agenda Coalition stressed that the NPT parties are long overdue to put into practice the multitude of commitments made to effectively implement Article VI of the NPT by taking practical steps to «*safeguard future generations from the catastrophic effects of a nuclear weapon detonation*».

The Coalition also made clear that, in its view, any of the options set out in the paper would serve to advance the implementation of Article VI, being compatible with the ultimate object and purpose of the Treaty and the development of effective nuclear disarmament measures being an obligation that would be incumbent on all States equally, not only on the nuclear-weapon States. There would in fact be no legal impediment to exploring these possibilities, even if the nuclear-weapon states chose not to engage. Thus, any of the options would have a positive policy impact, irrespective of the greater or lesser flexibility of the chosen instrument.

In the Coalition's view, the options should focus on two distinct legal approaches: the comprehensive convention/stand-alone ban treaty or the framework agreement of

8 *Idem*, para. 11.

9 De Salazar, G. (2015). El Tratado de No proliferación de Armas Nucleares: los temas clave en la Conferencia de Examen en 2015. *UNISCI Discussion Papers* no. 38. Complutense University of Madrid. P. 156.

10 See NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 9 of 9 March 2015.

mutually supportive instruments[11]. Specifically, a distinction can be made between the following (a common feature of all of them being the need for verification and monitoring of irreversible disarmament associated with deadlines, either as an obligation or as a mere possibility)[12]:

- A comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, establishing general obligations, prohibitions and an effective basis for nuclear disarmament.
- A treaty banning nuclear weapons, setting out the essential prohibitions necessary to achieve and maintain a nuclear-weapon-free world. Such a treaty could also set out the practical arrangements required to carry out and monitor time-bound, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament, although this would not be necessary.
- A framework agreement of mutually supportive instruments, with the same objective as outlined in the previous section. Such instruments would act together, within a legal framework to establish prohibitions, obligations and provisions essential to achieving nuclear disarmament.
- A hybrid or mixed arrangement, including elements of all or some of the above options, as well as any others deemed appropriate.

For its part and following the Preparatory Committee meeting in 2014, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 69/37, in which it urged States Parties to the NPT to «at the 2015 Review Conference, consider options for the development of effective measures envisaged and required in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty»[13].

In any case, it should not be lost sight of the fact that the very preamble of the TPNW recognises the NPT as the cornerstone of the disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime, with a vital role in the promotion of international peace and security through the development of Article VI of the NPT[14].

The discussion between the various ways of achieving disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons, and specifically the disquisition between «gradualism» and «abolitionism» (the latter advocated by Austria and Ireland) has also arisen within the European Union, which considers the NPT as the «*cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation system*», the key to achieving nuclear disarmament in accordance with the oft-mentioned Article VI of the NPT. This is in keeping with the overriding objective of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation system by promoting a bal-

11 See NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 30 (*Op. cit.*), para. 11.

12 See NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. III/WP.1 8 of 2 April 2014, para. 29.

13 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 2 December 2014; 69/37: Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments, para. 15.

14 Hernando Zamanillo, E. *Op. cit.*, p. 285.

anced outcome at the NPT Review Conference that will contribute to real progress towards the objectives enshrined in the NPT[15].

Reasons for the adoption of the TPNW. The opinion of the International Court of Justice

This chapter will set out the essential reasons for the adoption of the TPNW, both those that have traditionally been argued (without going as far as possible into the different positions of the states, which will be dealt with later) and those drawn from the research carried out, and particularly from the ICJ's Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996.

At the Nayarit and Vienna Conferences it was already made clear that, although it was understood that there was little likelihood of an actual detonation of nuclear weapons, the mere risk of such a detonation must be qualified as unacceptable, such that this risk is evident whether by accident, miscalculation or deliberate action, and that the only way to eradicate it is the complete elimination of these weapons[16]. This being the objective envisaged in the new TPNW, there is no doubt that if the Treaty were to be fully effective, it would contribute extremely effectively to the minimisation of nuclear risks.

Given that, as noted above, the effects of nuclear weapons detonations do not transcend national borders, and are therefore a global problem in terms of risk prevention, there is no doubt that any progress in disarmament towards the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons must be properly assessed and attributed an importance that is beyond doubt (assessments of its real effectiveness aside). So much so that the ICJ itself has stated that the prohibition of the use of weapons that cause indiscriminate effects, as in this case, constitutes a norm of *ius cogens*, such that «states must never attack civilians and, consequently, must never use weapons that cannot distinguish between civilian and military objectives[17]».

On the other hand, when analysing the possible reasons for the adoption of the TPNW, it is essential in the opinion of the undersigned to refer to the ICJ and, more specifically, to its Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 cited above, in which the Court essentially refers to the compatibility of the threat or use of nuclear weapons with the principles and rules of international law, on the basis of the fact that international law «does not specifically authorise the threat or use of nuclear weapons», but neither does

15 De Salazar, G. *Op. cit*, p. 166.

16 See NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 30 of 22 April 2015 (*Op. cit.*).

17 Doswald Beck, L. (1997). International humanitarian law and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. *International Review of the Red Cross*, No. 22 (139), p. 40.

it «contain a total and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such»[18].

First of all, analysing the legality or illegality of nuclear weapons as such (paragraphs 49-73), it considers that the use of these weapons cannot be considered as expressly prohibited on the basis of the provisions of the Second Hague Declaration (1989), the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention (1907) or the Geneva Protocol (1925). In this way, and at the time of its issuance, it refers that the line of action to date has been the declaration of the illegality of certain weapons, considered weapons of mass destruction, by means of specific instruments, there being at that time no specific prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in existing international treaties, nor in international custom (as there was in the case of bacteriological and chemical weapons)[19][20]. In the light of this opinion, I believe that an essential motivation for the adoption of the TPNW should be sought precisely in eliminating this problem raised by the ICJ, so that in the future the ICJ can rule on the «general» illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

Following this first conclusion, it then examines (paragraphs 74-87) the question of whether the use of nuclear weapons should be considered illegal under the principles and rules of IHL. The Court holds that, although nuclear weapons came into being after most of the principles and rules of IHL were already in force, it cannot be concluded from this fact that such rules and principles do not apply to these weapons, as this would be contrary to the universal vocation of IHL itself.

Particularly in relation to the principle of neutrality (paragraphs 88-97), there are various positions, ranging from those that maintain that the application of IHL does not imply a total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, to others that understand that the necessarily indiscriminate consequences of the use of such weapons can in no case be compatible with the principles and norms of IHL. According to this second theory, therefore, the TPNW would be not only a tool to serve the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament, but also a way of complying with the provisions of IHL in any case, in such a way that a general prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons would prevent possible future non-compliance with such provisions.

Moreover, suffice it to say that the Court recognises that the very characteristics of nuclear weapons seem hardly compatible with respect for the requirements of IHL, although it is forced to conclude that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion on the

18 Greenwood, C. (1997). The Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons and the contribution of the International Court to international humanitarian law. *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 22, no. 139, p. 71.

19 On the failure to adopt an express resolution on the merits of this case and the concept of *non liquet* in international law: Aznar-Gómez, M.J. (1999). The 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and Non liquet International Law. *International & Comparative Law Quartely*. Pp. 13 to 17.

20 Matheson, M.J. (1997). The Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. *American Journal of International Law*. P. 424.

legality of the use of nuclear weapons in «extreme» circumstances of self-defence, in which the very survival of the State invoking it is threatened[21].

Is there an obligation for NPT member states to negotiate disarmament? And for non-members? The case of the Marshall Islands

In relation to the first of the questions posed and in the light of Article VI of the NPT, the answer seems clear to be yes, as the ICJ has already made clear in its Advisory Opinion analysed above, in which (paragraphs 98-103) it refers to this issue, recognising the long-term problem in international law in relation to the different opinions regarding the legal status of this type of weapons and recognising that the most appropriate means in this respect is complete nuclear disarmament. In such circumstances, the Court recognises the importance of this obligation to negotiate in good faith for nuclear disarmament, an obligation which is not one of mere conduct but precisely one of achieving a concrete result: nuclear disarmament. It can therefore be concluded in any case that the dual obligation to negotiate and conclude these negotiations applies to all NPT states parties.

But should these negotiations be channelled through the Treaty which is the main subject of this paper? In order to answer this second question, we will turn to the specific case of the Marshall Islands; to do so, we will first set out the background to the dispute in question, without which it would be difficult to understand it.

Between 1945 and 1992, the US conducted more than a thousand nuclear tests, most of which, after the first one in the New Mexico desert, moved to the Pacific, more specifically to the Marshall Islands. To this end, the population of these islands was forcibly displaced from 1946 onwards. Between June 1946 and August 1958, 67 nuclear tests were conducted in the Marshall Islands, both in the atmosphere and underwater, causing severe and long-lasting damage, including the physical disappearance of some islands[22].

Following decolonisation through the *Compact of Free Association*, signed in 1982, the United States prevented the Marshall Islands from signing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. Section 177 of the Agreement provided that the United States Government agreed to compensate Marshall Islands citizens for loss or damage to property and persons caused by the nuclear testing programme, with the Nuclear Claims Tribunal Act being established in 1987, and the Marshall Islands Government filing a petition for review of the Agreement on 11 September 2000. This request was based on a finding of injury and damage resulting from the US nuclear testing

21 Cervell Hortal, M.ªJ. (1999). El derecho internacional humanitario y las armas nucleares. *Anales de derecho: revista de la Facultad de Derecho*, p. 81.

22 Pigrau Solé, A. (2018). El caso de las islas Marshall: colonialismo, armas nucleares y justicia ambiental. *Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional* no. 44, pp. 444 to 455.

programme that could not reasonably have been detected, or could not have been determined, prior to the entry into force of the programme. An amended version of the FTA was adopted in 2003, which did not include any provisions on the subject, giving rise to a complaint in this regard. This was rejected by the US Congress, and a wide range of other lawsuits were brought against the US government.

In parallel to these claims supported by the Marshall Islands government, it is worth noting that the Marshall Islands changed its strategy in 2014, adopting two lines of action focused on the alleged violation of the NPT: one before the federal courts and the other before the ICJ, shifting the debate from an issue related to personal and environmental damage to another concerning the very existence of nuclear weapons, as well as the necessary respect for the NPT as a fundamental instrument of the nuclear weapons regime. Thus, on 24 April 2014, the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands simultaneously filed nine separate complaints with the ICJ registry against the nine nuclear-weapon States (China, North Korea, France, Israel, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, India and Pakistan) for non-compliance with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT[23].

Considering the claims as a whole, it can be identified that the Marshall Islands generally considers that the States Parties to the NPT have breached their obligations under Article VI by actively refusing to negotiate in good faith for effective measures leading to cessation of these activities and nuclear disarmament and by ignoring UN General Assembly resolutions in this regard. The applicant state thus sought a ruling requiring these states to enter into multilateral negotiations within a specified period (one year from the date of delivery of the judgement), with a view to concluding an international treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In the applicant's view, the obligations under Article VI are not only treaty-based but also customary in nature, so that they do not only apply to States Parties to the NPT but to any State that has pursued nuclear rearmament policies.

In the end, the lawsuit could only be brought against three of the nine states (the United Kingdom, India and Pakistan), precisely those that had previously accepted the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction in accordance with Article 36.2 of the ICJ Statute. Even within these three respondent states, only the UK is a party to the NPT, so India and Pakistan's non-compliance could be based solely on an international norm of a customary nature, which gave the Court grounds to resolve the question posed at the beginning of this chapter: is there a general obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament?[24]

23 Fernández Egea, R. (2016). Jurisprudencia ambiental internacional (segundo semestre 2016). *Revista Catalana de Dret Ambiental*, vol.VII, n.º 2, pp. 4 to 9.

24 It is up to the ICJ to determine whether or not we are dealing with a norm of *jus cogens*. In this sense, Abello-Galvis (2011). Introducción al estudio de las normas de *ius cogens* en el seno de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional. CDI', *Vniversitas*, no. 123, pp. 95-99.

However, in its judgement of 5 October 2016, the aforementioned ICJ considers that it cannot deal with the merits of the matter, due to the plea raised by the defendants based on the «*non-existence of a dispute between the parties*». It does not accept the Marshall Islands' allegation concerning its statements in various international fora calling on these states to intensify their efforts towards safe and effective disarmament. It thus considered that they could not be understood as an assertion that those States were in breach of international law, so that the defendants could not have been aware of the existence of a dispute between them and the Marshall Islands in respect of the issue at hand. Likewise, it did not consider as valid the allegation regarding the fact that the parties had conflicting opinions in their pleadings and defence, as it required that the dispute had previously existed. In any case, the decision was far from unanimous among the members of the Court, with a multitude of judges giving separate and dissenting opinions. Most of the judges who voted against the ruling (Bennouna, Cançado Trindade, Crawford, Robinson, Sebutinde, Yusuf and Judge *ad hoc* Bedjaoui) considered that the 'awareness' requirement (the need for the defendant to be aware of the existence of a clear opposition of views with the plaintiff for a dispute to exist) is too formalistic and subjective, excessively limiting the ICJ's knowledge of cases.

According to Judges Sebudinde and Yusuf, and Judge *ad hoc* Bedjaoui, the existence of a dispute between the parties could be affirmed in the case in dispute, with Judge Yusuf adding that such a dispute may be incipient and crystallise with the filing of the lawsuit. Despite the inadmissibility of the claim, nothing would prevent the Marshall Islands from bringing it again without it being inadmissible again due to the lack of a prior dispute, an issue that was appreciated by other judges such as Xue, Bhandari or Gaja, according to whom the ICJ should have inadmissible the claim on the basis of other objections raised by the defendants (such as the so-called Monetary Gold rule[25]).

Turning to the opinions in favour of having admitted the claim and gone into the merits of the case, Judge Crawford considered that the Monetary Gold rule objection is intrinsically linked to the merits of the case, and therefore should not have been previously ruled on as an exception.

The dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade is particularly relevant for the purposes of this article. He states that the existence of an obligation to carry out negotiations in good faith in order to achieve nuclear disarmament can be affirmed, an obligation that would have a customary character as it exists both in practice and *opinio iuris* in the international community. He justifies this view by reviewing the International Conferences that have dealt with the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free and protected zones and the numerous UN Assembly and Security Council resolutions, as well as the statements of the UN Secretary General that have referred to the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith

25 According to it, the ICJ could not rule on the merits given the absence of other nuclear states as defendants, while condemning only the UK, Pakistan or India would not solve the problem of nuclear disarmament.

to achieve nuclear disarmament. In the opinion, not only of Judge Cançado Trindade but also of Robinson, as the ICJ is the main judicial organ of the United Nations, it should have shown some sensitivity to this issue, contributing to its resolution, as it is one of the most important concerns of the international community[26].

Therefore, and trying to answer the questions posed in the title of this chapter, it can be concluded that the ICJ ruling in the Marshall Islands case has been a missed opportunity to resolve this issue in a more or less definitive way, as it is clear that NPT member states do have an international obligation to negotiate disarmament under the terms of Article VI, but that there is no clear opinion on this matter from non-member states.

Legal analysis of the provisions of the TPNW

This chapter will analyse the provisions which, in the author's view, are most interesting and innovative in relation to the previous Treaty.

Beginning with the Preamble to the TPNW, it starts with the recognition of the NPT as «*a cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, with a vital role in promoting international peace and security through the implementation of Article VI of the NPT itself*[7]». Therefore, and in accordance with the wording of this Preamble, great importance is attached to the NPT itself, referring also to the development of Article VI, which constitutes the primary objective of the new Treaty.

For its part, Article 1 of the TPNW adopts an absolute prohibition of conduct «*involving the derivative use of any nuclear device, including permitting the stationing, installation or deployment on the territory of a State Party*[28].» The following conduct is prohibited under this article:

- To develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- To transfer or receive the transfer of nuclear weapons or other devices or direct or indirect control over them.
- To use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

26 According to Article 1.1 of the San Francisco Charter, it is a purpose of the Organisation «To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace; and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to breaches of the peace».

27 Hernando Zamanillo, E. *Op. cit.*, p. 285.

28 Art. 1. g of the TPNW.

Article 2 adds the obligation to declare the existence of this type of weapon by the State that has them under its control or jurisdiction, imposing on the UN Secretary-General the obligation to transmit to the States Parties the declarations received in this regard.

In the field of disarmament, Article 4 of the TPNW provides for the establishment of an international authority whose main task would be to verify the elimination of nuclear weapons, with the parties undertaking to make them «*immediately inoperable*». This results in the creation of an authority in charge of verifying the process which, although it does not pose particular problems in relation to the ultimate aim of establishing an authority independent of the States through which to channel the verification process, it can and does pose problems on the practical side, especially in relation to the economic costs that could arise from the establishment of the verification systems.

As for domestic implementation by States Parties, Article 5 provides for the obligation of transposition into domestic law through the adoption of «appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of criminal penalties» for the purpose of preventing and suppressing activities prohibited by the CTBT carried out by persons or on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the State concerned. In the opinion of the undersigned, this last part could give rise to problems regarding the application of the different jurisdictions, as it expressly refers to both the personal and spatial criteria in the delimitation of jurisdiction, a problem that could have been solved by referring to the general criteria on jurisdiction.

Article 6 sets out a number of provisions in relation to victim assistance and environmental restoration, provisions that I believe are necessary, especially in light of cases such as the Marshall Islands case described above, and establishes the obligation of States Parties to provide appropriate assistance to persons under their jurisdiction affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, «in accordance with applicable IHL and human rights law», and goes on to state that such assistance shall take into account age and gender *without discrimination*. It is this last statement that is difficult to understand, in the sense that if such aid is to take gender and age into account, it will, in the opinion of the undersigned, necessarily discriminate on the basis of these criteria, so that without going into an assessment of the necessity or advisability of such discrimination, it is difficult to make compatible the first reference to these criteria in order to end up referring to non-discrimination.

Referring in arts. 10 and 11 to the system of amendments and dispute settlement between the parties respectively, Art. 12 reflects the intention to «universalise» the prohibition of nuclear weapons that is the primary objective of the TPNW, stating that «[e]ach State Party shall encourage States not parties to this Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to it, with the objective of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty by all States».

In the same vein, and given the universal and univocal vocation of the ultimate purpose of the Treaty, Article 16 expressly prohibits the making of reservations to its

articles, a prohibition which, although it seems intended to guarantee the application of its provisions in full, may be excessively ambitious in such a way that nuclear states may find this point difficult to reconcile with their national interests. However, Article 17 of the Treaty includes the possibility for the parties to withdraw from the Treaty due to extraordinary events, imposing the obligation to give twelve months' notice prior to its effectiveness and establishing that if after this period it is involved in an armed conflict, the provisions of the TPNW will apply to it until such time as it ceases to apply.

Therefore, in the light of the latter article, the threat or use of force in armed conflict by means of nuclear weapons would in practice be totally incompatible with the provisions of the TPNW, regardless of the exceptional circumstances in which the States Parties are involved.

Balance between utopia and reality

It will analyse the fundamental problems posed by the TPNW with regard to its ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, problems arising from a series of issues such as the current lack of adherence by the nuclear powers, the alleged verification of disarmament, the costs involved, etc.

Firstly, and due to its special practical impact, it is worth mentioning that Article 9 of the TPNW refers to the costs derived from the effective implementation of the Treaty, determining the obligation to cover these costs not only by the States Parties but also by those States that are not parties but participate in the meetings as observers, «*in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately*». In particular, and with regard to costs related to verification through the measures required by Article 4 of the TPNW itself, as well as «*the destruction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the elimination of nuclear weapons programmes, including the elimination or conversion of all nuclear weapons-related facilities, should be borne by the States Parties to which they are attributable*».

Having made the reference to the costs and continuing with the practical effectiveness of the Treaty, it is striking that the TPNW does not limit itself to establishing a general prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons for destructive purposes, but that Article 2 of the Treaty itself prohibits the possession or possession of this type of weapon, regardless of its subsequent use. This objective, no doubt well-intentioned, is currently difficult to reconcile with the defence pretensions of the nuclear powers, as well as with certain defence strategies of certain International Organisations, such as NATO. In principle and according to the organisation's official objectives, its member states are committed to supporting transparency and mutual trust in order to improve international stability. However, NATO's doctrine on nuclear weapons is a faithful reflection of the security and defence policy of the Western nuclear powers, and especially of the US nuclear deterrence strategy. It is based on the strategic privilege that these states benefit from in the NPT, which is based on nuclear weapons as one of the pillars of their security and defence policies, as well as using them to consolidate their

supremacy; that is why in the current and medium-term context it does not seem easy for the members of this organisation to sign up to the TPNW, as it would be incompatible with their strategy on peace and security[29].

In this regard, it is worth mentioning that NATO's strategic concept (Lisbon, 19 November 2010), ratified by the organisation at the Warsaw Summit of 8-9 July 2016, makes it clear that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will be a nuclear-capable organisation.

In view of the foregoing, and although an analysis of the TPNW shows that it is an instrument for achieving the objective set out in the NPT itself, which already called for the adoption of a general and complete disarmament treaty in Article VI, it seems clear that before it enters into force it is already limited by the fact that the nuclear states have not taken part in it (nor does it appear that they will do so in the medium term), with the possible consequence of diverting attention from the non-proliferation and disarmament regime, called into question by the drafting of this new international treaty.

For the time being, it seems that the idea of achieving total disarmament in the medium term is illusory, which leaves a window open to explore new measures to prevent possible future humanitarian catastrophes, with the TPNW itself appealing even in this sense to the responsibility of States in the prohibition and definitive elimination of nuclear weapons, especially in relation to the humanitarian aspects and the prevention of the effective use of such nuclear weapons[30]. Thus, as long as the TPNW does not enter into force, the most viable option would be to insist on the full implementation of the NPT, particularly Article VI, which would also be compatible with the subsequent entry into force of the TPNW.

Going further and beyond the idea of an absolute ban on nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal, it seems difficult even to achieve an effective reduction of nuclear weapons, given the lack of political consensus on this issue. This inevitably leads to the impossibility of reaching agreements in this regard. This opens the door to export control rather than disarmament agreements, and the prospects are dim despite the fact that at least «controlled proliferation» has been achieved, with «only» eight or nine nuclear powers.

Continuing with the analysis of the problems related to the effective implementation of the TPNW, it should be noted that there are measures in the NPT that could be useful in achieving the same objective, but which have not been developed due to the lack of commitment by states. Article VI of the NPT itself, by referring to the

29 Gouyez Ben Allal, A. (2014). La política nuclear de la OTAN: la amenaza de las armas nucleares tácticas para la seguridad internacional y el régimen de no proliferación nuclear. *Paix et sécurité internationales: Revue maroco-espagnole de Droit International et Relations Internationales* no. 2, pp. 65 to 80.

30 Hernando Zamanillo, E. *Op. cit.*, pp. 291 et seq.

obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament under international control, leaves the door open (as discussed in previous chapters) to different negotiating tracks. The ambiguity of this precept has given rise to interpretative problems that remain in force today, with the ICJ advocating the interpretation of non-nuclear countries, which argue that this obligation is imposed on nuclear states, which contravenes their interests in relation to the possession of this type of weapons for deterrence purposes.

It is true that the signing of the TPNW itself pursues the essential objective of giving effect to the oft-mentioned article VI of the NPT, although, as has already been pointed out, the fundamental problem is determined by the current ineffectiveness of the new Treaty in terms of achieving complete and definitive disarmament, caused by the reluctance of the nuclear powers.

In any case, there is no doubt that the new Treaty contributes, with all the necessary limitations, to the idea of delegitimising nuclear weapons as such, a delegitimisation that must take into account the humanitarian dimension in the nuclear field, considering that the humanitarian impact of the possible use of nuclear weapons would entail *catastrophic humanitarian consequences*[31] and *incalculable human suffering*, trying to achieve the definitive stigmatisation of this type of weapons.

Analysis of state arguments

This chapter will analyse the arguments put forward by states in relation to the possession and use of nuclear weapons, particularly with regard to the TPNW. This analysis is particularly relevant in view of the fact that, with regard to the possible determination of a customary rule, both the existence of a uniform practice at the international level and the fact that this practice is «*extensive and representative*»[32] are essential.

First, and referring to the two great nuclear powers (the United States and the Russian Federation), to which approximately 90 percent of the existing powers belong, we find that the possession of nuclear weapons has served to compensate for the superiority in conventional weapons that the opposing side may have had at a given moment, especially in the context of the Cold War[33]. While at that time it was the US that tried to compensate for its inferiority in the field of conventional weapons with respect to the USSR, today the situation is the reverse, with Russia relying on this type

31 In this sense, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

32 Henckaerts, J-M. (2007). Estudio sobre el derecho internacional humanitario consuetudinario. Una contribución a la comprensión y al respeto del derecho de los conflictos armados. *Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional*, vol. 7, pp. 520 and 521.

33 Ortíz-Cañavate Levenfeld, J. (2014). *El futuro de las armas nucleares tácticas de la OTAN*. Opinion paper: Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 7 and 8.

of weapons to try to balance the situation through so-called tactical nuclear weapons (i.e. those deployed and capable of being used in an eventual conflict scenario).

It is precisely this attempt to maintain balance that is the reason why Russia today continues to give nuclear weapons a pre-eminent role in its military strategy, including considerations of their use in response to large-scale conventional attacks, as reflected in its 2010 military doctrine[34]. Although it is true that it is limited to serious cases involving the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy or conventional weapons when there is a threat to the very existence of the state, the express reference to the use of this type of weapon is striking. The latest reforms of the Russian army show that the Russian government does not consider nuclear deterrence alone to be sufficient, maintaining the aforementioned exceptions that would allow the use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances and in accordance with the military doctrine in force in that country[35].

As far as the United States is concerned, the US has constantly reaffirmed the importance of «*the fundamental role of nuclear weapons* (...) *in deterring a nuclear attack on the United States, its allies and partners*», while the United Kingdom has also confirmed the role of nuclear weapons as «*the ultimate guarantee of the nation's survival*[36]».

Nevertheless, the US understands that it does not need to rely on such weapons today as much as it did in the past, without prejudice to continuing to convey the message of «assured destruction» through technological superiority in the conventional arena, which can replace, at least in part, the nuclear deterrent of the past. Thus, the US has initiated a major reduction of nuclear weapons, declaring in its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review that it «*will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those non-nuclear weapon states that are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that comply with their non-proliferation obligations*». However, it cannot be overlooked that this statement of commitment is limited, referring only to non-nuclear states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.

Having set out the positions of the two main nuclear powers, we will now analyse some positions of other States, essentially on the basis of the various International Conferences that have been held on this issue and which have already been described in previous chapters, as they can be useful in establishing the positions of the different States from a historical point of view.

At the Vienna Conference in 2014, which was based on the unacceptability of the harm that the use of nuclear weapons would cause to the victims, essentially referring

34 According to it, the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the case of aggression against its nation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.

35 Barcelona Centre for International Affairs. La política de defensa de la Federación Rusa. P. 509.

36 Gouyez Ben Allal, A. *Op. cit.*, p. 67.

to moral and ethical aspects and concluding that the only possible solution would be the total elimination of this type of weaponry, it is worth highlighting the intervention of New Zealand, which strongly called for this prohibition, referring especially to the possible humanitarian consequences in connection with the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996.

Similarly, Australia, through its representative, made special reference to the humanitarian aspect, expressing the desire for concrete efforts to achieve the effective implementation of Article VI of the NPT, fundamentally through effective arms control and transparency in management. Thus, the TPNW is the culmination (even if only for theoretical purposes) of this process concerning the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Having devoted part of this analysis to the positions of the major nuclear powers, as well as the most relevant positions in the humanitarian sphere on the part of the, shall we say, states in favour of the prohibition of nuclear weapons, mention must be made of another series of states that pose serious difficulties for the effective implementation of the new Treaty. Such would be the case of Israel, India and Pakistan, countries that have never in fact been members of the NPT, so their access to such weapons could not even be considered non-compliance[37].

More controversial is the case of North Korea, which conducted its first nuclear test only three years after announcing its exit from the NPT in 2003, with states parties maintaining different positions on the country's current status in relation to the NPT. In any case, we should not forget that, apart from this controversial case, the new nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel) are not even party to the NPT.

Conclusions

There is no doubt of the importance of the subject of this paper, since not only the absolute prohibition of nuclear weapons but also the reduction of the existing arsenal itself, as well as the imposition of restrictions on their possession, manufacture, stockpiling, use, etc., has given rise to intense debate within the international community, a debate which, moreover, is not likely to reach a positive conclusion from a practical point of view and with a view to the aforementioned prohibition. This is despite the fact that, in order to encourage this debate and the adoption of common points of view, a multitude of initiatives have been taken (for example, the three major conferences mentioned above) which, although they have produced positive results, have not achieved their primary objective of prohibition, and the problem has been carried over to the present day.

37 Martín Corrales, C. (2017). *Tratado sobre la prohibición de las armas nucleares: Progress towards nuclear disarmament?* Opinion Paper: Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies. Pp. 6 and 7.

This inability to resolve the problem is not surprising if we take into account the historical background to the issue, which, together with the different security and defence strategies and particularly with regard to the role of nuclear weapons in these areas, offer multiple visions and interests that make it difficult to reach concrete agreements.

In any case, there is no doubt that the issue of the possible use of nuclear weapons in relation to international humanitarian law is of particular importance in this case. This is evidenced by the International Court of Justice itself stating, for example, that «*humanitarian law in particular is imperative that it take into account the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human suffering and their capacity to harm future generations*[38]».

With regards to the problems of the new Treaty and in comparison with the NPT, which is one of the most successful treaties concerning nuclear weapons (rarely have such a large number of states been willing to voluntarily renounce their use for military purposes through an international instrument), we find that the main problem with regard to the effectiveness of the TPNW and the achievement of the ultimate goal of prohibition of nuclear weapons lies precisely in the lack of ratification, especially by the nuclear powers[39]. Thus, while the NPT (thanks, in my opinion, to its ambiguity on certain points) achieved a broad consensus in the international community that facilitated the accession of the vast majority of its member states, the TPNW, which is more ambitious in its objectives, has not yet shown any signs of becoming the great instrument for facilitating the prohibition that it should have been.

In this connection, the question arises: Are the TPNW and the NPT compatible? The answer to this question is not easy, since the TPNW has a clearly different normative basis than the NPT, with a rationale that could be described as humanitarian[40]. The new Treaty thus has a different objective, namely to achieve a definitive ban on this type of weapon. This different normative basis of the new Treaty, however, is based on that of the NPT, within the framework of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which has revealed certain contradictions, such as the following:

First, it turns out that the very preamble of the TPNW reaffirms the applicability of the NPT as a cornerstone of guaranteeing the maintenance of international peace and security. In this regard, Art. 18 determines that the TPNW itself shall apply without prejudice to obligations previously entered into by States Parties, provided that such obligations are compatible with the text of the new Treaty. Therefore, as a first approximation, it could be concluded that the TPNW Treaty should not prevent compliance with the obligations set out in the NPT. However, by establishing the necessary compatibility for

38 Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996.

39 Garrido Rebolledo, V. (2005). La conferencia de revisión del TNP: entre el desarme y la no proliferación. Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos. P. 3.

40 Herrera Almela, M.F. (2018). *El tratado sobre la prohibición de las armas nucleares: ¿es realmente necesario?* Opinion Paper: Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies. Pp. 8 and 9.

their application, a fundamental requirement of compatibility of the international obligation to be applied with those assumed under the new Treaty is introduced.

In the same vein, and in relation to the compatibility or incompatibility of the obligations established in both treaties, it should be noted that the TPNW does not recognise one of the fundamental pillars on which the NPT is based, namely the existence of two categories of states: nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. Similarly, the TPNW prohibits states from allowing «*any stationing, installation or deployment*» of nuclear weapons on their territory, a prohibition that is not explicitly included in the NPT, as well as prohibiting nuclear testing despite the fact that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet entered into force. It can therefore be concluded that the compatibility of the Treaties in question is, at the very least, open to question.

In spite of all this, I believe that it would not be fair to assess the TPNW in an absolutely negative way; although some authors have considered that «it is nothing more than a high-risk gamble that jeopardises the delicate balance of non-proliferation[41]», restricting this analysis only to the effective contribution to disarmament and prohibition in a purely practical and short-term sense, it should be stressed that the very approval of a Treaty whose ultimate aim is to achieve this prohibition, emphasising the very serious problems that could arise from a possible nuclear incident, particularly in humanitarian terms, could favour the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons in itself, giving rise to a broadening of the terms of international discussion in this regard that could in the future contribute to the effective prohibition of this type of weapons.

In any case, there is no doubt that non-proliferation, as well as disarmament and nuclear arms control, will continue to be at the top of the political and diplomatic agenda, particularly in the doctrinal discussion on International Humanitarian Law, given the problems posed by the existence of a vast amount of nuclear material, spread throughout the world, with a destructive power 150,000 times greater than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Nuclear disarmament thus continues to be a priority for humanity[42], especially if we take into account the indiscriminate consequences that would necessarily result from its use (which could hardly be compatible with the principles of IHL), as the ICJ made clear in its Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996.

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42 Garrido Rebolledo, V. (2011). *La no proliferación y el desarme en perspectiva histórica*. Colección de Estudios Internacionales. P. 32.

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Spanish Armed Forces in the fight against terrorism

Abstract

Since the spreading of the terrorist phenomenon and its mutation at global level, the international community has made a commitment to the fight against terrorism, identifying it as a priority attention threat. The joint efforts of States and international security and defense organizations have resulted in the approval of multiple strategic and operational measures aimed at countering the terrorist phenomenon. Spain maintains an active and supportive commitment to the fight against terrorism as a member State of international security institutions and through its participation in international missions. To this end, the spanish Armed Forces play a fundamental role as guarantors of National Defense. On the one hand, in the different countries where they deploy their troops to counter terrorism and, on the other hand, on national territory, in coordination with the State Security Forces and Corps.

Keywords

Terrorism, Armed Forces, defense, security, missions, Spain, NATO, European Union.

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Introduction. Spanish Armed Forces: fighting terrorism as a priority line of action

Terrorism is a complex and dynamic phenomenon that greatly hinders international cooperation due to its constant changes. Thus, the lack of regulatory heterogeneity caused by states themselves —which sometimes refuse to sign global counter-terrorism cooperation conventions, either because of inability, disagreements or priorities, to agree on which acts, individuals and organisations should be described as terrorist — has prevented a precise definition of what terrorism is[1].

However, although the international community has not adopted a common definition of terrorism, certain basic acts and elements are defined. These were first taken up in 1994 when the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism in its resolution 49/60. It was later updated by the Security Council in its resolution 1566 (2004): 'acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, with the purpose to... intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act[2]'.

The impact of the terrorist phenomenon and its constant evolution has thus required, and continues to require, the international community and the Spanish state to conduct a periodic review and parallel transformation.

To this end, in recent decades, there has been a drive to further strengthen international cooperation through leading security and defence organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the European Union, the United Nations, and other bilateral agreements between countries.

Today, the terrorist phenomenon represents one of the main challenges for State Security and Defence. For this reason, the Spanish Armed Forces play a fundamental role both in defending Spanish society and in the security of other states, which in turn guarantees national security.

The Spanish Armed Forces have the constitutional right and duty to defend Spanish society. Their organisation and main mission are regulated by Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence, which considers the Armed Forces as an essential element of national defence and a *"single entity[3]"* made up of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

1 Sánchez-Gil, L.M. (2011). Repensando el concepto de ciberterrorismo [Rethinking the concept of terrorism]. Madrid, IEEE.

2 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2008). *Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*, no. 32, Geneva.

3 Spain (2005). Organic Law 5/2005, of 17 November, on National Defence. *Official State Gazette*, Madrid.

Article 15 of the Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence attributes to the Armed Forces the mission of *'guaranteeing the sovereignty and independence of Spain, defending its territorial integrity and the constitutional order*[4]*'*. To this end, they contribute militarily to the defence of Spain and its allies.

In its operations, the Spanish armed forces are authorised to respond to terrorist attacks that threaten the security of society and that occur in recognised global common spaces: land, sea, air and cyberspace.

Jihadist terrorism has become so dangerous for the international community that states such as Spain have been jointly participating in supranational organisations for years, combining political, police, legal and military efforts.

With its participation in both international missions and discussion forums and international organisations, Spain show that it is a reliable, secure and committed partner in the defence of the interests of the international community. Beyond guaranteeing security on national territory, Spain has at the same time achieved a privileged position in international security decision-making. This participation is therefore not only a necessity for national defence, but also an opportunity for Spain to actively contribute to global security and the fight against terrorism.

International fight against terrorism. Developments in international missions and terrorist alert levels

In 2021, the Spanish Armed Forces will continue the fight against terrorism by participating in stabilisation and peacekeeping missions beyond national borders[5].

The degree of international engagement, mainly with the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, means that the efforts expected for 2021 will follow the same line of action as in the last four years.

Therefore, taking into account ad hoc adjustments due to temporary command of international forces, security and the health crisis, the Armed Forces' efforts will remain similar to recent years. Its budget will remain around 1.176 billion, exceeding the 966 million budgeted in 2019 and matching the 1.18 billion budgeted in 2020[6].

4 Spain (2005). Organic Law 5/2005, of 17 November, on National Defence. *Official State Gazette*, Madrid.

5 Infodefensa (2020). España destinará 1.176 millones en 2021 a misiones en el exterior de las Fuerzas Armadas. *Infodefensa* [online]. Madrid, Information & Design Solution S.L. [Accessed: 12 February 2021]. Available at: https://www.infodefensa.com/es/2020/12/23/noticia-espana-destinara-millones-misiones-exterior-fuerzas-armadas.html

6 Infodefensa (2020). Spain earmarked 996 million euros for missions abroad in 2019. *Infodefensa* [online]. Madrid, Information & Design Solution S.L. [Accessed: 12 February 2021]. Available at:

Meanwhile, deployment will involve approximately 2,900 military and civil guards on 4 of the 7 continents[7].

Annual comparison of resources used from 2018 to 2021

In 2018, the Armed Forces took part in 20 international missions in response to Spain's global commitments to NATO, a deployment of 3,117 troops with 930 assigned to EU missions, 890 to NATO missions, 616 to UN missions, 480 to Coalition against Daesh, 104 to National Missions and 87 to Corporate Security.

In 2019, the Armed Forces cooperated in 15 international missions, again in response to the global agreements between Spain and the aforementioned international organisations. The number of deployed troops was reduced to 2,510, with 686 deployed to EU Missions, 554 to NATO Missions, 615 to UN Missions, 551 to Coalition against Daesh and 104 to National Missions.

In 2020, the Armed Forces took part in 14 international missions, once again fulfilling their international obligations and duties. The number of deployed troops stood at 2,325, with 495 deployed to EU missions, 891 to NATO missions, 615 to UN missions, 274 to Iraq Support (International Coalition and NATO)[8] and 50 to National Missions[9].

FAS- INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS 2018-2021

Year	No. missions	No. troops	EU	NATO	UN	SUPPORT FOR IRAQ (Coalition and NATO)	National missions
2018	20	3,117	930	890	616	480	104
2019	15	2,510	686	554	615	551	104
2020	14	2,325	495	891	615	274	50
2021	17	2,900					

https://www.infodefensa.com/es/2020/06/08/noticia-defensa-destino-millones-euros-misionesen-exterior.html

7 Government of Spain (2020). *Ministry of Defence: Missions abroad* [online] Madrid, Spanish Ministry of Defence. [Accessed: 10 February 2021]. Available at: https://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/#:~:text=Like%20that%20occur%20in%20civilians%20deployed%20on%20four%20continents

8 Government of Spain (s.f.). *Office of the Presidency of the Government: NATO Heads of State and Government agree on NATO's entry into the coalition against Daesh* [online]. [Accessed: 10 February 2021]. Available at: https://www.dsn.gob.es/es/actualidad/sala-prensa/jefes-estado-gobierno-otan-acuerdan-entrada-alianza-coalici%C3%B3n-contra-daesh

9 Government of Spain (2020). *Ministry of Defence: Infographic Missions abroad (2 July 2020)* [online]. Madrid, Spanish Ministry of Defence.

In 2021, the Armed Forces will participate in 17 international missions and deployment is not expected to exceed 2,900 troops.

Spain will continue to deploy military staff in the context of the European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on the African continent, with operations in countries such as Mali, Somalia and the Central African Republic, and in the Indian Ocean with Operation Atalanta. In addition to the deployment of EU Rapid Response troops who, together with France, are working in the Sahel.

Under the UN framework, Spanish military staff work in the mission in Lebanon and Iraq (together with the International Coalition and the NATO mission in this country).

As part of NATO , they will assist in the peace, deterrence and defence processes in Iraq, Afghanistan, Romania, Latvia and Turkey. They will also form part of the standing naval forces in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

The main operational variants will be in the Afghanistan and Iraq missions, where troops will be reduced while being working on the EUTM Mali mission[10]. In conclusion, as a sign of perseverance and commitment, the Spanish Armed Forces will maintain their presence following the same line of operations as in recent years.

Annual comparison of terrorist alert level from 2018 to 2021

The international community's experience in the fight against terrorism has been reflected in the deployment of various missions and the adoption of international public policy documents. States have combined efforts to define the scope of the terrorist phenomenon and to combat it jointly.

The table below aims to analyse the impact of the terrorist threat and its evolution in various European countries[11], some of them members of the European Union and others belonging to the Atlantic Alliance.

10 *Ibidem.*

11 Government of Spain (2019). *Office of the Presidency of the Government: Europe anti-terrorist alert levels* [online]. Madrid, National Security Department. [Accessed: 15 February 2021]. Available at: https://www.dsn.gob.es/es/actualidad/infografias/europa-niveles-alerta-antiterrorista

TERRORIST ALERT LEVELS 2018-2021

NATO countries	EU countries	2018	2019	2020	2021
Germany	Germany[12]	High	High	High	High
Belgium	Belgium	2 of 4	2 of 4	2 of 4	2 of 4
Croatia	Croatia	3 of 4	3 of 4	-	-
Denmark	Denmark	4 of 5	4 of 5	4 of 5	4 of 5
Spain	Spain	4 of 5	4 of 5	4 of 5	4 of 5
	Finland	2 of 4	2 of 4	2 of 4	2 of 4
France	France	2 of 3	2 of 3	3 of 3	3 of 3
Italy	Italy	2 of 3	2 of 3	2 of 3	2 of 3
Norway		3 of 5	3 of 5	3 of 5	3 of 5
Netherlands	Netherlands	4 of 5	4 of 5	4 of 5	4 of 5
United Kingdom		4 of 5	4 of 5	4 of 5	3 of 5
Sweden		3 of 5	3 of 5	3 of 5	3 of 5

In view of the data shown in the table, the only changes in alert levels in the countries listed are in France and the United Kingdom.

Missions abroad

Support to Iraq - Inherent Resolve - NATO Mission-Iraq

The main objective of the *Inherent Resolve* Iraq support mission is to train and advise the Iraqi army on counter-terrorism issues in order to address the expansion and consolidation of Daesh in Syria and Iraq. The Spanish Armed Forces are carrying out their mission on Iraqi territory as part of the International Coalition against Daesh.

Since October 2018, NATO has also been leading the *NATO Mission-IRAK*[13] (NMI), which mainly aims to advise the Iraqi government on national security and defence issues.

Description of the mission

- Operation *Inherent Resolve* is a joint effort of the 60-state international coalition against Jihadism led by the United States. The mission encompasses different activities:
  - Iraqi Army training.
  - Targeted bombing of Jihadist enclaves in northern Iraq.

12 German terrorist alert levels are not graduated.

13 Allied Joint Force Command Naples (2021). *NATO Mission Iraq* [online]. Italy. [Accessed: 23 February 2021]. Available at: https://jfcnaples.nato.int/nmi

- Operation *NATO Mission-IRAK* is being conducted with the resources of Alliance Member States. Its main tasks are:
  - Advising government institutions on national security and defence. These institutions are the Ministry of Defence, the Office of the National Security Adviser and Iraq's military education institutions.
  - Strengthening Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi Armed Forces.
  - Strengthening military training institutions and academies.
  - Promoting more 'sustainable, transparent, inclusive and effective[14]' national security structures and military education institutions «.
- Timeline: In 2014, the Iraqi government requested UN assistance to combat the spread of Daesh in the region. By June of that year, Daesh had seized several cities, including Mosul and Samarra.

  The international coalition to fight Daesh Jihadist terrorism originated at the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014. It was formalised following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2170/2014. From the outset, the mission was supported by other international organisations such as the UN and the European Union. In October 2014, Spain joined the mission after the Spanish government authorised the participation of the Spanish Armed Forces in the mission.

  The resolution focuses on five areas of action: '*Military operation, preventing the flow of foreign fighters, cutting off sources of funding, humanitarian aid and delegitimising the Jihadist ideology of Daesh*[15]».
- Spain is currently continuing its mission to train and educate the Iraqi army with 150 soldiers deployed. It also remains in the *Inherent Resolve* Coalition with Special Operations teams and the Army's *Task Force Toro*[16] helicopter unit, deployed at the Al Asad airbase, whose mission is to airlift personnel and equipment from Coalition countries.

  Spanish Armed Forces activity also continues in Iraq as part of '*NATO Mission-Iraq*', providing support to allied countries to help guarantee the security

14 Government of Spain (2020). *Ministry of Defence: Missions abroad* [online]. Madrid, Spanish Ministry of Defence. [Accessed: 22 February 2021]. Available at: https://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/actuales/listado/apoyo-a-irak.html

15 *Ibidem*

16 National Security Department (2020). *Ministry of the Presidency of the Government: Spanish Armed Forces: end of deployment in the 'Inherent Resolve' training mission in Iraq* [online]. Madrid. [Accessed: 23 February 2021]. Available at: https://www.dsn.gob.es/es/actualidad/sala-prensa/fuerzas-armadas-espa%C3%B1a-fin-del-despliegue-misi%C3%B3n-adiestramiento-%E2%80%98inherent

of the Iraqi population in the face of the terrorist threat. Spain has deployed 7 military personnel.

EUNAVFOR ATALANTA

The main objective of European Union mission '*European Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) - Operation Atalanta*' is the fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean. Its primary mission is thus to protect maritime traffic in the western Indian Ocean from the threat of piracy. As part of its mission, the operation also has the following objectives:

- Protect World Food Programme (WFP), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other vulnerable vessels.
- Deter, prevent and repress piracy and armed robbery at sea.
- Monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.
- Support other EU missions and international organisations working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the region17.

Description of the mission

- The EU Naval Force patrols between the areas of the Gulf of Aden, between the Horn of Africa region and Yemen, and the Indian Ocean and the Seychelles, an archipelago in East Africa. At present, resources involved in this operation are reduced to the Amphibious Assault Ship Castilla (L-52) and the maritime patrol aircraft *P-3 Orion*[18].
- Timeline: In 2008, the UN Security Council passed Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838 concerning the situation in Somalia, due to increased piracy in the Indian Ocean, with the aim of protecting maritime traffic. Somali piracy had become a priority threat due to the number of ships crossing the Gulf of Aden each year. According to official figures, in 2008 alone there were 134 attacks and 40 vessels hijacked, including Spanish fishing boat Playa de Bakio[19].
- In November 2008, the EU Council approved the creation of a naval air force, supported by UN Security Council Resolution 1816, and within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, giving rise to Operation Atalanta in December 2008. It was not until January 2009 that the Spanish government approved the participation and dispatch of the first contingent to Djibouti.

17 European Union (2012). *EU Naval Force – Somalia. Operation ATALANTA* [online]. Available at: https://eunavfor.eu

18 *Ibidem.*

19 Government of Spain (2021). *Ministry of Defence: Missions abroad* [online]. Madrid, Spanish Ministry of Defence. [Accessed: 23 February 2021]. Available at: https://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/actuales/listado/atalanta.html

- Somali piracy is not the only security threat. The presence of the terrorist group Al-Shabbaab and piracy practices linked to the financing of its activities[20] also highlight the relevance of the Atalanta mission in the region to guarantee security in the area.
- Spain has been participating in Operation Atalanta since January 2009 with the deployment of 50 military personnel and a P-3 *Orion* aircraft that form part of the *Orion* detachment in Djibouti. It also provides two vessels during inter-monsoon periods and one during the monsoon periods. Spain is currently the largest contributor to Operation Atalanta.
- In March 2019, Spain assumed command of Operation Atalanta led from the EU Headquarters at the Rota Naval Base (Cádiz). The operation is currently commanded by Vice Admiral Eugenio Díaz del Río.

Operation Sea Guardian

NATO's maritime operation Sea Guardian is primarily aimed at researching and understanding the maritime environment in order to deter and combat terrorist organisations and to counter any threats that may emerge in this common global space. Specifically, the scope of the mission extends to the international waters of the Mediterranean Sea and the approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar.

Description of the mission

- Operation Sea Guardian is a maritime security operation whose main objective is to deepen knowledge of the maritime environment by combining various techniques and networks; and ensuring a reliable exchange of information between allied countries and international organisations related to the maritime environment. The main tasks of the operation, contained in the NATO Maritime Security Concept of Operations[21], are:
  - Maritime support for the fight against terrorism.
  - Supporting knowledge of the maritime environment.
  - Contribution to regional maritime security capacity building[22].

20 Arcos Sánchez, A. (2014). El terrorismo de Al Shabab en Somalia [Al Shabab terrorism in Somalia] [online]. Madrid. [Accessed: 24 February 2021] Available at: https://armada.defensa.gob.es/archivo/rgm/2014/05/cap04.pdf

21 NATO (2021). Missions: *Operation Sea Guardian* [online]. Northwood, Maritime Allied Command. Available at: https://mc.nato.int/missions/operation-sea-guardian

22 Government of Spain (2021). *Ministry of Defence: Missions abroad* [online]. Madrid, Spanish Ministry of Defence. [Accessed: 25 February 2021]. Available at: https://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/actuales/listado/otan-sea-guardian.html_

- Subject to NATO approval, four additional permanent tasks may be carried out:
  - Upholding Freedom of Navigation.
  - Maritime Interdiction.
  - Combating the proliferation of Weapons of Maritime Destruction.
  - Protecting Critical Infrastructure23.
- The scope of Operation Sea Guardian is slightly wider than that of its predecessor, Operation Active Endeavour, as it includes the approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar, as well as the international waters of the Mediterranean Sea.
- Command: the operation is directed from NATO's Maritime Headquarters in Northwood, United Kingdom.
- Timeline: Operation Sea Guardian is a continuation of NATO's Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), a naval operation approved in 2001 following the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, which prompted the invocation of NATO's Article 5[24] *Collective Defence* for the first time in NATO history.

  In July 2015, the North Atlantic Council approved the replacement of OAE with Operation Sea Guardian, a '*Non-Article 5*' mission [25]. November 2016 marked the start of the current mission and, with it, Spain's participation.
- Spain contributes the following resources to the operation[26]:
  - An Air Force Maritime Patrol aircraft.
  - A Spanish Navy submarine.
  - An offshore patrol boat ready for deployment.
  - A command ship with a staff available to command the operation.
  - Permanent diplomatic clearance to dock at Spanish naval bases.
  - Any military unit that transits the Sea Guardian's area of operations at any time becomes an associated support cooperating unit.

23 *Ibidem.*

24 NATO. Missions: *Operation Sea Guardian… Op. cit.*

25 A 'Non-Article 5' mission is referred to when mission approval is not covered by the principle of Collective Defence, enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO's founding treaty.

26 Government of Spain (2021). *Ministry of Defence: Missions abroad* [online]. Madrid, Spanish Ministry of Defence. [Accessed: 27 February 2021]. Available at: https://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/actuales/listado/otan-sea-guardian.html

NATO Operation Active Fence - Turkey

The main objective of the mission is to defend Turkey against ballistic missile attacks from Syria[27]. Spain remains interested in fortifying NATO's increased attention to the south in the face of unusual threats such as terrorism.

Description of the mission

- A collective and purely defensive mission.
- Timeline: the mission began in 2012, with Spain joining in 2015 — the first time Spain would deploy a ballistic missile defence system abroad — and has been extended to the present day.
- The mission is related to counter-terrorism because of its background and present risks. The use of Scud-D or Scud-C missiles[28] employed by the Bashar el-Assad regime against the rebels, as well as the risks of the Daesh terrorist organisation taking control of them, forced the Turkish government to ask NATO for protection.
- The system is coordinated in Germany by Aircom, NATO's air force allied command, which consolidates and distributes radar information from the Ballistic Missile Defence Operations Centre at Ramstein Air Command. Currently, 149 Spanish military personnel are deployed (a maximum of 150 and personnel rotation every 6 months) at the Incirlik air base (city of Adana).
- Weapon system. There were initially 5 Patriot batteries (PAC-2 model) operated by Germany, the Netherlands and the United States. In 2015, the US withdrew its detachment in the area by contributing to Turkey's air defence from its destroyers in the Mediterranean. In turn, the Netherlands withdrew its two batteries, replaced by Spain. The Spanish battery, deployed in Turkey, is composed of five launchers and a reserve, together with command and control components. The system is capable of dealing with all types of attack, from short-range to long-range and from very low to very high altitude. To do so, it uses MIM-104C guided missiles that destroy a variety of targets in an estimated 3-5 minutes.
- Achievements. By working as an active and committed NATO partner, Spain is helping to reduce the force's vulnerability to terrorist attack, which in turn helps to protect Adana's entire population of between 1.7 and 2 million.

27 Government of Spain (2021). *Ministry of Defence: Missions abroad, Support to Turkey* [online]. Madrid, Spanish Ministry of Defence. [Accessed: 22 February 2021]. Available at: https://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/actuales/listado/ayudaturquia.html

28 ABC Blogs (2020). NATO. España renueva otros seis meses su misión OTAN de misiles Patriot en Turquía [Spain renews its NATO Patriot missile mission in Turkey for another six months] [online]. [Accessed: 21 February 2021]. Available at: https://abcblogs.abc.es/tierra-mar-aire/otan/espana-misiles-turquia.html

NATO Operation Resolute Support (RSM) - Afghanistan

The main objective of the mission is to assist, train and advise Afghan institutions. For more than 18 years, Spain has helped fight the insurgency and contributed to restoring the country.

Description of the mission

- Support and assistance mission.
- Timeline: Spain began its activity in Afghanistan with Operation Enduring Freedom, although it was in 2001, with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), that it made its greatest contribution. ISAF ended in 2014 and NATO's Resolute Support mission was launched.
- The mission is related to counter-terrorism because of its origins. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the Twin Towers by the Al-Qaida terrorist organisation prompted the NATO Security Council — for the first time in its history — to invoke Article 5 of the Treaty in support of NATO's Operation Enduring Freedom.
- Efforts: Since it began, Spain has contributed in Afghanistan by '*carrying out 28,000 patrols, crossing 3 million kilometres and deactivating explosives in more than 1,400 missions*[29]'. During the process of pacification and development of the Asian country, 102 Spanish soldiers died, 64 of them in the Yak42 plane crash[30].
- The mission: during Operation Enduring Freedom, Spain provided helicopters, ships, airlift and medical support. Subsequently, with the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), Spain focused on the rehabilitation of the province of Qala-i-Naw and the implementation of the field hospital (Role 2E) in Herat. In addition to its first actions in Kabul, where the first 350 military personnel were deployed.

  Currently, through the Resolute Support mission, the Spanish military deployed in Afghanistan (27) contribute from their headquarters in Kabul to training and assisting Afghan forces. Furthermore, since 2018, one of the additional capabilities that Spain has contributed is the deployment of its Special

29 Government Of Spain (2021). *Ministry of Defence: Missions abroad, Resolute Support, Afghanistan* [online]. Madrid, Spanish Ministry of Defence. [Accessed: 20 February 2021]. Available at: https://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/actuales/listado/afganistan.html

30 Expósito, J.L. (2019). Los grandes contingentes [Large contingents]. *Revista Española de Defensa* (*Spanish Defence Review)* [online]. May, p. 3. [Accessed: 19 February 2017]. Available at: https://www.defensa.gob.es/Galerias/gabinete/red/2019/05/p-60-63-red-361-30-anyos-misiones.pdf

Operations Force (FOE in Spanish), through which it has trained and advised Afghan special operations forces[31].

- Achievements: to sum up the mission, Spain has provided Afghanistan with '*more security and better infrastructure for citizens*'.

EUTM-Mali

The main objective of the mission is to provide military training in southern Mali to Malians army infantry units in order to create an autonomous force that can defend the country against the Jihadist threat. The mission is the military pillar of European Union strategy in the region, which aims to advance the country's political, humanitarian, security and defence capabilities.

The main tasks of the Spanish contingent in Mali are therefore[32]:

– Force training without direct participation in combat operations.
– Advising on chains of command and control.
– Recommendations on international humanitarian law.
– Supporting G5 Sahel to improve operability and cooperation with other armies in the region that are part of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Advising the G5 Sahel Joint Force Headquarters.
– Contributing to improving the Military Education System.

Description of the mission

- EUTM-Mali is led by a Spanish brigadier general as of 12 January 2021, who is in command of 700 military personnel from 28 European countries[33].
- The Spanish contingent is currently made up of 180 military personnel due to anti-Covid measures, although its maximum projection is 280 troops; Spain is the main contributor with 24% of the units. The bulk of the troops are located in Koulikoro (157 military personnel), as this is where training and education takes place.
- The contingent is currently made up of the 11th Brigade 'Extremadura' and troops from Marine Infantry Brigade 'Tercio de Armada'.

31 Somonte, R. (2018). Visita al contingente español en Afganistán [Visit to the Spanish contingent in Afghanistan]. *Revista Española de Defensa* (*Spanish Defence Review)* [online]. December, p. 2.

32 Defence Staff (2020). *Ministry of Defence: Operations abroad* [online]. Madrid, Spanish Ministry of Defence. [Accessed: 21 February 2021]. Available at: https://emad.defensa.gob.es/operaciones/operaciones-en-el-exterior/43-UE-EUTM-Mali/

33 *Ibidem*

- Timeline: Following the 2012 coup d'état (by the Tuaregs and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) that led to the independence of the north of the country, in January 2013, the Malian government requested assistance from France and Operation Serval was launched. In view of the insecurity and the Malian government's request for assistance, Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP of 13 January 2013 was adopted, developing the structure and objectives of EUTM-Mali. Thus, the mission was launched both by UN Resolutions and EU Decisions, due to the risk of the humanitarian and security crisis in Mali spreading to the entire Sahel region, while at the same time posing a danger to Europe. In January 2013, the EU Council approved the training mission (which had been expressly requested by the Malian government) and in February the first Spanish soldiers arrived.

  Operation EUTM-Mali led by Spain is thus contributing to the political stabilisation of the country, helping to re-establish the government's sovereignty over the northern territories and improving operations with the G5 Sahel Joint Force to strengthen security in the region.

EUTM-Somalia

The main objective of the European Union mission in Somalia (EUTM-Somalia) is to train the Somali army so that it is fully capable of combating both terrorism and piracy. Thus, from the ground, it complements Operation Atalanta in order to guarantee security in the region for the benefit of both the Somali people and the international community.

The mission is based on 3 pillars[34]:

– Training

– Tutoring

– Strategic advice

Description of the mission

- Spain is currently contributing 19 military personnel to the mission deployed in Mogadishu, serving alongside troops from 10 other EU countries and Serbia. The Spanish contingent is mainly involved in training light infantry

34 Council Of The European Union (2020). *Press releases* [online]. Madrid, Spanish Ministry of Defence. [Accessed: 21 February 2021]. Available at:

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/press/press-releases/2020/12/23/operation-atalanta-eutm-somalia-and-eucap-somalia-mandates-extended-for-two-more-years/

units, combat engineers and command units[35] in order to combat terrorist groups operating in the region, such as Al-Shabbaab.

- The mission's approach is to move progressively from direct tactical training to training Somali officers to take over the instruction of their troops.
- Timeline[36]: since the European Union launched the mission on 25 January 2010 (under UN Security Council Resolution 1872 of May 2009), Spain demonstrated its commitment by being the first country to assume command of the mission, initially led from Uganda. On 22 April of the same year, Congress authorised the dispatch of Spanish troops and on 4 May, the mission began operations led by the Spanish Armed Forces.
- The need to deploy an international mission in the area stemmed from the fact that, in 2010, Somalia was a failed state in which organised crime, terrorism and piracy operated with impunity. The absence of security forces or strong state structures also made the country a haven for pirate groups raiding ships in the Indian Ocean, which the EU had been fighting for years in Operation Atalanta.

  EUTM-Somalia has therefore emerged as a land-based reinforcement to complement Atalanta's naval operations, seeking to train Somali army personnel to take charge of their country's security.

The Armed Forces as guarantors of National Defence

In a globalised and interconnected world, emerging threats and risks have global repercussions that challenge the entire international community. An example of this is the emergence of Jihadist terrorism worldwide or global warming. This is why ensuring security abroad is essential to protect national territory.

The commitment and work of the Armed Forces translates into developing missions abroad and, as guarantors of national defence, into support for the Public Administration and the State Security Bodies.

Cooperation between the Armed Forces and State Security Bodies

The Armed Forces and State Security Bodies collaborate to guarantee security and defend the rule of law both within and beyond national borders. Therefore, at

35 Defence Staff (2020). *Ministry of Defence: Operations abroad* [online]. Madrid, Spanish Ministry of Defence. [Accessed: 24 February 2021]. Available at: https://emad.defensa.gob.es/operaciones/operaciones-en-el-exterior/44-EUTM-Somalia/

36 Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (2018). *Analysis of the situation in Somalia*. Madrid, Ministry of Defence, CESEDEN.

national level, the Ministries of Defence and Interior collaborate actively, in solidarity and effectively, through joint activities and operations; they also draft strategic and operational documents in order to address risks and threats to national security.

Defence-Interior inter-ministerial collaboration

At executive level, inter-ministerial collaboration in the field of security and defence is carried out through various bodies created to promote and foster coordination and cooperation in security matters. The National Security Council[37] is the body responsible for advising the President on the direction of the National Security System and National Security policy. It is also responsible for developing the National Security Strategy, with an update approved in December 2017.

The National Defence Council[38] advises the President on national defence matters. This body is made up of the President, Vice-President and the Ministers of Defence and the Interior, among others. According to Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence[39], National Defence Council duties include assisting the Government in managing crises and armed conflicts affecting National Defence.

In turn, the National Security Strategy[40] highlights the importance of promoting a '*common positioning*' of all bodies responsible for security, as well as '*strengthening synergies and aligning state resources*'.

Collaboration between the Armed Forces and State Security Bodies

In recent decades, cooperation between the Armed Forces and State Security Bodies has taken the form of various initiatives related to diplomacy, security and defence. According to the latest National Defence Directive, approved in June 2020, the Armed Forces are responsible for ensuring effective defence with the support of civil

37 Government Of Spain (2021). *Office of the Presidency of the Government: National Security Council* [online]. Madrid, National Security Department. [Accessed: 16 March 2021]. Available at: https://www.dsn.gob.es/es/sistema-seguridad-nacional/consejo-seguridad-nacional#collapseFour

38 Government Of Spain (2021). *Ministry of Defence: National Defence Council* [online]. Madrid, Spanish Ministry of Defence. [Accessed: 16 March 2021]. Available at: https://www.defensa.gob.es/defensa/consejodefensa/index.html

39 Spain (2005). Organic Law 5/2005, of 17 November, on National Defence. *Official State Gazette*, Madrid.

40 Government Of Spain (2017). *Presidency of the Government: National Security Strategy* [online]. Madrid, Presidency of the Government.

society and '*complemented by other State security instruments*[41]', for example, the National Police Force and the Civil Guard, under the aegis of the Ministry of the Interior.

A clear example of Armed Forces-State Security Body coordination was Operation Balmis, launched throughout the country with the deployment of more than 2,500 troops belonging to the three armies, the Military Emergency Unit and the Royal Guard to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic health crisis.

The Armed Forces are involved in permanent missions[42] that highlight their commitment to citizens, their role as guarantors of national defence, and their support for State Security Bodies. These missions are complemented by support provided in situations considered '*of risk or disaster*' to civilian authorities, in civil protection missions or relief to the civilian population.

In coordination with State Security Bodies, some of the specific Armed Forces permanent missions are:

- The Army performs tasks related to border protection and environmental protection. It also supports the health sector and helps in the fight against natural disasters[43].
- The Spanish Navy actively collaborates with the Centre for Intelligence against Terrorism and Organised Crime (CITCO), part of the Ministry of the Interior, in the control of illicit trafficking. It also protects borders and monitors illegal immigration and mafias[44].
- The Air Force carries out various missions in support of State Security Bodies in counter-terrorism matters. It also carries out fire-fighting operations and customs surveillance.
- The Military Emergency Unit is considered 'a tool of State Action' with the mission of complementing emergency services of the State and, in turn, other administrations such as the Autonomous Regions[45].

In the field of counter-terrorism, coordination and efforts to combat terrorism have taken the form of strategic and operational documents such as the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalisation (PEN-LCRV).

41 Government Of Spain (2020). *Ministry of Defence: National Defence Directive* [online]. Madrid, Ministry of Defence

42 Government Of Spain (2020). *Ministry of Defence: permanent missions* [online]. Madrid, Ministry of Defence. [Accessed: 16 March 2021]. Available at: https://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/espanna/

43 *Ibidem.*

44 *Ibidem.*

45 Government Of Spain (2020). *Ministry of Defence: Military Emergency Unit* [online]. Madrid, Ministry of Defence. [Accessed: 16 March 2021]. Available at: https://ume.defensa.gob.es/CONOCENOS/Bienvenida_del_General/

National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2019-2022)

This document expresses the willingness of the Ministries of Interior and Defence and the National Security Department to combat the terrorist threat in a coordinated, cooperative and unified manner.

The strategy, which covers the period 2019-2022, has been drawn up by the Ministry of the Interior's Centre for Intelligence against Terrorism and Organised Crime (CITCO). It replaces the 2012 Comprehensive International Counter-Terrorism and Radicalisation Strategy (EICTIR).

The document identifies terrorism *as 'one of the main threats facing our country*[46]', focusing both on the danger posed by potential attacks and the propaganda and narrative terrorist groups use on social media.

With the threat of Jihadist terrorism as a backdrop, State Security Bodies on the one hand, and the Spanish Armed Forces on the other, have the mission of: preventing and stopping attacks on national territory for the former, and deterring and carrying out an international projection of force for the latter. Both actors are of vital importance for an effective response to terrorism since, in order to achieve a secure state, the international environment must also be secure.

Context

Although the text focuses on issues such as the threat of returning Jihadists, the financing of terrorism and radicalisation in prisons, the importance of Armed Forces participation lies in the fact that in order to limit the impact of foreign terrorist groups in Spain, neighbouring countries must have strong and competent security forces capable of taking responsibility for the stability of their territories.

Thus, the main objective of the Armed Forces is to safeguard the integrity of Spain, and this involves acting abroad, cooperating with other nations to prevent terrorist groups from attacking Spain[47]. By minimising terrorist activity in other countries by training their Armed Forces and Security Bodies, it is possible to reduce the capacity to act and potential impact that terrorist activity these groups could have in our country.

For this reason, the contribution of the Armed Forces to the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy is one of the essential pillars in terms of operational action at national and international level[48].

46 Government Of Spain (2019). *Ministry of the Interior: National Counter-Terrorism Strategy* [online]. Madrid, Ministry of the Interior.

47 Government Of Spain. *Ministry of Defence: EUTM-Mali Missions abroad* [online]. Madrid. Available at: https://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/actuales/listado/eutm-mali.html

48 GESI. International Security Studies Group. El empleo de las fuerzas armadas en la lucha contra el terrorismo [The use of armed forces in the fight against terrorism] [online]. Available at: http://www.seguridadinternacional.

Goals

The Strategy is based on 4 well-defined pillars: Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Prepare response. To achieve this, cooperation between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior is essential because the main terrorist groups posing a threat to Spain operate from abroad[49], in unstable countries where the presence of State Security Bodies has become essential to maintain the security of any police or civilian operation:

1. Prevention is implemented both on national territory and in third countries. As noted above, by strengthening the security forces of other countries prone to harbouring terrorist groups such as Mali, Somalia, Iraq or Afghanistan, we prevent those groups from operating in Spain.

2. By protecting the borders and communities of these insecure countries, we protect our own community. By bringing stability through international missions, the possible radicalisation of individuals in these countries and, therefore, sending Jihadist propaganda and narratives to Spanish territory is anticipated[50]. By reducing the vulnerability of societies abroad, we reduce our own vulnerability. State Security Bodies and the Armed Forces also cooperate in protecting national and European critical infrastructures in Spain, key elements for the proper functioning of our society (the Armed Forces would intervene at alert level 5)[51].

3. In terms of pursuit, information gathered on the ground by the Armed Forces during their missions is essential for State Security Bodies to develop intelligence. This information makes it possible to identify potential terrorist targets in Spain or to Spanish citizens (or residents in Spain) displaced to combat zones who may return, to investigate their financing networks, weapons, training, etc., making it possible to establish operations and arrest criminals, as well as to dismantle the aid and logistics they receive from abroad.

4. Preparing a response would be the '*last frontier*' in guiding actions to reduce the consequences of a possible attack, i.e. when the previous elements have failed. At this point, State Security Bodies and the Armed Forces would act jointly in the event of a major terrorist attack requiring an increase of the anti-terrorist alert to level 5[52]. All necessary resources would be used against a threat to the integrity of the state.

es/?q=es/content/el-empleo-de-las-fuerzas-armadas-en-la-lucha-contra-el-terrorismo

49 Government of Spain. *Ministry of the Interior: National Counter-Terrorism Strategy... Op. cit.*

50 Real Instituto El Cano. De Mali en peor [From Mali to worse]. *Seguridad y Defensa* [online]. Madrid. Available at: https://blog.realinstitutoelcano.org/el-sahel-de-mali-en-peor/

51 Government of Spain. *Ministry of the Interior: Anti-Terrorist Alert Level* [online]. Madrid. Available at: http://www.interior.gob.es/prensa/nivel-alerta-antiterrorista

52 *Ibidem.*

Features

This is a strategy with a comprehensive vision of the terrorist phenomenon, addressing the problem of violent extremism and seeking to defend society against the radicalisation and violent ideologies that lead to terrorism.

The document also covers terrorism as a global phenomenon, with international terrorist networks operating from multiple countries. As proof of this, Jihadist terrorism poses the greatest threat to our security today. Thus, of all terrorist-related arrests made since 2012, 70 % were related to Jihadism, 20 % to ETA and the remaining 10 % to other terrorist organisations[53].

The decline of Daesh in Syria and Iraq marks a turning point. This is because, in the face of the caliphate's territorial loss, the strategy was geared towards increasing attacks in the countries of origin rather than seeking to displace fighters to conflict zones[54].

Collaboration and mission

The document emphasises the collaboration of all national institutions and international coalitions of which Spain is a member, including the Armed Forces and their international action.

The mission is to defend the values, freedoms and rights of Spaniards and their interests both in Spain and abroad. The goal to achieve this is to neutralise the terrorist threat, minimising the vulnerability of citizens and curbing the radicalisation of violent extremism[55].

Pillars and lines of action

The Strategy is divided into 4 fundamental pillars (Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Prepare response) developed by various lines of action, while each pillar has 3 areas of action: internal, external and global common spaces.

Cooperation between the Armed Forces and State Security Bodies will mainly take place in the external sphere since, the fight against terrorism acquires a comprehensive approach through Armed Forces international missions.

53 Government of Spain. *Ministry of the Interior: National Counter-Terrorism Strategy... Op. cit.*

54 ATALAYAR. Daesh vuelve a aumentar su amenaza en Siria e Irak, según la ONU [Daesh is once again increasing its threat in Syria and Iraq, according to the UN] [online]. Available at: https://atalayar.com/content/daesh-vuelve-aumentar-su-amenaza-en-siria-e-irak-seg%C3%BAn-la-onu

55 Government of Spain. *Ministry of the Interior: National Counter-Terrorism Strategy... Op.cit.*

- In the Prevent pillar , Spain promotes collaboration with NATO allies, the Council of Europe, the EU and the UN, increasing collaboration with police and intelligence services with these countries, given the evidence of the increasingly extensive international logistical and financial network that sustains terrorist activities.

  This collaboration has resulted in the arrest of more than 100 people in 12 different countries, where the fight against Jihadist terrorism accounts for 60% of all operations[56]. This cooperation aims to identify factors that contribute to violent extremism and terrorism.

- The Protect pillar seeks to identify potential threats at national and international level. At national level, giving special importance to the protection of critical infrastructures by State Security Bodies and the Armed Forces where appropriate, and at international level, protecting Spanish citizens, institutions and interests in high-risk areas of great importance such as the Sahel or the Middle East (countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Central African Republic or Mali).

  On this point, the document makes special reference to the '*exchange of information with Armed Forces on areas of deployment or with official representation abroad*[57]'. It also seeks to combat the proliferation of international trafficking in CBRN, weapons and explosives. Armed Forces-State Security Body coordination is essential in this regard since illegal arms can flow both from European countries to conflict zones, where they can be used in attacks against Spanish troops abroad, and from conflict zones to the national territory (taking advantage of lax regulations in neighbouring countries), given the possibility of being used by cells in our territory against the civilian population.

  Virtual protection is also worthy of mention as the Armed Forces, through the Joint Cyberspace Command, monitor and defend against any cybernetic attack on Spanish sovereignty, including terrorist actions that could affect both troops and society in general.

- In the Pursuit pillar, it is worth highlighting CITCO's role as a link between the Armed Forces and State Security Bodies as it is the centre that combines the intelligence provided by military and police units, enabling a constant flow of information and better coordination of anti-terrorist operations[58]. This communication makes it possible to carry out prospective work in order to foresee possible threats at national and international level, analysing the situa-

56 *Ibidem.*

57 *Ibidem.*

58 Government of Spain. *Ministry of the Interior: Counter-Terrorism and Organised Crime Intelligence Centre* [online]. Available at: http://www.interior.gob.es/prensa/noticias/-/asset_publisher/GHU8Ap6ztgsg/content/id/2624738

tion of countries in conflict where potentially dangerous terrorist groups are based, facilitating their neutralisation before they can attack Spanish interests.

The aim is therefore to strengthen bilateral instruments with other states to investigate and arrest terrorist elements, as well as multilateral instruments to carry out operations at NATO level (cooperating with other armies and security forces in countries such as Iraq or Afghanistan), at EU level through Europol and Eurojust, and at international level through Interpol.

This not only facilitates the investigation of terrorism as a crime, but also increases the security of third countries through training missions to improve their counter-terrorism capabilities and create a secure environment for Spain, because if its neighbours are stable, our borders will be more secure.

- Finally, the Prepare response pillar seeks to counter the effect of a terrorist action, minimising consequences and seeking to restore normality. Accordingly, by coordinating with allies in the state's external action, it aims to reduce the vulnerability to terrorist acts of citizens, companies and national interests abroad.

  One of the main tools in this area where cooperation between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence can be observed is[59]:

  > '*Strengthen international cooperation, especially in the EU area and in the Mediterranean* (area where police-military coordination operations in the fight against arms trafficking, among others, are carried out)[60]'.

Additionally, the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy presents the Specialised Counter-Terrorism Committee (a National Security Council support body) as a point of contact between the Ministry of Defence on the one hand, and the National Police Force General Information Commissioner Office and the Civil Guard Information Headquarters on the other. The latter represent the Ministry of the Interior and are the State Security Bodies responsible for the fight against terrorism at national and international level[61].

This Strategy stands as a '*cornerstone*' to articulate Spain's actions against terrorism, with a view to safeguarding National Security and Spanish interests within and beyond our borders.

The fight against terrorism is thus considered a coordinated task between State Security Bodies and the Armed Forces, each in its own sphere of action, in order to achieve the four pillars of this Strategy. A global struggle that requires support and

59 Government of Spain. *Ministry of the Interior: National Counter-Terrorism Strategy... Op. cit.*

60 Government of Spain. *Ministry of Defence: Operation Sea Guardian. Missions abroad... Op.cit.*

61 Government of Spain. *National Security Department. Specialised Counter-Terrorism Committee* [online]. Available at: https://www.dsn.gob.es/es/comit%C3%A9-especializado-contra-terrorismo#collapseTwo

cooperation with allied countries through international organisations such as the EU, NATO, UN, OSCE and other organisations or coalitions in which Spain participates.

With this document, Spain reiterates its anti-terrorist commitment to 'make use of all the means of the rule of law to achieve its defeat[62]' through the coordinated action of the State Security Bodies, Armed Forces and Intelligence Services.

National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalisation (PEN-LCRV)

The role of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence has taken on vital importance in the 2015 PEN-LCRV. The Plan focuses on the former National Security Strategy of 2013, renewed in 2017 and due to be updated in 2021.

In addition to the future NSS 2021, the Ministry of the Interior is expected to reach its commitment to develop a new '*National Strategic Plan to Prevent and Combat Violent Radicalisation*[63]. A concept also covered in the 2019 Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which establishes among its '*priority axes*' the revision, updating and development of PEN-LCRV[64].

However, in view of the possible changes to come, the last six years have also demonstrated the importance of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces in the fight against violent Jihadist radicalisation, objectives that were already set out when drafting the PEN-LCRV.

Context

Without prejudice to how PEN-LCRV focuses on all kinds of radicalisation, current and future threats to work on come from Jihadist terrorism. Coordination between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence thus acquires relevance since the Armed Forces are deployed in 11 counter-terrorism missions.

The Armed Forces therefore contribute to the implementation of the European Union Internal Security Strategy[65], the National Security Strategy and the Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

62 Government Of Spain. *Ministry of the Interior: National Counter-Terrorism Strategy... Op. cit.*

63 National Security Strategy (2020). *National - Combating terrorism/organised crime* [online]. Madrid, National Security Department. [Accessed: 28 March 2021]. Available at: https://www.dsn.gob.es/en/actualidad/seguridad-nacional-ultima-hora/nacional-%E2%80%93-lucha-contra-terrorismocrimen-organizado

64 Government Of Spain (2019). *Office of the Presidency of the Government: National Security Department. National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2019* [online]. Madrid, National Security Department. [Accessed: 12 March 2021]. Available at: https://www.dsn.gob.es/es/documento/estrategia-nacional-contra-terrorismo-2019

65 AWARE. *From Europe* [online]. [Accessed: 08 March 2021]. Available at: https://euaware.eu/desde-europa/

Goals

Among the various objectives of the Strategy, cooperation between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces abroad is indispensable for three reasons:

- The phenomenon of violent radicalisation is a national necessity that crosses borders.
- It is indispensable to comply with EU Guidelines on Combating Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. These guidelines warn that:

  '*Combatants should continue to return to their families and recall that the efforts made at European level must be matched by the implementation of all EU activities abroad*: *(North Africa, Western Balkans, Turkey)*[66]'.
- PEN-LCRV is comprehensive and therefore involves and obliges all ministries involved in the coordination of public security67.

Features

The four main characteristics of PEN-LCRV are that it is a '*strategic, national, efficient and coherent*' Plan .

However, defining it as '*national*' does not imply reducing it only to the domestic sphere since, as the Plan itself explains, it encompasses '*all areas of interest to Spain*[68]' and nowadays the boundaries between external and internal security have become blurred.

Security today cannot be compartmentalised, threats and risks feed off each other and transcend our borders. It is not just domestic or national. In addition to regional and home-grown threats, Spain faces global threats. An effective security strategy must be capable of regional, national, European and global responses[69].

Plan and 'Where'

The Plan is a strategic document and therefore has a structure that decrees '*where, how and when*'.

66 *Ibidem.*

67 Government Of Spain (2013). *Ministry of the Interior: National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalisation* [online]. Madrid, Ministry of the Interior. [Accessed: 09 March 2021]. Available at: http://www.interior.gob.es/web/servicios-al-ciudadano/plan-estrategico-nacional-de-lucha-contra-la-radicalizacion-violenta/plan-estrategico-nacional/caracteristicas-del-plan

68 *Ibidem.*

69 Government of Spain (2011). *Spanish Security Strategy. Everyone's responsibility.* Madrid, Government of Spain. Available at: http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es and the Catalogue of Publications of the General State Administration http://publicacionesoficiales.boe.es

The '*where*' distinguishes 3 areas of action, with the '*external*' area being where the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces play the most important role.

> '*Outside national territory. The national coordination structure will be aware of the State's external action on the phenomenon of radicalisation and violent extremism and will provide proposals to the government, depending on the action to be taken. Coordination of the proposed measures will be the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, and implementation of each department concerned, highlighting the role played by the Armed Forces abroad [Interests and area of influence]*[70]'.

How and when

The Plan also sets out '*three functional areas*' (before, during and after) on which specific actions should be carried out: '*prevention, action and monitoring*'.

As for the *how*, note that the Spanish security strategy has tools to defend both exclusively national interests — in this case those of PEN-CLRV — and those shared with our partners and allies in the EU, NATO, OSCE and other organisations. The most important tools to be put into joint use are the Armed Forces and State Security Bodies[71].

Thus, although PEN-LCRV has established the internal sphere as a priority, taking the local geographic area as the main scenario and focusing action on local groups and State Security Bodies, in the external domain, the Plan grants coordination to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Coordination.

The Plan therefore provides that the national coordination structure will be aware of the State's external efforts in all matters affecting the phenomenon of radicalisation and violent extremism. However, in addition to important information work, the Armed Forces may be called upon to act in all three functional areas:

- Prevent (attendance and participation in international fora).
- Monitor (support, training or collaboration with other countries).
- Act (dispatching armed forces or State Security Bodies in risk scenarios).

Structure

The Plan establishes a single national inter-ministerial structure comprising members from 12 ministries, including the Ministry of Defence. Coordination is led by the Ministry of the Interior, implementing and developing the Plan in its entirety.

70 Government Of Spain (2013). *Ministry of the Interior: National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalisation* [online]. Madrid, Ministry of the Interior 2013... *Op. cit.*

71 *Ibidem.*

Such requirements highlight how coordination between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence, as well as Security Bodies and the Armed Forces, is a key enabler for the successful development of PEN-LCRV.

Future challenges

April 2019 marked 70 years since the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recalled its creation by declaring that NATO is the only place where Europe and North America *discuss, decide and act* together on security and defence issue. He also made it clear that all member countries remain united *one for all and all for one*[72].

The current security and defence landscape, characterised by a complex and changing world, highlights the relevance of national and international cooperation and coordination. On national territory, through the coordination of different public administration bodies, the private sector and civil society. At international level, by promoting active cooperation among the states of the international community and the adoption of new strategies to combat risks and threats to global security and well-being.

This paper aims to highlight a number of forward-looking areas of action through which cooperation and coordination in the fight against terrorism could be improved.

National level: Armed Forces and State Security Body cooperation

At national level, the challenges facing Spain are not few, as stated in the 2017 National Security Strategy. To meet current and emerging challenges, it is essential to foster cooperation between the Armed Forces and State Security Bodies on national territory and across borders. Domestic presence of the Spanish army would complement and facilitate the work of the National Police, the Civil Guard and local police forces, mainly in the fight against terrorism, citizen security and migratory flows.

At executive level, it is clear that a permanent flow of information between the Ministries of Defence and the Interior through multidisciplinary working groups and bodies such as CITCO, the National Security Council and the National Defence Council must continue. In the field of counter-terrorism, it would be interesting to approve the creation of a body that would focus its efforts on combating the expansion, radicalisation and recruitment of new terrorists, in line with the strategic documents mentioned in this paper.

72 *La Vanguardia* (2019). Live: NATO Secretary General's press conference [online]. London. Available at:
https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20191204/472056548441/conferencia-prensa-otan-londres-jens-stoltenberg-directo-video-seo-lv.html

In addition to collaboration within our borders, the presence of State Security Bodies and their experience in the fight against terrorism would add great value to international missions to combat terrorism, providing advice and support to the Spanish Armed Forces and the armies of allied countries.

International level: involvement of the International Community

International Community States have constantly had to combine efforts to address security threats throughout history. Time has shown that countries are stronger when they work together towards common goals. Therefore, in view of the future and the possible risks that may emerge, it is essential to promote common ground among the international community in order to adopt new forms of cooperation and strategies to combat threats to global security, including terrorism. Strategies capable of responding to current and future needs and risks.

The emergence of new global common spaces such as cyberspace has led to the development of hybrid threats, characterised by combining conventional and novel elements that have taken advantage of the consolidation of new information and communication technologies. Terrorist groups have adapted their expansion strategies to cyberspace by exploiting advantages such as low cost, speed and anonymity. For this reason, the international community and international organisations must join forces to adopt new resolutions on cybersecurity.

Recent successive cyber-attacks by states, cyber-criminals and terrorist organisations highlight the need for new international missions with cyberspace as their sole sphere of action. The creation of a Spanish cyber army under NATO will be key to dealing with future threats.

Shift from the Middle East to the Sahel

The Sahel region is currently the main security concern for Mediterranean countries and, therefore, for Spain. Jihadist terrorism, organised crime, clandestine immigration networks and human trafficking, on the one hand, and the demographic, climate and economic crises ravaging the region on the other, make it a focus of major interest for our country.

Since 2020, Spain's foreign policy has been shifting: having met the military objectives set in the Middle East (Iraq and Afghanistan), troop deployments are being reduced in order to increase them in missions in the Sahel. The geographical proximity of this area and the great impact events there have on Spain's national security only underscore the need to increase Spain's military presence and, therefore, its international engagement in the Sahel countries.

Other EU countries such as France have been calling for increased EU efforts in the region for years. This request is justified by events such as the elimination in Mali

of Al Qaeda's North African leader, Abdelmalek Drukdel, in June 2020, showing the effectiveness of preventive efforts both domestically and in Europe.

In June 2020, Pedro Sánchez reiterated Spain's commitment to this region at the Sahel Summit (Mauritania). The President of Spain announced that, in addition to increasing the number of troops assigned to the EUTM-Mali mission (up to 530 troops, as the mission's mandate now includes training armed forces from all G5 Sahel countries), experts from the Civil Guard's Special Training Centre in Logroño will train the gendarmerie of G5 Sahel countries.

Increased presence in the Sahel will imply reducing capabilities in missions such as Afghanistan, a theatre of operations where the agreement between the Kabul government and the Taliban and the progressive withdrawal of the US reduces the need for Spanish deployment.

Spain currently provides almost 25 per cent of military troops for EU missions in Africa, and is one of the main drivers of stabilisation on the continent, along with France. Spain's military presence is vital not only in protecting national borders, but also those of all EU countries.

Working to reduce the presence of terrorist groups in the Sahel will contribute to controlling instability in the region by enabling local government institutions to establish a rule of law model in their respective territories, thus allowing criminal and terrorist networks to be efficiently pursued before they operate in Spain.

Thus, increased military deployment in the Sahel in the coming years, to the detriment of missions in the Middle East, indicates that the main threats to Spain's security are to be found in Africa.

Increasing police missions

However, increasing military presence is not everything. As we have seen, the Sahel countries are a refuge for Jihadist groups, an area of operations for criminal organisations dedicated to drug trafficking and smuggling, as well as the main migratory route from countries such as Senegal and Mauritania to Spain.

The Sahel faces problems that cannot be solved with military resources. Armed groups operating in the region are engaged in drug trafficking, Jihadist radicalisation and support for secessionism (such as the 2012 and 2020 coups in Mali), problems that require an approach beyond conventional military force. Therefore, increasing police cooperation with these countries and the presence of State Security Body members in international missions is vital to ensure complete stabilisation for the region.

While military intervention and training local armed forces is necessary in the first phase to create a secure environment and combat problems such as the direct threat from terrorist groups, once this threat is significantly reduced, preventive policing is paramount.

Once the Jihadists' military strength has been neutralised, police forces have considerable advantages. In addition to the extensive experience of both the National Police and Civil Guard in counter-terrorism, their action in a foreign country allows them to train and cooperate with local police to pursue cells that are still operating on the ground. This is important because conventional armed forces do not have the means or expertise to investigate and prevent terrorist acts against civilians, or to neutralise criminal organisations that finance terrorist activity or supply them with weapons. Moreover, in the eyes of local public opinion, the presence of a foreign contingent of troops could be seen as an '*occupying force*', a situation that does not occur with the police and state security bodies do not have the war component that characterises an army.

Currently, the National Police and the Civil Guard (with its dual police-military aspect) participate in missions in the Sahel region, specifically: UN missions in countries such as Central Africa, Sierra Leone, and EU missions in Niger and Mali. Missions involved members of State Security Bodies are based on advising and training local security forces in order to provide them with self-management tools. This is an extremely important task because these countries generally have little expertise in the pursuit and prevention of crime.

For example, officers in Mali participate in the EU's GARSI project, which aims to improve security in areas where there is little state presence (which is common, hindered by desert geography and poor communication infrastructure). Other missions such as EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali collaborate in training the police and judicial sector.

Individually, the Civil Guard leads the GARSI Sahel mission to train Rapid Action Groups for surveillance and intervention in the Sahel; and the National Police leads the ECI Niger project (Joint Investigation Team) in the fight against criminal networks linked to illegal immigration, human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

The Spanish Armed Forces and State Security Bodies must continue to cooperate to fight insecurity beyond our borders, not only to combat terrorism in third countries, but also to guarantee the national security of Spain and its interests.

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COSI, a decade devoted to the European Union's internal security policy

Abstract

After several failed attempts, the signature of the Lisbon Treaty allowed the setting-up of the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI). After an initial period of definition of the work procedures, the Committee has been strengthening and expanding its responsibilities, related to judicial and police cooperation, the implementation of the strategic directions of internal security, the fight against organized crime or the cooperation of the JHA agencies. Gradually, issues related to the fight against terrorism have also been added to its agenda, despite the reluctance of some Member States. Ten years after its creation, the COSI has demonstrated its ambition, adaptability and flexibility, abilities that have contributed to consolidating its position as a relevant actor in the field of internal security in the European Union.

Keywords

COSI, internal security, policy cycle, terrorism, JHA Agencies, European Union.

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Introduction

Just as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States led to progress in the European Union's response to terrorism, subsequent terrorist activity in Europe, as well as migratory crises and the need for a joint response to a transnational threat such as organised crime, have slowly managed to secure and extend this progress, which seemed to have stagnated after an initial dizzying momentum.

This essentially reactive nature of the EU's fight against terrorism1 has sometimes managed to overcome the traditional reluctance of national authorities to cede parts of national sovereignty linked to national security.

In this process, the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) has established itself as a major player in the development of European cooperation in justice and home affairs, and is a key factor in achieving greater European integration in internal security policy.

Origins and responsibilities

COSI emerged in 2010, following the mandate of Article 71 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which provided for the creation of a standing committee, within the Council, with the objective of ensuring, within the Union, the promotion and intensification of operational cooperation in the field of internal security.

It was not the first time there had been talk of an internal security committee, the absence of which was seen as a deficit of the European Union2, particularly when compared to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), a Second Pillar body. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed in 2004 but never ratified, already provided for the creation of this committee in Article III-261; its wording was almost identical to that of Article 71 TFEU.

The terrorist attacks of 2001 in the United States, and those of 2004 and 2005 in Europe, put internal security at the top of the EU's political agenda. It was precisely after the 2001 attacks that the idea of a high-level body in charge of home affairs began to take shape. The Spanish Presidency of the Council in 2002 had already made

1 Powell, C. and Sorroza, A. (2009). La Unión Europea y la lucha contra el terrorismo global [The European Union and the fight against global terrorism]. *Política Exterior*, pp. 127-137.

2 Bossong, R. and Rhinard, M. (2013). The EU Internal Security Strategy: towards a more coherent approach to EU security? *Studia Diplomatica*, vol. 66, issue 2, pp. 45-58.

a first attempt[3] and Luxembourg envisaged in its 2005 Presidency programme to start preparations for the establishment of such a committee[4].

Had it materialised at that time, it would undoubtedly have helped to prevent some of the measures taken in the heat of the response to the attacks from stagnating or being forgotten.

But the Treaty of Lisbon had to be ratified for the provisions on this body to become a reality, which, together with the formulation of the Stockholm Programme[5] and the impetus of the Spanish Presidency in 2010, in favour of improving border security and anti-terrorist cooperation, converged in the idea of completing the internal security strategy[6].

Article 71 TFEU was translated into Council Decision 2010/131/EU of 25 February 2010[7], setting up the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security, the name given to the standing committee referred to in the Treaty. COSI shall facilitate, promote and strengthen coordination of actions of the authorities of the Member States competent in the field of internal security by facilitating and ensuring effective operational cooperation and coordination in the context of the area of freedom, security and justice, in particular in areas covered by police and customs cooperation and by authorities responsible for the control and protection of external borders. It shall also cover, where appropriate, aspects of judicial cooperation in criminal matters relevant to operational cooperation in the field of internal security and shall evaluate the general direction and efficiency of operational coordination, identify possible shortcomings or failures and adopt appropriate concrete recommendations to address them. COSI shall assist the Council in accordance with the provisions of Article 222 of the Treaty referring to the Solidarity Clause. It shall not be involved in conducting operations, which shall remain the task of the Member States, and shall not be involved in preparing legislative acts. In addition, where appropriate, representatives from Eurojust, Europol, Frontex and other relevant bodies shall be invited, as observers, helping to ensure consistency of action by those bodies.

3 Arteaga Martín, F. (2010). La Estrategia de Seguridad Interior de la Unión Europea [The EU Internal Security Strategy]. *Boletín Elcano*, no. 124, p. 8. Horgby, A. and Rhinard, M. (2015). The EU's internal security strategy: A historical perspective. *Security Journal*, vol. 28, issue 3, pp. 309-321.

4 Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the European Union. *The Presidency's Priorities* [online]. [Accessed: 25 May 2021]. Available at:

http://www.eu2005.lu/en/presidence/priorites_et_pgm/priorites/index.html#justice

5 European Council (2010). Stockholm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizen. *Official Journal of the European Union* OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, pp. 1-38.

6 Bossong, R. and Rhinard, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

7 Council Of The European Union (2010). 2010/131/: Council Decision of 25 February 2010 on setting up the Standing Committee on operational cooperation on internal security. *Official Journal of the European Union* OJ L 52, 03-03-2010, p. 50.

Finally, COSI shall be obliged to regularly submit a report to the Council on its activities and to keep the European Parliament and national parliaments informed of its proceedings. These reports cover periods of eighteen months.

It should be borne in mind that according to Articles 72 and 73 TFEU, Member States remain competent for the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security, as well as national security.

The Stockholm Programme also introduced an obligation for COSI to report on its work to senior officials of Member States in the areas covered by Justice and Home Affairs, which the European Council considered highly useful and which should be encouraged as far as possible.

COSI's duties were further elaborated in other texts, such as the Internal Security Strategy of the European Union[8], which emphasised that the Committee had been established to ensure effective coordination and cooperation of law enforcement and border management authorities, including the control and protection of external borders and, where appropriate, judicial cooperation in criminal matters relevant to operational cooperation. Its work would also be based primarily on national and EU threat assessments and priorities.

The specific duties of COSI included the monitoring and implementation of this Internal Security Strategy, which will become one of its priority tasks. It would also be responsible for receiving information on coordination and cooperation in the fight against trafficking in human beings, as set out in points 4.1 and 4.4.2 respectively of the Stockholm Programme. In the initial drafts of this Programme, COSI was linked to the work on the EU Drugs Strategy 2005-2012, but this reference disappeared in the final version. The follow-up to this Strategy for the years 2013-2020[9] did mention the need for the Horizontal Working Party on Drugs, as the main coordinating body on drugs in the Council, to strengthen its coordination efforts to take into account the work of bodies with a drugs component, such as COSI.

Five years later, with the renewal of the Internal Security Strategy[10], COSI's role was reaffirmed and it was tasked with drawing up a list of priority measures for implementation, as well as monitoring and reporting on progress, together with the Commission and other actors.

A common practice, not reflected in its regulatory document, is that draft Council Conclusions on issues of interest for internal security are examined by COSI, as a

8 Council Of The European Union (2010). *EU Internal Security Strategy: Towards a European security model.* Doc. 5842/2/2010, 23 February.

9 Council of the European Union (2012). EU Drugs Strategy (2013-2020). *Official Journal of the European Union.* 2012/C 402/01 OJ C 402, 29 December, pp. 1-10.

10 Council of the European Union (2015). *Draft Council Conclusions on the Renewed EU Internal Security Strategy 2015-2020*. Doc. 9798/15, 10 June.

preliminary step to the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) or the Council. In a way, this confirms COSI's importance in the Community structure in the field of justice and home affairs, recognising its capacity to supervise or coordinate the other related working groups, and it confirms that it is a body with a broad perspective on internal security.

On the other hand, issues that are decided in the JHA Council, provided they concern internal security matters and are not eminently legislative, are often first discussed in COSI.

The European Commission also referred to COSI, assigning to this Committee the responsibility to ensure that European cooperation was promoted and strengthened, as well as to facilitate the coordination of actions by the competent authorities of the Member States, actions which the Commission itself undertook to support[11]. It recommended that COSI and the PSC should work together and meet regularly, seeking consistency between the Internal Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy and exploiting synergies between internal and external policies, including risk and threat assessments.

This strategic framework has been evolving, as in April 2015 with the presentation of the European Agenda on Security[12], in which the European Commission set out the principles for EU action to respond effectively to security threats and the main steps envisaged for their implementation, and identified three priorities for immediate action: terrorism and radicalisation; international organised crime; and cybercrime. This document also recognised COSI's central role in relation to the EU policy cycle to tackle organised and serious international crime, to which reference will be made below.

The following year, based on the European Security Agenda, the concept of a Security Union was first introduced[13]. Based on a new approach aimed at shared responsibility between the EU and Member States, and under the leadership of the Commissioner for the Security Union, created specifically for to develop this process, the EU Strategy for a Security Union[14] was adopted in July 2020, covering the period

11 European Commission (2010). *Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe*. COM(2010) 673 final, 22 November.

12 European Commission (2015). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions The European Agenda on Security.* COM(2015) 185 final, 28 April.

13 European Commission (2016). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine Security Union*. COM/2016/0230 final, 20 April.

14 European Commission (2020). *Communication from the Commission on the EU Security Union Strategy*. COM/2020/605 final, 24 July.

2020-2025 and focusing on four priority areas: a security environment that stands the test of time; addressing evolving threats; protecting Europeans from terrorism and organised crime; and a strong European security ecosystem.

As far as counter-terrorism is concerned, its inclusion in the scope of COSI has gone from strength to strength. Despite its clear internal security implications, it has struggled to find its place due to the reservations of some national delegations who did not see it as one of their responsibilities. The ever-present terrorist threat and the activity of some Member States have succeeded in breaking down some of this resistance so that COSI can carry out its task of coordinating and monitoring the European Union's counter-terrorism actions.

In short, the establishment of COSI is enshrined in the Treaty, and its development has been supported and reinforced in various strategic documents by both the Council and the European Commission, aided by the impetus of certain Member States interested in furthering Community integration in this area of internal security.

Composition of COSI

COSI is composed of senior officials from the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Justice of each Member State, as well as representatives of the Commission and the European External Action Service[15].

Neither Article 71 TFEU nor the Council Decision establishing COSI laid down its composition. Only the possible participation of the Union bodies and agencies concerned, such as Eurojust, Europol, Frontex or CEPOL, which will attend as observers, was envisaged. To find out who should be part of COSI, we must refer to the declaration[16] adopted by the JHA Council on the same day as the Decision on its creation, which stated that 'given its operational role, COSI will be capitals-based'. Each Member State will decide whether to have a single representative in charge of all issues or several representatives, in both cases with appropriate support. However, the number of delegates shall be limited in order to ensure the efficiency of the Committee's work.

The lack of clarity about Member State representation in COSI has led to different solutions being adopted by different countries.

In Spain, the highest responsibility for the Spanish delegation first fell to the then Director General of the Police and Civil Guard, who was also the first president of

15 Council of the European Union. *Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI)* [online]. [Accessed: 14 March 2021]. Available at:

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/standing-committee-operational-cooperation-internal-security/

16 Council of the European Union (2010). *Draft Council Decision on setting up COSI*. 05 February. Doc. 5949/10.

the Committee. Subsequently, the head of the delegation has been assumed by the Director of the Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Security or, as at present, by the head of the Directorate General for International Relations and Immigration, who is supported by officials from the State Secretariat of State (Directorate General for International Relations and Immigration and Cabinet of the Secretary of State), the Civil Guard, the National Police, the Tax Agency, the Basque and Catalan regional police forces and the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation. All these bodies contribute to COSI's preparatory work, usually by agreeing on a common position on the issues to be addressed, according to their respective competencies, and by participating in the different activities promoted by the European Union. They may also include one of their representatives in the Spanish delegation that travels to Committee meetings in Brussels, although interventions on behalf of Spain are made, with some exceptions, by the head of the delegation.

Delegations from other Member States may be headed by directors of police agencies or senior officials from the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Justice, but also by lower level officials, such as police force international relations officers, ministerial or diplomatic advisors or officials from Permanent Representations in Brussels.

JHA agencies are usually represented by their senior management, with the executive director or one of the deputy directors attending, depending on the subject matter.

What could be considered its equivalent body in the field of external security, the PCS, is made up of Brussels-based ambassadors from member states. Another important difference with COSI is that while COSI usually meets two or three times per semester, the PSC usually meets twice a week.

This heterogeneous composition of COSI does not satisfy all Member States, some of which have limited their level of representation[17], but has not changed substantially since its first meeting. If the objective is to have a body with specific weight in the field of justice and home affairs, the choice made by some in the appointment of their heads of delegation does not seem the most appropriate. But what is really important is that, regardless of the level of representation, those participating in COSI are provided with sufficient decision-making capacity and flexibility to avoid obstructions or delays in the issues under discussion.

In carrying out its responsibilities, COSI will be supported by the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU (Directorate General for Justice and Home Affairs) which provides the secretariat and assistance to COSI, prepares agendas, drafts documents and their revisions, assists the Presidency and Member States, etc. In other words, a kind of qualified general staff, with a very strong influence on the decision-making

17 Scherrer, A., Jeandesboz, J. and Guittet, E.-P. (2011). Developing an EU Internal Security Strategy, fighting terrorism and organised crime. European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties. Report No. PE 462.423.

process. JHA Counsellors posted to the respective Permanent Representations to the European Union, meeting in the form of a COSI Support Group, shall also play an auxiliary role and meet as necessary between COSI meetings.

Committee presidency rotates on the basis of the country holding the six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union, and programmes are established by the Trio Presidency for a period of 18 months. Ordinary meetings are held in Brussels, with two or three sessions every six months. In addition, an informal meeting is usually organised every six months and takes place in the country holding the current presidency.

COSI's initial activity and first years of operation (2010-2013)

The Committee's first meeting, which took place under the Spanish Presidency, was held on 11 March 2010, the European Day for the Victims of Terrorism, just six years after the Madrid attacks.

As stated in COSI's first regular report to the European Parliament and national parliaments[18], the initial phase focused on determining the role and tasks of the Committee in implementing the provisions of the Council Decision setting up COSI, the Internal Security Strategy and the Stockholm Programme. Thus, part of its energy was devoted to trying to translate the ambiguous mandate it had received and to finding its space in an area where it risked duplicating efforts with other groups or with the Commission.

The creation and development of COSI was indeed high on the Trio Presidency's JHA agenda as one of the relevant responsibilities. It then listed all the fields in which action was intended, many of which would fall under the competence of COSI. The ambition of the Member States and their desire for concrete and tangible results was clear from the first meetings, which is understandable given that some had been waiting for almost a decade for a working forum such as COSI.

The first meeting addressed important issues, such as the state of EU internal security with a view to its discussion in the Council, the Harmony project, the origin of the European Union policy cycle to tackle organised and serious international crime, cooperation between JHA agencies, joint operations and the fight against terrorism, the latter despite the resistance of some delegations.

The following meetings continued to discuss cooperation between JHA agencies, the protection of external borders and the fight against irregular immigration, and the status of COSPOL projects[19], but there was also a desire to begin to give shape to

18 Council of the European Union (2011). *Report to the European Parliament and national Parliaments on the proceedings of the Standing Committee on operational cooperation on internal security for the period January 2010 - June 2011.* 23 September. Doc. 14614/11.

19 Background to EMPACT, discussed below.

what was considered one of the Committee's most important responsibilities, namely operational cooperation between authorities in charge of internal security. Thus, in its first six months of operation, a combined operation was launched, Operation Global Europe[20], involving police, customs and border agencies from several Member States. The results of the operation were considered satisfactory, despite acknowledging the difficulty of working with 27 countries, the lack of interest shown by some agencies in participating in multinational operations or complications arising from the existence of different means of gathering information, working procedures or communication systems.

At the last COSI meeting of the Spanish Presidency, the Belgian delegation presented its programme for the Committee's work over the next twelve months. COSI would focus on five vectors: coherence across the EU policy cycle; joint operations, actions and projects; cooperation and coordination between EU agencies; identification of gaps; and discussion of COSI's role in the implementation of the solidarity clause.

On this basis, the work programme[21] for the remainder of the Trio Presidency period was approved at the first meeting under the Belgian Presidency, taking into account the principle of subsidiarity and trying to avoid duplicating efforts with other preparatory bodies and JHA bodies. Fourteen topics were selected out of 34 proposed by Member States, including issues that had already been on COSI agendas, such as the Internal Security Strategy, the political cycle, COSPOL projects or the coordination of joint operations. But other novelties were also introduced, such as the fight against arms trafficking, actions against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the internal security fund, the solidarity clause or interaction between internal and external security. Human trafficking and the Passenger Name Record (PNR), which had been discussed at some of the meetings, disappeared. The fight against terrorism was also not included, except for the reference to actions against the PKK.

However, in line with maintaining a high level of ambition, it was made clear that COSI should be able to respond to new challenges that might have an impact on internal security.

As can be seen, these are matters of a different nature, with others not included above added.

The policy cycle established by COSI at its meeting on 5 October 2010[22] is one of the tasks that has been demanding the most effort. It establishes a clear and modern methodology for defining and prioritising how to combat the threat to internal securi-

20 Council of the European Union (2010). *First evaluation of the European global operation*. 23 June. Doc. 11410/10.

21 Council of the European Union (2010). *COSI's Work Programme for the rest of the COSI Trio Presidency*. 03 September. Doc. 13084/10.

22 Council of the European Union (2010). *Draft Council conclusions on the establishment and implementation of an EU policy cycle*. 25 October. Doc. 15358/10.

ty posed by organised crime. Approved by the JHA Council in November 2010, it is a four-stage, multi-annual policy cycle and its development requires that it be included as a discussion item at almost every COSI meeting. Although the period set for the cycle was four years, an initial period of two years was agreed on an experimental basis for this first stage. Following an assessment of the threat of organised crime[23], the Council identified EU priorities for the years 2011 and 2013[24]. COSI then discussed and approved the strategic objectives of the priorities for the fight against crime[25], confirming which Member States would act as coordinators for each, as well as the participants. These strategic objectives were translated into operational action plans for 2012[26] and 2013[27], the coordination and implementation of which constitutes the EMPACT phase of the cycle.

In total, the initial policy cycle covered eight priorities:

- West Africa.
- Western Balkans.
- Illegal immigration.
- Synthetic drugs.
- Containerised smuggling.
- Trafficking in human beings or illegal human trafficking.
- Organised itinerant criminal gangs.
- Cybercrime.

The activities of the project groups set up to implement five of the 29 measures to enhance the protection of external borders and the fight against illegal immigration were also integrated into the policy cycle[28],which would continue as actions under the 'illegal immigration' priority. Only the Action 4 project group, led at European level by the Civil Guard, which aimed to improve operational cooperation with third coun-

23 Council of the European Union (2011). *EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2011*. 06 April. Doc. 8709/11.

24 Council of the European Union (2011). *Draft Council conclusions on setting the EU's priorities for the fight against organised crime between 2011 and 2013*. 06 June. Doc. 11050/11.

25 Council of the European Union (2011). *Strategic goals related to the EU's priorities for the fight against organised crime between 2011 and 2013*. 21 October. Doc. 15850/11.

26 Council of the European Union (2011). *Operational Action Plans (OAPs) related to the EU's priorities for the fight against organised crime between 2011 and 2013*. 15 December. Doc. 17796/3/11.

27 Council of the European Union (2012). *OAPs (2013) related to the EU's priorities for the fight against organised crime between 2011 and 2013*. 05 December. Doc. 16038/2/12.

28 Council of the European Union (2010). *Council conclusions on 29 measures for reinforcing the protection of the external borders and combating illegal immigration*. 01 March. Doc. 6975/10.

tries of origin and transit, in relation to joint land and maritime patrols, continued its activities until 2013.

The Committee first reviewed the policy cycle process in early 2012, and closely monitored progress on the basis of reports from the coordinators of the different operational action plans[29], the six-monthly meetings of the National EMPACT Co-ordinators[30] (NEC) and reports from the Director of Europol. These national coordinators had the strategic command and authority to ensure the implementation of EMPACT projects in their country, although not all of them were appointed at the time.

In 2012, COSI also validated the methodology for assessing the threat posed by organised crime and serious international crime[31]with the aim of achieving a full and comprehensive assessment of regional and pan-European threats that could impact the European Union.

JHA agencies, involved from the outset in the work of COSI, continued to make an important contribution. Europol has been and continues to be the backbone of the policy cycle, in which CEPOL has also cooperated with its training courses, as well as Eurojust and Frontex with their participation in some plans. In general, the presence of JHA agencies in COSI is paramount and brings a high level of performance, without detracting from that of the Commission, which is key, and increasingly that of the European External Action Service.

On inter-agency cooperation and coordination, an issue inherited from the implementation of the Stockholm Programme, COSI discussed and agreed on working methods as noted at the Council on 9 June 2011. These methods included the organisation of regular meetings to improve planning and information sharing and the organisation of joint meetings, all in the field of EU security.

Moreover, the first meetings of JHA agency heads took place at this stage and their reports were submitted to COSI. While there are 4 JHA agencies that always assist COSI and the COSI Support Group (EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX and CEPOL), the so-called 'JHA Agencies Network' has also been gaining in importance, comprising a total of nine agencies (the above four plus EIGE, EASO, FRA, EULISA and EMCDDA). This network is chaired each year by one of the nine and has an integrated work plan, reporting annually to COSI.

And the Committee provided the European Commission with its views for preparing proposals related to the future of Europol and CEPOL.

29 Council of the European Union (2012). *EU Policy Cycle: Monitoring of the OAPs 2012*. 20 November. Doc. 16014/12.

30 Council of the European Union (2012). *Summary report of the National EMPACT Coordinators meeting held at Europol on 29-30 May-2012*. 08 June. Doc. 11089/12.

31 Council of the European Union (2012). *Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) - Methodology*. 04 July. Doc. 12159/12.

The EU's Internal Security Strategy continued to be discussed at COSI meetings, as well as possibilities for strengthening cooperation and coordination with regard to EU Security, for which a roadmap was drawn up jointly with the PSC. In fact, the first informal meeting between the PSC and COSI was organised in 2011, which supported the PSC's proposal to draft a work programme for cooperation between internal and external security.

With regard to terrorism, while its activity appeared to be limited to receiving information related to the PKK, COSI considered a report by the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator on the judicial dimension of terrorism and participated in discussions on information sharing mechanisms in relation to changes in national threat levels, the results of which were adopted at the December 2010 Council[32].

The first 18 months of COSI activity thus focused mainly on working methods and procedures and on laying the foundations for the development of many of the responsibilities assigned to it, as well as other tasks which at the time of creation did not seem likely to fall within its remit.

The only new issue included in the second COSI work programme, which ran from July 2011 to December 2012, was the European Pact against synthetic drugs[33]; operational implementation of this pact would be integrated into the 'Synthetic drugs' operational action. The remaining items, up to a total of ten, were taken from the previous agenda, from which cooperation in the fight against organised crime, the PKK, financing of operational cooperation and the conclusions of the Heads of National Contact Offices had been dropped. COSPOL was also removed from the list, although in this case it was renamed the European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) in line with experience gained in implementation and the particularities of the 2011-2013 policy cycle.

In summary, during the first three years COSI dealt with a variety of issues, but the focus was on guaranteeing that the policy cycle was implemented as planned and on ensuring its follow-up. Some shortcomings were noted despite progress made, such as the lack of funding, or the limited involvement of Member States, which should be taken into account for the launch of the new policy cycle from 2014 onwards. It outlined the importance of the fight against terrorism, which initially seemed to be outside its agenda. And the ambition to become a reference for internal security was clear, despite the continuing tendency of Member States to avoid relinquishing control in favour of Community instruments, while recognising the implications of the new security context[34].

32 Council of the European Union (2010). *Council conclusions on the information sharing mechanism on changes in the national threat level*. 01 December. Doc. 17303/1/10.

33 Council of the European Union (2011). *Draft European Pact against synthetic* drugs. Doc. 14 October. 15544/11.

34 Sorroza Blanco, A. (2011). La seguridad interior en la UE: diez años después del 11-S [Internal security in the EU: ten years after 9/11]. *Boletín Elcano*, no. 139, p. 11.

In search of operability and visibility (2013-2014)

During its fourth year, COSI looked at how to operationalise and increase its public outreach at both national and community level. But the main focus remained the political cycle, with the end of the first two-year term and the establishment of the regular four-year cycle. COSI analysed the progress made by the different coordinators in the operational plan reports for each of the eight priorities set[35], together with the results of the NEC meetings and reports of the Director of Europol[36].

The experience of the first political cycle was indeed fruitful. Not only were a high percentage of the activities foreseen in the operational plans completed, but the number of countries participating in the priorities was steadily increasing.

However, as mentioned above, some shortcomings or areas for improvement were also identified: the need for more specific funding for the new cycle, communication, alignment between national and European priorities, and the multidisciplinary approach, as cooperation with other actors such as NGOs, tax and customs authorities, judicial authorities, third countries and the private sector was considered important.

The assessment methodology approved by COSI the previous year[34] was used for the first time to identify the recommended priorities in the area of organised crime[37]. Importantly, the operative working document in COSI discussions to define the strategic priorities of the cycle is the Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment Report (SOCTA), which is prepared by Europol with contributions from Member States. But once this document has been presented, the strategic-political level comes into play, represented by COSI and the Council, which play a decisive role in the version that is finally adopted. Hence, some of SOCTA's operational priorities may be modified or even disappear, or new ones may be introduced that were not in SOCTA (such as firearms, a priority been led from the beginning by the Civil Guard).

Following discussions in COSI, the JHA Council of 6-7 June 2013 adopted nine priorities for the years 2014 to 2017[38]:

- Illegal immigration.
- Trafficking in human beings.
- Counterfeit products.

35 Council of the European Union (2013). *Summary report of the NECs meeting held at Europol on 18-19 November 2013*. 06 December. Doc. 17315/13.

36 Council of the European Union (2013). *EU Policy Cycle: Implementation Monitoring*. 10 June. Doc. 9996/1/13.

37 Council of the European Union (2013). *SOCTA 2013-Executive Summary*. 11 March. Doc. 7368/13.

38 Council of the European Union (2013). *Council conclusions on setting the EU's priorities for the fight against serious and organised crime between 2014 and 2017*. 26 July. Doc. 12095/13.

- Excise fraud and intra-Community fraud.
- Synthetic drugs.
- Trafficking of cocaine and heroin.
- Computer-related crime.
- Firearms.
- Organised property crime.

A multi-annual strategic plan[39] was developed for each priority, also discussed in COSI, which were converted into operational action plans for 2014. Finally, there were twelve action plans, rather than priorities, in order to cover all identified areas of crime. And for each of the plans, a driver was designated, as well as other representatives (codriver) who could replace the driver in case of absence.

A brief analysis of participation data in the second political cycle compared to the previous cycle already showed a significant increase, from 97 participants in June 2011 to 275 in October 2013. Similarly, 104 actions in 2013 became 224 the following year.

Reports on the Internal Security Strategy were also on COSI's agenda, as were issues such as cooperation between JHA agencies, measures to address the threat posed by firearms to EU internal security, strengthening cooperation and coordination between internal and external security, and projects related to the Western Balkans.

As for counter-terrorism, a significant change from the early years of COSI was already beginning to emerge. The Committee's initial reluctance to address this issue did not prevent it from becoming increasingly influential in its discussions, as it could only be expected. In February 2013, a COSI meeting was organised to discuss the possible implications the situation in the Sahel and Maghreb could have for the EU's internal security, in preparation for the March JHA Council. The issue of foreign terrorist fighters, considered to be of utmost importance for European internal security, was discussed on several occasions throughout 2013 and 2014, with a view to its inclusion in subsequent JHA Council meetings. COSI's opinion was also sought for the implementation of the Draft Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism[40], in particular the draft Action Plan[41], or for the presentation of Europol's report on the situation and trends in terrorism in the EU[42].

39 Council of the European Union (2013). *Multi-Annual Strategic Plans related to the EU priorities for the fight against organised crime between 2014 and 2017*. 20 September. Doc. 13495/13.

40 Council of the European Union (2014). *Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*. 19 May. Doc. 9956/14.

41 Council of the European Union (2014). *Action Plan for the EU Strategy for combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*. 25 March. Doc. DS1163/14.

42 Council of the European Union (2014). *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2014*. 04 June. Doc. 10420/14.

Discussions on the future of COSI have also featured prominently in its debates, demonstrating its dynamic and ambitious nature. After this first stage of establishing roles and functions, the Committee spent part of 2013 and 2014 considering how to become more operational, efficient and public-facing, and in particular how to refine its mandate. As a result, in the second half of 2013, at the initiative of the delegations of France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Finland, COSI outlined lines of action to develop its responsibilities in the coming years, bringing the areas in which the Committee could play a significant role to the JHA Council[43]:

- Addressing the issue of terrorism from a strategic and political approach, leaving the more operational issues to the relevant Council working groups. It should only be involved where it can add value and where it does not interfere with national security and intelligence service activities.
- Enhancing coordination and cooperation between JHA agencies, encouraging them to report possible shortcomings in operational cooperation and information exchange between agencies and with Member States.
- Developing responsibility for evaluation, which should focus on the effectiveness of operational cooperation, thus fulfilling one of the tasks set out in the Council Decision setting up COSI. This did not mean that COSI could assess how Member States implemented EU legal instruments or their national arrangements.
- Working more closely with the PSC to improve cooperation between the areas of Freedom, Security and Justice and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
- Influencing EU strategic decisions in the fight against terrorism, organised and serious crime, as well as in relation to new or evolving threats, which will be addressed using the same methodology.

This document highlighted the desirability of improving COSI's working procedures and increasing its visibility, especially vis-à-vis the Council. After a first few years of consolidating its responsibilities, the Committee's ambition was to be able to advise the Council of the European Union directly on internal security issues, without prejudice to the competencies of COREPER.

Discussions on the future of COSI, both formally and informally, were extremely interesting and influential during 2016 to 2018.

Other topics of interest to COSI delegations were the strengthening of cooperation between JHA agencies and the link between internal and external security, which was an important part of the Committee's work.

43 Council of the European Union (2014). *Future role of COSI*. 29 April. Doc. 7843/3/14.

Consolidation (2015-2017)

During the second half of 2014, COSI prepared the work for the renewal of the EU Internal Security Strategy, which was adopted in December 2014[44], specifying the EU's priorities in the field of internal security for the period 2015-2020.

In June the following year, the JHA Council approved the Draft Council Conclusions on the Renewed European Union Internal

Security Strategy 2015-2020[8], reaffirming COSI's key role in operational cooperation on internal security and in the development, implementation and monitoring of this renewed Strategy for the period 2015-2020. It recognised links between European Union internal and external security and in this context COSI was invited to work together with the Commission to actively contribute to political security dialogues with third countries, in close coordination with the European Union's overall external action.

In addition, the Council requested COSI to draw up, also with the European Commission, a list of priority actions for the implementation of the renewed Strategy. During the second half of 2015, this issue was taken forward and a detailed progress report[45] was presented to the Council.

Since then, COSI has been preparing a six-monthly report for each Presidency, which gives an account of what has been done and what is to be undertaken in the different areas of the Internal Security Strategy. These six-monthly documents, together with the eighteen-monthly reports to the Parliament[46], are crucial to the functioning of COSI and can be said to shape its work plan in a sense.

From 2015 onwards, COSI's work was strongly influenced by the wave of terrorist attacks in Europe, particularly in France and Belgium. In fact, an extraordinary meeting of the Committee was convened for the first time following the January 2015 attack in Paris against satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*. The same happened in November of that year, after the attacks on the Bataclan in Paris and around the Stade de France. A series of anti-terrorism measures were prepared, discussed and agreed by the Justice and Interior Ministers at both sessions.

The fight against terrorism continued to be one of the priority issues in COSI's work during the period from January 2016 to June 2017. Terrorist attacks in Nice, Berlin, Stockholm, Brussels, Manchester and London, which left 138 people dead, re-

44 Council of the European Union (2014). *Draft Council conclusions on the renewed EU Internal Security Strategy*. 19 November. Doc. 15670/14.

45 Council of the European Union (2015). *Renewed EU Internal Security Strategy: Report on Implementation*. 26 November. Doc. 14636/15.

46 Council of the European Union. Documents 14614/11, 7283/13, 14440/14, 7033/16, 14108/1/17, 7500/19, 11413/20, which have served as the basis for analysing the work of COSI.

vealed some shortcomings or gaps in the EU's internal security architecture, especially related to information management and sharing, protection of non-military targets, combating illicit trafficking of firearms, border controls, combating terrorist financing, violent radicalisation and online terrorist content.

Largely because of the terrorist attacks, COSI was able to address one of these shortcomings, which was one of the workhorses of internal security integration, namely information sharing and management. The JHA Council established a Roadmap[47] with the measures necessary to improve information management and cross-border information exchange, including system interoperability. Implementation will be strategically monitored by COSI, which will also be informed of the work carried out by the other Council bodies, the Commission and the agencies listed in the Roadmap plans. Ministers also agreed that COSI should assess implementation progress, identify key obstacles and propose future action for the other bodies involved to take.

Continuing COSI's growing involvement in counter-terrorism issues, the development of a structured and interdisciplinary approach to counter-terrorism was discussed, expressly noting that it was not a new policy cycle. This resulted in drafting a master document with the most relevant actions in this area agreed by the Council. This master document was annexed to the six-monthly report on the implementation of the renewed Internal Security Strategy[48].

The Committee monitored the implementation of the operational measures agreed by Ministers and Heads of State and Government at the end of 2015[49], paid attention to reports on the future of terrorism by Europol and the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), and contributed to the Council Conclusions on preventing radicalisation leading to violent extremism[50].

COSI's efforts in this field have contributed to progress in the way Member States jointly combat this threat to internal security, with some successes in areas such as information exchange, operational cooperation, or the fight against firearms trafficking. In other words, the fight against terrorism — already been part of COSI's work — thus became one of its key issues and one that would recur on the agendas of its meetings, which were frequently attended by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.

47 Council of the European Union (2016). *Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management including interoperability solutions in the Justice and Home Affairs area.* 06 June. Doc. 9368/1/16.

48 Council of the European Union (2017). *Renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy and Counter-Terrorism Implementation Paper: Report on implementation in the second half of 2016.* 15 December. Doc. 15277/1/17.

49 Council of the European Union (2015). *EU Council conclusions on counter-terrorism.* 20 November. Doc. 14406/15.

50 Council of the European Union (2016). *Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism - Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council (21 November 2016).* 23 November. Doc. 14276/16.

Implementation of the EU policy cycle remained the major COSI issue. In the period covering the second half of 2014 and the year 2015, one of the actions undertaken was the mid-term evaluation of the cycle according to a revised methodology adopted in the Committee. This assessment did not lead to changes in the established crime priorities, although some documents were adopted that would form the basis of the new assessment that Europol would complete in 2017 (SOCTA 2017), which served as the basis for the definition and adoption of the ten EU crime priorities for the period 2018-2021[51]. Compared to the previous period, three new priorities were introduced:

– criminal financial operations, money laundering and asset recovery
– documentary fraud
– environmental crime.

The first two were truly ground-breaking and generated a great deal of debate because of the change in orientation. These were two eminently cross-cutting or horizontal priorities, which meant partly changing the practical methodology of the operational plans.

COSI worked to make the new four-year political cycle more effective, efficient and disciplined than the previous cycle. It also introduced changes to the mid-term evaluation, so that achievement of strategic objectives could be measured in order to improve operational performance. In other words, yet another example of COSI's focus on improving the functioning of national agencies in internal security matters.

Following the Council's approval of the continuation of the policy cycle, COSI was tasked with amending the relevant documents, the templates of the multi-annual strategic plans and the operational action plans, reaffirming once again the Committee's leading role in this field. Among other aspects, COSI agreed on the terms of reference[52] of the policy cycle for 2018-2021, highlighting the integrated nature and setting out the tasks to be carried out by all actors involved. A new evaluation mechanism was also approved, highlighting the operational role of operational plan coordinators and reinforcing the role of the NEC, a key figure developing the policy cycle.

In this context of the political cycle, and as a result of migratory pressure, the activities of organised criminal groups involved in facilitating irregular migration and trafficking in human beings continued to be monitored with particular interest. Other activities related to the cycle were the fight against organised burglary, or financial investigation. COSI also had the opportunity to discuss national experiences, such as the experience of the Spanish coordinator of the 'Firearms' operational action plan, a lieutenant colonel of the Civil Guard, whose achievements influenced the

51 Council of the European Union (2017). *Council conclusions on setting the EU's priorities for the fight against serious and organised international crime 2018-2021 (18/05/2017)*. 19 May. Doc. 9450/17.

52 Council of the European Union (2017). *EU Policy Cycle Terms of Reference*. 05 December. Doc. 10544/2/17.

development of a national legislative framework to enable effective coordination and increased contributions to the Focal Point 'Firearms'. But the need for greater commitment from Member States was reiterated.

One of the novel aspects of work related to the policy cycle was the organisation of joint intervention days, i.e. cross-border police operations focusing on key crime issues, to be carried out across the European Union by Member States with the support of Europol, under the strategic guidance of the Committee. The lessons learned from these operations were presented to COSI, which took note of them and considered being able to participate in advance in their preparation and follow-up to be essential.

Another novelty of the policy cycle was funding, included in several of its sessions. At the end of 2014, implementation of the policy cycle in 2015 and 2016 had been approved with €7 million from the Internal Security Fund. Although the competencies rested with Europol and the Commission, COSI stressed the need to be involved when decisions of a strategic nature were taken.

COSI and the PSC continued to explore possibilities for enhanced cooperation and coordination between internal security and external security, holding joint meetings focusing on cooperation between CSDP missions and freedom, security and justice actors in the field of immigration, analysing their usefulness for EU internal security.

All in all, discussions on the new 2018-2021 cycle were of great interest during the first half of 2017. The evaluation of the previous cycle carried out by an external consultancy under guidance from the European Commission was analysed, drawing up a series of suggestions that were subsequently assessed and amended by the General Secretariat of the Council and the Maltese Presidency. Finally, they were submitted to COSI for discussion and to the JHA Council for approval, which produced two Council conclusions: one deciding on the new cycle and its new methodology, with up to six important novelties, which sought above all to 'streamline' and reduce policy cycle bureaucracy as much as possible; the second included the priorities of the cycle.

A specific web page[53] was also created for the cycle and a media boost was given to the cycle, which was greatly reinforced.

Recurrent contents in COSI included the continued implementation of the renewed Strategy, which contained forty measures on improving information exchange, enhancing operational cooperation, supporting measures, counter-terrorism and preventing radicalisation, and hindering organised crime.

According to the Council Decision setting up COSI, the committee shall not be involved in drafting legislative acts. This has not prevented its meetings from dealing with legislative matters with increasing frequency. In 2016 and 2017, several legislative

53 Council of the European Union. *EU fight against organised crime* [online]. [Accessed: 25 May 2021]. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/policies/eu-fight-against-organised-crime-2018-2021/

proposals were discussed in COSI, such as the Directive on combating terrorism, the Directive on the control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, the amendment of the Regulation on strengthening border controls, the Europol Regulation, or the Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard.

COSI's involvement in this work makes perfect sense as, on the one hand, it is not uncommon for legislation to be driven by operational needs and, on the other hand, these legislative measures should be accompanied by operational and strategic measures.

Five years after COSI was created, work on internal security has taken on greater importance, mainly because of terrorism, which has been the main factor in eliminating national resistance and making progress towards the goal of greater integration in this area. COSI contributed to the adoption of operational measures, both in their implementation and in their consolidation, and demonstrated its ability to react immediately to unforeseen situations, as proven by the extraordinary meetings held to try to provide a common response to terrorist attacks on European soil.

All in all, COSI remained committed to its essential role of ensuring enhanced operational cooperation in all aspects of EU internal security, fulfilling the mandate it received in 2010, without hesitating to take responsibility for monitoring, advising and decision-making, together with representatives and experts from Member States, JHA agencies, national law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities. The Committee's influence in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice was already visible[54].

COSI today

Counter-terrorism remained a major issue for COSI during the second half of 2017 and the year 2018, but it is undeniable that the decrease in the number of terrorist actions has had some impact on the Committee's workload. This was despite the fact that the new period had begun with the August 2017 terrorist attack in Barcelona, in which 14 people were killed.

For example, at the end of 2017, it was agreed that the process of drawing up conclusions and recommendations, which are presented biannually on the basis of Europol and INTCEN threat assessments, should be streamlined and only carried out if the situation has changed or needs to be adjusted.

That did not mean it was unimportant. The work developed over the previous years was bearing fruit. JHA agencies, which had enhanced mandates, were much more in-

54 Tereszkiewicz, F. The role of COSI in the European Union's internal security area: the initial years of activity. *Studia i Materiały Wydziału Zarządzania i Administracji Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej im. Jana Kochanowskiego w Kielcach*, no. 4 Security and Defence in Europe: Diverging Interests, Fragmenting Policy, pp. 245-264.

volved in supporting Member States' counter-terrorism efforts. And COSI, in which JHA agencies have been involved from the outset, was to continue its responsibility to ensure the synergies of these agencies and to frame recommendations and guidance for the future of these agencies, conscious of the need to consolidate a joint approach capable of addressing counter-terrorism globally in order to increase capabilities to deal with a changing threat.

The movements of terrorist fighters and returnees and counter-radicalisation continued to draw the attention of COSI, which followed the work of the High-Level Commission Group on Radicalisation, established in July 2017[55] following the European Council's decision[56] to accelerate collective efforts to share experiences on terrorist fighters and radicalised individuals.

And while there were no terrorist attacks as vicious as in previous years, two worrying events related to the CBRN threat occurred in 2018: the nerve agent poisoning of a former Russian serviceman and his daughter in Salisbury (UK) and a foiled attack in Cologne (Germany) with a biological ricin bomb. COSI would follow with interest progress in implementing the Action Plan to Enhance Preparedness against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security Risks[57], encouraging progress in this area.

If terrorism seemed to decline as one of the triggers for progress in internal security integration, part of its role appeared to be taken over by migratory pressure, although this was not a new element since its influence had been felt since 2015. The European Council itself called for increased efforts in the fight against trafficking in human beings and for the development of a series of operational measures.

Meanwhile, the political cycle for serious and organised crime continued to run its course, increasingly supported by positive operational results. In mid-2018, ministers were able to assess the impact of the completion of the first full period of action between 2014 and 2017, confirming its significance and underlining its multidisciplinary component as a clear example of a successful European initiative. And work was ongoing for the new 2018-2021 policy cycle, which would continue to rely on the strategic guidance of the Committee.

New proposals, such as strengthening police response to cybercrime, were being incorporated and integrated as the policy cycle unfolded.

During this period, COSI also established cooperation with customs authorities as one of its objectives, exploring ways to enhance their contribution to internal security.

55 European Commission (2017). *Commission Decision of 27.07.2017 setting up the High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation*. Official Journal of the EU. C/2017/5149. DO C 252 3.8.2017, pp. 3/7

56 European Council (2017). *European Council meeting (22-23 June 2017) - Conclusions*. 23 June. Doc. EUCO 8/17.

57 European Commission (2010). *Communication from the Commission Action plan to enhance preparedness for CBRN security risks*. COM/2017/0610 final, 18.10.2010.

It also continued to elaborate on the possibilities for enhanced cooperation between internal and external security. The European Council itself called for the staffing of CSDP missions to be completed and their mandates adapted to assist in the fight against trafficking in human beings. A specific example of this cooperation was the establishment of a crime intelligence cell in Operation EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA. And second, the agreement of COSI and the PSC on the Civilian CSDP Pact, an issue of relevance for both internal and external security actors. These are tangible examples of COSI-PSC cooperation that have served as a framework for strengthening links between the EU's internal and external security, as well as the joint work of the two committees.

One area that had not been explored much to date was training. In September 2018, COSI welcomed the joint training initiative undertaken by the French Gendarmerie and the Spanish Civil Guard[58], considering the possibility of extending this model to European level. Both this experience and the student exchange programme between Bulgaria and Germany were held up as examples in this field. And a month later, CEPOL presented the first EU Strategic Needs Assessment[59], as a collective effort to identify training priorities in the area of internal security.

The period from July 2017 to December 2018 ended with the adoption of Council Conclusions on the future strategic direction on internal security[60], in which Ministers noted the need for deepening the integrated and comprehensive approach in order to support Member States in their objective of ensuring internal security, underlining that internal security challenges require close interaction of all EU and Member State stakeholders and, recognising the role of COSI, inviting the Committee to discuss the future strategic direction in the field of internal security, its key challenges and cross-cutting issues.

Ultimately, COSI remained committed to its responsibility to ensure and enhance cooperation on internal security within the EU, and continued to monitor implementation of the Internal Security Strategy and development of the policy cycle for the fight against organised crime.

The end of last phase under study, from January 2019 to June 2020, was affected by the pandemic caused by COVID-19, which brought new challenges and difficulties. In addition to modifying standard working procedures to adapt to new health and safety requirements, COSI was flexible enough to reorient its agendas based on how the pandemic impacted internal security.

58 Council of the European Union (2018). *Discussion paper on integrated training*. 21 September. Doc. 12412/18.

59 Council of the European Union (2018). *EU Strategic Training Needs Assessment 2019-2021*. 19 November. Doc. 14196/18.

60 Council of the European Union (2018). *Draft Council Conclusions on the future strategic direction in the field of internal security*. 06 December. Doc. 14806/18.

Another feature of this phase was the drop in the number of terrorist attacks, which did not mean this issue lost relevance as a COSI priority, as it continued to analyse progress in this field and to monitor the return of foreign terrorist fighters, paying particular attention to those from non-European countries. In fact, the Committee discussed the possibilities of incorporating information on terrorist fighters from trusted third countries into European databases.

Also in the fight against terrorism, an attempt was made to give greater importance to actions against violent right-wing extremism as a result of the recent attacks in this area and, above all, the increase in the number of detainees linked to this type of terrorism. A more detailed monitoring of related activities was proposed, but discussions in COSI revealed different approaches among Member States, which could result in a partial and insufficient state of play.

Significant in this phase was the importance of new technologies, whose impact on internal security was evident in an increasingly computerised world with a growing number of digital natives. COSI was invited to confirm and further operationalise the principles for setting up an innovation centre for internal security in Europol.

Another focus was on strengthening the EU framework for operational cooperation and the development of European technology solutions to increase connectivity and enhance information exchange in the future.

The implementation of interoperability could be considered as a top priority, not only from a technical point of view but also in terms of practical implementation, although the need for caution before extending interoperability to decentralised systems without having ensured the full implementation of the package was noted.

COSI continued to play its main role in steering the policy cycle, reviewing and assessing activities and progress made in the various operational plans, verifying the commitment of Member States and other stakeholders, or facilitating the approval of the next threat assessment (SOCTA), which will identify priorities for the 2022-2025 cycle. Implementation of the policy cycle has brought a new dimension to cooperation between Member States, and its results are also tangible. For example, in 2019, 8,000 arrests were made, 1,400 victims of human trafficking and online child pornography were identified, 6,000 firearms were seized, 75 tonnes of drugs confiscated, €77M was seized and €400M in fraud was prevented, all within the framework of operational plans developed for each of the organised crime priorities[61].

Other areas in which COSI was engaged were the fight against drug trafficking, adopting a set of strategic and operational measures[62], improving the response to hu-

61 Council of the European Union (2020). *EU Policy Cycle to tackle organised and serious international crime 2018/2021 - EMPACT - Implementation monitoring - Factsheets of results 2019*. 05 May. Doc. 7623/20.

62 Council of the European Union (2020). *Enhancing the response to drug trafficking - a strategic and operational set of measures*. 15 June. Doc. 7743/1/20.

man trafficking, the contribution of customs services to internal security, or enhancing cooperation between internal and external security. On the latter, COSI and the PSC worked on the implementation of the Civilian CSDP Compact, as well as on hybrid threats.

With regard to the future of internal security, COSI addressed issues related to digital transformation, information management, artificial intelligence, and the promotion of joint training, a matter considered of strategic importance in order to to face with guarantees, among other issues, the challenges that new technologies bring, leverage the opportunities that arise, and respond flexibly to the need to enhance operational cooperation.

Conclusions

No country currently has sufficient capacity to act alone against internal security threats. This is particularly evident in EU members, where the disappearance of internal borders has made it extraordinarily easy for criminals and terrorists to move around.

It is precisely the terrorist threat that has been of concern to the European Union for years. In the past, terrorism has proved to be the trigger for increased intergovernmental cooperation, as evidenced by the creation of the Trevi Group[63] in the mid-1970s, or the Prüm Convention. Today, it can be said to have been a catalyst for the integration process[64] in the field of internal security.

There is no doubt that adopting emergency measures is one of the immediate reactions to terrorism[65]. This is what has happened in the European institutions in the aftermath of the major terrorist attacks. Their leaders, together with national authorities, have realised the need for joint action.

However, the first major reaction came not with an attack on European soil, but on US soil in September 2001. Until then, Member State activity lay within the framework of the aforementioned intergovernmental cooperation, in line with a strict interpretation of the principle that national security was the exclusive competence of national authorities.

63 Del Moral Torres, A. (2016). Cooperación internacional de interés policial: material de apoyo al alumno/a [International cooperation of police interest: Student support material]. Centro Universitario de la Guardia Civil.

64 Lodge, J. (2002) Sustaining Freedom, Security and Justice-from terrorism to immigration. *Liverpool Law Review*, vol. 24, issue 1, p.p 41-71.

65 Díaz, C. and Demurtas, A. (dir.). (2016/2017). El impacto de los atentados de los lobos solitarios en la estrategia antiterrorista europea [The impact of the lone wolf attacks on Europe's counter-terrorism strategy]. Master's thesis. Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona [Accessed: 30 July 2020]. Available at: https://ddd.uab.cat/record/191303

A multitude of counter-terrorism measures were adopted within a few weeks, many of which had already been considered[66], but this insufficient effort may not have been accompanied by adequate development due, among other reasons, to the lack of mutual trust between national intelligence services[67].

The terrorist attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 also gave a boost to Europe's counter-terrorism drive, but despite undeniable progress, the results did not meet the expectations of all EU partners, some of whom insisted on intergovernmental cooperation.

As national security continued and continues to be the exclusive responsibility of each Member State, as confirmed by Articles 72 and 73 TFEU, which legitimise the position of those countries that are more reluctant to deepen the adoption of Community procedures on internal security.

But we must bear in mind that the area of freedom, security and justice cannot be fully consolidated if the European Union does not have the appropriate instruments at its disposal, a task that is complicated if its member countries refuse to cede or share some of their competences in this area. Furthermore, the question of whether the concept of national security of an EU Member State can be equated with that of any other country needs to be explored further. Because in an area without internal borders and with freedom of movement, a threat to national security in one of its members can and probably does constitute a threat to the national security of the other partners. Therefore, the European Union, which facilitates the movement between countries of citizens, capital and companies, but also of criminals and terrorists, should provide the necessary means to guarantee their security. In other words, it would be advisable to define the scope of the concept of national security in the Community framework.

The European Union has sought to seize the opportunities presented to it in the aftermath of major terrorist actions by adopting measures that would otherwise have been more difficult. This essentially reactive character, which has sometimes managed to overcome the traditional resistance of national authorities[68], has not been sufficient to ensure the effectiveness of the agreed counter-terrorism measures. This is a contradiction in terms or hypocrisy: the European Union and its Member States reach agreements that these same states then fail to implement, either due to lack of trust, lack of will or interest, or inability. Whatever the reasons, responsibility can only be laid at the door of the national authorities who are ignoring both the European institutions and their citizens, who have repeatedly, as Eurobarometer polls show, expressed their

66 Schroeder, U.C. (2006). Coping with complexity. An organisational perspective on European security governance. EUI SPS 2006/09. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/6417

67 Thieux, L., *et al.* (2004). European security and global terrorism: The strategic aftermath of the Madrid bombings. *Perspectives: Review of International Affairs*, no. 22, pp. 59-74.

68 Powell, C. and Sorroza, A. (2009). La Unión Europea y la lucha contra el terrorismo global [The European Union and the fight against global terrorism]. *Política Exterior*, pp. 127-137. Available at http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.uned.es/stable/20647065

desire for the fight against terrorism to become part of the policies with decision making centred in Brussels.

The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty marked the culmination of a process that had been in the making for almost a decade, the emergence of a Committee, COSI, with major responsibilities for internal security issues.

COSI devoted its initial efforts to defining its working procedures and carving out a niche for itself in the European machinery, trying to shore up and expand its responsibilities in the field of justice and home affairs.

It is a working forum, available to Member States, with a global vision of internal security, which addresses operational and strategic issues and monitors the work of the different working groups in the field of justice and home affairs, thus facilitating a comprehensive and permanent follow-up. It can be seen as an enabler of the internal security integration process, responsible for reminding European leaders that reacting to crisis situations is not enough, there is also a need for continuity.

The European Union's policy cycle for the fight against organised crime has been perhaps the most demanding issue for COSI, a project in which it has been involved and led from the beginning. Work related to the strategic development of internal security has also claimed an important part of the Committee's agenda. And although initially it hardly appeared among the dossiers to be included in COSI's work due to the reservations of some national delegations, terrorism, a fundamental factor in the integration process, has become an increasingly important part of the Committee's work, which has contributed enormously to achieving significant progress in the EU's fight against terrorism. In fact, the permanent terrorist threat has managed to overcome this resistance. And with the ambition shown since its early years and its flexibility, it has taken on new responsibilities, such as violent extremism or right-wing terrorism, examples of how COSI has evolved.

COSI is committed to its internal security responsibilities within the European Union. The experience acquired in more than a decade, the flexibility demonstrated, its capacity to adapt to new threats and demands and the results obtained are helping to underpin its position as a relevant actor in this field, and they predict a future of definitive consolidation and further development of its functions, as well as a major contribution to European integration in the area of internal security, in other words, to the European Union's area of freedom, security and justice.

As Tereskiewicz points out, despite the enthusiasm displayed from the outset, the activity of COSI's early years showed that the new committee's priorities were broad, diffuse and disorganised[69]. It took years for them to settle down and for members to gain experience and fluency, including with the European Union institutional procedures, to which they were probably not all accustomed; this was a new, capital-based

69 Tereszkiewicz, F. *Op. cit.*, p. 255.

committee with infrequent meetings. This development of COSI has been underpinned by various strategic documents of the Council and the Commission, supported by a number of Member States interested in further integration.

Over time, the Committee's wide-ranging competences have been strengthened and it has been able to take on a central role in the Community's development of internal security afforded by the Treaty. Indeed, it has been the catalyst of the major transformation the Council has undergone in the field of justice and home affairs[70]. In this process, the role played by JHA agencies, whose contribution has been essential, should be highlighted.

And although not all Member States have shown the same level of enthusiasm in their participation, the work of the Committee can generally be described as satisfactory, although it would perhaps be desirable to make Member State representation in COSI more homogeneous, at least in terms of level, and to reflect on the possible drafting of broader terms of reference than the 2010 Decision, which would develop COSI's tasks and responsibilities, without restricting its flexibility.

On the other hand, it would also be advisable to analyse whether two or three COSI meetings every six months is sufficient, in particular when compared to its external security equivalent, the PSC, which meets twice a week. The magnitude or number of the issues dealt with in the two committees does not seem to justify such a difference.

Also with a view to the future, COSI could perhaps be expected to make a greater contribution to shaping a real common internal security policy, a task for which it is well placed due to the participation of the most relevant EU actors in this field and the breadth of the issues included in its work programme, whether operational, strategic, financial or legislative, although in the latter case to a limited extent, or to assess strengths and weaknesses, identifying shortcomings and the resources needed to fill them. The road is sure to be long and fraught with obstacles as internal security is one of the most complicated areas of European integration due to Member States' zeal in preserving their sovereignty. However, the benefits of having a common internal security policy, as is already the case with the common security and defence policy, go beyond its own limits, and could help give the European Union a political weight that it currently lacks.

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70 Scherrer, A., Jeandesboz, J. and Guittet, E. *Op. cit.*, p. 38

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Description and analysis of a terrorist group: Boko Haram. The (inter)national risks produced by a breakable state and a terrorist threat.

Abstract

Boko Haram has been the bloodiest terrorist group of the last decade and its actions have triggered a great global media impact, even though they take place in Nigeria. Included on the salafi jihadist terrorism, this group is an important franchise to global jihadism. Furthermore, the current Boko Haram´s dissemination could cause further destabilisation of the fragile Occidental Sahel region. Even so, Boko Haram´s speech, social support and strategy are closely linked to the internal situation of Nigeria. For this reason, it is necessary to analyse Boko Haram's context.

In this article we are going to describe Boko Haram's beginning, ideology and objectives, strategy, leadership, structure and composition, as well as the committed attacks and victims. Next, we will do an analysis of this terrorist group, focusing on its context and as factor of destabilization of Nigeria and Sahel Occidental region. In addition, we will speak about the current state of the international fight against Boko Haram. Finally, we will suggest some conclusions and suggestions.

Keywords

Africa, Sahel, Nigeria, terrorism, Boko Haram.

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Profile of the terrorist group Boko Haram

What is Boko Haram? Origins of the group

Boko Haram is a terrorist group of Nigerian origin which, by its actions and objectives, can be considered a home-grown terrorist group. However, since this group has pledged allegiance to DAESH and then split off and spread throughout the Western Sahel region, it can be categorised as international terrorism or, as the case may be, as transnational[1]. Be that as it may, due to the scale of its actions and number of victims, or because of its interrelations with other local groups or with the global jihadist movement, it is an important destabilising factor for the entire Western Sahel region, and therefore its relevance is and must be international[2].

It is indeed a highly lethal terrorist group. Responsible for the deaths of 6,644 people, it was, according to the *Institute for Economics and Peace*, the most lethal terrorist group in 2014, the time of its peak[3]. Its activity has been declining considerably, but it was still the fourth deadliest terrorist organisation of 2018, and remains the deadliest in Sub-Saharan Africa[4]. As a result of this group's activity, the *Global Peace Index 2020* continues to rank Nigeria 147th on the global peace index[5]. In this sense, Nigeria remains one of the least peaceful countries in the world, with neighbouring countries such as Niger and Chad ranking close to Nigeria.

1 Although both concepts denote activity beyond a territory considered as a nation, the two terms should not be confused. Transnational terrorism is terrorism that crosses borders because the perpetrator has the infrastructure or means to operate in more than one country. All international terrorism is, by definition, transnational, but local terrorism can also be transnational. Local if its target is focused on a specific country, and transnational if it has the capacity to carry out its violent activity outside the boundaries of the country in which its target is based. García Reguera, J.M. (2017). *Amenaza y reacción contra el terrorismo global y el crimen organizado*. Madrid, Centro de Estudios Financieros. P. 77.

The key to the difference is in the objectives and intentions. Terrorism «which is carried out with the deliberate intention of altering the structure and distribution of power in entire regions or even on the scale of global society itself» is therefore international. Moreover, it is one whose actors have carried out attacks across a large number of countries or geopolitical areas, in line with stated global purposes. Reinares, 2006, quoted by García Reguera, J.M. *Op. cit.,* p. 77.

2 Echeverría Jesús, C. (2014). El desafío terrorista de Boko Haram en Nigeria. *Documento de Investigación del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos* (02/2014), pp. 3-4. Available at: http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_investig/2014/DIEEEINV02-2014_Region_Africa_subsahariana_C.Echeverria.pdf

3 Institute for Economics and Peace (2015). *Los cinco grupos terroristas más letales*. Madrid, esglobal. Available at: https://www.esglobal.org/los-cinco-grupos-terroristas-mas-letales/

4 Institute for Economics and Peace (2019). *Los grupos terroristas que más matan*. Madrid: esglobal. Available at: https://www.esglobal.org/los-grupos-terroristas-que-mas-matan/

5 *Global Peace Index 2020*. New York, Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP Report 72). P. 9. Available at: https://visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/GPI_2020_web.pdf

For its part, with almost two decades of history, Boko Haram, depending on the perpetrator[6], can be considered fourth or fifth wave terrorism. In any case, it is a terrorism that fits in with the current global terrorist trend, which is religious in nature and centred on the Islamic world, and which has recently been characterised by extreme violence, a violence inspired by an ideal of the search for purity and which even overshadows the message content behind the terrorist activity[7].

As for the origin of Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation, its date of birth is not entirely clear, there is no consensus[8]. However, two dates stand out: 2002 and 2009. The period 2002-2009 corresponds to its starting date, when the identity of this group began to take shape, although during this time its violent activity was scarce. This period was dominated by one man: Mohammed Yusuf. However, from 2009 onwards, this group consolidated and began its terrorist activity openly under the command of Abubakar Shekau. However, if we want to look for its deep roots, we must dig deeper into Nigeria's history and its political, social, cultural and economic situation. The latter will be dealt with in the *Analysis* section, but it is worth noting now that the country is deeply divided along religious lines, and an artificial border can be drawn between a Muslim north and a Christian and animist south.

In 2002, the person known as Mohammed Yusuf came to prominence on the Nigerian stage. Yusuf would go on to found the sect that would later become known as Boko Haram from a split in the non-violent Muslim Brotherhood or *Shabala*, which was led by Abubakar Lawan, who was succeeded by Yusuf in 2002[9]. Previously, it should be noted that a few years ago –in the heat of the central government's offer to apply *Sharia law* in some Muslim-majority states– several Koranic schools (*madrassas*) had spread in the north of the country, controlled by preachers coming from or encouraged and financed by some Gulf countries or even by Pakistan or Iran. From them, a rigorist, conservative, if not combative, interpretation of Islam was inoculated

6 Rapoport, the leading theorist of the waves of modern terrorism, established four waves. Later, other authors such as Kaplan have updated them and added a fifth, in which Boko Haram would be the paradigmatic reference. The main works of the two authors are, respectively: Rapoport, C. (2004). The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism. In CRONIN, A. and LUDES, J. *Attaching terrorism: Elements of a grand strategy*. Washington DC, Georgetown University Press. Pp. 46-73; y Kaplan, J. (2008). Terrorism's Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 2, issue 2.

7 García Reguera, J.M. *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

8 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. (2020). Boko Haram and ISWAP: dos caras de la misma moneda. *Documento del Observatorio Internacional de Estudios sobre Terrorismo* (13/2020). P. 8. Available at: https://observatorioterrorismo.com/eedyckaz/2020/08/Documento-OIET-13-20201.pdf

9 Adewunmi Falode, J. (2016). The Nature of Nigeria's Boko Haram War, 2010-2015: A Strategic Analysis *Perspectives On Terrorism*, February, vol. 10, issue 1, p. 43. Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). Boko Haram: movimiento ideológico, guerrilla insurgente y grupo terrorista, also supports the same information. *Opinion Paper, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies* (49/2018). P. 5. Available at: http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2018/DIEEEO49-2018_Boko_Haram_JMSA.pdf.

among the Muslim population of the North[10]. One of these preachers was therefore Yusuf, who spread a rigorist and intolerant ideology that he had adopted from Saudi Arabia[11]. Their postulates, well known among the Nigerian Muslim scholarly community and not without a few detractors, were mainly based on their outright rejection of Western education and culture[12], and their opposition to any form of *bid'ah* –innovation– including governments that were not inspired by *Sharia*[13].

Interspersing his prayers with political arguments, such as state oppression, malnutrition or lack of schooling among children, to push the religious discourse based on the need to impose Islamic law –at least in the Muslim northern states– as a solution to the impoverishment of the people and to curb rampant corruption, Yusuf went on to become a charismatic and quite successful figure, managing to adopt a large number of followers[14]. The latter established in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State (the most northeastern state in the country), a religious complex consisting of a mosque and a school where young Muslim students from Borno and other northern states, as well as from neighbouring countries such as Niger, Chad and Cameroon, attended[15]. Among Yusuf's sympathisers were also Nigerian politicians who, on the basis of Islamic values, sought to rally young Muslim militiamen to their cause through whom to retain or conquer power[16]. One of these was the country's last dictator, Mohammed Abacha (1993-1998), who may have been responsible for the early origins of Boko Haram and the rise of Yusuf[17].

Thus, Boko Haram was born at the hands of Yusuf. However, in these early years violence did not dominate the group, and it is difficult to consider it as a terrorist organisation, even if it was a sect of Muslim radicals. Some authors, such as Summers and Yagüe[18], consider this period of «quietist Salafism», i.e. mainly devoted to preaching. Thus, «Mohammed Yusuf maintained a fierce dialectic against the Nigerian state

10 Echeverría Jesús, C. *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

11 Mesa García, B. (2016). Boko Haram, de milicia a grupo terrorista. *Opinion Paper, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies* (33/2016). P. 6. Available at: http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2016/DIEEEO33 2016_BokoHaram_DeMilicia_GrupoTerrorista_BeatrizMesa.pdf

12 Torregrosa López, F.J., *et al.* (2016). Boko Haram: análisis del fenómeno terrorista en Nigeria. *Revista Criminalidad*, vol. 58, issue 1, p. 71.

13 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

14 Mesa García, B. *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

15 Adewunmi Falode, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 43.

16 Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

17 Mesa García, B. *Op. cit.*, pp. 4-5. It also reaffirms this idea: Santé Abal, J.M. (2017). Nigeria, elenco de conflictos. *Analysis Paper 26/2021, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies* (03/2017). P. 109. Available at: file:///C:/Users/fuste/Downloads/Dialnet-NigeriaElencoDeConflictosJoseMariaSanteAbal-6057670.pdf

18 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

in his years at the head of the sect, but he had never indulged in violence»[19]. With the exception of the so-called Nigerian Taliban –of which it is disputed whether they were a splinter group of Yusuf's or not[20]– the rest of the violent actions that were carried out were punctual and used rudimentary methods, mainly attacks with bladed weapons – a fact that most experts agree on.

However, the turning point came in 2009. From 2008 onwards, there was a shift in Yusuf's speeches, which almost exclusively dealt with issues such as *Jihad* and violence as a method of action[21]. This advocacy of violence may have led to clashes with other Muslims in the northern states[22], and the resulting disorder led to the intervention of the Nigerian Armed Forces and Police, who, under *Operation Flush*, entered these territories, ostensibly to put an end to the theft[23]. It made the atmosphere more tense, and it all seemed like a government offensive. Several clashes ensued, which were followed by successive declarations of revenge by leader Yusuf and the authorities[24].

But the final trigger was undoubtedly the altercation on 11 June 2009, when some young people were arrested for not wearing helmets on their motorbikes. They refused to be arrested and a shoot-out ensued. The next day Yusuf openly declared *jihad*[25]. This led to the so-called *Maiduguri Mutiny*, which spread to four other northern states at the end of June and involved systematic robberies and extortion of banks and police stations[26]. The police and army retaliation was brutal, leaving a total of 1,000 dead in Boko Haram's ranks[27]. In addition, Nigerian authorities captured the leader Yusuf and extra-judicially executed him[28], slit his throat and videotaped him for the rest of his followers to watch and crumble[29]. However, the effect they achieved was adverse: this disproportionate and indiscriminate persecution further encouraged the population and the whole episode was seen as a mass martyrdom[30].

19 Santé Abal, J.M. (201. *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

20 Santé (2018) considers that the Nigerian Taliban was indeed a splinter group of Yusuf's Boko Haram. In contrast, other authors such as Torregrosa, *et al.* (2016) postulate that it was a separate group with no connection to the preacher.

21 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.* support this information through the collection of videos and broadcasts of leader Yusuf dating from 2008-2009.

22 Mesa García, B. *Op. cit.*, p. 6, and Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

23 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

24 Mesa García, B. *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

25 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

26 Mesa García, B. *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

27 Endorse these figures: Torregrosa, *et al. Op. cit.*, p. 71, and SUMMERS, M. and YAGÜE, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

28 Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

29 Mesa García, B. *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

30 Echeverría Jesús, C. *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

At the same time, President Umaru Yar' Adua, a Muslim, fell seriously ill that year and was replaced by his vice-president Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian. The following year he dies, and Goodluck definitely becomes the new president. In Nigeria there was an unwritten rule that each presidency must rotate between a Christian and a Muslim[31]. As the Muslim president in office had not completed his term in office, it was felt that the rule had been broken, and this unexpected turn of events further inflamed the atmosphere and served as an excuse for Boko Haram's violence[32]. However, it was only a stimulus to the pre-existing climate. It was by no means the origin of Boko Haram as originally estimated[33].

Yusuf's death also brought about a change in leadership, which was accompanied by a paradigm/strategy shift. One of his lieutenants, Abubakar Shekau, took Yusuf's place, and he, unlike the other, was a military genius and not an intellectual, as well as the most radical of his followers[34]. Since the summer of 2009 there has been no further news of Boko Haram, it seemed that the gang was disbanded[35]. But in September 2010, Shekau, appointed as the new emir, made a spectacular comeback with the release of 700 prisoners from Bauchi prison using military tactics that overwhelmed the existing security forces in the area[36]. The sophistication of their attacks increased qualitatively over the course of the same year, now with bomb attacks and not only on Christian or governmental targets. This, together with the start of a real guerrilla war, marks the beginning of Boko Haram as a terrorist group.

Ideology and objectives of the organisation

Ideologically, Boko Haram can be considered a Salafist Islamist jihadist movement[37]. This group is therefore related to the Islamic religion[38].

31 Kabunda, M. (2011). Nigeria: oil, religion and ethnic divisions. *Política Exterior*, March/April, vol. 25, issue 140, p. 41.

32 Echeverría Jesús, C. *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

33 Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

34 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

35 Pérez Ventura, Ó. (2014). *Boko Haram, el terror 'yihadista' en Nigeria*. Madrid, esglobal. Available at: https://www.esglobal.org/boko-haram-el-terror-yihadista-en-nigeria/

36 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

37 Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

38 Two points should be made here. On the one hand, Islam should not be confused with Islamism. Islam belongs to the *-isms*. It is thus an ideology in which a series of political ideas based on the Muslim religion are accepted. Islam, on the other hand, is the religion, which is fourteen centuries old and stands between other religions such as Judaism and Christianity. Del Prado Higuera, C. and Sánchez de Rojas Díaz, E. (2018). *Terrorismo islamista: el caso de Al Gama´a al Islamiyya.* Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch. P. 85. ISBN 978-84-9190-145-7.

In short, Islamism is «the affirmation of a set of political beliefs of an Islamic character»[39]. Islamism is not so much a type of fundamentalism, but rather a political option within modern Muslim states that advocates the Islamisation of their institutions and a preference for the application of *Sharia* law. Nor is Islamism synonymous with violence. Many Islamists have accepted the current state of affairs and admitted democratic competitiveness, for Islamism is also a reform of Islam, a way of modernising and adapting it to the times to come.

Salafism, on the other hand, is an attitude towards Islam –a doctrinal current, if you will– while Islamism is strictly a political current. Traditional Salafism preaches doctrinal purity, the cohesion of the religious community and the preservation of the moral order of Islam from a vision of breaking society from tradition, thereby promoting orthopraxy and re-Islamisation[40]. Salafist Islamism therefore implies accepting a series of political ideas of an Islamic nature, but under the doctrinal point of view of Salafism. In this way, Salafist Islamists are configured as a type of radical Islamist-integrist, intolerant, declared enemy of the «modern» and the «Western», who only conceives as a valid form of government that which is governed by the *Sharia*. Moreover, as a political attitude it implies a shift to political activism away from preaching (*dawa*) and education, the original ways of spreading Salafism and promoting a reform of Islam from below rather than from above.

Finally, jihadist Salafism or simply jihadism would be «a perverse and minority derivation of a large current known as Salafism, characterised by the desire to return to the doctrinal origins of the religion and the way of life of the first Muslims [...] through the promulgation of holy war and, therefore, instrumentalising violence in the name of Islam»[41]. In short, it is the Islamist component that seeks to achieve the objectives of Salafism by means of political violence, making use of the honourable concept of *Jihad*.

Although officially named *Jama'at Ahl as Sunnah lid Da'wah wa'l-Jihad* (i.e. People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), this group is

On the other hand, Islam is characterised as a religion with great interpretative freedom. There is no overriding dogma and no ruling class, no ecclesiastical hierarchy, which, with the exception of the caliph –who is no longer there– can decree what is or is not in accordance with Islam. Thus, «There is no clear and precisely defined orthodoxy, but a tradition or, more precisely, several equally valid traditions; we are dealing with a community of the faithful, in its most gregarious sense, rather than with a dogmatic group». Aznar Fernández-Montesinos, F. (2014). Doctrina y acción política. Pugnas sobre el islam verdadero. El salafismo. In the School of Advanced Defence Studies. *Safety and Defence Documents*, 62. Madrid, Ministry of Defence. P. 19. There is a multiplicity of religious schools and different streams of Islamic thought. However, this contains a certain risk component since it allows radicals to speak out and be followed by the community without a religious authority being able to excommunicate them and stop them in their tracks.

39 Aznar Fernández-Montesinos, F. *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

40 *Ibid*, pp. 24-26.

41 Jordán (2005), quoted in Del Prado Higuera, C. and Sánchez de Rojas Díaz, E. *Op. cit.*, p. 95.

better known by the name Boko Haram, which can be translated as «Western education is sin» or «Western education is forbidden»[42]. This last name gives us several clues about the idiosyncrasies of this group. Central to the ideology spread by Yusuf is the doctrine of *bid'ah* –innovation– originally attributed to the Egyptian intellectual Qutb[43]. The condemnation of any kind of innovation that departs from the original path set by the Qur'an and the Prophet was adapted to Nigeria's post-colonial reality to dictate that the country was tainted by the post-colonial heritage. According to Yusuf, this was the cause of the break with tradition and the waywardness of good Muslims, thus serving to outlaw any kind of Western influence – education.

In this indigenist Salafist discourse, Yusuf opted for the political option of Salafist Islam and thus for the implementation of *Sharia* as a way to purify the Muslim community of «Western education». Indeed, Nigerian politicians were the target of much of his criticism – all the more so because they were an oppressive elite mostly educated and trained in the West or by Westerners[44]. However, their action was more proselytising and aimed at raising awareness in the minds of believers. Therefore, the Nigerian government and the country's Christianity were not part of their plans. Thus, the political objectives of the sect led by Yusuf were the establishment of *Sharia* law in Borno - Boko Haram's initial headquarters – and in those other Muslim communities in the north of the country.

However, after proclaiming *Jihad* in June 2009 and, above all, from 2010 onwards, the organisation's objectives changed and became more ambitious. Since then, they have sought to establish *Sharia* law throughout the country, pursuing the Islamisation of Nigeria even though half of its population are non-believers[45]. This is partly explained by the teachings of what is considered to be the first amir –Yusuf– according to whom Islam in Africa had historically been promoted through *jihad*. He also considered that the current bad situation of the population is a direct consequence of the abandonment of *Jihad*, and the government, contrary to Islam and tradition, is the main beneficiary of this[46]. The central government became their direct enemy, especially the executive led by Goodluck Jonathan. But on the other hand, by designating moderate Muslim targets or allies of Christians, it is intended to bring about a takfirist revolutionary movement[47] through which to generate an exceptional community of believers[48].

42 Institute for Economics and Peace (2015). *Op. cit.*

43 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

44 Mesa García, B. *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

45 Adewunmi Falode, J. *Op. cit.* p. 43.

46 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

47 '*Takfir* is the doctrine by which radicals exclude from Islam Muslims who do not follow their views' *Takfirista*. España, Observatorio de la islmalofobia en los medios, 2020. Available at: http://www.observatorioislamofobia.org/glossary/takfirista/

48 Mesa García, B. *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

Organisational strategy

From 2009 onwards, and culminating with the transfer of power to Shekau in 2010, the change of strategy within the group became evident. With the proclamation of *Jihad* , the insurgency in the northern states began, which materialised in the *Maiduguri Mutiny* of June 2009, which lasted for several days and ended badly for the insurgents. After the murder of 1,000 members and the public death of its leader and emir Yusuf, Boko Haram consolidated violence as a pattern of action, using the 2009 massacre as an element of justification for revenge and violent action, as well as an inspiration for contemplating it as collective martyrdom[49]. Likewise, at Shekau's hands, there is a change in the targets attacked and a qualitative leap in the sophistication of his methods and tactics.

First, Shekau's Boko Haram expanded the number of targets it could attack. On the one hand, although the government and Christians are their main enemies, moderate Muslims who do not support Boko Haram also become prey to their attacks. It should not be forgotten that most of Boko Haram's victims are Muslims and not Christians[50]. On the other hand, Boko Haram attacks both «hard targets» –such as military barracks, police stations, self-defence militias, penitentiary institutions or the headquarters of the Federal Police Headquarters– and «soft targets». In the latter, apart from attacks on marginal police posts or checkpoints, he also attacks civilians[51].

Through the *Global Terrorism Database*[52], we can see that many of his victims are banks and credit centres, civilians and private property, places of worship and religious leaders, as well as schools and teachers, thus living up to its name – «Western education is sin». The latter targets account for 1,893 of the 3,039 Boko Haram incidents recorded by the database, more than half of them. In this way, he employs indiscriminate, severe violence, especially against Muslims who are educated in Western culture or who do not follow the organisation's radical postulates.

Secondly, Shekau improved the *modus operandi* of the organisation, making it much more effective and lethal. The violent acts carried out by Boko Haram until 2010 were based on sporadic clashes or lynchings carried out by individuals equipped with rudimentary weapons such as machetes, knives, clubs, or Molotov cocktails[53]. On occasion there was the occasional altercation with firearms[54], and even some skirmish-

49 Echeverría Jesús, C. *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

50 *Ibid*, p. 11.

51 *Ibid*, p. 10-11.

52 *Global Terrorism Database*. University of Maryland: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Available at: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=boko+haram&sa.x=38&sa.y=13

53 Adewunmi Falode, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 43.

54 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

ing such as shooting from *okada* –in local slang, motorbikes– at their targets[55]. However, December 2010 saw a new development reflecting greater sophistication: the use of improvised explosive devices in strategic locations. The following year, moreover, the first suicide bombing took place[56], this one against a police station in Abuja, the country's capital, which is undoubtedly a clear sign of the radicalisation and predisposition of its members[57].

But not only that. Since 2010, in its attacks on «hard targets» it has tended to use large, heavily armed groups of at least thirty men, sometimes more than a hundred and sometimes even 200-300[58]. In these cases, it employs military tactics[59], which are largely based on guerrilla methods[60], especially the so-called coup hand. Boko Haram's arsenal then became composed of explosives such as Semtex, AK-47 automatic rifles, vehicles with machine guns, grenade launchers and hand grenades, surface-to-air missiles, and even T-55 tanks[61].

These circumstances denote that Boko Haram's strategy has gone beyond simple terrorism, and positions it as a guerrilla insurgency that does not renounce terrorism –but rather exploits it– to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy. This places Boko Haram on the fine line between insurgent and terrorist activities[62]. In this sense, similar to groups such as the Taliban, Boko Haram is a truly asymmetric enemy that poses an unrestricted fight, completely outside the usages and rules of war, seeking to exploit the vulnerabilities of the conventional adversary, undermining, above all, his will and resistance. In fact, Adewunmi[63] argues that the conflict in Nigeria is based on the pillars of hybrid warfare[64], and all this makes us realise that what has happened with Boko Haram in the country is not only terrorism, but could be approached as a civil war[65].

55 Adewunmi Falode, J. *Op. cit.,* p. 43.

56 Suicide bombings have become a hallmark of Boko Haram. Along with high-explosive bombings, they are the group's preferred tactic, and this, in turn, is relatively rarely used in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Institute For Economics and Peace (2019). *Op. cit.*

57 Pérez Ventura, Ó. *Op. cit.*

58 Echeverría Jesús, C. *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

59 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

60 Torregrosa López, F.J., *et al. Op. cit.*, p. 71.

61 Adewunmi Falode, J. *Op. cit.* p. 44.

62 Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

63 Adewunmi Falode, J. *Op. cit.,* p. 47.

64 *Hybrid warfare* is characterised by «the integration in time and space of conventional procedures with tactics of irregular warfare». Martí Sempere, C. (2020). *Naturaleza, causas y evolución de los conflictos armados*. Madrid, Centro de Estudios Financieros, p. 111.

65 Torregrosa López, F.J., *et al. Op. cit.*, p. 72.

The use of sequestration is also noteworthy. At the time of Echevarría's writing, kidnapping was a one-off practice, unlike other groups in the Sahel, such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – a group that has been noted for its recurrence to this practice[66]. At the time, their funding was mainly covered by theft, donations from sympathisers –not only from the global jihadist sphere, but also presumably from Nigerian authorities, who have also provided them with weapons[67]– and various illicit activities – notably drugs[68]. However, since 2013, the number of people abducted by Boko Haram has been increasing[69].

Today, kidnapping has become one of the group's hallmarks. Kidnapping has not only been used to obtain ransom payments, although abductees have often been used as bargaining chips for the release of ex-combatants. In addition to the psychological dimension –anyone can be kidnapped, spreading fear among the population– kidnapping has also been another recruitment tool in the organisation[70]. The most affected have been women and children, with Boko Haram having adopted a conscious strategy of forced recruitment of these demographics[71]. The training of future child-soldiers is sought, as well as the employment of children and female suicide bombers, although at other times women and girls are sold as sex slaves or young wives to encourage morale in the troop[72].

Finally, in terms of radius of action, this was originally limited mainly to the Nigerian state. However, although initially considered a Nigerian problem, Boko Haram, prior to its split and spread, had cross-border ties with neighbouring Chad[73], taking advantage of the cross-border economy, smuggling routes and existing criminal gangs, as well as the prevailing family, ethnic and, above all, religious ties in the region, to obtain weapons, supplies and recruits, and to carry out the occasional kidnapping and looting[74]. In that sense, before it began attacks in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, Boko Haram already possessed enormous potential to function as a transnational terrorist network.

66 Echeverría Jesús, C. *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

67 Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

68 Echeverría Jesús, C. *Op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

69 Torregrosa López, F.J., *et al. Op. cit.*, p. 73.

70 SUMMERS, M. and YAGÜE, J. *Op. cit.*, pp. 16.

71 Institute for Economics and Peace (2019). *Op. cit.*

72 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

73 MAHMOOD, O.S. and CHRISTIAN ANI, S. (2018). *Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region: Policies, Cooperation and Livelihoods*. Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies. P. 10. Available at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf

74 *What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?* Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2020 (Crisis Group Africa Report No. 291). P. 5. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/291-what-role-multinational-joint-task-force-fighting-boko-haram

Leadership, organisational structure and composition

The leadership of Boko Haram was in the hands of Yusuf until his death in 2009, and later, in 2010, it passed to Shekau, who also proclaimed himself emir. Shekau was one of Yusuf's two top lieutenants and, unlike his former leader, he is primarily a military genius rather than an intellectual. He is also much more radical and bloodthirsty than the former. An ethnic Kurani Muslim from Yobe State, he joined the organisation in the late 1990s[75].

Although relevant, Shekau never gained much recognition both domestically and on the global jihadist stage. However, as a result of his leadership, he became recognised throughout the world. Shekau led the organisation to its peak around 2014. Indeed, in addition to being the year in which Boko Haram claimed the most victims –making it the most lethal terrorist group on the planet– 2014 was the year in which Shekau effectively controlled part of the territory of Nigeria's northern federated states, an area roughly the size of Belgium[76]. Emboldened by his power, and given the inefficiency of the authorities to counteract the group's growth and territorial dominance, Shekau, on 23 August 2014, declared that the areas of Nigeria under his control constitute an Islamic caliphate.

According to Summers and Yagüe, «facts like these, added to the increasing presence in the media and international forums due to the noise and impact of their actions, make Boko Haram an object of desire of the large jihadist groups [...]»[77]. Boko Haram had previously had relations with Al Qaeda[78], mediated by its affiliate AQIM[79], in neighbouring Mali, although it should be noted that the organisation had also interacted with other local groups active in the Western Sahel, such as Ansaru or MUYAO[80]. However, Boko Haram took an unexpected turn and positioned itself in favour of DAESH, the self-styled Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Thus, on 7 March 2015, Shekau decided to swear an oath of allegiance (*bay'ah*) to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of DAESH, and Boko Haram became the Islamic State of

75 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

76 Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

77 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

78 *Global Terrorism Index 2017: Measuring the and Understanding the Impact of the Terrorism*. New York, Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP Report 55). P. 74. Available at. https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2017-11/apo-nid208941.pdf

79 It is now known that Boko Haram and Al Qaeda had a mutually supportive relationship, knowing that AQIM may have been behind the sophistication of their methods, offering military training and instruction in explosive devices. Torregrosa López, F.J., *et al. Op. cit.*, p. 71.

80 Echeverría Jesús, C. *Op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

West Africa (ISWAP), which, in turn, is registered as another province of the great Caliphate of DAESH[81].

This has been of real significance in terms of leadership. Soon Shekau would clash with the directives imposed by DAESH's parent organisation. This coincided with the fact that by the end of 2015 the group had lost much of its social support base and was also in retreat, losing some of the territory it controlled. Indeed, compared to the forcefulness in combat in 2014 and 2015, by the end of 2015 it was being defeated thanks to two elements: firstly, government military forces had embarked on an ambitious campaign of conquest, improving and adapting their techniques to the guerrilla and anti-terrorist struggle with the support of white South African mercenaries; secondly, there had been the intervention of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a combined military force composed of the four countries of Lake Chad –Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon– plus a modest contribution from Benin, which came to the aid of the overwhelmed Nigerian army[82]. Internal divergences then began to emerge, criticisms which, above all, were directed against takfirism and the indiscriminate and unnecessary use of violence against Muslim civilians[83]. The DAESH leadership decided to mediate in the matter and promoted Abu Musab al-Barnawi, son of Mohammed Yusuf, making him the new leader and sidelining Shekau. However, Shekau did not support this decision and, together with some others loyal to his leadership, decided to split his own faction, which went under the old name of Boko Haram[84].

As it is, what was once Boko Haram has split into two major splinter groups, although there is thought to be a further independent group[85]. On the one hand, we have ISWAP, aligned with Daesh and led by al-Barnawi, which would therefore be the remnants of the original organisation. The latter is now based in the area around Lake Chad, and concentrates on targeting mainly Nigerian military and government agents, trying to renounce violence against civilians. On the other hand, there is Shekau's Boko Haram, which remains holed up in the Sambisa jungle –close to the Cameroon border– and continues with the same *modus operandi* as in the past[86].

It is worth noting that factions that have pledged allegiance to the major leaders of global jihadism are now acting as their franchisees. In this sense, in addition to adopting their brand, and while retaining their own local –and therefore less global

81 Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

82 Adewunmi Falode, J. *Op. cit.,* p. 46.

83 Opinion shared by studies such as Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, p. 13, or Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

84 This is also reflected by the previous authors.

85 The 2017 Global Terrorism Index tells us of up to three splinter factions after the group's collapse in 2015: one violent, one aligned with ISIS and one with Al Qaeda.

86 Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, pp. 14-15; Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, pp. 19-20; and Institute for Economics and Peace (2019). *Op. cit.*

than the parent company's– agenda, they combine their interests with those of the central core[87]. This forms a network of networks[88], so ISWAP is a network organisation within a network. The franchised groups therefore still retain a good deal of independence both operationally and in terms of objectives. In fact, Boko Haram has on more than one occasion been reluctant to participate in the global *jihad*[89]. In addition to the evidence of having carried out minimal actions against international targets[90], there is the fact that, despite the fact that its ideology orbits Salafist jihadism, its social message is still intoxicated by a strong ethnicity based on the North-South difference –which is ultimately strengthened by religious divergences– and this is what really attracts its followers. Santé concludes that Boko Haram's rapprochement with DAESH has been driven more by survival and necessity than by conviction[91].

Regarding its composition, some authors claim that the number of Boko Haram members and troops is unknown[92]. However, it is clear to them that, given the type of massive attacks they carry out and the many casualties they have suffered in recent years at the hands of the Nigerian Armed and Security Forces, there is no shortage of candidates to swell their ranks. The majority of its members are young people with economic aspirations, with political or religious issues taking second place[93]. However, there are also many cases where there is a severe lack of identity and personal fulfilment, finding an attractive message in the discourse of such organisations[94]. For their part, the majority are Nigerian nationals –mainly ethnic groups from the north– but there are also Muslims from neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Nor should we forget the unusually high proportion of women and children within the organisation –something that contrasts with other terrorist groups[95]– which, as mentioned above, are mainly used for suicide terrorist actions and, to a large extent, these troops come from abduction.

87 García Reguera, J.M. *Op. cit.* p. 22.

88 Del Prado Higuera, C. and Sánchez de Rojas Díaz, E. *Op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.

89 This is the view of Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

90 With the exception of the attack on the UN headquarters in Abuja in August 2011, which killed 26 people, Boko Haram has not perpetrated any other major international attacks. Thus, unlike other groups, Boko Haram has not attacked other Western countries. Rather, it is the brutality of its actions –such as the abduction of 276 girls from the Chibok orphanage (2014)– that has earned it international condemnation and inclusion on the respective lists of terrorist organisations. Summers, M. and Yagüe, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

91 Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

92 As Echeverría Jesús, C. *Op. cit.*, p. 7, or Torregrosa López, F.J., *et al. Op. cit.*, p. 72.

93 Mesa García, B. *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

94 Torregrosa López, F.J., *et al. Op. cit.*, p. 72.

95 Institute for Economics and Peace (2019). *Op. cit.*

Attacks perpetrated by the group

According to the recently published Global Terrorism Index, the number of terrorist attacks in Nigeria from 2007 to 2019 was 4,383, resulting in a total number of 23,354 deaths[96]. Furthermore, the economic impact of terrorism in Nigeria is estimated at $141,889.4 million, making Nigeria the largest victim of terrorism in Africa[97]. For its part, UNHCR[98] offers figures that are close to those given –it states that there have been 28,000 deaths in total at the hands of Boko Haram– and also provides the figure of more than 2,000 women and girls kidnapped, as well as mentioning the humanitarian crisis that the country is experiencing. It notes that some 7.1 million people have been affected by the conflict, 276,850 are refugees and 2.5 million are displaced in regions of Nigeria far from the conflict.

Analysis of the terrorist group Boko Haram

Context in which the group originates: Nigeria's fragility

In 2004, Bin Laden himself declared that Nigeria was «one of the most prepared countries for Jihad»[99]. Certainly, a number of conditions exist in this country that make it a real breeding ground for insurgency and terrorist movements of the calibre of Boko Haram.

On the one hand, Nigeria is an artificial country within sub-Saharan Africa, whose current borders are inherited from the colonial era[100]. Nigeria was a British colony until 1960, when it became an independent, presidential federal republic[101]. In this sense, Nigeria is not a state that has formed around a particular nation or a more or less homogenous social group, but one that, replicating British rule, brings together a range of ethnicities - some with historical tribal and state entities – around the lower reaches and delta of the Niger River.

Within the existing cultural diversity –some 250 ethnic groups– the majority ethnic groups are the Hausa and Fulani in the north (33% of the total population), Igbo in the

96 To these must be added combat deaths, around 35,000, according to the Institute For Economics And Peace (2019). *Op. cit.*

97 *Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of the Terrorism*. New York, Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP Report 75). P. 36. Available at: https://visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-1.pdf

98 *El Terror de Boko Haram en Nigeria*. Geneva, La Agencia de la ONU para los Refugiados. Available at: https://eacnur.org/es/labor/emergencias/el-terror-de-boko-haram-en-nigeria

99 Quoted by Echeverría Jesús, C. *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

100 Martínez Peñas, L. (2009). Amenazas a la estabilidad en la Nigeria actual. *Athena Intelligence Journal*, vol. 3, issue 1, p. 71.

101 Torregrosa López, F.J., *et al. Op. cit.*, p. 70.

southeast (12%) and Yoruba in the southwest (31%), each with their own language[102]. It is precisely because of this diversity that it is a federal republic. Moreover, the north and south of the country are quite different in terms of ecosystems – savannah in the north, in the Sahel, and jungle in the south, in the Gulf of Guinea. In addition to this natural border, there is another cultural border that has been of real importance for the future of the Nigerian people and for the emergence of Boko Haram, i.e. the religious differences between north and south. The north, with a closer link to the empires in Mali, has traditionally been Muslim, while the south, with more foreign influence in the past –predominantly British– is mostly Christian –from different churches– and animist[103]. Likewise, north and south have also been differentiated by the practice of two different socio-economic activities: north, transhumant livestock farming, and south, agriculture. Historically in the Sahel, both activities have generated great social conflict –as the practice of one is detrimental to the practice of the other– and climate change is exacerbating this as the progressive desertification of the savannah pushes pastoralist communities to the more fertile south[104].

On the other hand, Nigeria is a powerful country, but only in appearance. In reality it is a «giant with feet of clay»[105]. It is one of the largest in Africa and also the most populous on the continent, with more than 200 million inhabitants. Economically, Nigeria is the highest GDP state in Africa, ahead of such prosperous economies as Egypt and South Africa[106], and has recorded an average annual growth rate of around 5.7% over the last two decades[107]. It is also Africa's largest oil producer and the world's sixth largest exporter. It has one of the largest oil reserves in the world[108], and in addition to this natural wealth there are large deposits of natural gas, coal, timber and gold. Yet, despite all this, Nigeria is home to the world's largest population in extreme poverty, at 87 million and growing, with half of the population subsisting on less than two dollars a day[109].

102 Kabunda, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 38.

103 Torregrosa López, F.J., *et al. Op. cit.*, p. 70.

104 Santé Abal, J.M. (2017). *Op. cit.*, p. 115.

105 Kabunda, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 38.

106 Datos comparativos de PIB bruto extraídos de *Economía y datos de países: UA – Unión Africana*. Datosmacro. Available at: https://datosmacro.expansion.com/paises/grupos/union-africana

107 Average annual economic growth calculation obtained from *GDP growth (% p.a.) - Nigeria*. Washington D.C., World Bank. Available at: https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2020&locations=NG&start=2000

108 Rodríguez, N. (2015). *Boko Haram: crecimiento, desarrollo y conflicto en Nigeria*. New York, Researchgate. P. 3.Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275959422_Boko_Haram_Crecimiento_Desarrollo_y_Conflicto_en_Nigeria

109 *Economic and commercial information. Nigeria. Structure of the offer*. Madrid, ICEX. Available at: https://www.icex.es/icex/es/navegacion-principal/todos-nuestros-servicios/informacion-de-mercados/paises/navegacion-principal/el-pais/informacion-economica-y-comercial/estructura-de-la-oferta/index.html?idPais=NG#4

The large revenues derived from the production and export of natural resources, especially crude oil, although they have been the engine of Nigerian economic growth, have certainly not led to the country's development, but rather have generated a flawed economy, increasingly dependent on this sector and, therefore, scarcely diversified[110]. The primary sector continues to account for the majority of the labour force –approximately 70% of the workforce– which is a clear indication of a low level of development[111]. In addition, the poor state of the country's infrastructure, the lack of electricity supply due to the problems of generating energy on their own –despite the country's vast natural resources– the low literacy rate, the lack of food and the need to import it, and the lack of quality of its industry should also be highlighted. However, the 2019 Human Development Report ranks Nigeria among the countries with the lowest development index in the world, at 158 out of 189, with a development index of 0.534[112].

Economic inequality is another endemic problem in Nigeria. Thus, for example, it is estimated that the richest 20% of the population accumulates 42.4% of the country's income, while the poorest 20% accumulates only 7.1%[113]. The World Bank estimates that 40.1% of the population lives below the poverty line, i.e. below the median income. Similarly, inequality is also reproduced at the regional level, with the poverty rate being higher in the northern states than in the south[114].

It is in this context of impoverishment and great socio-economic inequalities, as well as strong cultural contradictions, that the political crisis in which this country has been mired practically since its birth must be understood. In Africa, a patrimonialist conception of power has normally prevailed, and the Nigerian authorities –Nigeria is ranked as the 25th most corrupt state in the world[115]– have, of course, displayed it. Seen in this light, struggles for control of resources in favour of a particular ethnic group, via secession –for example, that of Biafra between 1967 and 1970– or by means of a coup d'état, have been a constant feature of its history. However, the country has known democratic normality only since 1999, when Abasanjo became the first democratically elected president. However, even in the 21st century, Abuja has continued to

110 As a result of this lack of diversification, the Nigerian economy is very sensitive to oil price fluctuations, which explains the recession the country went through in 2016 and 2020 when oil prices plummeted. Diplomatic Information Office (2021). *Country profile - Nigeria - Federal Republic of Nigeria*. Madrid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation. P. 2. Available at: http://www.exteriores.gob.es/documents/fichaspais/nigeria_ficha%20pais.pdf

111 Santé Abal, J.M. (2017). *Op. cit.*, p. 106.

112 *Human Development Report 2019*. New York, United Nations Development Programme. P. 27. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2019_overview_-_spanish.pdf

113 Income distribution data extracted from *Nigeria - GINI index*. Knoema. Available at: https://knoema.es/atlas/Nigeria/topics/Pobreza/Desigualdad-del-ingreso/%C3%8Dndice-GINI

114 ICEX. *Op. cit.*

115 Corruption data offered by Echeverría Jesús, C. *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

face insurgent movements in the south of the country, especially over the control of oil, such as the secessionist reminiscences of Biafra or the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a struggle which, of course, adds to the growing Islamic radicalism in the north of Nigeria[116].

Immersed in power struggles, the Nigerian state has barely developed its public sector[117], so that the federal administration is unable to provide basic public services (health, education, clean water, electricity, etc.) to its citizens. This is especially evident in areas far from the political and economic centre of the country (northern Nigeria and areas around Lake Chad), where state presence is practically non-existent. It is in these marginalised areas where feelings of neglect by public administrations have surfaced the most, which, together with the high perception of corruption in the institutions, has favoured distrust and disconnection from the state[118]. As in other cases –for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon– non-state actors fill this vacuum by acting as a social network of containment and mutual aid, recruiting supporters for their cause[119].

Nor should we ignore the deterioration of human rights and the rule of law in Nigeria[120], a country that has been characterised by the use of force not monopolised by the state and the abusive practices of the Armed and Security Forces[121].

Overall, we can conclude that Nigeria is a fragile state[122], with an economic engine –natural resources– that, as it has been managed, does not allow for the equitable distribution of income or the generation of national wealth, and where poverty and inequality have come together with cultural differences to generate a highly conflictive context that has prevented the adequate development of the public sector and the guarantee of human and civil rights. In this scenario, there has been a proliferation of psychocultural dispositions unfavourable to the rejection of violence, little legitimacy of official institutions, and a social discourse based on difference and oriented towards

116 Boko Haram was neither the first –they have the precedent of the *Yan Tatsine*sect– nor the only Muslim religious terrorist group that has prevailed during this time – there are the so-called Nigerian Taliban or the first split of Boko Haram materialised in Ansaru. Torregrosa López, F.J., *et al. Op. cit.*, p. 70.

117 Nigeria's public services score poorly (8.9) in the *Fragile States Index*. Washington D.C., Fund For Peace (Annual Report 2019). P. 43. Available at: https://fundforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/9511904-fragilestatesindex.pdf

118 Mahmood, O.S. and Christian Ani, S. *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

119 Rodríguez, N. *Op. cit.*, p. 3-4.

120 Respect for human rights and the rule of law in Nigeria also receives a poor score (8.3) in the cited *Fragile States Index* from 2019.

121 Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

122 Version corroborated by the *2019 Fragile States Index*, which rates Nigeria as a state on alert (red), with a fragility score of 98.5 according to its state fragility index.

the reinforcement of one's own group, generating an «us» and a «them»[123]. It now seems that this discourse is articulated more along religious rather than traditional ethnic lines.

Boko Haram as a further destabilising factor

Given the north-south differences, where ethnic distinctions are reinforced by religious differences, Boko Haram's rhetoric has further energised traditional inter-communal clashes in Nigeria[124]. Thus, it is worth noting that, in addition to power struggles, at a more micro level infighting between communities has been another constant in their history[125]. Boko Haram has thus further eroded this already steep landscape.

It has been unusually successful in exploiting the religious cause, but its mobilisation has really been achieved because of the lack of legitimacy of institutions and because of political, social and economic inequality between north and south[126]. Arguments such as the imposition of *Sharia* and the path of *Jihad* as a solution to the problems affecting these peoples, or the search for purity of identity, arguing that they were contaminated by the malicious «Western education», reveal a rather ethnicist message that is perfectly intertwined with the religious-political. As a result, it has fuelled not only inter-communal conflict between different confessionalities –Christians and Muslims– and with Islam's own adherents, but also the country's traditional entrenched ethnic conflict.

Yet Boko Haram has further fractured and polarised the Nigerian population. But not only that. The scale of its casualties, as well as the humanitarian crisis that has resulted from its activity –with thousands of refugees and millions of internally displaced persons causing further regional imbalance and destabilisation– have reached the dimensions of a full-blown civil war. Nigerian northerners have thus lived in a state of constant fear and exception in recent years.

For their part, the Nigerian armed forces and police have seen their legitimacy further eroded. Its arbitrary and indiscriminate pattern of action partly explains the climate of violence[127]. We have already seen how the authorities' wrongdoing in 2009 spurred the group to engage in violence under the banner of *jihad* in order to

123 Santé Abal, J.M. (2018). *Op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

124 Echeverría Jesús, C. *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

125 Outside the political orbit, various Nigerian ethnic communities have clashed over control of the –legal and illegal– oil business in the Niger Delta. On the other hand, in Plateau State, the «middle belt» of the religious frontier, violent confrontations between Muslim herdsmen and Christian farmers have intensified since the 21st century. Martínez Peñas, L. *Op. cit.*, pp. 78 and 80.

126 Santé Abal, J.M. 2018. *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

127 *Ibid*, pp. 15-16.

achieve its aims. On another occasion, in 2013, the declaration of a state of emergency in the north of the country brought further arbitrariness by giving the green light to search or raid suspects and commit all kinds of human rights violations against alleged criminals or sympathisers of the group[128]. In turn, the militarisation of northern states has exacerbated problems such as delayed return home, more displaced people, or difficulties in developing cross-border trade due to established border control, all of which increase general resentment against the authorities and increase the number of targets susceptible to recruitment by Boko Haram or other violent groups[129].

Both the national and local economies have been affected by this conflict. On a general level, the instability of the country discourages potential international investors, and violence and the risk of kidnapping lead to the country being labelled as dangerous, thus minimising the arrival of Western foreigners as tourists or skilled labour[130]. This prevents the arrival of foreign capital and reduces the country's chances of modernisation. To these opportunity costs must logically be added the direct costs arising from the destruction of infrastructure and private property, as well as the indirect costs arising from the cost of military operations.

Regarding the local economy, border restrictions following the declaration of the state of emergency have hampered the traditional trade in fish and peppers that locals carry out with neighbouring countries, restrictions that are additional to the fees that terrorists unilaterally impose on traders to allow them to pass[131]. Other bans, such as cycling and night-time mobility restrictions, have further contributed to local suffocation. Equally, the economic potential of northern Nigeria will be limited by the number of deaths, migration, subsequent insecurity and loss of property in the region. Thus, for example, the impossibility of returning home will result in the loss of a new harvest, with all that this entails for a farmer[132]. In addition, the existence of Boko Haram and other terrorist actors is fuelling the growth of illicit activities, including the worrying drug trade[133].

However, it can turn the situation around thanks to the weakness of the group. Thus, «it has recently become accepted that Boko Haram is decimated, short of territory, broken into groups that go beyond a simple split into two major factions and that it only seeks soft targets, as opposed to its strength on the battlefield in particularly

128 Mesa García, B. *Op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

129 *Watch List 2017*. Brussels: International Crisis Group (Special Report No. 3). P.12). Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/3-watch-list-2017

130 Torregrosa López, F.J., *et al. Op. cit.*, p. 73.

131 Mesa García, B. *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

132 International Crisis Group (2017). *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

133 Echeverría Jesús, C. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

tough years such as 2014 and 2015»[134]. This is partly true. In recent years, the *Institute for Economics and Peace* has recorded a drop in the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram, as well as a decrease in their effectiveness, which it attributes to the dismemberment of the group and the greater effectiveness of the authorities in their fight against the terrorist phenomenon[135]. Some groups are also in negotiation with the government, and the amnesty campaign is helping the progressive redemption of combatants into the Armed Forces[136].

However, it should also be added that Shekau's splintering remains particularly lethal and active, even if it now tends to concentrate on easier targets[137]. All this while the loss of territory has favoured the spread of the group and its splits, multiplying its bases and presence in neighbouring countries such as Cameroon and Niger and, to a lesser extent, also Chad[138]. This drags destabilisation into those other countries –already unstable enough as it is– that are currently most affected by their terrorist attacks, and turns what was Boko Haram into a transnational terrorist phenomenon. Equally, the organisation's greater weakness is pushing it to become more dependent on the global jihadist cause, and groups such as Al Qaeda are already hoping to increase their influence in the area[139].

The current state of the international fight against Boko Haram

To provide some background, the international fight against Boko Haram is mainly led by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a combined military force composed of the Lake Chad countries (Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and the Republic of Chad) plus a modest contribution from Benin. This force was officially born in 2014[140]. However, it became operational throughout 2015, coinciding with the peak of Boko Haram and its oath of allegiance to DAESH. In that year, the MNJTF was finally authorised by the African Union, given a concept of operations, and the new executive of Muhammadu Bukhari gave it a definitive boost in Nigeria. It has since been endorsed by the United Nations, supported both politically and financially by

134 García Reguera, J.M. *Op. cit.*, pp. 88.

135 Institute for Economics and Peace (2015). *Op. cit.*, and Institute for Economics and Peace (2019). *Op. cit.*

136 Mesa García, B. *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

137 International Crisis Group (2017). *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

138 García Reguera, J.M. *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

139 International Crisis Group (2017). *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

140 The MNJTF was created at the behest of its member states, which had previously modified the mandate of an existing multinational structure –the Multinational Joint Security Force– dedicated to fighting cross-border crime in Chad, so that it could take on the fight against Boko Haram. Mahmood, O.S. and Christian Ani, S. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

the European Union, and with the approval and technical support of the African Union Peace and Security Council[141].

The military component of the MNJTF is headed by a Force Commander, always of Nigerian origin, accompanied by a Headquarters in N'djamena (Chad) for the command and control of the force. The latter, under the political supervision of the Lake Chad Basin Commission[142], coordinates the operations of the troops provided by the Member States. For its part, the deployment pattern is divided into four sectors, each corresponding to the border portion of each State on Lake Chad, with each national contingent being positioned within its own border limits, where they have priority of action without prejudice to their possible deployment in another country. As for the size of the force, it reached 11,150 troops by the end of 2015, with Nigeria contributing 3,500 soldiers, Chad 3,000, Cameroon 2,650, Niger 1,000 and Benin 750[143]. It also had an initial budget of $700 million, which has been provided mainly by the Nigerian government, the European Union and unilaterally by other Western nations such as the United Kingdom[144].

The first military operations that the MNJTF was able to coordinate in 2015 and 2016 were successful to the extent that they prevented the spread of Boko Haram and favoured its atomisation, marking a turning point in the fight against the group. In contrast, the following international interventions of the MNJTF have not been successful. The reason lies in the terrorists' acquired ability to escape and retreat to more remote wilderness areas, and also, in part, in the inability of the Chadian states –especially Nigeria– to push for the reconstruction and return to normality of the recaptured territories, which hinders their full consolidation[145]. As a result, the territory that Boko Haram initially effectively controlled has been reclaimed and abductees have been released, but the MNJTF's efforts against Boko Haram factions have stalled and the situation remains *status quo*[146].

141 Guerrero, A. (2019). *The regional military response against Boko Haram*. Granada, Global Strategy. P. 5. Available at: https://global-strategy.org/la-respuesta-regional-militar-contra-boko-haram/

142 The Lake Chad Basin Commission is the regional organisation for the Lake Chad Basin. It was created in 1964 by Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger and the Republic of Chad, and later expanded to include the Central African Republic and Libya. However, Benin, although a member of the MNJTF, is not part of the Commission. Its main mission is the joint management of Lake Chad and its water resources, the preservation and protection of its ecosystem, and the promotion of regional integration. For more information *Home page - About us*. N'djamena: Lake Chad Basin Commission. Available at: https://cblt.org/about-us/

143 Morales González, A. (2017). Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram. *Opinion Paper, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies* (130/2017). Pp. 10-11. Available at: http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2017/DIEEEO130-2017_MNJFT_contra_Boko_Haram_AlbertoMorales.pdf

144 *Ibid*, p. 12.

145 International Crisis Group (2020). *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

146 Mahmood, O.S. and Christian Ani, S. *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

Thus, the multiple factions into which Boko Haram has disintegrated are not yet fully defeated and may continue to generate problems and instability, now also in a wider radius than northern Nigeria after having consolidated as a transnational terrorist phenomenon. In fact, Operation *Yancin Tafki* («Enduring Freedom» in Hausa), the longest operation undertaken against ISWAP in the framework of the MNJTF and the longest operation ever carried out –lasting almost the whole of 2019– failed to produce lasting results. ISWAP was able to easily regroup and then attack Nigeria following the withdrawal of Chadian troops in Borno State. For its part, the army of the Republic of Chad received one of the bloodiest attacks of the conflict in March 2020 –with more than 90 casualties– when Shekau's faction stormed the Chadian base of Bohama[147]. The President of the Republic of Chad, Idriss Déby, then announced the launch of a new military operation –Wrathof Bohoma– this time alone, reflecting internal divergences within the MNJTF[148].

Against this backdrop, some analysts, such as experts from the International Crisis Group, advocate a paradigm shift in the international fight against the Boko Haram phenomenon in order to gain the trust and support of the population in the affected areas[149]. Until now, international efforts have focused solely on the spectrum of counter-terrorism prosecution, with limited cooperation in all non-military responses[150]. But the MNJTF's mandate already envisages broader operations than military action, assigning the force to stabilise areas affected by the conflict with Boko Haram[151]. At this level, it should be noted that the MNJTF is actually structured into three main components (military, police and civilian), each with its own roles and responsibilities. In practice, however, the military is the only one that has been fully activated[152]. On the other hand, the military component of the MNJTF also faces other problems, which also detracts from the effectiveness of the international fight against Boko Haram factions[153].

Overall, the MNJTF is on a solid legal basis, has the potential to expand its role and become a genuine stabilisation force, is supported by the international community, and its military component has been successful in coordinating military efforts in Chad's border areas and, on occasion –when combined military operations have been conducted– in fostering tactical cooperation between armies. However, as already mentioned, the MNJTF has been relegated to armed struggle only, and its military component suffers from other structural limitations. One of these limitations has

147 International Crisis Group (2020). *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

148 *Ibid*, p. 11.

149 *Ibid*, pp. 2 and 22.

150 Mahmood, O.S. and Christian Ani, S. *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

151 Morales González, A. *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

152 Guerrero, A. *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

153 International Crisis Group (2020). *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

been the permanent lack of funds and delays in financing, which has fuelled recriminations between actors involved and has generated difficulties in the acquisition of material. Another problem, no less relevant, is the weakness of the chain of command. The force's units fight primarily in their own countries, and national commanders still hold considerable command, in many cases deciding when their units enter or leave international operations. This leads to other problems such as the brevity of operations, which prevents the consolidation of victories. Similarly, civilian control over the military component is weak. The Lake Chad Basin Commission has struggled to exert authority over force or curb abuses by soldiers who are still accountable to national hierarchies[154].

In short, although Boko Haram entered a phase of weakness, withdrawal and atomisation at the end of 2015, it continues to be a destabilising factor for Nigeria and neighbouring countries and, in general, for the entire Western Sahel region. The fight against this scourge is not over and needs a new impetus, for example by taking a more holistic approach and addressing structural problems with the multinational military force.

Conclusions

Contextual analysis of Nigeria shows the fragility of this state. Problems such as inequality in income distribution, poverty, the lack of legitimacy of public institutions, the lack of basic services and the erosion of the rule of law exacerbate the ethnic and religious contrast of a state that does not reflect the multinational reality on which it is based. In this abrupt panorama, in which violence has already become a way of life and hatred of others is already consolidated, the radical Islamist message of its first preacher, Mohammed Yusuf, struck a chord with a youth that is unemployed, impoverished, lacking in personal fulfilment and satisfaction, and disaffected from the public authorities.

Boko Haram took shape from 2002 onwards, initially as a sect of Muslim radicals, but without a violent projection. However, the poor performance of the Armed Forces and the federal police in 2009 unleashed the latent desire for violence embedded in the group. Such violence erupted in the form of *jihad*, and was a year later seconded by its second leader, Abubakar Shekau, who transformed Boko Haram into a truly lethal machine, acting on the principles of asymmetric warfare. Given the forcefulness shown in combat, the scale of the numbers killed and affected, and the number of combatants, we must affirm that we are faced with an insurgency in the north of the country that is highly organised and based on the use of terrorism. In that sense, what happened with Boko Haram could rise to the level of a civil war. Moreover, the

154 International Crisis Group (2020). *Op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

group has shown no objection to engaging in a wide range of criminal activities, such as abducting women and children and using them as suicide bombers.

Thanks to the strength of its attacks, Boko Haram was able to control part of northern Nigeria by 2014, also drawing on transnational ties across Chad's porous borders. Under its takfirist ideal of purity, it also targeted the local Muslim population itself that did not follow its dictates, thus inserting a whole state of terror. At this point, in order to consolidate its territories, it resorted to the help of DAESH, pledging allegiance to this matrix of international terrorism. Given the turn of events, the international community mobilised to support Nigeria, resulting in the formation of a multinational counter-terrorism force with its neighbours, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The combined military operations carried out by the MNJTF between 2015 and 2016 were able to contain Boko Haram and turn the situation around, coinciding with a time of weakness and internal dissidence within the terrorist organisation. This was the turning point in the fight against Boko Haram, marked by the group's atomisation, withdrawal and weakness.

While it is true that Boko Haram is at its lowest ebb, we cannot accept President Buhari's triumphalist discourse that the organisation is already defeated[155]. Its various splits are still active and causing high numbers of casualties, and more worryingly, they have spread to adjacent countries. Boko Haram's interests are clearly localist and its discourse is religious as well as ethnicist, but it is developing a greater capacity for transnational action and there is a risk that its international projection will increase as a result of its greater dependence on global jihadism. Yet Boko Haram was born and nurtured by Nigeria's instability, but has in turn become a further destabilising factor in both the country and the Western Sahel region. In this sense, its significance is not only at the national level, but also at the international level.

Given the MNJTF's combat superiority, Boko Haram factions have decided to escape, increase their mobility and improve their ability to operate from other geographical locations. Thus, the military advance of Nigeria and the other Chadian states is intimately linked to the group's recent transnational character. They have proven to be far more resilient than the multinational force, knowing how to adapt their strategy to the circumstances. Thus, post-2016 military interventions have reduced their effectiveness, and the fight remains stagnant. Hence the need for a paradigm shift in the international fight against the Boko Haram phenomenon. However, we must not let our guard down. The fact that the various factions of Boko Haram remain in a corner is not synonymous with premature victory. Rather, as the experience of the Taliban in Afghanistan has shown, insurgent terrorist groups have the capacity to hold out in hiding and regain power when circumstances are more propitious.

Combating this threat will require a greater international effort, as well as much more comprehensive action that goes beyond combating the remnants of Boko Har-

155 Mesa García, B. *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

am. Although successful, the MNJTF's armed action risks generating a vicious circle that will again encourage the population to join the jihadist cause[156].

National reconstruction and stabilisation capacities need to be improved, and these missions need to be incorporated into the international cooperation agenda. Specifically, it requires: an effective demobilisation and reintegration programme for ex-combatants that goes hand in hand with restorative justice, assistance to the displaced and refugee population, patrolling and surveillance of the retaken areas, increased intelligence operations, implementation and expansion of public services, and reinforcement of the state presence in collusion with local authorities. More broadly, Nigeria and other affected governments will need to implement a prevention programme to help reduce levels of radicalisation, fight institutional corruption and organised crime, and even provide more democracy, rule of law and equity in their respective states to avoid the breeding ground of their fragility. For its part, the rest of the international community will have to ensure that these tasks are carried out, and will have to ensure that the necessary resources and funds are available to do so. Similarly, Chadian states should return to previous levels of military cooperation, and seek to address the structural problems afflicting the military component of the MNJTF.

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Little Red Riding Hood asks about defence planning. Some answers and the NATO case

Abstract

The research questions guiding this article are about what is the basic problem faced by «defence planning» and its context, as well as the relationship with public policies, what are the main planning types and how is it carried out in NATO.

Literature in Spanish about public policy is vast, but scare when it comes to analyse defence policy and defence planning from a public policy lens. A qualitative explanatory approach sets the route of this study, which start with «defence planning» as a process of the defence public policy, incardinated with the National Security Strategy, in which internal and external requirements are considered. Coherence must be ensured from top to bottom and vice versa. Formulation and implementation parts of the «defence policy» converge in «defence planning».

Among the findings, the author emphasizes the importance of establishing a clear political defence planning «level of ambition» for the military instrument, the possible impact of hypothesis-based planning scenarios, to which to respond, to face the future threats, risks and challenges.

The article synthesizes a taxonomy of four main types of defence planning: «mobilization», «threat based», «portfolio», and «capability based», and introduces the «NATO Defence Planning Process» (NDPP), as an example of the «portfolio» type, and based on the «NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept» (NWCC), it offers some guidelines on the configuration of future planning scenarios.

In a broader context, this approach to defence planning from the prospective of public policy can be applicable to other international organizations or democratic nations.

Keywords

Defence Policy, National Security Strategy, Defence Planning, NDPP, Defence Planning models, mobilization, threat-based, portfolio, capabilities-based, planning scenarios, NWCC.

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«Unfortunately, it is these gentle wolves who are the most dangerous ones of all!»[1]

Introduction

Little Red Riding Hood: But do you know where the wolf will be tomorrow? Where will he hide, and how will he lie, waiting for me next month? In the forest, by the lake, or by the sea? What costume will the wolf wear? How will he surprise us? How will the hunters think on that? Uhm,... what worries me the most is: How long and sharp will his fangs be in a few years' time? Will the hunter be ready? How long will their rusty shotguns work for?

This article is mainly related to the theoretical framework of a doctoral thesis, focusing on 'defence policy' and 'defence planning'. The reader is expected to understand the basic problem facing defence planning, to identify its political and strategic context, to understand the impact that can be derived from the definition of scenario-based scenarios. In addition, a simplified taxonomy of types of defence planning is provided, which can be used for case studies of such processes, in individual countries or in international organisations. This applies to the NATO case.

«Defense planning» is a cogwheel in a gear driven by strategic-political issues and others more directly related to planning itself.

The former encompasses: How is the world changing? What are the military implications of these changes? What role do we aspire to play in the world, and what are our defence objectives?

In between these two levels, the question arises: What do we want to be able to do militarily?

Other basic planning questions include: What capabilities, whether civilian or military, should we have? For when? How to obtain them, and in how much time? Who is in charge of getting them?[2]

It is argued that 'defence planning' is a process of public defence policy, to be coherently embedded in the «National Security Strategy» (NSS), and that it is primarily concerned with future risk. This risk is illustrated by planning scenarios, to which a methodical process is used to respond, ensuring that the political level's ambitions for the military instrument are realised. Although numerous approaches can be applied

1 Perrault, C. (1657). Petit Chaperon Rouge. En *Histoires, ou Contes du temps passé, avec des moralitez.* Paris. 47–56, p. 56.

2 Mauro, F. (2009). EU Defence: The White Book Implementation Process. *EU Policy Department for External Relations*. 121.

in the art of planning,[3] it is also possible to handle a simpler taxonomy of four basic types according to certain characteristics, which does not exclude compatibility with the above-mentioned approaches.

The first part introduces the context of the process, what is meant by NSS, by 'defence policy', and by 'defence planning'.

This is followed by a discussion of the characteristics of planning scenarios, and how they influence possible outcomes. The types of logical reasoning applied to infer capability requirements from scenarios are identified. And, it provides a taxonomy of four basic types of defence planning: 'mobilisation', 'threat-based', 'portfolio', and 'capabilities-based'.

The third part describes the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), a portfolio case, and elaborates on possible future scenarios based on the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC).

Context: from strategy to defence planning. The coherence of the method

History is a weak determinant of the planning context. One has to keep a squint look back in time a *squinting eye* on time, neither forgetting,[4] nor abusing[5] the past, but focusing primarily on the future.

Nations define their security strategies and try to implement them coherently, with objectivity and subjectivity, with art and science.

Making more or less explicit about the threats, risks or challenges of different scenarios is not only a matter of knowledge and certainty, but also an eminently political decision.

The actors involved in 'defence policy' formulate it, plan its implementation, and implement different plans and programmes, constrained by the budget.[6] Implementation is subject to a limited rationality,[7] and the dialectics of public policy: «between

3 «Top-down, bottom-up, scenario, threat, mission, mission, hedging, technology and fiscal». Lloyd, R.M. *et al.* (1990). Fundamentals of Force Planning. Vol 1. Concepts. *Naval War College Press Newport, RI*, 453, p. 326. Bartlett, H. and Somes, T. (1995). The Art of Strategy and Force Planning. *Naval War College Review*, 48.2, 9.

4 Gray, C.S. (2014). Strategy and defence planning: meeting the challenge of uncertainty. Oxford University Press. 225, p. 14.

5 Howard. M. (1962). The Uses and Abuses of Military History. *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution. Vol* 107, Issue 165, , pp. 4-10.

6 Decandido, C.L. (1996). Evolution of Department of Defense Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System: From SECDEF McNamara to VCJCS Owens. *US Army War College.* 30.

7 Simon, H.A. (1997). Models of Bounded Rationality. *Cambridge: MIT Press*. 475.

reason and compromise, calculation and consensus, which are inherent to policy-making in pluralistic and competitive societies».[8]

One of the processes belonging to the field of 'defence policy' is known as 'defence planning'. From this process, the planning assumptions and the results obtained must be reviewed from time to time in order to improve a process which, like defence policy, is a public policy process.[9]

The 'National Security Strategy' integrates the 'Defence Policy'

The breadth of the concept of 'national security' implies a coordinated development of multiple public policies: 'defence policy', foreign policy, domestic policy, public health, and economic policy, among others. All are active at home and abroad, and both influence these policies.




Figure 1. The concepts of Security and Defence are intertwined

8 Aguilar Villanueva, L.F. (1992). La hechura de las políticas. Mexico. P. 10. Aguilar Villanueva, L.F. (1992). El estudio de las políticas públicas. México.

9 Anderson, J.E. (2011). Public Policymaking : An Introduction. *Texas A&M University*, 7th ed. Boston, Suzanne Jeans. 342.

Gray[10] postulates that security strategies allow for dealing with uncertainty about future risks and threats, and that there is an interrelationship between policy, strategy and defence planning. Policy, in a broad sense, gives context to the security strategy by setting its objectives. The NSS and in particular 'defence policy' give context to 'defence planning'.

The NSS considers the geopolitical environment, the external and the internal ones, and contextualises 'defence policy'. Geopolitics is about geography and power. The military is one of the elements of power. The NSS seeks to preserve interests (realism) and promote values (idealism) in a VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous) environment.[11] The aim is not only to be reactive, but to act [12] on the causes of security problems, [13] to prevent unintended consequences.

In 1989, Kent [14] conceived the NSS as:

> «National security strategy is the art and science of employing this nation's political, economic, and military power to achieve our stated national security objectives in peace and war (3). The perceived goals, intents, and behaviour of potential adversaries and the capability of these adversaries to carry out their strategies that threaten our national security drive our national security strategy.»

In a coherent framework, the NSS should influence both the formulation and implementation of 'defence policy', and can therefore impact on future 'defence planning' cycles, which determine the military capabilities and forces needed.

'Defence planning' is about realising part of the strategy, responding to political demands, and doing so according to a method. According to Gray, [15] good planning presupposes quality policy, and politicians who bring meaning to defence planning and programming, consistent with strategic objectives.

'Defence policy' as public policy

'Public policy' refers to the actions of the state to solve societal problems, and the way in which government is exercised. Those related to security and defence protect

10 Gray, C.S. *Op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

11 Yarger, H.R. (2020). The Strategic Appraisal: The Key to Effective Strategy. En *Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy*. US Army War College. 53-66, pp. 59-61.

12 Liotta, P.H. and Lloyd, R.M. (2005). From Here to There. The Strategy and Force Planning Framework. *Naval War College Review*. Vol 58,2, 122–37.

13 Arteaga Martín, F. and Fojón Lagoa, J.E. (2007). El planeamiento de la política de defensa y seguridad en España. *IUGM*. 463, p. 29.

14 «(3) The author believes that this classical definition should also include intellectual power – the power to outthink the enemy». Kent, G.A. (1989). A Framework for Defense Planning. RAND Corporation. Santa Monica, CA. 71, p. 4.

15 Gray, C.S. *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

goods of public interest,[16] such as the freedom of citizens, their well-being, and national sovereignty. 'Defence policy' is one of the protective public policies, which together with others, seek to provide security. Security is a 'pure public good',[17] from which all citizens benefit *equally, without exclusion or rivalry*.

The success of these protective policies depends on the state's capacity to act on risks, managing their potential impacts, or neutralising the capacity of threats. Such protection can be very ambitious when political, economic and military factors come together.[18]

Dunn offers a methodological model for analysing public policy, focusing on the definition of the problem related to the public good.[19] There are four stages of a public policy: the inclusion of the problem in the political agenda, the formulation of the policy, its implementation, and the review of results.[20]

A complete separation between the actors who design public policy and those who implement it can be fatal, whether in health,[21] or defence. In the latter case, this desirable confluence may fuel friction between politicians and the military. Olmeda means that what is relevant is the effectiveness of these relationships,[22] i.e. that the goodness of such a confluence in defence planning should be evaluated according to the results.

Public policies are influenced by pressure groups, each with their own 'special interest',[23] vying for resources. These actors influence from within and outside the country in question. The policy process involves relations between actors within the affected organisation, and with other governmental and international elements. Thus, for example, in the Spanish case of 'defence policy', the Ministry of Defence interacts, *inter alia*, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NATO and the EU.

16 Gómez Arias, R.D. (2012). Management of Public Policies: Operational Aspects. *Rev. Fac. Nac. Salud Pública.* 223–36.

17 Samuelson, P.A. (1954). The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. *The Review of Economics and Statistics.* 36.4, 387.

18 Gómez Arias (2012). *Op. cit.*, pp. 227-28.

19 Dunn, W.N. (2017). Public Policy Analysis: An Integrated Approach. *Routledge.*

20 Hogwood, B.W. and Gunn, L. (1984). Policy Analysis for the Real World. *Oxford University Press.* Pp. 19–23.

21 Pressnan J.L. and W.A. (1984). Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland. *University of California Press.* 281.

22 Olmeda, J.A. (2013). Escape from Huntington's Labyrinth. Civil-Military Relations and Comparative Politics. En Bruneau, T.C. The Routledge Handbook of Civil–Military Relations. *Routledge*. 61–76 (p. 66).

23 Olson, M. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. *Harvard University Press.* 186.

Often the bureaucratic processes related to 'defence policy' are «obscure and distorted by by particular interests of military services, civilian bureaucracies, defence industry and individual politicians «[24]. From a national point of view, an organisation such as NATO can also be seen as an external influence with its own dynamics and interest. Internal and external influences can cause inconsistencies between what is stipulated in national strategic-political documents, and the decisions taken in 'defence planning', materialised in plans and programmes.

Assessing the coherence and effectiveness of investment in 'defence policy', and in particular 'defence planning', is essential to determine the accountability of the government in the development of its public policy.

In conclusion, public policy such as defence policy involves a process in which policy is formulated –weighing what is rationally desirable (ends), possible (means) and right (art) in pursuit of the common good–, implemented (administration of the policy itself), and its results reviewed. There are internal and external influences on the process that can distort it.

What do we mean by 'defence policy'?

Battaglino's definition of 'defence policy' brings the concept closer to that of protection against the existential threat of the state: «a set of actions taken by a state to ensure its survival in the face of risks and threats».[25]

Tagarev provides a more military definition. He points out that this policy must respond to two fundamentally different tasks. The first is *how to use available means* (use of force) to achieve objectives (e.g. in the case of military aggression). The second is to *define the means by which the nation can effectively defend itself against future threats, risks and challenges.*[26]

Specifying the ambition of defence policy, i.e. defining the '*Level of Ambition*' (LoA), is a key aspect of its formulation. Proper planning can only start from a LoA established by the political authorities, sufficiently clear to be translated into concrete results. The LoA answers what the political authority wants the military instrument to be able to do, what kinds of efforts, autonomously or with allies, where and with what reaction time, and this is key to determining future capabilities and force structure.

24 Frühling, S. (2014). Defence Planning and Uncertainty. Preparing for the next Asia-Pacific War. *Routledge.* 239, p. 11.

25 Battaglino, J. (2010). La Política Militar de Alfonsín: la implementación del control civil en un contexto desfavorable. *Discutir Alfonsín*, 161–84.

26 Tagarev, T. (2006). The Art of Shaping Defense Policy: Scope, Component, Relationships (but No Algorithms). *The Quarterly Journal*, Spring-Summer. 15–36, p. 17.

Force design must not only be effective, but also sustainable. The capabilities to be achieved must be the balanced product of the employment concept, the structure of the organisation and its corresponding funding.[27] [28] Both Gray [29] and Arteaga[30] refer to the necessary coherence and balance between what political power asks of the military instrument, and the amount of resources devoted to that effort, and of both elements with the security strategy.

Whether in countries or in international organisations, the inherent difficulty of the military aspect of security can mean that the ambition of 'defence policy' is not entirely clear, and may be limited to crisis management alone, without explicitly contemplating high-intensity war scenarios. Disparate examples can be seen in relation to NATO and the EU.

In the Alliance, the 'defence planning process' includes the political definition of a LoA, making explicit the types of efforts to be undertaken, including high-intensity combat for collective defence, and defining threats such as Russia's, or risks such as those posed by China.

The 2016 European Union (EU) Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) stipulates the need for 'strategic autonomy'. However, there are those who point out that its real ambition does not include, in the short term, operating autonomously in very demanding war scenarios; it is still mainly limited to crisis management[31].

Policy must define the threats (capability and intent of the potential adversary), risks (probability and consequences) or challenges that the military instrument must be able to meet. Statements must be clear enough to translate political ambition into 'defence planning' decisions. These decisions take shape first on the basis of political judgement, and are then complemented by military judgement. The relevant information has to be collected and interpreted [32] logically inferring the capability requirements, and finally determining the most appropriate force structure.

In short, the domestic and the external are inputs into national 'defence policy' processes. Among the tasks of this policy is to define a LoA to initiate an implementation

27 Colom Piella, G. (2011). El proceso de transformación militar en España (2004-2011). *UNISCI*. 117–31.

28 EMAD (2018). PDC-01(A) *Doctrina para el empleo de las Fuerzas Armadas*. 178, pp. 52-53.

29 Gray, C.S. *Op. cit.*

30 Arteaga Martín, F. (2013). La defensa que viene. Criterios para la reestructuración de la defensa en España. *Real Instituto Elcano*. 32.

31 Brattberg, E. and Valášek, T. (2019). EU Defense Cooperation: Progress Amid Transatlantic Concerns. *Carnegie*. 36, p. 11.the disruptive impact of the Brexit negotiations and the election of U.S. President Donald Trump, demands for deeper European Union (EU

32 Frühling, S. (2014). *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

method to respond to the problem posed as a strategic risk. This methodical materialisation brings us closer to the concept of 'defence planning', which implements part of the aforementioned policy, and which starts from the sufficient definition of the political ambition to infer the requirements of the capabilities to be obtained, and to decide on the design of the force structure.

What do we mean by 'Defence Planning Process'?

Gray conceives of 'defence planning' as the intentional and continuous preparation for the defence of a policy in the short, medium and long term. It straddles the line between the formulation and implementation of 'defence policy'. Policy is, and should be, decisive in establishing the process that shapes such preparation[33]. Gray's approach to '*Defence Planning*' is very broad. Kent[34] sharpens the focus by referring to the 'defence planning' framework as follows:

> «Guided by top-level Government decisions and advice as to national security strategy and fiscal constraints, the Department of Defence (DoD) components have the task and responsibility of organizing, equipping, training, upgrading, and supporting the military forces under their command to provide operational capabilities that will support the selected national military strategies. In planning the structure of these forces, the DoD components should clearly link programs for the acquisition of systems and equipment to increase security strategy».

'Defence planning' is basically the second of the fundamental tasks of 'defence policy' as Tagarev conceives it: defining the means by which the nation can effectively defend itself against future threats and challenges. This approach basically coincides with what is understood in the Spanish joint doctrine,[35] what is related to the definition of capabilities and also to force design is a matter of the 'defence planning process'.

> The process is inevitably conditioned by budgetary constraints, a key factor in the viability of the various capability acquisition programmes that enable the armed forces to conduct 'military defence', as part of 'national defence', which in turn is embedded in 'national security'.[36]

Gray refers to integrity ad intra to mean that the national budget must meet all the country's domestic needs, and integrity ad extra to mean that investment must be able

33 Gray, C.S. (2014). *Op. cit.*

34 Kent, G.A. (1989). *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

35 EMAD (2018). *Op. cit.*, p. 52. Tagarev's second task would involve 'force planning' (within military planning), and other non-strictly military planning (for the Spanish case) such as resource planning (financial, material and human).

36 Martín Ballesteros, M.A. (2016). En busca de una estrategia de seguridad nacional. *Ministry of Defence*. 323.

to respond to external needs.[37] To estimate how much deterrence is necessary and sufficient, one has to start from planning assumptions, and regularly confirm that these assumptions remain valid for the future.

In the introduction, Little Red Riding Hood referred to the hunter's 'rusty shotgun'. In 2018, the Spanish CHOD in Congress described an «undesirable state of non-operationality of its materials».[38] The Spanish Ministry of Defence is currently working to modernise its armed forces in a scenario of economic crisis[39]. Estimating how much military power is enough to deter, depending on whom, is key. Knowing how much to invest is equally relevant, and prioritising which capabilities is even more important. The question of «how much to spend to do what» matters not only for 'defence planning', but also for other public policies.

Spending more does not mean better capabilities.[40] It is necessary to define the essential ones in a context characterised by technological advances, it is key to achieve them with economic efficiency and in the shortest possible time. The necessary adaptation may involve organisational evolution, affect the way organisations make decisions, and reduce inefficient bureaucracies in processes. Pragmatism can sometimes clash with tradition and cause unwanted friction in the face of necessary change.

'Future risk' is the main concern of 'defence planning'. The starting point is a situation of current 'operational risk', which is probabilistically considered in the event of using current forces in operations against a specific threat in the short term. This risk must be acceptable in terms of strategic, human, material and financial costs. On the basis of the short-term 'operational risk', and the scenarios proposed for the medium and long term, it is a question of identifying the 'future risk'.

The «what we want to be able to do militarily» is partly answered in the political-strategic sphere with 'strategic concepts'; in the military sphere, it is also answered with 'operational concepts'. The development of new 'operational concepts' can guide investment in new capabilities. From these concepts, fundamental operational tasks are defined, what Tagarev defines as the «*mission essential task list*»,[41] and from these tasks the new operational 'requirements' for new or existing capabilities are derived. Such concepts require experimentation before deciding on

37 Gray (2014). *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

38 Diario de sesiones del Congreso de Diputados. Comisión de Defensa de 16 de abril de 2018. Comparecencia del JEMAD GE Alejandre. [Accessed on 12 January 2021]. Available at: http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L12/CONG/DS/CO/DSCD-12-CO-482.PDF

39 Colom Piella, G. (2021). From Transformation to Adaptation: Analysing the Spanish Military Change (2004–2020). *Defence Studies*. 20.

40 Frank, L. (2020). New Times for Military Professionalism: Rethinking Core Competencies and Dynamic Capabilities. En *Rethinking Military Professionalism for the Changing Armed Forces*. *Springer.* Pp. 63-82.

41 TAgarev, T. (2006). *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

their implications for obtaining capabilities. Innovation and experimentation are necessary to deter or defeat potential military challenges[42] in the future operating environment.

The traditional domains of land, sea and air operations are now joined by cyberspace, outer space and even the cognitive domain. In February 2014, the hybrid became topical with the deployment of Russian soldiers without insignia in Crimea.[43] The grey zone[44] can also refer to an ambiguous framework between cooperation and competition at the political-strategic level; in the military, grey characterises operations in a hybrid environment[45] of blurred boundaries, where conventional coercive instruments operate overtly alongside covert ones.

Spain was hit by cyber attacks in March and June 2021. The first against the State Public Employment Service, the second against the Ministry of Labour and Social Economy. There are actors capable of affecting our security, and they can act in the continuum of peace, crisis or war. The action of criminal groups in possible collusion with certain states[46] makes attribution difficult.

New risks and threats can influence decisions on the critical capabilities in which to invest. Defining the requirements for the capabilities that will be critical is very important, but these capabilities also need to be quantified and organised into a suitable long-term force structure. The size and design of the forces also depend on the type of strategy chosen.[47] At the political level, different design options can be considered for the overall design of a sustainable force, with different weights of its specific components (traditional land, sea or air, or others).

Kugler explains that as US forces grew during the Cold War, all services benefited to a similar degree. Then, when it came to downsizing, all services contracted similarly. Whether this linearity will make sense in the future is uncertain; new strategic conditions and defence transformation could lead to a new mix of service

42 US Department of Defence (2003). Transformation Planning Guidance. *Homeland Security Digital Library*. 34, p. 9

43 Galeotti, M (2015). Hybrid War and Little Green Men: How It Works, and How It Doesn't. *E-International Relations*, 5.

44 EMAD (2018). *Op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

45 Jordan, J. Una reintepretación de la crisis del islote Perejil desde la perspectiva de la amenaza híbrida. *Revista General de Marina*. 218, num 274 Junio, pp. 941-952.

46 'Ryuk apareció en agosto de 2018 y lo maneja un grupo ruso llamado Grim Spider, según la consultora Crowdstrike'. [Accessed on 12 June 2021]. Available at: https://elpais.com/tecnologia/2021-03-09/el-virus-de-secuestro-informatico-ryuk-principal-sospechoso-del-ciberataque-contra-el-sepe.html y https://elpais.com/economia/2021-06-09/el-ministerio-de-trabajo-y-economia-social-sufre-un-ciberataque.html

47 Posen, B.R. and Ross, A.L. (1996). Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, International Security. *Naval War College Press.* Vol 21.3, 49, p. xxi.

force ratios. It is not only the internal structure of each service (army, navy or air force) that needs to be discussed, but also how in the future these structures can be merged to maximise joint operational capacity.[48] also taking into account civilian capabilities.

In cyberspace, the British example deserves mention. Its National Cyber Security Centre, created in 2016, has been staffed by civilian and military personnel since peacetime[49]. In Spain, the military organisation[50] envisages the 'Joint Cyberspace Command' (MCCE in Spanish), to plan, direct, and control the actions. This new body in the operational structure does not imply a new service in the organisational structure composed of land, sea and air force. The services develop specific cyber capabilities in line with the requirements set by the MCCE.[51] In outer space, France and Spain have entrusted such operations to their Air Forces.[52]

Whatever the decisions, it is key to ensure coherence. The top-down coherence of planning requires that it is correctly embedded in its context. In particular, with the objectives set out in the NSS for the military instrument, and with the objectives and courses of action to be detailed in the Military Strategy. The means available in the medium and long term must be congruent with the strategic concepts of the political level and the operational concepts resulting from military innovation. There will be top-down coherence to the extent that capabilities are sufficient to be able to realise the LoA set by the political authorities.

Bottom-up coherence of planning refers to the possibility of incorporating technological and market opportunities into capability acquisition, with sufficient flexibility and agility, provided that they fit into the operational concepts and strategic logic of «means, ways, ends». In both consistent approaches, the budget constraint has to be considered.[53]

Every object of public planning requires a method. In the 20th and 21st centuries, several basic types of 'defence planning' can be identified, distinguished according to the level of knowledge about threats and risks, the scenarios that are used to infer requirements for capabilities, and the types of logical inferences that are applied. This is elaborated on below.

48 Kugler, R.L. (2006). Policy Analysis In National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era. *National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy*. Pp. 275-276.

49 [Accessed on 20 July 2021]. Available at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/

50 Organisation of the Armed Forces (2020). Order DEF/710/2020, *BOE* no. 204 of 28 July 2020.

51 [Accessed on 20 July 2021]. Available at: https://emad.defensa.gob.es/unidades/mcce/

52 Aznar Fernández-Montesinos, F. (2021). El espacio exterior, una nueva dimensión de la seguridad. *IEEE*. 10, pp. 174-187, p.13.

53 Garbers, F., *et al*. (2020). Performance Management in Defence Organisations. *NATO STO*. 186.




Figure 2. The context of defence planning. Source: Juan C. Castilla




Figure 3.Interaction between strategy production and defence planning processes

On basic scenarios and types of defence planning

Geography[54] and realism are two of the key factors to consider in defining hypothetical conflict scenarios, from which to define the necessary capabilities, but they are not the only ones.

54 Kaplan, R.D. (2018). La venganza de la geografía: cómo los mapas condicionan el destino de las naciones. Barcelona, RBA.

The evaluation of the results of the process may reveal, a posteriori, the falsity of certain assumptions and lead to corrective actions. *Assumption-based planning* (ABP) is more easily applied to identify threats and vulnerabilities than to identify opportunities. In a way it serves to try to avoid 'black swan' surprises. When 'the impossible' is ruled out at the outset,[55] the result can be disastrous.[56]

On the characteristics of the scenarios and their possible impact.

The planning scenarios are considered for the short, medium and long term. Depending on the space-time, the certainty of inferring requirements for the necessary capabilities varies.

It is not the same to pose a confrontation today, between the US and Russia or China, and take decisions, as it is to approach the problem in ten or twenty years' time, and decide on the necessary force structure.

Larson[57] studied the scenarios used in the US between 1945 and 2016. This author assesses the potential impact of planning decisions based on two variables: the time horizon of scenarios, and knowledge about the threat. Thus, for scenarios with a time horizon of 5 to 7 years, the implications for planning are moderate, and may affect approximately 10 to 20 percent of the force structure. As more future scenarios are used, a greater proportion of the force structure may be affected.

There is a correlation between time and knowledge of the threat. The longer the time horizon of the scenarios, the less planning tends to be based on concrete knowledge of the threat (less 'threat-based'), the more speculative it necessarily becomes, and the more generically it tends to refer to possible capabilities (more 'capability-based'). Force structure decisions based on obtaining generic capabilities may have more impact on force structure than decisions based on concrete knowledge of the threat.

It is difficult to envisage a process that is purely capability-based, with very short-term scenarios, and focused solely on securing sufficient means to ensure that existing operational plans can be realised today. This would make it difficult to aspire to future-ready armed forces. Ideally, policy instructions should guide the design of scenarios, both in terms of threats and space-time.

55 Dewar, J.A., *et al.* (1993). Assumption-Based Planning. A Planning Tool for Very Uncertain Times. *Rand Corporation*, 88. Dewar, J.A. (2002). Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises. *RAND Studies in Policy Analysis. Cambridge University Press*. 238.

56 Millet, A.R. and Murray, W. (2007). Military Innovation In The Interwar Period. *Cambridge University Press*. 435.

57 Larson, E.V. (2019). Force Planning Scenarios, 1945–2016. *Rand Corporation.* 326.

Regardless of how a planning process labels itself ('threat based' or 'capability based', etc.), the specification of scenarios is important as an indicator of what planning is really intended to achieve.




Figure 4. Planning scenarios and impact on force structure

On the types of logical reasoning for inferring capabilities

Depending on the basic type of planning, a certain way of drawing inferences from scenarios predominates, with deduction and abduction being the most commonly used, although in some cases induction is also used.[58]

Logical inferences relate the provoked events or cases, the rules that act on the occurrence of the cases, and the observed or foreseeable outcomes. The greater the certainty about risks and threats, the more possible inference becomes. The greater the uncertainty, the more abduction should be applied. In line with Cruces,[59] below these forms of inference are summarised.

Deduction offers valid or invalid conclusions, it offers certainty, it starts from certain premises without significant doubts about their validity. From general truths or rules particular truths are deduced. The conclusion is valid depending on whether its prem-

58 Frühling, S. (2014). *Op. cit.*, pp. 27-29.

59 [Accessed on 20 July 2021]. Available at: http://kali.azc.uam.mx/clc/03_docencia/licenciatura/log_simb/Ra_LoSim_D_I_A.pdf

ises are valid or not. One can reason in this way when one knows one's adversary well, when one knows his political formulation, his doctrine, his means and procedures, etc.

Induction does not provide a valid or invalid conclusion, only estimates in accordance with the degree of plausibility or probability attached to the premises. With induction, general truths or rules are inferred with a certain probability from particular truths or cases and results. However, it at least provides a basis for what can be concluded, depending on the likelihood of the premises.

Abduction starts by describing the results caused by an act, followed by the establishment of premises that seem correct with a certain probability, and concludes by providing an explanatory hypothesis about the rule of action, the possible reasons or motives for the act. Sometimes referred to as conjecture, abduction offers an explanation for what at first glance seems most likely. In 'defence planning', this type of reasoning can be used when there is no detailed information about the future adversary.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the basic types of planning is the mode of inferential logic that prevails.

On the four basic types of 'defence planning'

The distinguishing features of the basic planning frameworks include:

a) The explicit or non-explicit declaration of an adversary as a threat.

b) Risk assessment and evaluation. The level of knowledge about threats (capabilities and intentions), the level of certainty about risks (the objective assessment of the probability of events, the impact of their consequences, and their subjective evaluation), and knowledge about the variety and possible concurrence of major contingencies are important.

c) The type of inference reasoning that is mainly used to establish capability requirements and decide on force structure.

d) The use of scenario-based planning scenarios: number and variety of types, importance of geography and time horizon.[60]

Based on planning practice in the 20th and 21st centuries,[61] four basic types can be distinguished:

e) '*Mobilization Planning*' in the face of a possible future threat.

f) The so-called 'net assessment planning' or 'threat based planning'.

g) 'Portfolio Planning', applicable for cases of concurrence of several known risks.

60 Larson, E.V. (2019). *Op. cit.*

61 Bartlett, H. and Somes, T. (1995). *Op. cit.*

h) 'Capability-based planning' or 'task-based planning' is applicable to an environment where the unknown about the potential adversary and its behaviour is paramount, and uncertainty about the future capabilities of potential threats or risks is at its highest.

The most opposed to each other are 'threat based', in which deductive reasoning prevails[62] and 'capability based', in which abduction is mainly applied.

TABLE I. THE FOUR BASIC TYPES OF 'DEFENCE PLANNING'

	Mobilization Planning	*Threat Based/ Net Assessment*	*Portfolio Planning*	*Capability Based Planning/ Task-Based Planning*
Explicit declared threat (adversary)	There is no identified risk at present, but one or more known future adversaries are assumed.	The adversary (1) is usually declared; although the approach is possible without doing so. (2)	There are several risks or threats.	No explicit threats are stated, and they may not be sufficiently known.
Risk assessment and evaluation **a.** Level of knowledge on probability and impact. **b.** Simultaneity or not of threats and risks	The probability of the current risk is not significant. A long reaction time is assumed for the use of force (months or years). Details on capabilities and operational concepts of the potential future adversary are unknown. Foresight should analyse possible trends that may increase the impact of the risk of future confrontation. Prudence dictates that minimal measures be taken in case the threat comes as a surprise in the short term. The amount of force required is a big unknown, because it depends on the development of the potential opponent.	Risk events are inferred from the intention of the threat (assumed or known), a highly probable risk is assumed, and the certainty of the impact depends on the control that can be made over the escalation.	It has to be considered that several risks may or may not materialise simultaneously. Risk prioritisation can be politically sensitive, especially if the force needed is identified as requiring more resources than anticipated. The level of combat readiness is demanding, with short reaction times.	It is difficult to know specifics about present risks and threats, but there is speculation about future ones.
Predominant type of inferences (Deduction, induction, abduction)	*Abduction* predominates, as there is no detailed information about the future adversary.	*Deduction*, based on detailed information about the opponent, predominates.	The risks are sufficiently well known to *derive* requirements as is done in *Threat Based Planning* for each specific risk, but the final decision on the overall capabilities and force design is mainly a product of *inductive* reasoning. *Abductive* reasoning takes on more weight the greater the indeterminacy of the risk, and the longer the time horizon considered.	*Abduction* predominates.
Planning scenarios **a.** Number and variety of scenario types (small/large) **b.** Geographically linked or generic. **c.** Time horizon (short, medium, long term)	Simultaneous scenarios can be envisaged, as many as the number of possible adversaries are assumed. (1) Scenarios include a specific geography, from which specific requirements are derived (obstacles, force or fire projection, logistical efforts, etc.). They are preferably located in the long term, although the medium or short term cannot be ruled out.	Planning scenarios are narrowed down according to the assumed threat scenarios and are often closely linked to geography. Short-term predominates.	The number and variety of scenario types is greater than in 'threat-based', depending on the number and specific risks identified, and their prioritisation. More generic scenarios for standard operations or contingencies are also included. Some scenarios are linked to geography, others are not, and both are based on concrete planning assumptions. They are envisaged in the short to medium term.	The characteristics of the planning scenarios are mainly related to the operational concepts to be developed, and depending on these also their possible geography. The longer the time horizon in the scenarios, the greater the probability of affecting the force structure. First and foremost, there is a tendency to maintain the flexibility of the force structure.
Comments.	1. Predominant in the inter-war period, the US assumed scenarios and drew up war plans against the red enemy (UK), the orange enemy (Japan), etc. 2. It allows the development of options for the development of capabilities and force design, with a first phase of short-term investment in R&D&I, and a second, later phase in which the quantities of materials to be obtained are determined.	1. Typical Cold War. 2. See, for example, the Australian case of 1987[63].		

62 On hypothetical deductive thinking, see Habernas, J. (1992). *Conocimiento e interés*. Universitat de Valencia. (Original from 1968). On the application of deductive thinking to strategy, see Frischknecht, F., Lanzarini, M.S.T. and Alonso, R.J. (1994). Lógica, teoría y práctica de la estrategia. *Escuela de Guerra Naval.* Buenos Aires.

63 Frühling, S. (2014). *Op. cit.*, pp. 52-60.

The third part of this article deals with the particular case of planning in NATO. The international arena affects national defence planning. For Spain, for example, what is agreed in the Alliance in terms of defence policy and defence planning is relevant. Obviously, EU decisions also matter.[64] In addition, planning in NATO provides a good example of the context and the importance of a coherent method, types and scenarios of planning.

On the 'NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP)'

In NATO, the 'Strategic Concepts' decided at the political level, 'Military Strategy' and 'defence planning' are coherently integrated. Such planning must respect the sovereignty of countries. This drive for coherence and integration of planning at the national level is also identified in other international organisations, such as the EU, in relation to its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and the development of initiatives related to capability planning.

The 'NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP)' deals with non-nuclear capabilities, although it does consider dual-use capabilities such as certain *dual-capable aircraft* (DCA).[65]

The NDPP formulates what needs to be in place to respond to planning scenarios related to concrete operational plans, as well as other purely hypothetical scenarios. It reviews the capabilities and forces available today, and seeks to improve them in the future, with an eye to the short, medium and long term.

The US greatly influences the internal dynamics of NATO defence policy, the development of strategic and operational concepts, and the NDPP. The five-step process aims to verify that national inventories contain the conventional capabilities the Alliance needs now and in the future.

Step 1 is the establishment of the 'Political Guidance' (PG) including the 'level of ambition'. Step 2 is the determination of the 'Minimum Capability Requirements' (MCR). Step 3 consists of distributing and assigning 'Capability Targets'. Step 4 is an ongoing activity consisting of facilitating implementation, obtaining capabilities by ensuring standards, e.g. those related to interoperability. Step 5 is the review of results, including country reports. While the first three steps are repeated every four years, step 5 occurs every two years.

64 Domecq, J. (2018). Coherence and Focus on Capability Priorities: Why EDA's Role in CARD, PESCO and EDF Matters. *Real Instituto Elcano*. 6. Fiott, D., *et al.* (2020). *The CSDP in 2020.* EU ISS. 157. Mauro, F. (2018). *Op. cit.*

65 Heinrich, B. and Mölling, C. (2020). Germany's Role in NATO's Nuclear Sharing. *DGAP Policy Brief.* num. 4, 8.




Figure 5. NDPP over time

In relation to planning, the 'Strategic Concept' is to NATO what the NSS is to a country. The resulting capabilities and forces must be sufficient to fulfil the three core tasks of the 2010 'Strategic Concept': collective security, crisis management and cooperative security.

Allied political authorities agree on the permanent tasks that the military instrument should be able to perform, and the LoA, which expresses the nature, scale, and number of joint operations of varying size that NATO should be able to undertake. It is articulated in number and model of 'Major Joint Operation Plus'(MJO+), 'Major Joint Operations' (MJO), and 'Small Joint Operations' (SJO). These operation types may be carried out simultaneously or alternatively, for specified periods of time, and in certain geographical and environmental permissiveness circumstances. Basically, the current LoA implies being able to ensure collective defence (MJO+), or simultaneously develop 2 MJOs and 6 SMOs[66].

It is premature to speculate on how the follow-up work to the *NATO 2030* document,[67] and in particular the new Strategic Concept to be agreed in 2022 in Madrid,[68] will influence possible changes to the 2023 PG and LoA, but the initial intention is a political and military reinforcement, improving military capabilities and the resilience of societies.[69]

Based on guidance from the political authorities, the Strategic Commands, Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) use different planning scenarios to infer the MCR, which is sufficient to be able to comply with the PG.

66 García Arnáiz, F.J. (2017). La estructura de mando de la Alianza Atlántica. In *NATO: presente y futuro*. Ministry of Defence. Pp. 51-82, p. 58.

67 NATO (2020) .*NATO 2030: United for a New Era.*

68 [Accessed on 29 July 2021]. Available at: https://elpais.com/espana/2021-06-13/la-nueva-estrategia-de-la-otan-se-aprobara-en-la-cumbre-de-madrid-2022.html

69 Fernández-Palacios, M. (embajador) (2021). Una nueva Alianza para unos nuevos tiempos. *Revista Española de Defensa*. Jul-Ago, 12–13.

Once the required capabilities have been defined, the 'Capability Targets' (CTs) are distributed among the allies, with a view to fair burden sharing. Some CTs are procured through allied pooled funding; the rest (the vast majority) is borne by the countries. CTs are allocated, negotiated and accepted, for each country to incorporate into its national planning. In the process, allied authorities report back to nations, and there is continuous interaction between political and military authorities, between Brussels and capitals.

Every four years, the conventional capacities and forces to be obtained in the national inventories are defined for a time horizon that is conceived as short (0-6 years), medium (7 to 19 years) and long term (from 20 years onwards).[70] [71] Progress is monitored every two years.

NATO expects allies to live up to their commitments under the NDPP. However, each nation sovereignly defines its capability development needs and priorities according to its own strategic choices, policies and operational concepts, which the Alliance ideally seeks to homogenise or make compatible. The design of a country's force structure needs to be domestically appropriate, while trying to respond to allied requirements in a timely manner. Countries retain sovereignty in how they formulate their planning and implement it over time, but the coherence of their decisions is subject to allied assessment.

On the type of 'defence planning' in NATO

During the Cold War, 'threat-based' planning predominated. In the 1990s, planning began to shift from being based solely on the Russian threat to a more generic, capabilities-based approach.

In the early 20th century, with the specification of the 'New Defence Planning Procedures' (SG(2004)0828) a significant revision of the process was completed. The 'capability-based planning' approach placed greater emphasis on identifying military requirements based on agreed intelligence assessments (MC 161),[72] operational analysis, and taking into account the provisions of the 'Political Guidance'. Despite this primary focus, a small amount of 'threat-based planning' was allowed, to validate the results of the requirements identification derived from the LoA.

70 Schmaglowski, D. (2018). The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP): An Overview. [Accessed on 21 July 2021]. Available at: https://www.dsp.dla.mil/Portals/26/Documents/Publications/Conferences/2018/2018%20International%20Standardization%20Workshop/20181030--Item3-NDPPOverview-IntlStdznWorkshop_Schmaglowski.pdf?ver=2018-11-06-151624-033

71 Wojciech, L. (2018). New Cycle of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). *Polish Institute of International Affairs,* num. 168, 2.

72 Fleischer, P. (2015). NATO Defence Planning Process. Implications for Defence Posture. *Securitología*, pp. 103-14.

Prior to the Wales Summit in 2014, two key issues for allied planning were identified: lengthening the time horizon, and the need to link with ongoing EU planning initiatives.[73]

The current NDPP specification dates from 2016. PO(2016)0655 consolidated the primacy and ownership of the political authorities over the generality of the process. The aim was to adapt it even more to the requirements of the environment, following the events in Ukraine.[74]

PO(2016)0655 classifies the process as '*threat/risk informed, capability-based*'. That is, it is informed by threats and risks, but based on capabilities. This approach is very flexible, it does not require an explicit declaration of a potential opponent as a threat, which does not exclude that a 'threat-based planning' approach can be adopted in the inference of capability requirements, if there is sufficient knowledge of the threats or risks.[75]

The PG specifies aspects of the different planning scenarios to be considered in order to infer minimum capability requirements. On the other hand, some publications provide insight into the Alliance's understanding of the future operating environment, the importance given to geography, and guidelines for planning scenarios.

> 'Two key concepts inform the new military strategy: theatre-wide approach and horizontal escalation, with both largely tying into NATO's overarching strategy of deterrence by punishment. The theatre-wide approach is NATO's military answer to the complexity of NATO geography: it is to say that NATO will not divide its planning and forces regionally but instead insists on having an integrated and seamless approach to defence and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO initially responded to Russia by drawing up Graduated Response Plans (GRP) that were geographically compartmentalized, covering segments of NATO's frontier from the North Atlantic through Central Europe to the eastern Mediterranean.' [76]

In the second step of the NDPP, military authorities check that the set of 'Minimum Capability Requirements' (MCR) is sufficient for a set of generic scenarios ('stress-testing') on which abduction is applied, and they cross-check that the MCR is also sufficient for the execution of existing operational plans, the advanced plans, in any of their categories ('Standing Defence Plan', 'Contingency Plan', 'Generic Con-

73 Mattelaer, A. (2014). Preparing NATO for the Next Defence-Planning Cycle. *RUSI Journal*. 159.3, 30–35 .

74 Fleischer, P. *Op cit.,* p. 111.

75 Frühling, S. (2014). *Op. cit.,* p. 32.

76 Rynning, S. (2021). Deterrence Rediscovered: NATO and Russia. En Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from from Theory and Practice Century. *Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies*. Pp. 30-43.

tingency Plan', 'Graduated Response Plan').[77] In some of these scenarios, it can be anticipated that geography is a key factor to the extent that it is considered in such plans, e.g. in 'Graduated Response Plans' (GRP), [78] [79] where checking the adequacy of the MCR involves deductive reasoning.

From the above, it is concluded that the way requirements are inferred is informed by varying degrees of knowledge of threats, risks and challenges, and that the 2016 NDPP specification corresponds to the basic type of portfolio planning.

On the one hand, those involved in the process use scenarios to verify that capabilities are sufficient at present. But on the other hand, they also need to project into the future, to mitigate risks. Present and future scenarios are used to infer requirements **for the** development of military capabilities and, possibly, to consider options for designing one's own force structure. What are the future scenarios for NATO?

On possible future planning scenarios

The future can only be hypothesised. In considering scenarios for the NDPP, what is published on the development of the 'NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC)'[80] could be relevant. The NWCC is one of the concepts derived from the 'NATO Military Strategy' approved in 2019.[81]

Geography will continue to matter, although activity in some domains, such as cyber and outer space, transcends it.

Combinations of different levels of activity in the operational domains will be considered, depending on the intensity of the scenario (low, medium or high), with fuzzy boundaries [82] between cooperation and competition. These scenarios will correspond to 'shaping', 'contesting' and 'warfighting' contexts, depending on the form and intensity of the opponent's actions in the different domains of operations. This will also require overcoming the opponent intellectually, with creativity and innovative leader-

77 UK MoD (2019). *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations(UK Joint Doctrine), Allied Joint Publication.* 5(A), 200, pp. 1-5;1-7.

78 Hodges, B. and Bugajski, J. (2020). One Flank, One Threat - A Strategy for NATO's Eastern Flank. *Center for European Policy Analysis*, 90, pp. 40;46;60.

79 «NATO puts defence plan for Poland, Baltics into action, officials say». [Accessed on 10 March 2021]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-baltics-turkey-idUSKBN24320B

80 Sweijs,T., *et al.* (2020). The NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept: Key Insights from the Global Expert Symposium Summer 2020. *The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.* 12.

81 Rynning, S. (2021). *Op. cit.*, pp. 40-41.

82 On the operating environment of 'fuzzy boundaries', see EMAD (2017). Concepto de empleo de las Fuerzas Armadas (Cambio 1), p. ii.

ship, in order to have the right skills in the future and to overcome the opponent, for example, also in the cognitive sphere.

In low-intensity ('shape') scenarios, war in the traditional sense would be less likely than cognitive warfare. It is possible to envisage scenarios in which it is merely a matter of shaping the environment in a way that is favourable to one's own interests, in collaboration with other actors. For example, with defence diplomacy activities in areas of mutual interest, and without significant interference from third parties, who are sought to be excluded from possible competition.

In the second category of scenarios ('contest'), it would not be easy to attribute actions in a Manichean way to competitors; while they oppose each other in certain domains of operations, they may collaborate in others. Such a scenario could be characterised by intense competitive activity in some of the domains while it remains low in others.

The third type of operational context ('warfighting') may correspond to war scenarios in the traditional sense, registering activity in some or all domains of operations, in a cross-cutting manner causing combat casualties, in a «future war that does not yet exist» mode. Among the keys to the necessary adaptation is «the imperative to seamlessly integrate the military, but also other non-military instruments in the pursuit of influence».[83]

In conclusion, the political use of the military instrument is and will be even more varied. The military can be used variably in multiple new domains, depending on operational contexts, in an operational environment of blurred boundaries between cooperation and competition. This can certainly be relevant for Military Strategy, but perhaps also for National Security Strategy (NSS), affecting 'defence policy' and 'defence planning', as it brings us closer to strategic thinking about in which contexts it will be necessary to operate, for what ('ends'), how ('ways') and with what means ('means'), and to the possible emergence of new operational concepts.

Conclusions

The main purpose of this article was to identify the basic problem facing 'defence planning', to understand its political and strategic context, and to do so from a public policy perspective. In addition, it was intended to provide a basic taxonomy of types of planning, and to identify the most relevant aspects of the planning process in NATO, including some relevant strategic concepts, which will guide future planning scenarios.

The basic problem facing 'defence planning' is to anticipate and procure the capabilities and force structure necessary to provide security, a 'pure public interest' to

83 Swijs,T. (2020). *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

protect, in the face of future threats, risks and challenges. It is a process that fits into the political and strategic context.

'Defence policy' is one of the protective public policies that seek to provide security. Different actors, civilian and military, are involved in the formulation of 'defence policy' and its implementation.

'Defence planning' is conceived as one of the tasks of 'defence policy', which in turn plays a role in accordance with what is specified in the 'National Security Strategy (NSS)', the next higher political-strategic contextual element.

A sound planning process must deliver the results desired by policy-makers, and must be coherently integrated with the products resulting from strategy development (NSS, Military Strategy, strategic concepts). The NSS also affects other public policies, and takes into account internal and external environmental conditions.

'Defence planning' addresses the future risk identified in different scenarios through a methodical process, which should ensure that the political 'level of ambition' (LoA) is met. Such planning seeks to define the means by which the state can effectively defend itself against the threats and challenges of the future operating environment.

In this planning, the formulation and implementation of part of 'defence policy' come together. The political definition of the LoA needs to be sufficiently clear so that it can be translated into core capability requirements for optimal force design. A total separation between the actors involved (civilian and military) in formulation and those who implement it is not desirable.

One of the challenges of this planning is to define the optimal military force organisation for the future. The starting point is to analyse a current structure and to work towards a long-term force goal, maintaining the effectiveness of a structure over time, which at the same time has to be sustainable, according to forecasts of the availability of financial resources.

Key to the planning method is coherence, from top to bottom and vice versa. A correct 'top-down' integration must be achieved with what the NSS establishes as objectives for the military instrument, and with the objectives and forms of action that are detailed for this instrument in the Military Strategy and in the strategic concepts. This process must also allow for the flexible incorporation of technological innovations and market opportunities, respecting 'bottom-up' coherence from operational to strategic concepts.

The planning process formulates the necessary means to respond to planning scenarios, real or hypothetical, near or distant in time. It reviews current capabilities, and tries to decide in advance how to improve the military instrument of the future.

Scenarios are considered for the short, medium and long term. Planning that only considers scenarios that may occur today can hardly aspire to have an armed forces prepared for the future.

The impact of decisions made on force structure varies according to the characteristics of the planning scenarios, according to the concreteness and knowledge of the threats, and according to the space-time considered.

The specification of scenarios is important as an indicator of what planning is intended to achieve. The further out in time such scenarios are envisaged, and the less is known about the characteristics of the threat, the greater the impact on force structure and force design decisions, and therefore the greater the prudence required.

Depending on the time space of scenarios and knowledge about threats, the certainty provided by different ways of thinking, through which requirements for the necessary capabilities and forces are inferred, varies. The most commonly used forms of inferential logic are deduction and abduction, although in some cases induction is also used.

Four basic types of defence planning are identified which are differentiated according to certain characteristics: a) whether or not there is an explicit declaration of an adversary as a threat; the level of knowledge about them (capabilities and intentions) and the level of certainty about the risks (probability and impact); b) variety and possible concurrence of contingencies considered as risks or threats; c) predominant type of logical inferences; d) use made of scenario-based planning scenarios (number and variety of types, the importance of geography and time horizon). They are as follows:

- 'Mobilisation planning' in anticipation of a possible future threat.
- 'Threat-based planning' (or 'net assessment planning'), in which deduction takes precedence.
- 'Portfolio planning', applicable for cases of concurrence of several known risks.
- 'Capability-based planning' (or 'task-based planning') applies to an environment in which the unknown is more important than the possible adversary and its behaviour, and uncertainty is at its highest about the possible threats or risks. Abduction takes precedence.

As an example of the above, the 'NATO Defence Planning Process' (NDPP) is identified as part of the Allied 'defence policy' and has the Strategic Concept as its overarching reference. The aim is to ensure the coherence of the process with its context.

It is essentially a methodical process, structured in five steps, cyclically renewed every four years, by which allies decide on the conventional capabilities and forces needed in national inventories in the short, medium and long term. It includes analysis of progress on results every two years, including country reports.

Although the NDPP imposes requirements on national planning for conventional capabilities, countries retain sovereignty in deciding how to formulate their planning and implement it over time.

Allied political and military authorities interact, with the former clearly predominating. These establish a political 'level of ambition' in a sufficiently clear manner for military authorities to translate it into military capabilities and forces.

The NDPP is specified as a 'threat/risk informed, capability-based' process; it is a case of 'portfolio' planning.

NATO 2030 envisages strengthening and adapting the military instrument to respond to future threats and risks. The military should be able to be used in a more varied way, and with greater integration with civilian capabilities to strengthen countries' resilience.

According to the 'NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept' (NWCC), derived from the Military Strategy, combinations of different levels of activity will be considered in multiple domains of operations (some newly conceived), according to low, medium or high intensity scenarios, with blurred boundaries between cooperation and competition. These will be scenarios in 'shaping', 'contesting' and 'warfighting' contexts depending on the form and intensity of the opponent's actions in the different domains of operations. From these contexts and scenarios, different capability development requirements will be inferred.

Corolario: Who in the past may have been your mortal enemy, today may be your cooperative partner in some matters, even if their interests and values may compete with yours in other areas. In the future, as long as interests and values coincide, cooperation can continue; as long as they differ, competition will flourish. Cooperation and competition can occur simultaneously in different domains, a balanced posture of deterrence and defence is essential to manage risks so that they do not turn into threats and conflicts.

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Russia's strategic personality and its influence on the relationship with the West

Abstract

Since 1991, the relationship between Russia and the West was marked by cooperation and competition. While in the first years of the newly formed Federation the ideas of the westernizers prevailed, the (neo) eurasianist postulates dominate the current national discourse, leading to stagnation in its relationship with the West. Such ideological reorientation is the result of external shocks in the international system, as well as internal. In this work, the main Russian and Western schools of thought are analyzed, contrasting them to explain, from the perspective of Neoclassical realism, the perception and behavior of Moscow, in relation to Western countries, at different stages in the global arena.

Keywords

Russia, the West, strategic personality, westernism, (neo) eurasianism.

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Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union meant a loss of national identity for Russia. Subsequent presidents, especially Yeltsin and Putin, tried to shape the country's national identity. In this sense, by taking as a starting point the idea of national identity as a state construct created to legitimise itself as different[1], two main schools of thought prevail in Russian intellectual circles, Westernist and Slavophile. These schools branch into different currents among which the Westernist, Eurasianist-Pragmatist and (neo)Eurasianist schools have had the greatest impact on Kremlin policy post-1991. Although they share some common assumptions, each of them highlights different categories to explain Russian national identity and the path for the country's development.

It is also worth noting the difference in perception between Russian and Western intellectual circles about the drivers of Russian behaviour in the global arena. While in Western circles the idea prevails that Russia's behaviour in the domestic and international sphere is mainly determined by the West's actions[2] ('outside-in' theory), for most Russian intellectuals domestic concerns are the main driver of actions in the international arena ('inside-out' theory). Without a doubt, it can be argued that both external shocks, which have had a particular impact on Putin's first and second terms, and domestic shocks, which were notable during his third term, have influenced the Kremlin's actions. While in the early years of the 'Putin era' an attempt was made to establish a friendly relationship with the West, in the later years a reassessment of their relationship took place due to various disagreements, as well as the redirection of world affairs towards Asia.

In this paper, we will analyse the strategic personality of the Russian Federation, seen from both domestic Russian and Western perspectives, after the collapse of the USSR and how this affects the country's relationship with the West. Although much has been written on the subject of Russian behaviour in the international arena and the relationship with Western countries, there is a lack of research that includes both perspectives. Finally, we will shed light on the real strategic personality traits that influence their behaviour and, drawing on neoclassical Realism, describe how national identity affects Kremlin policy decisions. This study is relevant because: first, Russia's relationship with the West affects international dynamics, as the country is an important player in the regional and global arena; second, the issue of Russian national identity and its effects on Russian foreign policy requires further elaboration; and third, the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism allows for the elaboration of

1 Contreras-Luna, R. (2019). Moscow great power dilemmas: the role of Asiatic Russia in Russia-China relations. *International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies* [online]. Vol. 15, no. 2, p. 3. [Accessed: 2 March 2021]. Available at: https://ijaps.usm.my/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/IJAPS-152_ART1-1-29.pdf

2 Understood as the United States and its European allies.

an analysis from a different theoretical perspective, contributing to a better deepening and understanding of the subject.

Thus, in the following sections, based on a qualitative method and applying a comparative analysis, we will carry out a review of primary and secondary bibliographical sources on the thoughts of important Russian and Western authors on the national identity and strategic personality of the country, as well as collect external information from speeches of important Kremlin figures. In addition, drawing on neoclassical realism, we will analyse Russia's strategy and behaviour in relation to the West and how its national identity and strategic personality affect the West. Finally, we will present some conclusions from the analysis.

Between the two perspectives

The Russian domestic perspective

During Russian history the historical-philosophical ideas, represented by the monk Philotheus of Peskov (the creator of the theory of 'Moscow-Third Rome') and Slavophiles like M. Bakunin and V. Solovyov, were the element forming the foundations of Russian foreign policy and state ideology. This changed in the 20th century, and specifically in 1990, with geopolitical paradigms replacing the historical philosophy prevalent in previous centuries. Following Russian political thought, the nascent geopolitical currents bifurcated political theories of international relations conditioned by geographical determinism, classical realism, the theory of civilisations, cultural and religious thought, as well as geostrategy.

Thus, with the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russian geopolitical thinking collided with the question that had prevailed for centuries in the country's intellectual circles: Should Russia integrate into Western processes or follow its own unique path? This question was directly related to the vision of what Russia is and should be, as well as what its strategic personality is. Westernists and Slavophiles, a patriotic movement and heir to the ideas of the *dikabristy*[3], are the two major branches of Russian thought that tried, and are still trying, to answer these questions. The former associate the West with democracy, freedom, civil society, progress and the nation-state while viewing the East as despotic, imperial and autocratic; Slavophiles, in turn, perceive the West as morally decadent, exploitative and under the American yoke, while appreciating the unity, order and strong state that characterise the East. Even in the face of divergent perceptions of the way forward for the nation, both schools converge on the existence of several fundamental realities that forge the country's strategic personality, although they interpret them in different ways. These include (1) the messianic nature of the Russian people and

3 First movement of noble-revolutionaries who, in 1825, took up arms to establish a constitutional order in the Russian Empire. The main slogans of the movement were the ideas of bourgeois revolution, which would sweep away feudalism and allow the development of a capitalist system.

the importance of anthropological and spiritual interests, (2) the recurrence to the civilisational basis, as well as (3) the continental factor (Russia as a tellurocracy) from which its (4) self-perception as a great power (*velikoderzhavnost*) derives[4].

In this vein, it should first be noted that the Russian conquest of space (16th-20th centuries) saw the expansion of a single centre of power, Moscow, with a single supreme authority, the Tsar. The non-existence of alternative centres of power or colonies allowed Russia to maintain its geopolitical unity and continuity. Thus, in the struggle for space, the Russian people had to forge the messianic idea in order to unite and shape the vast territories of the Empire. On the other hand, the conception of Moscow as a 'Third Rome' was formulated after the appointment of the *Kniaz'* as the successor of the Byzantine emperor, as well as the Tsar of all Russia[5]. Following a logical process, the appearance of the Byzantine emblem of a double-headed eagle on the ancient coat of arms of Moscow, depicting St George the Victorious, as well as the marriage of Ivan III to Sophia Paleolog gave way to the subsequent rise of pan-Orthodox messianism. This movement also contributed to the ultimate end of the Russian national idea, or messianism. In parallel, based on L. Mechnikov's anthro-geographical determinism[6], the idea of the Russians as a different civilisation developed. The ideology of *Ruskiy Mir* is undoubtedly the current main concept of civilisational basis combining Orthodox religion, Russian culture, language and tradition, as well as common history. This idea was institutionalised in 2007 in the Ruskiy Mir Foundation, which aims to promote Russian language and culture, as well as programmes and exchanges that reconnect the Russian community abroad with their homeland.

The narrative of the concept is based on geopolitical centres deriving from geopolitical points of resistance that keep the total area of territory under the control of the metropolis[7]. This notion was expanded over time by the introduction of the ideas

4 Trenin, D. (2015). *Rossiya i mir v XXI veke* [Russia in the 21st century] [online]. Moscow, Eksmo. [Accessed: 10 March 2021]. ISBN 978-5-699-84586-6. Available at: http://loveread.ec/read_book.php?id=51215&p=1; Tsimburskiy, V. (2007). *Ostrov Rossiya. 1993-2006.* Insular Russia. 1993-2006 [online]. Moscow, ROSSPEN. [Accessed: 20 March 2021]. ISBN 978-5-8243-0870-9. Available at: https://topliba.com/books/702953; Dugin, A. (2002). *Osnovi geopolitiki* [The basics of geopolitics] [online]. Moscow, Vector-Eurasia. [Accessed: 10 March 2021], p. 359. Available at: https://vector-eurasia.org/books/Dugin.Geopolitika.pdf; Ivashov, L. (2015). *Geopolitika russkoy tsivilizatsii* [Geopolitics of Russian civilisation]. Moscow, Institute of Russian Civilisation, pp. 749-759. ISBN 978-5-4261-0105-0; Korovin, V. (2018). *Udar po Rossii. Geopolitika i predchuvstviye voyny* [The blow to Russia. Geopolitics and the premonition of war]. St Petersburg, Dom Pyter. Pp. 191-193. ISBN 978-5-4461-0494-9.

5 See Ivashov, L. (2015).

6 Good spatial management is only possible through a thorough study of the characteristics of the space, the character and nature of the people who occupy it, in their close relationship and mutual influence throughout history. See Mechnikov, L. (1995). *Tsyvylyzatsyia y velykyie ystorychyskye reky* [Civilisation and great historical rivers]. Moscow, Pangea-Progress. ISBN 5-01-004448-X.

7 Panteleev, S. (2019). Donbass v geopolitike Russkogo mira [Donbas in the geopolitics of Ruskiy Mir]. In: *Russian Diaspora Institute* [online]. 3 April. [Accessed: 8 March 2021]. Available at: https://russkie.org/articles/donbass-v-geopolitike-russkogo-mira/

of 'network structure' and the 'network empire', understood from the perspective of Eurasian integration, as well as contributions from information and cyberspace geopolitics that underlined the importance of the use of information and social networks as an effective tool of influence[8]. On the other hand, based on the idea that none of the civilisations is capable of constructing universal 'final' forms of social structure, the principle of equality between them and the existence of a personal path for the progress of each of them was put forward. It is true that while the Slavophiles defend the existence of a unique path, different from the West, for Russia's progress, the Westernists consider that the country, although a different civilisation, can only develop fully if it participates in the process of Western development. Thus, while Westernists describe Peter I's reforms as an important step the nation took towards integration with the West, Slavophiles will see them as a blow to their identity.

Along the same lines, some thinkers[9] consider that the Eurocentric approach does not objectively explain the history of Russia and the peoples of the East, presenting it as an appendix to European history. Intellectuals from the (neo)Eurasianist camp argue that a civilisation must have the potential to preserve the historical pool of forces, as well as a population with unlimited willingness for self-sacrifice, discipline and a strong spirit. In this respect, since the beginning of the 18th century, the Russian people have played an undisputed role in the country's victory against Charles XII, Frederick II, Napoleon I and Hitler. One could also speak of the Russian colonisation of the Northeast, which historically was a reserve of Russian power that destroyed the Finnish tribes and restored the idea of Russian unity, whose successors were Peter I and Catherine II.

This leads to the assertion of civilisational identity as an essential factor that provides integrity to large spaces and whose political fragmentation around a civilisation leads to the deprivation of political strength resulting in the inability to resist external violence and danger. Therefore, it is concluded that the peoples speaking close languages and dialects must form a single political entity; the Russian people, consisting of 'Great Russians'/Russians, 'Little Russians'/Ukrainians and 'White Russians'/Byelorussians, must be part of a single state that would be integrated into a union of the Slavic peoples. This line of thinking is especially advocated by Slavophiles, but is also present in Westernist circles where, for example, the unique importance of Ukraine for Russia in terms of issues of identity (Empire—nation-state—*Ruskiy Mir*), sovereignty (Russian place, functions and capabilities in a US-dominated world), security (general security or balance of power) and integration (Greater Europe or Greater Eurasia) is asserted[10].

As part of the civilisational theory, the continentalist theory was developed, the leading exponents of which are the Eurasianists. The theory is based on the idea of

8 Korovin, V. (2018).

9 Trenin, D. (2015); Tsimburskiy, V. (2007); Dugin, A. (2002).

10 Trenin, D. (2015).

Russia as an ethnographically and culturally special world occupying an intermediate position between Europe and Asia (*heartland*[11] or *Russia-Eurasia*). This intermediate position of the country is understood to form the basis of its identity composed of Aryan-Slavic culture, Turkish nomadism and Orthodox tradition; it is an independent historical and spiritual geopolitical reality called Eurasia. In this vein, Russia's expansion to the Northeast is an important factor that influenced Russian national identity; it allowed it to develop from an Eastern European state into a multi-ethnic, bi-continental, landlocked empire that can claim the status of a global power[12].

While Westernists consider that the impetus for the development of *heartland* comes from Europe, (neo)Eurasianist authors[13] defend the idea that *Russia-Eurasia* is the very synthesis of culture and history and the nature of Russia participates in the full development of its culture and, at the same time, is the Mongolosphere; the formation of a mixture of Byzantine and Mongolian influence is present[14]. Such a Mongolian perception of the continent is opposed to the Western European perception of the sea (telurocracy versus thalassocracy[15]).

For (neo)Eurasianists, the participation of the telurocracies in the single world market[16], leads to existence on the periphery of the global economic and geopolitical system; to reduce the high transport costs borne by the telurocracies, it is proposed to develop regional relations[17]. Today, following this idea, Moscow is trying to exploit its potential as a transit country, which can be seen in the development of corridors such as the China-Mongolia-Russia corridor, and by pursuing close cooperation within organisations such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Although the Westernist current affirms Russia's need to integrate into Western processes, partially negating the postulates of the (neo)Eurasianist authors, it does recognise the

11 See Mackinder, H. (2004). The geographical pivot of history. In: *The Geographical Journal* [online]. December, vol. 170, issue 4, pp. 298-321. [Accessed: 5 October 2021]. Available at: https://www.iwp.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/20131016_MackinderTheGeographicalJournal.pdf

12 Trenin, D. (2012). Russia can pivot to the Pacific, too. In: *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* [online]. 7 September. [Accessed: 19 May 2021]. Available at: https://carnegie.ru/2012/09/07/russia-can-pivot-to-pacific-too-pub-49312

13 Tsimburskiy, V. (2007); Dugin, A. (2002).

14 Thanks to the Mongol-Tatar yoke, Russia was able to maintain geopolitical and spiritual independence from the Romano-Germanic world, as well as to preserve its ethnic uniqueness.

15 Thalassocracy is understood to be a commercial system, liberal democracy and pragmatism, while telurocracy is ideocracy (in any of its variants), domination of a religious ideal and hierarchical government.

16 The single world market is an organisational and cohesive factor that generates a solid economic basis for thalassocracies.

17 Islamic and Confucian potential, with Iran and China in the lead, are pointed to as potential allies against Western globalism.

need for close regional cooperation with neighbours. Undoubtedly, both schools underline the importance of the country's geographical position as a decisive factor in shaping its relations with the world, and especially with the West.

Such a self-perception of Russia as a different world derives from the idea of *velikoderzhavnost* on which the country's modern national identity is being built, integrating not only new realities but also historical events such as the Battle of Kulikovo or the Second World War. Thus, in the political discourse we find the idea of a country with a powerful army, the re-emergence of Russia as a great power and the conquest of a worthy place in the world. In line with L. Ivashov's thinking, from this self-perception of great power and imperial character derive the country's responses to geopolitical challenges such as the geographical conditionality of the policy of territorial expansion, directed mainly towards the East and West, and access to the sea to absorb 'unstable geopolitical zones'[18]. It is also important to mention the existence, within the Slavophile school, of the concept of *insular Russia* coined by V. Tsymburskiy which points to the *Russia-Heartland/Eurasia* concepts as reductionist and incapable of geopolitically identifying Russia. The author criticises Westerners for not taking into account that Russia, being a giant country, is not compatible with the European balance and will always be seen as an enemy[19].

Following the postulates of P. Semenov-Tian-Shanskiy and A. Vandam, both of whom assert Russia's need to defend its access to the East and South Seas, both Tsymburskiy and Ivashov advocate the need to focus on regional rather than global priorities. They affirm the need to exploit the country's Eurasian character and its importance from a transport perspective, as well as to promote demographic growth and economic development, especially in the Asian area. In the same vein, the Westernists propose another principle as a vector of *Ruskiy Mir*'s doctrine, asserting the Kremlin's need to gather people rather than land[20].

Finally, as mentioned above, Slavophiles exclude the existence of global human development and stress the individualism of each nation and community. In this sense, Russia cannot be identified as a fully European state because of its geographical position and its different perception of the world, manifested in the legal and political spheres, as well as the 'special spirit of the Russian people'; these elements forge the 'Russian idea', which is supranational, Orthodox and Christian.

It is also important to emphasise the special critique of European parliamentarism, which is a critique of liberalism and revolution. Following this logic, the aforementioned penetration of Western ideas such as democracy leads to revolution. Along these lines, fears of the 'domino effect' of the colour revolutions grew, leading to intervention in the Georgian war and the merger of the Crimean peninsula with Russia,

18 Ivashov, L. (2015).

19 Tsimburskiy, V. (2007).

20 See Trenin, D. (2015).

as well as the consequent worsening of relations with the West, which were already chronically problematic. While these developments are perceived by (neo)Eurasianists as a US crusade against Russia, which is part of the 'rest' not subordinate to their interests[21], advocates of the nationalist anti-Westernist current, like Westernists, point to the danger of the (neo)Eurasianists' postmodern concept and their 'crusade against the West' as exposing Russia to conflict[22].

The Western perspective

Already in 1995, one of the major contributors to the study of Russian behaviour, G. Hosking, pointed to the imperial character of the Russian state. During the Soviet era, Russian identity was suppressed in favour of a universalist (*vselenkost*), exceptionalist and messianic state, principles that paradoxically reinforced national identity by later deriving in the concept of Russian civilisation. Thus, messianism, widespread in the 16th-17th centuries[23] and suppressed in the context of the Schism of the Church and the reforms of Peter the Great, re-emerged in the 20th century in the form of Marxism[24].

Russian national identity was formulated from the statist and supranational perspective resulting in neo-Rossiyskiy; internationalist socialism had a Russian imperial speech and face while the hierarchical relationship with other non-Russian peoples was restored. This move towards a more traditional, great power, pragmatic perspective, based on neo-Rossiyskiy imperialism, was also accentuated by the implementation of a new religious policy. In this line, the difference between the ethnic (*ruskiy*) and imperial (*rossiyskiy*) aspects of Russianness, which was the cause of the disintegration of the empire in 1917, should be emphasised. All this gave way to the subsequent crystallisation of a 'Russianness' based on ethnic, imperial and Soviet elements. Still, it should be noted that with the emigration of ethnic Russians to other republics and thanks to the presence of their own key institutions during the Soviet period, they identified more with the Soviet Union as a whole than with the former empire or the Russian Federation[25].

21 Dugin, A. (2002). P. 359; Korovin, V. (2018).

22 Trenin, D. (2015); Tsimburskiy, V. (2007).

23 The notion of the Rus as the Eastern Christian ecumenical community and guarantor of the true faith prevailed.

24 Hosking, G. (1997). *Russia: people and empire, 1552-1917*. Cambridge; Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, p. 19. ISBN 0-674-78118-X; Kissinger, H. (2011). *The World Order*. New York, Penguin Books Limited. Pp. 193-195. ISBN 9781101445358.

25 The prevalence of language and ethnic Russians in the leadership, as well as the perception of the defeat of Nazi Germany as a national victory, led to the identification of ethnic Russians with the USSR.

This led to the establishment of a state regime in Russia in the late 1990s that was a hybrid of authoritarianism and democracy. The ensuing discrediting of Yeltsin and his anti-communism, the perceived loss of prestige and superpower status, and growing support for the communists undermined the legitimising foundations of the state and regime[26]. Nostalgia for the Soviet era combined with disillusionment with Western economic postulates, as well as a sense of betrayal by the West, with its expansion of NATO seen as the culmination of its policy to isolate Russia and criticism of Russian policy in Chechnya, pushed Russia further away from the West and encouraged nationalism. All this has to be understood in the context of globalisation and the desires to defend one's own culture against homogenisation, as well as the gap between the new political elite, with a president and prime minister unable to provide consistent geostrategic leadership, who failed to assess the domestic and international situation at the time[27].

Attempts to formulate a new national idea to legitimise the regime were in vain until the arrival of the 'Putin era'. During President Putin's first two terms in office, the anthem of the USSR was maintained as the anthem of the newly formed Federation and the achievements of the Soviet era were praised, while Tsarist symbols remained in order to build an ethnically based national identity, integrating positive imperial and Soviet elements, and to achieve consensus within the state[28]. At the same time, the various definitions of the Russian nation took shape[29], which are still present in Russian intellectual and political circles today. The amalgamation of definitions allowed the regime to draw inspiration from contradictory facts, such as the mixture of Soviet-Czarist ideology or ethnocentric-multiculturalist ideas, resulting in a flexible and adaptable doctrine. Among these currents, the civic definition encompassing all citizens of the Federation should be underlined. This, in theory, is defended by Putin, although it is true that on several occasions in Russian foreign policy he has adhered to the notion of Russian speakers (*rossiyani*) and compatriots (*sootechestveniki*) settled on the territory of the former republics and the need to defend their rights.

In line with the thinking of A. Lieven, who argues that empire building gave Russians a weak ethnic identity that helped to avoid conflicts with the other republics[30], the current strengthening of the national discourse is conducive to the emergence of clashes between Russia and post-Soviet states. In this regard, the resurgence of the

26 Brzezinski, Z. (1997). *The grand chessboard: American primacy and the geostrategic imperatives*. New York, Basic Books. Pp. 91-93. ISBN 0465-02726-1.

27 After communism, Russia was too backward and devastated to be a viable democratic partner for the United States. See Brzezinski, Z. (1997).

28 Shevtsova, L. (2003). *Putin's Russia*. Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pp. 144-145. ISBN 0-87003-201-1.

29 The defenders of imperial identity, ethnic base, linguistic base, and blood ties.

30 Lieven, A. (1999). *Chechnya: tombstone of Russian power*. New Haven; London, Yale University Press. P. 376. ISBN 9780300078817.

debate on the rights of the 'Russian diaspora' in the 'near abroad' should be noted, especially after Estonia and Latvia's refusal to offer citizenship to ethnic Russians who arrived there after the integration of these territories into the Soviet Union. Thus, from the initial indifference towards the Russian diaspora, political elites started to use it for political purposes by framing it within the concept of *Ruskiy Mir*[31] which, understood from an ethnic/cultural and spiritual perspective, is opposed to the Western world.

In the same vein, I. Zevelev[32], arguing against G. Hosking's idea that Russia is to become a nation-state along the lines of the Western model, points out the danger of such a situation that would boost ethnic-nationalism in the country and could lead to conflicts with neighbouring countries where Russian minorities are established. According to the author, the importance of territorial integrity within the country's existing borders is clearly exemplified by the two wars in Chechnya, as Russia has always presented itself as a defender of principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as being critical of attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other states and unilateral/multilateral attempts by other countries to change international norms. As for the annexation of Crimea, this is a particular case as it was a reaction to the threat to Russia's 'civilisational identity' and historical narrative. Undoubtedly, relations with the CIS are listed in official documents as Moscow's top regional priority. Thus, although after the failure to focus defences on the external borders of the CIS[33], Russia began strengthening its own borders, peacekeeping and stability activities in other Commonwealth countries did not cease despite the wishes of the governments of those countries[34].

Such a hierarchical relationship with other nations derives from the imperial consciousness which, in turn, allows Russia to claim the status of a global power with an

31 From a cultural/civilisational perspective, this concept is understood as a modernised version of the 'Russian idea' as it fulfils its main characteristics such as supranational/transnational character, messianism, conventionality of territorial borders, friend-enemy contrast, and the need to protect its ideas/values from external influence; from the religious perspective, the Russian world is a self-sufficient Christian-Orthodox civilisation whose core is the Russian Orthodox Church that legitimises political power; finally, from the geopolitical approach, based on the idea of balance of power and multipolar world, it appears as a model for integrating the Russian-speaking community and creating an alternative global political actor to the West. The situation in Crimea marked a shift in the perception of Moscow's zone of responsibility for security issues from the level of a nation-state to a larger vague community. See Korobkova, D. (2020). *Russian World? Protection of National Minorities Abroad as a Component of Russia's Foreign Policy* [online]. Master's thesis. Prague, Charles University. [Accessed: 4 May 2021], pp. 15-20. Available at: https://is.cuni.cz/webapps/zzp/detail/215023/?lang=en; Zevelev, I. (2016). Russian National Identity and Foreign Policy. Washington DC, CSIS [online], p. 13. [Accessed: 2 March 2021]. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23235?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

32 Zevelev, I. (2016). P. 4.

33 The organisation combined efforts at economic cooperation with subjective imperial determination.

34 They sometimes claimed that Russia was manipulating the conflict to maintain its influence in the region.

exceptional role emanating from its status as the heir of the Byzantine Empire, and thus the authentic seat of the Christian church, as well as the saviour of Europe in the Napoleonic and Second World Wars ('patriotic wars'). Apart from Russia's perception of its role in religion and history, the warrior impetus of the steppe, which was occupied to protect against invasion, and the harsh climate, which fostered the development of people's ability to withstand various problems and sacrifice for the common cause, are further factors that contributed to the forging of the Russian character and imperial consciousness[35].

Likewise, the possession of vast flat plains without natural borders has resulted in the need to «*have buffer zones or zones of influence to gain reaction time in case of invasion or attack from outside*»[36]. This quest for security also explains the presence of strong authoritarian rulers throughout Russian history; thus Putin, like Peter the Great or Stalin, responds to the national preference for a strong leader.

Russian expansionism, also driven by gaining access to open seas, has always raised suspicions among its neighbours about Russian intentions while their reaction has often been interpreted by Moscow as an effort to isolate it from Europe. This led to an amalgamation of ethnic, cultural and religious identities within the country that will be responded to by the generation of national myths denying or celebrating the fact; from the interpretation of the Viking conquest as occurring because the conquered invite the invaders in, to the perception of Moscow as the 'Third Rome', to the Kremlin's claim to present Russia as a bastion of traditional values and a bulwark against a US-dominated world system[37].

Furthermore, the geographical position between Europe and Asia, and the possession of the region defined as 'Siberia' allows the country to adopt a unique Euro-pacific identity that has resulted in the formation of a Russian civilisation with its own historical development. This intermediate position allows it to claim global power status rather than being reduced to a regional power. As M. McFaul argues, in the pursuit of regaining great power status, Putin is not only a transactional leader, but also an ideological one, whose decisions are guided by his desire to promote his anti-Western world view, positioning himself as a conservative and illiberal leader[38].

35 Kaplan, R. (2015). *Mest' geografii* [The revenge of geography]. Moscow, Kolibri. P. 109. ISBN 978-5-389-10490-7; Kissinger, H. (2011). *The World Order*. New York, Penguin Books Limited. Pp. 168-178. ISBN 9781101445358.

36 Pardo de Santayana y Gómez de Olea, J.M. (2017). History, identity and strategy in the Russian Federation. In: *Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies* [online]. 15 March, p. 6. [Accessed: 24 February 2021]. Available at: http://www.ieee.es/contenido/noticias/2017/03/DIEEEA16-2017.html

37 Galeotti, M. (2020). *A short history of Russia. How the world largest country invented itself, from the pugans to Putin*. Toronto, Hanover Square Press. ISBN: 1488076103.

38 Mcfaul, M. (2021). How to contain Putin's Russia. A strategy for containing a rising revisionist power. In: *Foreign Affairs* [online]. 19 January. [Accessed: 13 May 2021]. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2021-01-19/how-contain-putins-russia?utm_medium=email_notifications&utm_source=reg_confirmation&utm_campaign=reg_guestpass

Russia's strategy and behaviour in the relationship with the West

After the collapse of the USSR, Westernist thinking dominated the country. This current was especially represented by the implementation of the Kozyrev doctrine. Important steps towards cooperation were taken: in the new military doctrine of 1993, the United States was able to establish a new military doctrine. The Partnership for Peace was established within the framework of NATO and the OSCE, Russia joined the Council of Europe, and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU entered into force. The cooperation came from the fact that the country, in order to guarantee its existence, prioritised the change of the political and economic system and therefore needed Western assistance to carry out the modernisation process. At the time, two myths prevailed: that the West, in response to Russia's withdrawal from Central Europe, would provide funds for economic recovery and that the Western model, based on liberal democracy and free market economics, would quickly take root in the country and help its resurgence. However, while Peter the Great's reforms allowed the country to integrate into the common civilisational process for modernisation, this policy led to shock therapy, formation of a pseudo-market, a criminal economy, deformation of democracy, high corruption and impoverishment of the population, which eroded the desire to follow through with the ensuing reforms for a complete transition. This situation was explained by Slavophiles by the idea that the reforms did not reflect the needs of the people and were carried out in an abrupt and revolutionary manner. Also, the loss of initiative in foreign policy that was not oriented towards the country's strategic interests led Slavophiles to point to the Kozyrev doctrine as treacherous. Undoubtedly, the dismal economic situation within the country, as well as its weak positioning in the global arena, exemplified by NATO's eastward expansion and its intervention in Kosovo against Moscow's express will, were a humiliation for Russian nationalism[39].

In the following years, in response to the fading euphoria, Westerners gradually formulated the consensus geopolitical model, which gravitates towards pragmatic Eurasianism. This was implemented with the formation of a 'consensus' on Russia's identity as a great power in the context of a multipolar order, based on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, and the need to form a strong and independent state to maintain order and stability. Arguably, its tenets were adopted by Putin and after 2000, a kind of informal social contract was formulated between the regime and the broader segments of the population based on the material improvements and rejection of the 1990s[40]. The growing authoritarianism of the 'Putin era' was later referred to as 'sovereign democracy'[41] and took on populist overtones.

39 Pardo De Santayana Y Gómez De Olea, J.M. (2017). P. 8.

40 Bernsandt, N. Y Törnquist-Plewa, B. (Eds.) (2018). *Cultural and political imaginaries in Putin's Russia* [online]. Leiden; Boston, Brill, vol. 2, p. 2. [Accessed: 4 April 2021]. ISSN 1877-9484. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctvbqs855

41 It is understood as a democratic system based on the Russian political tradition of authoritarianism, a strong state and leader, and the idea of society as a single entity. See Trenin, D., (2015).

Although, due to various controversies (the future of the CIS and the Baltic states; problems related to START and ABMT; friendly relations with countries such as China, Cuba, North Korea, Iran and Iraq; the military intervention in Yugoslavia; etc.), the first year of his government was characterised by distrust and antagonism towards the West, in the period 2001-2002 an attempt was made to build a relationship based on trust and partnership, as the president was focused on domestic issues. Some intellectuals[42] claim that it was precisely his authoritarianism that led him to cooperate with the West after the war in Chechnya as part of the fight against terrorism and the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. However, this did not mean the country's integration into the West as the country pursued its own interests vis-à-vis other states such as Iran and Iraq, dubbed by the US as the 'axis of evil'. As B. Lo rightly pointed out, the Russian president was not committed to a single identity in world affairs, «*he is European in Europe, transcontinental 'strategic partner' when it comes to the United States, Asian and Eurasian in Asia, and cautiously integrationist in the CIS*»[43].

Thus, while D. Medvedev in 2008 underlined the genuinely egalitarian cooperation between Russia, Europe and North America, these being the three branches of European civilisation[44], Foreign Minister S. Lavrov pointed out that Russia will follow a different path due to global competition with a civilisational dimension that includes values and models of development. While the first approach concerned the relationship with Western states, the second was aimed at neighbouring states[45]. The multivectoral policy proposed by E. Primakov, implemented since 1996, was given greater importance in order to maintain the balance with the West and gradually regain its sphere of influence through Eurasian integration[46]. This policy also allowed it a certain flexibility and independence of action in the global arena, with rapprochement with other non-Western powers.

42 Sánchez Ortega, A. (2020). La política exterior rusa y su relación con Occidente. Una visión desde el realismo neoclásico. In: *Revista Española de Derecho Internacional* [online]. January/June, vol. 72, issue 1, pp. 172-173. [Accessed: 15 June 2021]. Available at: http://www.revista-redi.es/es/Artículos/la-politica-exterior-rusa-y-su-relacion-con-occidente-una-vision-desde-el-realismo-neoclasico/

43 Lo, B. (2003). *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*. London, Blackwell Publisher. P. 131. ISBN: 1-4051-0299-3.

44 Kremlin (2008). Vystupleniye Prezidenta Rossii Dmitriya Medvedeva na vstreche s politicheskimi, parlamentskimi i obshchestvennymi liderami Germanii v Berline [The speech of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the meeting with German political, parliamentary and civic leaders in Berlin]. 5 June [online]. [Accessed: 16 February 2021].Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/320

45 Lavrov, S. (2008). Russia and the world in the 21st century. In: *Russia in global* affairs [online]. July/September, issue 3. [Accessed: 15 February 2021]. Available at: https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/russia-and-the-world-in-the-21st-century/

46 Bugayova, N. (2019). *How we got here with Russia: The Kremlin's worldview* [online]. Washington DC, Institute for the Study of War. March, pp. 13-15. [Accessed: 10 March 2021]. Available at: https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report_The%20Kremlin%27s%20Worldview_March%202019.pdf

Similarly, under Putin's first and second terms, domestically, some Westernising reforms were introduced, especially economic ones, cooperating with the West to obtain technology and promote trade, while authoritarianism was strengthened by maintaining Tsarist and Soviet symbols and fostering state-centred and somewhat imperial nationalism. This comes from the old Russian dilemma of how to modernise and maintain state power at the same time, which historically was attempted from above by Peter the Great, hiring foreign shipbuilders, Catherine the Great, dabbling with Western philosophies, and Nicholas II, looking to Baltic aristocrats[47]. The recentralisation and strengthening of federal power and of the president was set in motion, and control over the energy sector was regained, leading to greater state interventionism in different sectors and, consequently, a greater capacity of the state to extract resources from society (which after the Georgian war were diverted to strengthen military power) and to pursue a more ambitious foreign policy. At the same time, revolutionary movements both at home and in the 'near abroad', perceived to be driven by external forces, were firmly quelled, and economic and political pressure was brought to bear on some post-Soviet republics.

In foreign policy, the Kremlin expected the West to regard Russia as a serious player and not to criticise its domestic policy. However, he felt betrayed on both counts and as early as 2007 criticised the unipolar order, adopting a nationalist and more confrontational line, which was probably with a view to his historical legacy as Russia's saviour that later lifted it from its kneeling[48]. In this sense, although the period 2009-2012 saw a *reset* in relations due to domestic political changes in the US and Russia, as well as common interests in the international arena, Moscow's subsequent actions (war in Georgia, cyber-attack against Estonia, annexation of Crimea, etc.) were presented as defensive responses to Western policies.

Undoubtedly, developments such as (1) the expansion of NATO, already perceived as an offensive organisation[49], and of the EU to the East; (2) military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq that denied respect for international law; (3) the deployment of the US anti-missile system near Russia's borders that undermined its nuclear power; (4) the outbreak of the colour revolutions, which upset the balance of power in Europe and threatened to 'contaminate' Russian society and lead to regime change in the country; as well as (5) the West's attitude towards the Arab Springs which, after the events in Libya, were identified with the colour revolutions and undermined confidence in Medvedev's project, exacerbated Russia's security problems and reinforced the sense of encirclement. While the postulates of the consensus model continued to be used, such developments, together with the rise in oil prices that accelerated the

47 Kissinger, H. (2011). Pp. 181-192.

48 Galeotti, M. (2020).

49 Lukiyanov, F. (2016). Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest to Restore Russia's Rightful Place. In: *Foreign Affairs* [online]. May/June. [Accessed: 28 May 2021]. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2016-04-18/putins-foreign-policy

Russian economy, led to a resurgence of nationalist, anti-Westernist and (neo)Eurasianist ideas. Following neoclassical realist thinking, such a Kremlin-driven ideological reorientation responds to the need to increase state power.

These currents start from some common underlying assumptions that are currently present in Kremlin rhetoric and official foreign policy documents. First, it is understood that world history is characterised by multipolarity and that North and East Eurasia are an alternative source of civilisational processes. Second, reference is made to the geopolitical synthesis of forest (West) and steppe (East), which underlies the status of the Russian state, key to maintaining cultural and strategic control over Asia and Eastern Europe, contributing to a balance between East and West while the cultural limitations of Western civilisation with its struggle for domination, accompanied by a complete misunderstanding of the culture of the East, only leads to conflict. Thus, while in the international arena multipolarity is promulgated for the maintenance of balance and security, in the regional framework the countries of the 'near abroad' are treated as younger siblings in need of Russia's protection. Third, it is based on the idea of the decline of Western civilisation as a conglomerate of 'chimerical' ethnic groups, so that the centre of gravity will shift towards younger peoples. Today, the relocation of world affairs to the Asia-Pacific is in line with this thesis. In this sense, with Siberia in its possession, Russia is understood to be closer to the new sceptre of gravity of international affairs and must take advantage of this situation. Several Russian intellectuals and think-tanks underlined the need for a comprehensive strategy for the development and integration of Siberia as they believe that Russia's position in the global arena will be determined by the place of its Asian territory in the new economic order[50]. Moscow is thus trying to exploit its potential as a transit country, which can be seen in the development of corridors such as the China-Mongolia-Russia corridor, and by pursuing development programmes in Siberia and the Arctic, as well as close cooperation within regional organisations, such as SCO, APEC, UEE and OSC, which include Asian states.

Of particular importance are the (neo)Eurasianist ideas that were consolidated during Putin's third term in office, in the context of falling oil prices and, consequently, the worsening economic state of the country leading to social protests in 2011-2013, negatively impacting Putin's popularity and calling into question the continuation of the regime. In such a situation, the events in Ukraine, a buffer state, and in Syria, which had a galvanising effect on some of the negative consequences of the previous intervention, served the Kremlin not only to present itself as a great power in the global arena, but also to ensure the continuation of the regime by keeping the population on its side, despite the economic recession and international isolation. The ensuing pressure from the West, and its portrayal by Russian domestic propaganda as similar

50 See Feng, S. (2017). From crisis to a new starting point of reconstruction: A perspective on the Far East and Siberia. In: *Valdai Discussion Club* [online]. 28 November. [Accessed: 09 February 2021]. Available at: https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/from-crisis-to-a-new-starting-point/

to the means employed by Nazi Germany, further contributed to increasing Russian respect for the president[51].

It could be argued that in the period 2012-2016, a process of intermingling between national identity discourse and foreign policy took place as national identity became a first order concern[52]. The political focus shifted to culture as the basis of the 'Russian national idea' and without which it is impossible to secure national interests, with patriotism, moral restoration and religion being the political priorities (with close church-state cooperation)[53]. Following the 2008 financial crisis and the sanctions imposed as a result of the annexation of Crimea, which undermined the Kremlin's ability to fulfil its part of the social contract, such an approach was reinforced by increased control of the media[54] and the restriction of human rights in many areas. The current pandemic also serves as a pretext for the introduction of new restrictions that were framed in the new Constitution and complementary amendments[55].

In search of its place in the international system, Moscow relies on domestic discourses and ideas and reinterprets its history outside global processes and the Atlanticist perspective. Already since the time of Peter the Great the country had defined itself as 'the other', as opposed to the West (and Europe as a whole), represented by the East due to the expansion of the Russian empire in the 19th century. That said, the link between sovereignty and preservation of national identity is emphasised by Putin's assertion that sovereignty and independence in the spheres of spiritual, ideological and foreign policy is an integral part of national character and both globalisation and

51 Trenin, D. (2015).

52 Kremlin (2013). Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. 19 September [online]. [Accessed: 6 February 2021]. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243

53 In 2014, the decree 'Fundamentals of the New State Policy' was signed, which points to the strengthening of the Russian value system and the establishment of the moral orientation of the individual as the only way to unify the nation. See also Kremlin (2015). Russian National Security Strategy. In: *The Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies* [online]. Pp. 3-22. [Accessed: 18 February 2021]. Available at: http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf

54 Kolesnikov, A. (2021). Obshchestvennyy dogovor 3.0» ['Social Counterpoint 3.0']. In: *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* [online]. 1 May. [Accessed: 8 March 2021]. Available at: https://carnegie.ru/2017/05/01/ru-pub-69834; Laruelle, M. (2017). Putin's Regime and the ideological market: A difficult balancing game. In: *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* [online]. 16 March. [Accessed: 14 March 2021]. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/16/putin-s-regime-and-ideological-market-difficult-balancing-game-pub-68250

55 The authorities' ability to filter and block online content and the «law on undesirable foreign agents and organisations» was expanded, as well as a law prohibiting «disrespect for authorities» and another exempting contractors from environmental impact assessments for «transport infrastructure modernisation projects». There was also a reduction in civic activism due to the banning of protests and politically motivated persecution.

the decadent West pose a threat to the preservation of this and to the security of the country[56].

Moreover, as already mentioned, the construction of modern national identity is based not only on modern realities, but also on historical ones, such as the idea of regaining the status of a great power and a strong state with military power, as well as Russia as the 'Third Rome' and the saviour of Europe in the two 'patriotic wars'. This leads to the reinterpretation, from a patriotic perspective, of historical memory; examples are the categorisation, following the growing convergence between Russian nationalism, orthodox creed and communist sentiment, of the victims of the gulag as martyrs of Russian uniqueness and superiority[57], as well as the patriotic reading of Stalin's role in the Second World War[58]. S. Lavrov himself gave an interpretation of the history of the nation, from which the specific value system and shaping of a national identity is derived, which has given rise to a distinct personality; taking into account the history and power, understood from the traditional approach, it is stated that understanding with the West has to go together with the West's recognition of Russia's status as a great power and respect for the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the country[59,60].

Along the same lines, I. Zevelev, conducting a thorough analysis of Russian intellectual circles, argues that such discourse is driven by Moscow's sense of insecurity and the search for securitisation of national identity narratives, which stems from a specific worldview and ideological conceptions[61]. In this sense, the historical problems in the West's recognition of Russia as a great power are largely due to differences in governance; weak economic and social foundations mean that the Kremlin has to 'shout' in pursuit of its goals at home and abroad. The promotion of the concepts of *Ruskiy*

56 Kremlin (2014). Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly. 4 December [online]. [Accessed: 6 February 2021]. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47173

57 Such an interpretation presents all victims as martyrs who by their sacrifice have contributed to the future collective success of their country. Narratives of nationalism of despair have become ideas of national belonging. See Sniegon, T. (2019). Dying in the Soviet gulag for the future glory of Mother Russia? Making 'patriotic' sense of the gulag in present-day Russia. In: Bernsandt, N. and Törnquist-Plewa, B. (eds.) 2018. Pp. 105-140.

58 According to polls, since the 2000s, the number of critics has fallen to an all-time low: compared to 34% in 1997, only 12% attribute the USSR's heavy human losses during the war to Stalin. See Levada Centre (2017). El número de críticos del papel de Stalin en la guerra disminuyó al mínimo histórico. 22 June [online]. [Accessed: 29 April 2021]. Available at: https://www.levada.ru/2017/06/22/chislo-kritikov-roli-stalina-v-vojne-snizilos-do-istoricheskogo-minimuma/

59 This stems from the fact that in the Russian mentality the concept of «sovereignty» is closely related to that of 'sovereign equality'. See Trenin (2015).

60 Lavrov, S. (2016). Russia's foreign policy in a historical perspective. In: *Russia in global affairs* [online]. April/June, issue 2. [Accessed: 26 February 2021]. Available at: https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/russias-foreign-policy-in-a-historical-perspective/

61 Zevelev, I. (2016).

Mir and Russia as an independent great power opposing the revolutionary forces and liberal ideas imposed by the West, as well as 'foreign adventures' are key to the legitimisation of the regime and securitisation of Russian influence.

Ironically, Putin's advocacy of a Russia in many ways different from the West parallels the actions of many Russian leaders who preceded him[62]. Such efforts to convince Russians that they are different from the West and fighting against malign cultural and geopolitical forces is to show that they are going against the grain. The Kremlin is conducting shock propaganda full of nationalist themes and stereotypes about «enemies» to manipulate public opinion and maintain political control, increasing the sense of external threat and the need for a leader [63].

Today, Russia does not fully meet the criteria for claiming great power status. In this vein, it should be noted that the Russian perception of great power identity differs substantially from the Western understanding, especially with regard to soft power[64], often framed in geopolitical terms, which is understood as anything that is not hard/military power. Yet, after events in Ukraine and Syria undermined Russia's external image, in his claim to great power status Putin, in addition to the traditional elements of power, was introducing forms of soft power such as science, culture and diplomacy. Although the president does not wield as much power as his Soviet predecessors, Russia is also not the weak state it was in the 1990s. Despite negative demographic trends and the rollback of market reforms, it is one of the most powerful countries in the world with military, cyber, economic and ideological power[65].

Undoubtedly, since 2000, Russia has been making progress in the area of national security. Some intellectuals point out that this trend was reinforced after Crimea's union with the Federation, which created a consensus among Russian elites and population ('post-Crimea consensus') that meant the acceptance of economic hardship by the population in exchange for Russia's status as a global power[66]. Thus, as RT's M. Simonian pointed out, Putin was elected president for the fourth time and became the

62 Galeotti, M. (2020).

63 Baldoni, G. (2016). A theoretical analysis of Russian foreign policy: Changes under Vladimir Putin. In: *E-International Relations* [online], p. 16. [Accessed: 10 February 2021]. Available at: https://www.e-ir.info/2016/09/10/a-theorical-analysis-of-russian-foreign-policy-changes-under-vladimir-putin/

64 See Kisileva, Y. (2015). Russia's soft power discourse: Identity, status and the attraction of power. *Politics* [online]. Political Studies Assosiation, vol. 35(3-4), pp. 322-323. DOI 10.1111/1467-9256.12100. [Accessed: 25 April 2021]. Available at: https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/default/files/Kiseleva-2015-Politics.pdf

65 Mcfaul, M. (2021).

66 Morozov, A. (2015). Postkrimskiy konsensus [Post-Crimean consensus]. In: *Ruskiy Zhurnal* [online]. 19 January. [Accessed: 29 February 2021]. Available at: http://www.russ.ru/Mirovaya-povestka/Postkrymskij-konsensus; Trenin, D. (2015). *Rossiya i mir v XXI veke* [Russia in the 21st century] [online]. Moscow, Eksmo. ISBN 978-5-699-84586-6. [Accessed: 10 March 2021]. Available at: http://loveread.ec/read_book.php?id=51215&p=1

Federation's *'vozhd'*. Although the president has been losing popularity and his grip on power has weakened, the regime is likely to survive through the use of the continuing crisis by exploiting frozen conflicts and disinformation campaigns. Currently, in the context of the pandemic, Russia has already been accused of resorting to disinformation tactics to discredit Western vaccines[67], while the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is being used to pressure the Biden administration and boost the regime's popularity. The relationship with Western countries continues to be marked by sanctions, cyber interventions, expulsions of diplomats and human rights violations. Both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) pursue a twin-track policy with Russia, engaging in dialogue on issues of common interest and imposing economic sanctions[68].

The current confrontation between the West and Russia results in the weakening of the Westernist component within the country, which has been losing its influence since the 'Yeltsin era', which has a negative impact on its relations with the West. It is true that, in the context of the disappearance of borders in the 21st century, the adoption of the postulates of the Slavophile, and especially (neo)Eurasianist, current is logical as it provides a rational alternative to communism, helps to unite all peoples into one nation (although it is questionable from an ethnic perspective) and fits Russian history and geography[69]. Thus, in his speech at the 17th Annual Session of the Valdai Club, the Russian president again underlined the importance of (neo)Eurasianist postulates: a strong state, derived from military power and the will of citizens to delegate broad powers to the elected government, as a basic condition for Russia's security and development; the individuality of the political system and the development path of each country, determined by history, traditions, and moral values; the risks of 'imported democracy'; and that a strong, free and independent civil society is, by definition, sovereign and nationally oriented, patriotic, collectivist, creative, efficient and strong-willed.

In contrast to the idea of M. McFaul[70], who sees Russia as a revisionist country, the Russian president affirmed the need to preserve the basic mechanisms for the maintenance of international security (UN) but with a corrected institutional structure, and mentioned the positive experiences of regional/international cooperation in which the country has participated (SCO, OPEC+, Astana format, etc.), these being sometimes more productive taking into account the multipolarity of the international system, and the importance of non-intervention of external forces, which are guided by their

67 Cook, L. (2021). La UE acusa a Rusia de diseminar noticias falsas sobre vacuna. *AP News* [online]. 28 April. [Accessed: 30 September 2021]. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/656f452ffc7f932a474dfd3d50c422b2

68 Colas, X. (2021). The US UU. y UE amplifican sus sanciones a Rusia por el «caso Navalny». *El Mundo* [online]. 2 March. [Accessed: 30 September 2021]. Available at: https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2021/03/02/603e4ef321efa094218b4660.html

69 Kaplan, R. (2015). P. 120.

70 Mcfaul, M. (2021).

ambitions in a process that affects a certain circle of players who can agree among themselves. [71]

As S. Kotkin pointed out, Eurasianism is simply another expression of the perception of uniqueness and messianism that the country has assumed throughout its history: from the concept of 'Third Rome' to the 'Pan-Slavic Kingdom' and from the 'world centre' of Communism to Eurasianism[72]. Still, after the events in Ukraine and in the context of the current pandemic, it can be argued that there is a return to a certain pragmatism with the establishment of the notion of *Greater Eurasia*[73] as the flagship of the Russian integration project.

Conclusions

After 1991, Westernist and (neo)Eurasianist currents attempted to respond to Russia's strategic personality dilemmas. While the former was present during Yeltsin's presidency, the latter gained weight with Putin's rise to power.

Such an ideological reorientation is the result of external shocks in the international system, as well as internal shocks in the Russian domestic arena. Even in the face of divergent perceptions of the way forward for the nation, both schools converge on the existence of several fundamental realities that shape the country's strategic personality and have influenced its relationship with the West, although they interpret them from different perspectives: the messianic character of the Russian people and the importance of anthropological and spiritual interests, the recourse to the civilisational basis and the continental factor from which its self-perception as a great power derives.

Similar assumptions are mentioned in the Western literature on Russia's strategic personality, in which a special focus is placed on the civilisational identity that integrates Soviet and imperial elements; the collectivist character of the Russian people; the fear of homogenisation and territorial disintegration; Russia's perception of its role in religion and history, which results in a hierarchical relationship with its 'near abroad'; a permanent search for security, due to its geography, which explains the preference for strong authoritarian rulers as well as its expansionism; and a unique position that leads to the claim of superpower status and explains Russian revisionism.

71 Kleimans, H. (2020). Putin's speech at the 17th Annual Session of the Valdai Club. *El País* [online]. 26 October. [Accessed: 24 March 2021]. Available at: https://www.elpaisdigital.com.ar/contenido/discurso-de-putin-en-la-xvii-sesin-anual-del-club-valdi/28791

72 Kotkin, S. (2016). Russia's Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern. *Council on Foreign Relations* [online]. May-June 2016, 95 (3), p. 3. [Accessed: 9 June 2021]. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4394685?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

73 China's influence is recognised and is to be mitigated through closer ties with other Asian states.

The early years of the newly created Federation were marked by cooperation with the West, as the country was focused on its internal problems and needed Western assistance for modernisation, and hope for a rapid transition. The euphoria faded due to Russia's internal problems, as well as Western actions that threatened the Kremlin's vital interests. Thus, the geopolitical consensus model was formulated and implemented with the formation of an 'agreement' on Russia's identity as a great power in the context of a multipolar order, based on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, and the need to form a strong and independent state to maintain order and stability. Also, due to internal threats, during President Putin's first years an attempt was made to create a relationship based on partnership, while the Primakov doctrine was implemented to maintain balance with the West.

Although the period 2009-2012 saw a reset in relations, after 2004 the relationship worsened due to various disagreements and Moscow's subsequent behaviour was presented as a defensive response to Western policies, whose actions further exacerbated Russia's security problems. Such Western behaviour, coupled with Russia's economic improvement, led to a resurgence of nationalist, anti-Western and (neo)Eurasianist ideas. These ideas, and especially (neo)Eurasianist ones, were consolidated during Putin's third term in office, in the context of the country's worsening economic state that led to social protests, which have called into question the continuity of the regime.

A process of intermingling took place between the discourse of national identity and foreign policy as the former became the main concern, with patriotism, moral restoration and religion becoming the political priorities. Moscow drew on domestic discourses and ideas and reinterpreted its history outside global processes and the Atlanticist perspective, formulating the new national identity from modern and historical realities. At the same time, the West and globalisation were branded as threats to the preservation of the country's national identity and security. Thus, the promotion of the concepts of *Ruskiy Mir* and Russia as an independent great power opposing revolutionary forces and Western-imposed liberal ideas, as well as 'foreign adventures' were key to the legitimisation of the regime and securitisation of Russian influence. Still, in the context of worsening relations and the pandemic, recent years have seen a return to a certain pragmatism.

The Kremlin's actions in the global arena are in line with its security concerns. Among them, the loss of power status, which could result in the loss of the country's territorial integrity and political independence, continues to be identified as a vital threat. Such a loss is understood to be due to US hegemonic desires, with the spread of liberal democracy and intervention in the domestic affairs of countries creating dangerous precedents for the stability of the Federation (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq and Syria) and its influence in the world, and especially in its immediate neighbourhood (colour revolutions). Such internal and external security problems have pushed the Putin regime to reinterpret the country's national identity and pursue a more conservative foreign policy with clear (neo)Eurasianist overtones.

Moreover, while its actions have been presented as responses to Western hegemonic desires, the West has defined the country as revisionist. While it is true that the

country pursues a two-sided policy, Russia, although not directly confrontational, has always disagreed with some dynamics (NATO expansion, military interventions outside the UN and US hegemony) but continues to defend the organisations of the international system, while stressing the need to adjust them to the multipolar order.

Although President Putin has been losing popularity and his grip on power has weakened, the regime is likely to survive through the use of the continuing crisis by exploiting frozen conflicts and disinformation campaigns. Undoubtedly, the current confrontation with the West results in the weakening of the Westernist component within Russia, which was already losing its influence since the 'Yeltsin era', which has a negative impact on its relations with the West. It is likely that the relationship with Western countries will continue to be marked by certain 'clashes' and that both the EU and the US will pursue a twin-track policy with Russia.

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A2/AD capabilities. the awakening of the West in front of the dragon's nest

Abstract

The article analyzes the concept of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD), it considers its capabilities and the challenges they represent. Due to the relevance it implies, to understand the operational problem presented by the A2/AD, it has been supplemented with an explanation, a historical review of the United States' thought development, operational concepts, strategic orientation and the possible answers it raises.

As a case study, the one from The People's Republic of China has been examined, cataloguing its A2/AD and addressing the problem from a strategic, doctrinal and operational level, under the prism of the use of aerospace power.

Keywords

A2/AD, anti-access, area denial, offset strategy, United States, China, security, defense, capabilities, threats.

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Introduction

Since the end of World War II (WWII), US military dominance of the international system has been evident. Its military forces have generally enjoyed unrestricted access to the global commons of sea, air, space and cyberspace, which has facilitated the access of its military power to areas of operations. Over the past two decades, the US war experience has required different capabilities and a different way of fighting from those needed to deal with a 'peer competitor'[1]. The latter, coupled with the unrestricted access discussed above, has contributed to the US shifting its attention to other planning priorities rather than securing the necessary operational access.

Today, as globalisation has intensified the worldwide spread of advanced military technologies, making them more accessible, the US is losing military superiority. As stated in the US National Defense Strategy, which openly acknowledges that the competitive military advantage enjoyed by its military forces has been eroding. As a result, the primary national security concern is not terrorism, but the strategic competition between states[2].

Thus, over the last twenty years, countries such as the People's Republic of China (hereafter China) and Russia have improved their economic situation and military capabilities and, in their quest to overhaul the established international order and achieve regional hegemony, are trying to weaken US influence in their areas of influence. Both countries have deployed sophisticated sensor networks and long-range weaponry along their borders and occupied territories. Deployment which, while ostensibly a defensive posture to protect its territories, also allows it to degrade the projection capacity of the US and other powers in the event of having to intervene in its neighbourhood[3].

In this context of growing strategic rivalry in various areas of the world, the concept of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities has become a focus of attention. Especially when, as potential adversaries enhance their A2/AD capabilities, US and allied capabilities are degraded, and at the same time, they may be hindered from accessing global common spaces[4].

The scope, lethality and sophistication of this array of anti-access and area denial systems constitute an unprecedented range of capabilities that threatens the projection and manoeuvre model of US and allied forces. Unless these challenges are not coun-

1 Clark, B., Gunzinger, M. and Sloman, J. (2017). Winning in the Gray Zone. *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)*, p. 1.

2 Department of Defense - United States of America (2019).. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. *Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge,* p.2.

3 Clark, B. *Op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

4 Fukuda, J. (2015). Counteracting China's Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilites. *Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS)*. Volume 6, Issue 1.

tered, it requires operating at much higher levels of risk and at greater distances from areas of interest, affecting the credibility of the US as a guarantor of international security[5]. In short, the conventional deterrence model will be compromised, the impact of the forward presence of US military power on regional stability will be limited and its reputation as a superpower will be damaged[6].

Conceptualisation of A2/AD capabilities

The use of A2/AD as a strategy has existed throughout the history of warfare. In World War II, for example, German submarine operations in the North Atlantic were aimed at preventing the deployment and supply of US forces in Europe. During the Cold War, US A2/AD strategies focused on preventing a Soviet offensive against Western Europe. The origins of the current A2/AD debate date back to the early 1990s, when the US military became increasingly concerned with the proliferation of WMD threats, ballistic and cruise missiles, and subsequently with the spread of advanced military technologies[7].

During the Cold War period, the US defence posture was based on the permanent deployment of forces abroad as part of a military strategy that emphasised deterrence and forward defence, so that major combat formations were stationed in Europe and Asia, with additional forces rotated periodically. This posture was effective and possible because on the US side there was a clear understanding of the major security threats, a high confidence as to where major acts of aggression might occur, and a belief that forward bases were reasonably safe, even in the event of enemy attack, conditions that no longer exist[8].

With the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989 and of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, US combat forces have been redeploying to the mainland and adapting to the expeditionary era[9]. It was an era in which potential adversaries seek asymmetric ways to oppose the movement of US military forces in their region, presenting very differ-

5 HUTCHENS, M., *et al.* (2017). Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons. A New Joint Operational Concept. *JFQ* 84, p. 135.

6 Colom, G. (2015). Rumsfeld Revisited: la tercera estrategia de compensación estadounidense. *Revista UNISCI*. Issue 38, p. 77.

7 BITZINGER, R., et al. (2017). Countering Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges. Strategies and Capabilities. *RSiS*, pp. 19-20.

8 Krepinevich, A., Watts, B. and Work, R. (2003). Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge. *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)*, p. 1.

9 In 2001, the *Global Strike Task Force* (GSTF) concept was introduced as the next step in the transformation of the US Air Force (USAF), emphasising the 'home-based, expeditionary force' as opposed to the 'forward basing overseas' of the Cold War. [*Ibid.* p. 11.].

ent challenges to those that allied forces faced during the Gulf War, or the more recent operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

The new challenges the US will have to face, coupled with political constraints (unlimited access to allied bases cannot be assumed) and geographical (depending on where the conflict takes place) and resource constraints (possible coincidence of several conflicts simultaneously), mean that the projection of forces to major ports and airfields is becoming increasingly complicated and operations are taking on a higher risk[10].

The threats that contribute to jeopardising the foundations of US military-technological and geopolitical supremacy come from different fronts and in different forms. On the one hand, there are the challenges that present a high level of military-technological sophistication, such as the anti-access and area denial threat posed by China in the Asia-Pacific theatre and, to a lesser extent, Russian military modernisation. On the other hand, there are much smaller adversaries that opt for asymmetric forms of fighting, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Daesh in Syria and Iraq, and jihadist groups in Africa. Finally, there are middle powers such as Iran and Pakistan, which exhibit 'mixed' strategies, alternating capabilities of medium-high technological value with asymmetric forms of warfare[11]. This paper will address only those challenges that present a high level of military-technological sophistication, analysing China's model.

The concepts of A2/AD capabilities are generally presented interchangeably, referring to both defensive and offensive asymmetric measures that restrict deployments of military forces to a particular theatre of operations (anti-access), and deny freedom of movement of deployed forces (area denial). However, their actions and potential effects can be better conceptualised if done separately[12].

Anti-access measures (A2)

The term anti-access means the action of hindering or obstructing the projection of military forces of other nations into a given area. A2 measures comprise any action taken by an opponent that has the effect of slowing the deployment of military forces to a theatre of operations (TO), preventing them from operating from certain locations within that TO or causing them to operate from distances further away from the focus of the conflict[13].

10 *Ibid.,* pp. 1-3.

11 Simón, L. (2015). Offset strategy: ¿hacia un nuevo paradigma de defensa de EE. UU.? *Real Instituto Elcano*. ARI 14/2015, p. 2.

12 Bitzinger, R. 2017. *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

13 CLIFF, R., *et al.* (2007). Entering the Dragon's Lair. Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States. *RAND Corporation*, p. 11.

The challenges presented by these A2 actions can be projected across the entire spectrum of conflict, ranging from the establishment of political and/or economic exclusion zones, to the use of military instruments involving the denial of transit, parking or overflight rights. At the highest levels of conflict, these actions can involve the use of force, ranging from attacks on air bases, ports and aircraft carriers, through the use of long-range ballistic missiles, submarines, weapons of mass destruction, or operations from space and cyberspace.

The strategic objective of these A2 measures is to prevent additional forces from being deployed in TO, to impose high economic and operational costs, to «shape» the adversary's strategic options and to succeed in preventing his intervention or an escalation of the conflict[14]. Thus, A2 measures can also be seen as an asymmetric 'cost imposition' strategy to deter and defeat a technologically superior adversary.

Area denial measures (AD)

The term area denial means the action of hindering or obstructing the operation of other nations within a given area. AD measures encompass any action that denies the opponent's capabilities and freedom of action, providing a decisive TO advantage at the operational and tactical levels. AD operations challenge the ability to maintain local air, land and maritime superiority; superiority and security in space and cyberspace; and the ability to conduct joint operations in certain areas of the conflict zone. AD measures act as a 'kind of barrier' against the operations of opposing air, sea and land forces.

The strategic objective of these AD actions is to influence the adversary's strategic calculations prior to the escalation of the conflict by introducing various unknowns into his planning, such as increasing the level of operational risk and uncertainty in estimating the likely outcome of a decision to use force.

Like A2 measures, AD measures use a wide range of capabilities such as the use of missiles, integrated air defences, electronic and cyber warfare, counter-satellite operations, as well as the use of non-military, non-conventional actors or local 'proxies' that increase levels of resistance in certain areas[15].

Security concerns are heightened by the increasing proliferation of missile technology and commercial satellite services that will allow even terrorist regimes, failed states, or regional actors to access and target any key fixed installation, as well as monitor deployments of military forces to forward bases. It is highest when such adversaries have the possibility and threat of using chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Enhanced Warhead) missiles[16].

14 Bitzinger, R. 2017. *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 20.

16 Krepinevich, A. *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

In order to make entry into a TO or freedom of action once inside more difficult and to degrade the effectiveness of operations against their A2/AD capabilities, states developing and deploying A2/AD capabilities could adopt the following complementary measures[17]:

- Deny political access, through alliances or threats to neighbouring countries.
- Deny geographical access.
- Reinforce fixed targets (command centres, weapons production and storage facilities, etc.).
- Establish sanctuaries, positioning their military forces in non-combatant neighbourhoods or near cultural sites.
- Increase their survival and effectiveness, through mobility, dispersal and deception.
- Conduct information operations and unconventional attacks against embarkation and disembarkation areas.

Having conceptualised the term A2/AD, it should be mentioned that it has its detractors. Like Admiral John Richardson who considers A2/AD to be a loosely distributed term lacking a precise definition, it conveys a variety of vague or conflicting ideas depending on the context in which it is used (exclusion zone, family of technologies or even strategy) so the US Navy should avoid using it as a stand-alone acronym[18]. Richardson criticises the term as unrelated to the broader history of naval strategy, focusing too much on the idea of defensive bubbles, without contemplating the complexity of fighting inside and outside defence systems. He therefore advocates more flexible language to discuss the US Navy's needs and priorities in a variety of different theatres.

Other analysts see the A2/AD debate as primarily about the future rather than the present, arguing that the main reason for concern lies not with China's current arsenal, but rather with continuing trends in procurement and the development of employment techniques, the maturation of which could take decades or even generations[19].

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7

18 There are four reasons the Admiral advocates for avoiding its use: «A2AD» is not a new phenomenon; the term «denial», as in «anti-access/area denial» is too often taken as a fait accompli, when it is an aspiration, as achieving success requires completing a complex chain of events, each of which is vulnerable and can be disrupted; A2AD is inherently defence-oriented; and the A2AD problem is challenging, but well understood. [Richardson, J. (2016). Deconstructing A2AD. *The National Interest*. October.].

19 Biddle, S. And Oerlich, I. (2016). Future Warfare in the Western Pacific. Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia. *International Security*, Vol. 41, Issue 1 (Summer), p. 10.

Depending on the scenario and the countries incorporating A2/AD measures, there are differences that acquire specific characteristics and singularities. For example, Russia, in response to NATO, has already established 'bubbles' or large A2/AD zones since the beginning of the Cold War, around the Baltic states, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arctic. These A2/AD bubbles, which still exist, are based on the integration of surface-to-air missiles and interdiction fighters, allowing the denial of the use of air and sea space in these regions (although they are not impenetrable) and limiting the movement of ships and ground forces in times of crisis[20]. Over the past decade, its armed forces have acquired and deployed modern weapons systems that have increased their mobility and combat readiness, demonstrating in operations in Ukraine and Syria new high-tech capabilities such as long-range precision strike with cruise missiles and guided bombs, and the use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPAS)[21] to detect targets, reflecting a high level of sophistication[22].

As another example, Iran is attempting to develop and deploy a range of A2/AD capabilities in the Persian Gulf with military technical support from China, North Korea and Russia, which could jeopardise maritime navigation and also the oil and gas production infrastructures of other states in the region. The implementation of these capabilities has singularities that compared to China, although obviously they cannot be equalled, have advantages such as geography, as it is a smaller area with its particular orography and with a 'bottleneck', the Strait of Hormuz[23], which undoubtedly confer operational differences that will affect the development and subsequent use of its A2/AD capabilities.

Implementation of an A2/AD strategy. China versus the US

Potential US adversaries have studied the characteristics of the new American style of warfare, have equipped themselves with the technological means[24] and related capa-

20 Bitzinger, R. (2017). *Op. cit.,* p. 34.

21 *Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems* (RPAS): *Unmanned Aircraft Systems* (UAS), *Unmanned Aerial Systems* (UAS), *Unmanned Air Vehicles* (UAV), or simply drones. [Ruiz, F. (2013). The importance of RPAS/UAS for the European Union. *Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies*. Opinion Paper 78/2013.].

22 Currently, A2/AD capabilities are mainly based on three fairly new systems: the S-400 anti-aircraft system, the *Bastion* anti-ship system and the *Iskander* ballistic (ground-targeting missile system). [Dalsjö, R., Berglund, C. and Jonsson, M. (2019). Bursting the Bubble. Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications. *FOI—4651--SE*. March, pp. 10-25.].

23 Krepinevich, A. (2010). Why AirSea Battle? *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA)*, p. 27.

24 C4ISTAR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information/Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting Acquisition and Reconnaissance) systems to digitise the battlefield, smart weapons to accurately engage enemy targets, and stealth or unmanned platforms to enter risky areas without being shot down.

bilities[25] and are developing specific measures, such as A2/AD or hybrid strategies, to prevent the US from being able to project its war power and exploit its military-technological potential[26]. These measures pose economic, operational, strategic and political costs that make it impossible to maintain the current US strategic defence paradigm based on forward presence and power projection[27].

China's establishment of A2/AD capabilities vis-à-vis the US gives it several advantages, the main one being that it enjoys geographic location. In the event of any possible conflict in the East and South China Seas[28], most of its forces are already positioned in the vicinity and could be used for A2/AD operations. In addition, it has reinforcements on occupied islands in these seas, such as the heavily militarised Woody Island in the Paracel Islands archipelago[29]. It also has the recent construction of important military infrastructure on the artificial islands in the Spratlys, such as the three new airfields with runway lengths long enough for any aircraft in the Chinese inventory to operate[30]. This forward presence significantly extends the reach of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) operations[31] and, at the same time, serves as a first defensive barrier.

Over the past fifteen years, the PLA has acquired considerable hardware that enhances A2/AD capabilities, mainly benefiting the forces that control missiles in China[32] and, in particular, the air force, which has significantly improved its air defence system and now has one of the largest and most advanced forces of long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems in the world. The recent acquisition of several hundred fourth generation and fourth generation plus fighter aircraft, as well as the aggressive expansion of the US arsenal of ballistic and ground-attack cruise missiles, have provided it with enhanced long-range precision strike capabilities that place US military forces

25 Joint action, dispersed operations, special forces and cyber warfare.

26 Colom, G. (2015). Air Power in the Third Offset Strategy. *Revista de Aeronáutica y Astronáutica*, May, pp. 384-385.

27 Colom, G. (2015a). *Op. cit.,* p. 77.

28 It represents a semi-enclosed space with an area of about 3.5 million km^2 of considerable geopolitical importance. More than half of the total tonnage of the world's merchant fleet and one third of the world's shipping traffic passes through straits in this region (Malacca, Sunda, Lombok).

29 There are four groupings of archipelagos in the South China Sea: the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, Macclesfield Bank and Pratas Reef. The Paracels are currently claimed by Vietnam, Taiwan and China (occupied by the latter in full since 1974), Macclesfield Bank is claimed in full by China and Taiwan and in part by the Philippines, while the Spratlys are claimed in full by China, Taiwan and Vietnam, and in part by the Philippines and Malaysia (Brunei only claims maritime space within that archipelago). [Granados, U. (2016). Las islas Spratly: internacionalización de un conflicto regional. 22 February. Available at: https://www.redalyc.org/jatsRepo/4337/433753443004/html/index.html].

30 One of its reefs, the 'Fiery Cross Reef', has a 3,000-metre-long airstrip.

31 The 'People's Liberation Army'.

32 Navy (*PLA Navy*), Air Force (*PLA Air Force*) and Missile Force (*PLA Rocket Force*).

and allied bases in the Western Pacific (including Guam, Okinawa and Taiwan) under new threats[33].

All this hardware development is being supported by a number of other software developments, namely improvements in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR); communications, reconnaissance, navigation satellites; RPAS[34] for surveillance and attack; secure communications and secure data networking; and a digitised command and control system. Recent US Department of Defense (DoD) reports on Chinese military power suggest that offensive cyberspace operations could support its A2/AD capabilities, particularly in the use of anti-satellite (ASAT) systems to destroy enemy satellites[35].

In projecting US military power into distant areas such as the Western Pacific, the main disadvantage it faces is distance. The US territories of Hawaii or even Guam[36] are respectively 10,700 km and 3,150 km away from the South China Sea. Moreover, in the event of conflict, most of the US allied bases where they have forces deployed are not well placed to be of assistance. For example, in Japan, the US naval forces in Okinawa are about 1,800 km away and in Yokosuka about 3,200 km away. Thanks to the fact that in 2014, Washington and Manila signed a new Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) allowing access to military bases in the Philippines, the US could have facilities located about 800 km away from the South China Sea[37].

Another disadvantage for the US is the uncertain involvement of its allies in the Asia-Pacific region in the event of a conflict between China and the US. Although it is very likely that it would drag some of them along, it is not certain how countries such as South Korea, Japan and Australia would contribute, bearing in mind that US military doctrine advocates deep-strike missions that could generate situations of conflict escalation[38].

In projecting power and accessing environments with strong A2/AD defences, Washington considers that its armed forces face four major operational problems[39]:

33 Bitzinger, R. (2017). *Op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

34 See note 22.

35 Bitzinger, R. (2016). Third Offset Strategy and Chinese A2/AD Capabilities. *Center for a New American Security*, pp. 3-4.

36 The US has considerable military power at its disposal, including B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers.

37 The agreement provides for the use of 8 bases. Its forces rotate in these facilities along the lines of the 'US Joint Special Operation Task Force-Philippines' (JSTOF-P) in Mindanao and Darwin (Australia) with forward operational presence and pre-positioning of assets.

38 Bitzinger, R. (2017). *Op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

39 Martinage, R. (2014). Toward a New Offset Strategy. Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Golbal Power Projection Capability. *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)*.

- The increasing vulnerability of facilities where US forces are deployed.
- Their adversaries are equipping themselves with strategic C4ISTAR assets capable of detecting, identifying and tracking the movements of surface ships from great distances, and are equipping themselves with anti-ship missiles to sink them before they reach the coast.
- The fourth-generation aircraft40 represent the bulk of its fleet, lack stealth technology and are vulnerable to enemy anti-aircraft defences.
- Satellites and the capabilities they provide (global positioning, navigation, intelligence, observation, communications, etc.) are increasingly vulnerable to physical or cyber attacks41.

In order to accommodate its security architecture to the international environment, and conditioned by the proliferation of new security risks, the narrowing of the military gap with its rivals and the financial crisis, the US requires a new strategic model that seeks to maintain both the supremacy of its armies on the battlefield and the ability to project its power globally while reducing defence spending[42].

Historical development of operational concepts for countering A2/AD capabilities

The use of A2/AD capabilities as a strategy has existed throughout the history of warfare, with recent years witnessing the progressive adoption by China, Russia and other US strategic competitors of some of the technologies, capabilities and operational concepts that were developed by the US in the 1970s and 1980s and that have sustained its technological and strategic leadership for more than three decades. Its main geopolitical adversaries, especially China, have been compensating for this technological gap by putting its projection capacity at risk[43].

Today, the A2/AD capabilities that countries such as China and Russia have been equipping themselves with not only include what are considered traditional capabilities such as aircraft, submarines, mines and missiles, but also encompass emerging capabilities in all domains, including space and cyberspace[44]. Moreover, as Sonne points out: «[Russia and China] *have learned from what we have done, they have learned from*

40 The most representative of the fourth generation include: F-15, F-16, F/A-18 and the MiG-29.

41 Colom, G. (2015a). *Op. cit.,* p. 76.

42 *Ibid.,* pp. 72-73.

43 Bitzinger, R. (2017). *Op. cit.,* pp. 19-28.

44 Hutchens, M. *Op. cit.,* p. 135.

our success», serving to prepare them for a type of high-intensity warfare[45], which the US has not faced for many years[46]. The events of 11 September 2001 forced a rethinking of the country's defence to focus on addressing the problems that arose during the War on Terror (stabilisation, military support for reconstruction, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism) rather than preparing for future conflicts[47].

For all of the above reasons, the expeditionary and precision paradigm that emerged from the second offset strategy[48] has entered into crisis for financial, political and strategic-technological reasons, the latter being the main one. In order to regain its hegemony, the US DoD has been developing new operational concepts, capabilities and technologies over the past decade[49], which will be discussed below.

In July 2009, recognising the growing challenge posed by anti-access and area denial capabilities, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates unveiled a new operational concept called 'Air-Sea Battle' (ASB) to enhance US military expeditionary power projection capabilities and strategies, access its forward bases and ensure the necessary freedom of movement across potential battle spaces[50].

It is a limited operational concept, which identifies both the actions needed to defeat such threats and the investments required to carry them out[51]. The central idea is to develop networked integrated air and naval forces capable of conducting attacks in depth (NIA) by applying operations in the different combat domains to destabilise,

45 The spectrum of conflict ranges from peacetime actions, to generalised high-intensity combat, to a transitional zone (non-peace/non-war). In high-intensity environments, the military opposition is organised and has combat power with a high capacity for physical destruction. Conventional combat operations predominate, although these may be combined with asymmetric-type actions. Ministry of Defence (2018). Publicación Doctrinal Conjunta PDC-01 (A). *Doctrine for the employment of the Armed Forces*, pp. 90-91.

46 Sonne, P. and Harris, S. (2018). U.S. Military Edge Has Eroded to A Dangerous Degree. *Study for Congress Finds. The Washington Post.* 14 November.

47 Colom, G. (2015a). *Op. cit.,* pp. 72-73.

48 The first 'New Look' offset strategy was developed in the 1950s. The Eisenhower Administration identified US leadership in nuclear technology and long-range bombers and missiles as the most efficient way to offset Soviet conventional superiority. By the mid-1970s, after the Soviet Union had devoted much effort to building up its nuclear arsenal, it had nuclear parity and a three-to-one conventional advantage. This situation endangered the strategic and geopolitical balance in Europe and, in response, a second 'Offset Strategy' emerged, based on US technological and industrial superiority that made possible substantial advances in precision weapons, stealth technologies and communication, computing, surveillance, reconnaissance, information and navigation systems in combat, which would later lead to the creation of GPS and the Internet.

49 Simón. L. *Op. cit.,* pp. 2-7.

50 BItzinger, R. (2017). *Op. cit.,* p. 23.

51 Cordesman, A., Hess, A. and Yarosh, N. (2013). Chinese Military Modernisation and Force Development. A Western Perspective. *Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)*, p. 189.

destroy and defeat (D3) the adversary's A2/AD capabilities and provide maximum operational advantage to own forces (NIA/D3)[52].

Critics of this operational concept argued that its successful implementation was conditioned by a number of factors, such as the vulnerabilities of US forward bases and deployed forces; the ability of stealthy[53] and unmanned aircraft to penetrate enemy air defences and damage C4ISR networks; and the possible measures taken by the adversary (dispersal of its A2/AD assets to increase survivability) to counter US actions. In addition to the above, the ASB operational concept amplified the inherent risks of an escalation of the conflict, particularly at the nuclear level, and did not establish clear lines of interoperability, roles and missions for US allies in the conflict region, omitting their possible involvement at different levels, political, strategic and operational[54].

At the same time as the ASB concept generated uncertainties and posed different operational risks, the debate to counter the challenges presented by A2/AD capabilities shifted towards an alternative of 'indirect' strategies, prioritising deterrence, prevention, surveillance and intelligence, and defence diplomacy, to the detriment of direct military intervention. Where air and naval operations outside the range of A2/AD systems and the imposition of economic costs and military pressure on the adversary were considered[5556]. A clear example is the 'Offshore Control' concept, which consists of the US adopting an A2/AD strategy in the Asia-Pacific theatre with the aim of intercepting Chinese imports of energy, raw materials and industrial exports. It establishes a set of concentric rings of defence and air and sea space dominance inside and outside the first island chain, denying China the use of the sea inside this chain. In addition, penetration of Chinese airspace is expressly prohibited in order to reduce the possibility of nuclear escalation and to facilitate the termination of the conflict[57].

In an effort to improve the ASB operational concept so that it could address current and future 'contested environments', it was renamed the 'Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons' (JAM-CG) in October 2016. As Hutchens quotes: «*It is a joint concept built on the ASB chassis*»[58]. Some important ideas can be

52 '*Networked, Integrated Attack-in-Depth*' *disrupt/destroy/defeat* (NIA/D3).

53 Stealth or very low observability technology is achieved by a combination of several techniques: shape geometry (design with angular shapes), the use of composite (non-metallic) materials, the application of radar absorbing paint and the use of passive sensors.

54 Bitzinger, R. (2017). *Op. cit.,* p. 24.

55 *Ibid.,* p. 24.

56 Simón, L. *Op. cit.,* p. 6.

57 Hammes, T. (2012). Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict. *Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS)*. Pp. 3-5.

58 Hutchens, M. *Op. cit.,* p. 136.

gleaned from the name of the concept itself: 'access and maneuver' reflects the general importance of operational access and freedom of action; while 'global commons' recognises that the global commons belong to no state and their access is vital to national interests, both as an end in itself and as a means to project military force into hostile territory.

Unlike the ASB concept which was designed to counter emerging A2/AD challenges on an approach of destabilising, destroying and defeating[59] the capabilities of a specific adversary; the JAM-GC concept, instead of concentrating on dismantling their capabilities, establishes an approach to operations in contested environments by focusing on defeating the adversary's planning and intentions. A subtle but important shift, it describes the acceptance that A2/AD capabilities evolve faster than anticipated and require a high level of risk-taking.

The new concept is an operational-level approach that recognises the importance of overcoming adversary capabilities, defending one's own vulnerabilities, and the limits of technology. It therefore builds on existing systems and capabilities along with the need to integrate 'low-tech' operations when and where appropriate for the joint force. It does not advocate any specific emerging capabilities, nor does it endorse promising future capabilities (still under development), without ruling them out if they were to materialise, as they would serve to make the JAM-GC approach more effective.

Operating against an A2/AD threat set requires the integration of many capabilities across the five 'warfighting domains' (land, sea, air, space and cyberspace) and not just the maritime and air domains as the name of the predecessor concept suggested. It also sees building US engagement with allies and friends around the world as essential to successfully overcoming threats that limit or impede access to the global commons. JAM-GC therefore focuses on improving the integration of all armies in all domains and interoperability with allies and friends[60].

In November 2014, former US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel launched two projects: the 'Defence Innovation Initiative' and the 'Long-Term Research and Development Programme', with the respective goals of generating new military capabilities and making the country's military administration more flexible; and identifying and maturing emerging technologies in the 2030-35 timeframe. These two projects constitute the pillars of the 'Third Offset Strategy' developed to ensure future US military supremacy[61] over its adversaries.

The third offset is based on the legacy of the information RMA (US technological capabilities), designed to define the model of military power projection, aimed at

59 *Disrupt/Destroy/Defeat*.

60 *Ibid.*, pp. 135-139.

61 Hagel, C. (2014). Speech by the Secretary of Defense at the opening of the Reagan National Defense Forum. Sim Valley. 15 November.

guaranteeing the ability to access any point on the planet independently of the A2/AD strategies deployed by its enemies and aimed at both strengthening security ties with its allies and strategic partners and forcing its potential adversaries to embark on a new arms race that its military-industrial complexes may not be able to sustain. This new offset strategy will motivate the development of new operational concepts, the generation of new military capabilities and the consolidation of new styles of conceiving, planning and conducting warfare on land, at sea, in the air, in space and in cyberspace[62]. This is precisely what is new about this new offset strategy, which, in addition to research into new and improved capabilities, is also working on new operational concepts.

TABLE I. THE THIRD OFFSET STRATEGY

Goals:
– Increase US ability to project war power in anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) environments.
– Strengthen conventional deterrence.
– Impose a high opportunity cost on potential adversaries.
Lines of action:
– It will exploit the gap that the US maintains in five 'core competencies': unmanned operations, long-range naval and air operations, unobservable operations, undersea warfare, and systems engineering and integration63. Enabling the global observation and attack network.
– It will replace the traditional approach to conventional deterrence based on the threat of armed intervention with one that prioritises both deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment[64].

The Pentagon's adoption of the 'third offset strategy' in late 2014 symbolises the emergence of a new paradigm in US defence policy, an attempt to bring coherence to a series of processes and to address a series of challenges that have 'matured' in recent years. Its goal is not to arrive at a specific technological solution, but to identify a common conceptual framework encompassing a set of operational, technological and industrial concepts[65], integrating the various existing initiatives and channelling the financial, intellectual and technological resources of the US strategic community around a coherent vision that will enable the US to neutralise the challenges to its current force projection model.

62 Colom, G. (2015b). *Op. cit.*, pp. 390-391.

63 Martinage, R. *Op. cit.*, p. 71.

64 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

65 Simón, L. *Op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

People's Republic of China A2/AD Capabilities

Doctrinal aspects

During the 1990s, the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China (PLA) progressively learned from the US war experience, from conflicts such as the 1991 Gulf War and NATO's Kosovo air war in 1999. Over the years, China has adapted its military planning to rely on new technologies and strategies that can maximise its strengths while creating opportunities to exploit US weaknesses. Thus, the PLA increased investments in A2/AD-related technologies[66], such as: ballistic missiles (nuclear and conventional warheads), advanced air defence and early warning systems, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, new classes of submarines, surface combat ships and fourth and fifth generation 'multi-role' combat aircraft. These investments in technology and other experimental developments (hypersonic vehicles, space and cyberspace capabilities) will enable the PLA to achieve a decisive advantage in combat against its opponents, through both denial of its military power projection and advanced presence and freedom of action[67].

In 2015, China's ambitious military modernisation entered a new phase as President Xi Jinping unveiled the most sweeping reforms in at least thirty years[68]. The PLA updated high-level strategies, plans and policies that reflect its intention to continue to transform itself into a more flexible and advanced force, capable of conducting highly complex joint operations[69].

In addition to the old doctrinal concept of '*People's War*', which has been modified and updated to remain relevant in the 21st century, the two highest-level concepts in its body of doctrine are: '*Active Defense*' and '*Local Wars under Conditions of Informatization*' or '*Local Wars*'[70]. While the former provides the basic strategic posture for the PLA, the latter regulates its concept of operations in this new era.

'Local Wars' has been the PLA's official doctrine since 1993, formulating that the war of the near future will be geographically local (mainly) to China's periphery, limited in scope, duration and means, and conducted under 'conditions of informatisation'. These conditions are described by the DoD as those in which modern military forces use advanced computer systems, information technology and communications net-

66 In China's strategic thinking the concept closest to A2/AD is 'Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines' (ASCEL), which envisages the use of long-range precision strike capabilities against opposing forces.

67 Bitzinger, R. (2017). *Op. cit.,* pp. 4-6.

68 Office of the Secretary of Defense (2016). Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016. *Annual Report to Congress*, pp. 42-43.

69 *Ibid.,* p. 3.

70 Bitzinger, R. (2017). *Op. cit.,* p. 53.

works to gain operational advantage over the opponent. The ability of military forces to communicate and coordinate rapidly through C4ISR networks implies that, at the operational level, these forces must be agile with the capacity to conduct high-intensity operations in depth, characterised by being resource intensive, critically reliant on information and present in all domains of warfare.

'*Active Defense*', '*Local Wars*' and '*People's War*' describe how China strategically postures, develops its military forces and fights at the strategic level. Operationally (at the campaign level in China's terminology) the PLA has developed doctrines and principles of warfare where it considers joint operations to be a critical component of future operations and a necessary means to defeat technologically superior adversaries. It is worth noting that the doctrinal concepts of 'Local Wars' and 'People's War' are complementary, the latter often being confused with guerrilla warfare, while the latter is a concept in which the population actively supports (logistically, politically or operationally) military forces during times of war. These civilian personnel support functions are still fully accepted in PLA doctrine, which it considers necessary to achieve victory in local wars[71].

In May 2015, China launched a new defence White Paper in which it reaffirms many of the existing elements of its military strategy, particularly the concept of Active Defence. Concept that develops the commitment not to attack until attacked, but once hit to strike back with full force using offensive operations at all levels and at all stages of conflict[72]. It also insists on China's 'no-first-use' nuclear policy, declaring to use its nuclear forces only in response to a nuclear attack. Although there is some ambiguity about the conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons, such as to deal with a conventional attack that would threaten the survival of its nuclear force or the regime itself.

Notably, its White Paper presents a vision of a more joint, flexible and active force overall, confirming its transition from continental to maritime power by elevating the maritime domain within the strategic orientation of the PLA, and paying more attention to emerging domains such as space, cyberspace[73] and the electromagnetic spectrum. Cyberwarfare has become a major aspect of PLA modernisation, with a

71 In PLA doctrinal documents, «arming the civilian population for military operations» generally refers to the militia, civil defence and reserve forces.

72 The PLA doctrinal document 'The Science of Military Strategy' has described the principle of «active defence» as the pillar and guide of the strategic theoretical framework. According to General Zhang Qinsheng, 'active defence' is 'in general' strategically defensive, but 'in the details' potentially offensive. The relationship between 'active defence' and the 'Military Strategic Guidelines' is so intimate that the two are almost indistinguishable in the PLA's mind. The Pacific Review (2016). Washington's Perceptions and Misperceptions of Beijing's Anti-access Area-denial (A2-AD) 'Strategy': Implications for Military Escalation Control and Strategic Stability. *RPRE-2016-0037*. [Accessible on 20 June 2020] .Available at: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre

73 Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.

singular focus on electronic warfare (EW) and promoting through networked warfare and EW tools the crippling of adversary C⁴ISR capabilities.

Its main doctrinal principles also include the central role that Information Warfare will play in future conflicts. Recognising that information superiority or the ability to access and process information in C⁴ISR networks must be achieved and maintained while denying the enemy[74].

China's current doctrine enhances the use of offensive and defensive platforms, with a wide range of capabilities from integrated command and control (C2) to the use of a combination of ballistic and cruise missiles to attack potential adversaries' military forces in order to deny access to their air and sea lanes of approach in the Asia-Pacific theatre[75] .

The reform in A2/AD capabilities undergone by China has become a source of concern for the US, which, if it were to hinder its force projection in the Western Pacific theatre, would result in seriously serious implications[76].

Ballistic and cruise missile capabilities

The development of China's long-range precision strike capability using conventional missiles has been extraordinarily rapid. As recently as ten years ago, its ability to strike targets beyond the first island chain (such as US bases on Okinawa or Guam) was very limited. However, it is currently deploying a range of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)[77], as well as land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)[78], special operations forces (SOF) and cyber warfare capabilities to keep targets at high risk throughout the region. Thus, US bases in Japan are within range of LACMs and an increasing number of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)[79]. Guam could also be targeted by air-launched LACMs, as evidenced by flights first conducted in 2015 by H-6K bombers in the Western Pacific[80].

China's ballistic and cruise missiles have significantly improved accuracy, making them more capable of reaching their targets (adversary air bases, logistics facilities, communications, power projection elements and other infrastructure). All (nuclear

74 PLA doctrine considers that advantages in information gathering, transmission and processing at the tactical level bring advantages at the operational and strategic levels.

75 Bitzinger, R. (2017). *Op. cit.,* pp. 5-6.

76 Fukuda, J. *Op. cit.*

77 *Short-Range Ballistic Missiles.*

78 *Land-Attack Cruise Missiles.*

79 *Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles.*

80 Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Op. cit.*, p. 59.

and conventional) ground-launched missiles are operated by the People's Liberation Army Missile Force (PLARF)[81] which has an inventory of some 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) capable of striking targets in Taiwan. The PLARF has deployed a large number of them (DF-11, DF-12, DF-15/CSS-6)[82] along the Taiwan Strait[83] and is increasing the lethality of its conventional missile force with the DF-16/CSS-11 ballistic missile[84], a missile that entered service in 2015, is road-transportable, has an estimated range of 700-1,000 km and is designed to specifically counter Taiwan's Patriot MIM-104 PAC 3 system[85].

With sufficient range to reach targets in Japan, China has the DF-21C/CSS-5 medium-range land-attack ballistic missile (MRBM)[86] and is deploying a growing number of conventionally armed MRBMs, such as the DF-21D/CSS-5 Mod-5 anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), which represents the ultimate expression of China's anti-ship capabilities[87]. This solid-fuel rocket-propelled missile has an estimated range of 1,500-1,700 km (potentially extended to 2,150 km), has a manoeuvrable warhead and can be equipped with both conventional and nuclear strike capability. The DF-21D variant is specifically designed to counter air defence systems such as the AEGIS combat system used by most modern US and allied ships.[88].

The ballistic missiles are complemented by the DH-10 (DF-10)/CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)[89], which is the PLA's first cruise missile and is derived from the Cold War Soviet Kh-55 cruise missile[90]. It has a range of 1,500 km-4,000 km and, compared to ballistic missiles, offers different flight profiles that improve the chances of locating targets[91].

During the September 2015 military parade in Beijing, China unveiled the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), with an estimated range of 3,000-

81 *PLA Rocket Force*.

82 Chinese/US nomenclature will be provided. DF is an acronym for Dong-Feng («east wind») and CSS for *China surface-to surface (missile)*.

83 Fukuda, J. *Op. cit.*

84 Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

85 Kuper, S. (2019). The Teeth in China's Antiaccess/Area Denial Defences. Defence Connect. 24 April.

86 Fukuda, J. *Op. cit.*

87 Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Op. cit.*, pp. 22-25.

88 Kuper, S. *Op. cit.*

89 There is a variant, the CJ-20, which can be launched from the H-6K bomber, giving the Chinese military the ability to reach distant targets such as Hawaii.

90 *Ibid*.

91 Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Op. cit.*, pp. 22-25.

4,000km, has the capability to conduct precision strikes against ground targets (key US infrastructure in the Pacific, mainly on the island of Guam) and can carry nuclear warheads, contributing to strategic deterrence in the region. Like most Chinese missiles, it is road-transportable, allowing it to evade pre-emptive strikes by an adversary, increasing its survivability and deterrence capability[92].

China continues in the process of developing and deploying a modern and sophisticated arsenal with more advanced capabilities, such as anti-ship ballistic missiles equipped with independently manoeuvrable multiple warheads (MIRVs)[93] and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs)[94] like the DF-17[95].

This process is conducted in secret because of the country's unwillingness to be subject to international arms control and other transparency agreements. The combination of all these capabilities will degrade the survivability of key elements of US military power projection such as the aircraft carrier and forward air bases. In addition, China is also developing a growing fleet of submarines equipped with ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of attacking the US mainland[96].

On nuclear weapons policy, China prioritises maintaining a nuclear force capable of surviving an attack and responding with sufficient force to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy. It has a large arsenal of ballistic missiles, including some 75-100 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) such as the silo-based DF-5/CSS-4 Mod-2 and the MIRV-equipped DF-5B/Mod-3; the solid-fuelled, transportable DF-31 and DF-31A/CSS-10 Mod-1 and 2, capable of reaching targets on the US mainland; and the shorter-range DF-4/CSS-3.

This force is complemented by transportable solid fuel DF-21/CSS-5 Mod-6 MRBMs. China is also developing a new road-transportable ICBM, the DF-41/CSS-X-20 equipped with MIRVs[97,98].

92 Kuper, S. *Op. cit.*

93 *Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle.*

94 *Hypersonic Glide Vehicle.*

95 *Ibid.*

96 Missile Defense Project (2018). Missiles of China. *Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies.* [Accesible on 06 June 2020]. Available at: https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/

97 Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Op. cit.*, pp. 22-25.

98 In relation to nuclear-capable offshore platforms, China continues to produce Hainan Island-based JIN-class nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) capable of carrying JL-2/CSS-NX-14 SLBMs with an estimated range of 7,200 km.

TABLE II. PLARF MISSILE TYPES[99]

Missile	Class	Range (Km)
Short-range ballistic missiles (<1,000 km)		
DF-11 DF-12 DF-15 DF-16	SRBM	280-300 420 600 800-1,000
Medium-range ballistic missiles (1,000-3,000 km)		
DF-21	MRBM	2.150
Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (3,000-5,000 km)		
DF-4 DF-26	IRBM	4,500-5,500 3,000-4,000
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (>5,500 km)		
DF-31 DF-41 DF-5	ICBM	8,000-11,700 12,000-15,000 13,000
Hypersonic glide vehicles		
DF-17	HGV	1,800-2,500 km
Land-attack cruise missiles		
DH-10 (DF-10)	LACM	2,000 km

China's ballistic and cruise missile capabilities pose a direct threat to Japan and the US, making ports and bases in the Western Pacific vulnerable[100].

Chinese Air Force Capability

China's aviation, consisting of its PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF), is the largest in Asia and the third largest in the world (behind the USAF and the Russian Air Force). In terms of its composition, it has made great strides in many areas, replacing its ageing inventory of obsolete aircraft with modern multi-role aircraft. Currently, one third of the total aircraft in its inventory are modern[101].

TABLE III. GLOBAL FLEETS OF MILITARY AND COMBAT AIRCRAFT[102]

Global fleet of military aircraft					Combat aircraft	
Ranking	Country	In service	%		In service	%
1	USA	13,266	25		2,657	18
2	Russia	4,163	8		1,616	11
3	China	3,210	6		1,603	11
4	India	2,123	4		710	5

99 Table prepared by the author.

100 Fukuda, J. *Op. cit.*

101 Cordesman, A. *Op. cit.*, pp. 192-217.

102 Source: Flight International. *World Air Forces 2020.* P. FightGlobal 13-14. [Accessible on 27 June 2020]. Availabñe at: https://www.flightglobal.com/download?ac=66025

TABLE IV. SPECIAL MISSION AIRCRAFT FLEETS, AAR AND TRANSPORT[103]

Ranking	Special missions			Resupply Aerial			Transport		
	Country	In service	%	Country	In service	%	Country	In service	%
1	USA	744	38	USA	614	77	USA	945	22
2	Japan	152	8	Saudi Arabia	22	3	Russia	424	10
3	Russia	127	6	France	20	2	India	250	6
4	China	111	6	Russia	19	2	China	224	5

Since the beginning of this century, the PLAAF has undergone a major change in its structure and composition from an air defence-based approach (based on interdiction aviation) to a multi-mission approach, having to acquire a large number of modern combat aircraft capable of performing air defence, strike, transport, ISR and EW missions. Between 1995 and 2003, the PLAAF inventory reduced the specific weight of interceptors from 80% to 50% and increased that of surface attack aircraft by more than 2.5 times.

In 2004, the PLAAF published its strategy 'Integrated Air and Space Operations, Being Prepared for Simultaneous Offensive and Deffensive Operations' in which it restructures its force to respond to the needs stipulated in the 'Local Wars' doctrine, contemplating further reductions in the proportion of aircraft dedicated to the interdiction role and the need to acquire a greater number of advanced aircraft to be able to carry out missions against adversary air defences. A tendency that shows a strong desire to have the ability to conduct both defensive and offensive missions.

Another important aspect highlighted in this paper is the need to build the capacity to develop the human capital necessary to operate these advanced systems and conduct the required missions. To this end, they have put in place a combination of measures affecting the training of their personnel and their instruction (improved academic performance, renewed intensive training and enhanced joint military exercises). In terms of personnel, the PLAAF and the PLAN have respectively 398,000 and 235,000 personnel, representing 27.5 percent of the total number of PLA personnel[103], confirming the priority given to them in the PLA's organisational plans[104].

In terms of infrastructure, China has a total of thirty-two air bases configured in three lines of defence (forward, middle and rear), the first two lines are heavily reinforced and protected[105].

103 Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Op. cit.*, pp. 30-32

104 Shlapak, D. (2007). Coping with the Dragon. Essays on PLA Transformation and the U.S. Military. National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy.

105 Fukuda, J. *Op. cit.*

To achieve air superiority and conduct strike operations, China has a fleet of fourth-generation aircraft: Su-27, Su-30, Su-35 (fourth-generation plus fighter), Russian-made J-11A and domestic J-11B, JH-7 and J-10 (own design).

The 2013 DoD report on Chinese military power revealed that China is developing A2/AD capabilities, precision strike and enhanced air defences, and stealth technology[106]. Air-to-air capability is central to its transformation from a predominantly territorial air force to one capable of offensive and defensive operations, and the availability of fifth-generation fighter aircraft[107] would significantly strengthen it. Thus, China is, along with the United States, the only country that has two stealth technology programmes simultaneously, the J-20 fighter and the FC-31[108], the latter of which is similar in size to a US F-35 fighter and appears to incorporate similar design features to the J-20.

In the bomber fleet, the PLAAF continues to upgrade the H-6[109] to increase operational effectiveness and lethality by integrating long-range weaponry. There are different versions of the H-6, all of which have a weapons bay in the fuselage hold capable of carrying gravity bombs, precision-guided bombs and naval mines. The H-6H and H-6M versions are the older versions; the H-6G is the embarked version, equipped with dedicated systems and four armament-loading pylons; and the H-6K, a new variant redesigned with turbofan engines and capable of carrying six LACMs, providing extended range and long-range offensive capability.

With regard to airlift, China has a small fleet of aircraft, relying on a limited number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft for strategic airlift and continues to introduce its large Y-20 transport aircraft into the PLA inventory to complement and replace its fleet[110].

The number of bombers coupled with the small number of aerial refuelling aircraft (AAR) reveals a limitation of PLAAFs to conduct strike missions on close-in targets (those within the first island chain). Although cruise missile versions of the H-6 bomber give it the capability against long-range targets, this is considered to be relegated in the PLARF due to limited bomber and missile holdings.

106 Cordesman, A. *Op. cit.,* pp. 207-208.

107 Combat aircraft with high manoeuvrability and low observability (radar absorbing paint, angled design and internal weapons bay), with modern avionics and sensors (radars with advanced tracking and targeting capabilities, protection against enemy electronic countermeasures and fully integrated EW systems) that provide improved situational awareness for the pilot in network-centric combat environments.

108 The FC-31 made its maiden flight on 31 October 2012 and debuted at the 10th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai in November 2014.

109 Originally adapted from the Soviet Tu-16 design of the late 1950s.

110 *Ibid.,* pp. 30-32.

TABLE V. COMPOSITION AND TYPES OF PLAAF AIRCRAFT[111]

People's Liberation Army Air Force			
Combat/Bomber		**Special mission**	
H-6	120	737 (MPA)[112]	2
J-7	388	An-30 (EW)	3
J-8	96	Challenger 870 (Reconnaissance)	5
J-10	235	Il-76 (A50I) (AEW)[113]	1
J-11/16/Su-27/30/35	351	Il-76 (KJ-2000) (AEW)	4
J-20	15	Tu-154(EW)	8
JH-7	69	Y-8 (AEW)	11
Q-5	118	Y-8 (EW)	16
Transport		Y-8 (Reconnaissance)	1
Il-76	22	Y-9 (KJ-500) (AEW)	13
MA60	9	*Resupply*	
Tu-154	2	Il-78	3
Y-7	47	*Training*	
Y-8	69	JJ-7	35
Y-9	15	JL-8	170
Y-12	11	L-15	2
Y-20	7	Y-7	13

TABLE VI. COMPOSITION AND TYPES OF PLANAF[114] AIRCRAFT

People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force			
Combat/Bomber		**Special mission**	
H-6	30	Challenger 870 (Reconnaissance)	2
J-7	30	Ka-31 (AEW)	9
J-8	47	SH-5 (SAR)[114]	3
J-10	25	Y-7 (SAR)	1
J-15/Su-30/33	45	Y-8 (AEW)	8
JH-7	34	Y-8 (MPA)	9
Training		Y-8 (Reconnaissance)	8
JJ-6	14	Y-9 (HJ/KJ-500) (AEW)	6
JL-8	11	Z-18 (AEW)	1
JL-9	2	*Transport*	
L-15	12	Y-7	17
Y-7	5	Y-8	13

111 Source: Flight International. *World Air Forces 2020*. P. FightGlobal 13-14. [Accessible 06 June 2020]. Available at: https://www.flightglobal.com/download?ac=66025

112 Maritime Patrol Aircraft.

113 Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft.

114 Search and Rescue.

Some American experts believe that the limited number of AAR, EW, ELINT, AEW&C, and C2 aircraft indicates that the PLAAF's effectiveness is comparatively less than that of other Western or Russian air forces; but that leveraging this diversity of capabilities shows that it is on the right path of modernisation and development to achieve similar capabilities[115].

China is moving ahead with the development, procurement and employment of longer-range UAVs that would increase its ability to conduct ISR and long-range strike operations[116]. Just as it is incorporating stealth technology into combat aircraft, it also sees it as an integral part of unmanned aircraft, especially those with an air-to-surface strike role, as it would improve the ability to penetrate heavily protected targets. The new unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) in service is the «Gongji-11» (GJ-11) largely influenced by Western designs (very similar to the Northrop Grumman X-47B UCAV).

The PLAAF is rapidly closing the technology gap with Western air forces through the development of a broad spectrum of capabilities spanning C2, jammers, EW and datalink[117]. The modernisation of both force structure and composition indicates a focus on targets within the first island chain, which is consistent with the 'Local Wars' doctrine and is an indicator that this doctrine is influencing the modernisation of Chinese aviation, and it is expected that these modernisation trends will continue and that it will progressively increase its capacity to act in contingencies that arise along its borders[118].

China has a robust Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) that relies on early warning, fighter aircraft and a variety of SAM systems, which provide it with the capability to counter different types of targets (fighter aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, and long-range strike air platforms).

The PLAAF has one of the largest forces of advanced SAM systems in the world, consisting of a combination of Russian-origin S-300PMU/SA-10[119] and S-300PMU1-2/SA-20 battalions[120] and domestically produced HQ-9 battalions (similar to the S-300PMU) with a maximum range of 200km, all capable of intercepting aircraft and cruise missiles at low altitude. In an effort to improve its strategic air defence systems, China is importing the Russian S-400/Triumf SAM system[121] (with a theoretical range

115 Cordesman, A. *Op. cit.,* pp. 192-217.

116 In 2015, Chinese media reported the development of the *Shendiao* (Holy Eagle or Divine Eagle) as the most modern high-altitude, long-range UAV for a variety of missions.

117 Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Op. cit.*, pp. 30-32.

118 Cordesman, A. *Op. cit.,* p. 212.

119 Russian designation/NATO designation.

120 One of the most advanced SAM systems Russia offers for export with a range of over 200 km.

121 In 2014 China was the first foreign buyer to seal a government-to-government agreement with Russia. Moscow has already begun delivering an undisclosed number of S-400 missile systems (NATO designation, SA-21 Growler) to Beijing.

of 400 km), and is also expected to continue research and development of its own HQ-19 system providing the basis for a ballistic missile defence capability[122].

With regard to ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability, the existing inventory of long-range surface-to-air missiles offers limited capability against ballistic missiles. With new domestically produced radars, such as the JL-1A[123] and JY-27A, which are designed to address such a threat; with the SA-20 PMU2 SAM that has the capability to engage ballistic missiles at speeds of 2,800 metres per second; and with the acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, it is estimated that China could gain the capability to counter MRBMs[124].

Other capacities in support of A2/AD

China's latest White Paper reaffirms the PLA's focus on new and emerging security domains such as outer space and cyberspace. In terms of space capabilities, China continues to invest significantly in improving and strengthening its military space capabilities.

China is seeking to use space systems to enhance the C2 of joint operations and to establish a surveillance, reconnaissance and warning system capable of real-time monitoring of targets around the world and in space. It has placed more than thirty satellites in orbit with the intention of supporting platforms with precision strike capability[125], with particular emphasis on the following capabilities: satellite communications (SATCOM), ISR, satellite navigation (SATNAV) with advances in the *Beidou* navigation satellite system, meteorology, as well as space exploration (manned, unmanned and interplanetary). In addition to satellites in orbit, China's space programme has built a vast ground infrastructure that supports the manufacture of spacecraft and space launch vehicles, C2 and downlink data.

In parallel with its space programme, China continues to develop a variety of counter-space capabilities designed to limit or prevent the use of space-based capabilities by adversaries during a crisis or conflict. However, China publicly opposes the militarisation of space[126].

Chinese military doctrine also advocates taking advantage of 'cyberspace superiority' by developing offensive capabilities to deter or stop an adversary. Chinese offensive cy-

122 Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Op. cit.*, pp. 30-32.

123 Theoretically, the JL-1A radar is capable of accurately tracking multiple ballistic missiles.

124 *Ibid.*, pp. 60.

125 Fukuda, J., *Op. cit.*

126 In 2009, then PLAAF commander Xu Qiliang retracted his earlier claim that space militarisation was a «historical inevitability» after former president Hu Jintao contradicted him.

berspace operations could employ A2/AD measures against critical nodes of adversary communications and data networks to disrupt them throughout the conflict region[127]. As part of the US-China defence consultative talks, the US DoD is urging China to provide greater transparency on its military doctrine and missions in cyberspace.

Another essential element of China's ability to counter third-party intervention is its control of the information spectrum in all dimensions of the modern battlespace. In PLA doctrine, it is often cited that in order to establish the conditions necessary to achieve air and sea superiority in modern warfare, it is necessary to control information (calling it 'information blocking' or 'information dominance') and take the initiative early in the campaign. China is improving information and operational security to protect its own information structures and, at the same time, is developing other information warfare capabilities, including denial and deception[128].

Conclusions

Potential US adversaries have learned by studying the characteristics of its new style of warfare and globalisation has facilitated the spread of advanced military technologies, both of which have eroded the competitive military advantage that the US military has enjoyed.

The use of A2/AD capabilities as a strategy has existed throughout the history of warfare, both defensive and offensive measures that restrict force projection and deny freedom of movement. Today, they represent a kind of asymmetric strategies of 'cost imposition' and 'influencing strategic calculations' that seek to deter a technologically superior adversary by raising unknowns in its decisions or even defeating it.

China's current doctrine promotes the use of offensive and defensive platforms, with a wide range of capabilities and combined use of assets in order to deny potential adversary forces access to the Asia-Pacific theatre.

The People's Liberation Army's ambitious military modernisation, updating strategies, plans and high-level policies reflects its intention to continue to transform itself into a more flexible and advanced force, capable of highly complex joint operations. The synergy produced by air force restructuring and composition, aircraft modernisation and personnel policies ensures that the PLAAF is increasingly capable of fighting and winning «Local Wars» as it moves forward with its modernisation programme.

Today, the scope, lethality and sophistication of anti-access and area denial systems, coupled with the development of doctrinal and operational concepts and the

127 Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Op. cit.*, p. 59.

128 China's 'information blocking' probably envisages the use of military and non-military instruments of state power across the entire battlespace, including cyberspace and space.

training and instruction of personnel, threaten the projection and manoeuvre model of US and allied forces. Mainly because they pose economic, operational, strategic and political costs that make it impossible to maintain the current US strategic defence paradigm based on forward presence and power projection.

As China continues to implement A2/AD capabilities, develop the necessary technologies and employ them to their full potential, US control of the global commons will be compromised. We will enter a new era of regional hegemony in the Western Pacific, where there will be a more differentiated pattern of control, shaped by a system of competing spheres of influence. Resulting in a US sphere of influence around allied territories (including most of the region's disputed island chains); another Chinese sphere of influence over mainland China; and finally, a mutual exclusion zone or contested battle space covering much of the South and East China Seas, in which neither side will enjoy freedom of movement[129].

The US requires a new strategic model in order to accommodate its security architecture to the international environment. The third offset strategy symbolises the emergence of this new paradigm in its defence policy, in which, in addition to researching new and improved capabilities, it seeks to identify a common conceptual framework encompassing a range of new operational, technological and industrial concepts that will enable it to neutralise challenges to its current model of force projection and, in the process, ensure future military supremacy over its adversaries.

Despite the popularisation of the term A2/AD and its use to guide US strategy, it should be borne in mind that each case is different. The US's focus over the years on the third offset strategy, while it has helped to narrow down the problem, is focusing too much on an operational issue when it is the framing strategy that is relevant. In defining the new paradigm in US defence policy, it needs to be framed within a much broader strategy, in which more subtle or silent functions of the military instrument, such as deterrence, prevention, surveillance and intelligence, and defence diplomacy, among others, are revalued to the detriment of direct military intervention.

Moreover, one of the key advantages the United States has over its potential competitors is its strong network of allies and alliances, so the third offset strategy will not succeed without the participation of its allies, and interoperability cannot be an impediment, a critical factor that is not being taken into consideration.

Although new technologies tend to spread rapidly, the benefits they provide tend to be short-lived. While identifying and acquiring innovative technologies presents significant challenges, the challenges do not end once these two steps are achieved. It is then that new capabilities and new operational concepts must be integrated into the culture of the armed forces, which is not always particularly receptive to

129 Biddle, S. *Op. cit.*, pp. 43-48.

change. There is a need to promote changes in the institutional culture in order to enable innovation at the organisational level. Developing technology is only the first step in innovation, as what you fight with is only as useful as how effectively you fight with it.

Finally, it should be noted that A2/AD capabilities are proliferating globally, in regions such as Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, which are of great relevance for Europe and, more specifically, for Spain. So the A2/AD capabilities debate should be raised. At the level of the armed forces, the capacity to innovate, to develop and integrate new operational concepts to take advantage of innovative technologies; and at the political level, the need to provide sufficient budgetary stability, even if some of the innovation paths do not bear immediate fruit.

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A financial analysis of the Spanish Defence Industry

Abstract

The analysis of the Spanish defense industry is still at an advanced stage due to the lack of adequate information and the little relevance that this topic has in the academic world. In this work an economic-financial approach is made to the Spanish defense industry in order to deepen the knowledge of some features of its structure, conduct and results. To this aim, the classic ECR approach of the Industrial Economics is used. The years 2012 and 2016 have been considered, in order to show the main changes that have taken place as a result of the exit of the economic crisis.

Keywords

Defense industry, Spain, SCP analysis, financial ratios.

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Introduction

The study of the Spanish defence industry requires knowledge that goes beyond the usual analyses that address turnover, employment, exports and, in some cases, variables linked to innovation. For this reason, this paper attempts to delve deeper into more novel aspects linked to financial variables, although without excluding the classic factors already mentioned. This allows for a deeper understanding of the industry, complementing the more classical aspects with others that have hardly been addressed.

As Fonfría (2012) explains[1] 'The study of the functioning of the Spanish defence industry lacks both theoretical and empirical analyses that have a certain depth and representativeness in this field. In some cases, studies have been carried out on specific subsectors of those usually included in this industry, but with reference either to a small number of companies, normally the largest and most representative — assuming that their activity represents the whole, with no general prior study of this — or to a broad analysis of cases, whose statistical representativeness and results are far from being extensive to the whole, or to aggregate studies which do not allow for the analysis of certain aspects in detail'.

As is well known, the trend within the European Union (EU) is towards a market in which national industries are diluted, with the long-term aim of having an integrated European industry with the large corporations driving the destinies of the remaining companies in the current national defence industries.

This situation can be positive for countries with the largest companies or extremely powerful industrial conglomerates, such as the UK, Italy or France. However, for countries with smaller industries the outcome may not be too positive. This would be the case of Spain, as the intermediate size of its defence industry puts it at a disadvantage compared to other countries, such as those mentioned above. This is why a thorough understanding of the financial capabilities of this industry is necessary.

The aim of this paper is to analyse in depth some economic-financial aspects of the companies that make up the Spanish defence industry at two points in time: in the midst of the economic crisis, 2012, and after it, 2016. It is therefore a microeconomic and sectoral study. Better knowledge of these aspects — which have hardly been analysed so far — will allow us to identify some of the industry's strengths and weaknesses and provide certain knowledge that could improve its position within Europe as a whole. It can also serve to guide defence industrial policy.

1 Fonfría, A. (2012). Estructura, conducta y resultados de la industria de defensa española [Structure, conduct and performance of the Spanish defence industry]. *Cuadernos Aragoneses de Economía*, 2.ª época, no. 1-2, pp. 11-30.

No financial studies on the Spanish defence industry have been found that include the fundamental variables (revenues, costs, profits, etc.) at company level, beyond some partial analyses of specific companies[2].

The research question to be answered in this article is whether the end of the economic crisis has allowed defence industry companies to improve their performance and, if so, what factors have driven this improvement.

To this end, the following research hypothesis is put forward: the evolution of profits of sector companies depends substantially on costs — linked to market behaviour — and, to a lesser extent, on aspects related to market structure, since the existence of market power — oligopolies and monopolies — reduces the role of aspects related to structure.

Theoretical approach: Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm

The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm (SCP)[3] is the traditional approach of Industrial Economics and assumes that there is a causal relationship between the structure of an industry, the conduct of firms and their performance in that market. While this has been the case in the early days[4], from the 1980s onwards it was observed that the relationships did not always go in that direction alone, but that performance affected conduct, and conduct affected structure.

It is based on the existence of basic, generally given, conditions in the industry concerned, such as level of trade union membership, regulation, etc., which affect the market structure that may arise and this in turn affects the behaviour or conduct of firms, leading to performance.

In addition to being highly useful for industrial analysis, the value of this approach is also that it allows industrial policies to be created with a better understanding of what is happening in the sector being analysed. In short, there is feedback between the various aspects that make up the SCP paradigm as a whole, so that changes in business performance or conduct can change the structure of the market and require changes in policy.

2 See García Alonso (2010).

3 An explanation of this theoretical approach can be found in Clarke (1993).

4 In the 1950s, Mason and Bain developed this approach based on case studies. For a description of the method, see Bain (1956).

It can be summarised as follows, including details of some variables, as an example:

Basic conditions of the industry
■ Structure
■ Number of companies
■ Relative size of companies
■ Degree of product differentiation
■ Conditions of entry
■ …
■ Conduct
■ Price competition
■ Advertising
■ R&D expenditure
■ …
■ Performance
■ Degree of efficiency
■ Sharing surplus (consumers + producers)
■ New product introduction rate
■ Profit
■ …
Public policies

Source: Prepared internally based on Clarke (1993)[5]

Some more recent work on this approach shows that relating companies' profits to the level of concentration in the market is sufficient, i.e. a variable that approximates market power. This would suggest that restrictions to competition in a market — particularly in the defence market — would be the result of structural variables and that behavioural variables would remain in the background, Segura (2006)[6].

The analysis will take into account both market structure and company conduct and performance variables. It is important to consider them because of significant competition problems in the defence sector, which is dominated by oligopolies and even monopolies. However, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) becoming increasingly important, the structure itself may be changing in certain sub-sectors within the defence industrial field. Logically, in the face of changes in industrial structure, companies have to change their market conduct and these aspects mus also be considered.

Following García Alonso (2010)[7] the lines of defence industrial policy have changed the industrial fabric towards a significant growth in sector turnover, also boosting concentration, at least until the mid-2000s.

5 Clark, R. (1993). *Economía Industrial [Industrial Economics]*. Madrid, Ed. Celeste.

6 Segura, J. (2006). Política de defensa de la competencia: objetivos, fundamentos y marco institucional [Competition defence policy: objectives, foundations and institutional framework]. *Ekonomiaz*, no. 61, primer cuatrimestre, pp. 16-39.

7 García Alonso, J.M. (2010). *La base industrial de la defensa en España [The Industrial Base of Defence in Spain]*. Madrid, Ministry of Defence

In short, the connection between the various aspects of the SCP Paradigm, including industrial policies — although the latter are not the subject of this paper — means that microeconomic aspects of Spanish defence industry companies have to be considered.

Defining the scope of analysis

Several approaches were initially used to conduct the research work carried out as it is difficult to obtain an adequate volume and disaggregation of information — or research work on the subject — in the field of the defence industry. However, several articles analyse the industry; specifically, part of this paper is based on Fonfría (2012)[8] and Fonfría and Martí (2020)[9], which study the Structure, Conduct and Performance of the Spanish defence industry.

In order to provide new knowledge on the subject covered by the aforementioned works, financial indicators were analysed, something that had not been done so far. Most studies on the defence industry use sectoral and economic data, without delving into the internal structure of companies, their financing capacity, or their costs and profits. This is a new feature of this study.

The fundamental difficulty lies in obtaining homogeneous and comparable data for the companies included in the analysis. Therefore, a scope of analysis was defined, which led to the selection of a number of companies and then focused on the SCP analysis mentioned above.

Both in the choice of companies and the sectors to be studied, the annual report on the industry produced by the Directorate General for Armaments and Material (DGAM) for 2015 was taken as a reference, completing information with reports from other years, as at the time research work began it was the last year published. Finally, information was extracted from the Orbis database[10]. Given that this database offers the possibility of obtaining a large number of economic-financial indicators, the SCP scheme was used to go beyond the economic aspects of the market, leaving the scheme with the operational variables as follows:

8 Fonfría, A. (2012). Estructura, conducta y resultados de la industria de defensa española [Structure, conduct and performance of the Spanish defence industry]. *Cuadernos Aragoneses de Economía*, 2.ª época, no. 1-2, p. 11-30.

9 Fonfría, A. and Martí, C. (2020). Spanish Defence Industry: A long way to go. In, Hartley, K and Belin, J. (eds.). *The Economics of the Global Defence Industry*. London and New York, Routledge.

10 Having obtained all data for each of the companies, a database was created with the help of Visual Basic. It was then imported into the analysis software: SPSS. From this we obtained all the results shown throughout the article, which in some respects have been complemented by sectoral information in the absence of business data.

Basic conditions of the industry
■ Structure
■ Operating Revenue (Turnover)
■ Fixed Assets
■ Total Assets
■ Number of Employees
■ Fixed Assets/Total Assets
■ Conduct
■ Shareholder Equity
■ Shareholder Equity/Total Liabilities
■ Solvency Ratio
■ Material Cost
■ Employee Cost
■ Total Costs
■ Material Cost/Total Cost
■ Employee Cost/Total Cost
■ Performance
■ Earnings before Tax
■ Profit per Employee
■ Profit Margin
■ EBITDA[11]

Source: prepared internally

Company civilian and military activity could not be fully differentiates, so this is considered a limitation of the analysis. However, due to the increasing duality (civil-military) of a multitude of technologies, products and services, this constraint tends to be reduced over time.

With regard to the companies included, we have selected the companies provided by the DGAM, TEDAE and AESMIDE[12] as well as others — mainly SMEs —, which are known to have a turnover in the field of Defence.

Structure Analysis

Analysing the market structure of an industry for which there is no agreed definition is not an easy task, as we encounter difficulties such as: difficult access to informa-

11 EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortisation): realised income minus expenses. Financial expenses (company taxes, interest, depreciation and amortisation) are excluded. For a broader definition see Annex.

12 TEDAE and AESMIDE are employers' associations. The first is strictly defence and the second is an association of firms working for public authorities. In the latter case, only those that also invoice for defence goods and services have been selected.

tion — this information is not available in all cases, nor are official statistics available — and duality in data, as some companies have diversified their businesses and work for both civilian and military sectors.

In this case, and given that we have opted for a more novel accounting-financial analysis, we will now explain some financial variables, which are an approximation to the structure of the sector[13].

The tables below[14] show some statistical data calculated to study the variables to be explained[15].

TABLE 1. STRUCTURE VARIABLE DATA YEAR 2012

Structure Year 2012				
	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	CV
Operating Revenue (Turnover)	85	22,824,599.53	50,529,741.36	2.21
Total Assets	85	55,398,538.18	213,781,701.05	3.86
Fixed Assets	85	13,334,091.84	46,378,431.25	3.48
Number of Employees	82	1,608.90	5,111.74	3.18
Fixed Assets/Total Assets	87	54,125,008.57	211,446,199.98	3.91

Source: Prepared internally with Orbis.

TABLE 2. STRUCTURE VARIABLE DATA YEAR 2016

Structure Year 2016				
	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	CV
Operating Revenue (Turnover)	83	25,831,898.75	64,734,621.59	2.51
Total Assets	83	52,938,101.80	198,877,921.39	3.76
Fixed Assets	83	10,957,521.64	32,079,376.09	2.93
Number of Employees	81	1,882.62	5,806.87	3.08
Fixed Assets/Total Assets	86	51,091,423.83	195,580,978.07	3.83

Source: prepared internally with Orbis
Note: the number of companies differs between the two years due to three factors: acquisition and sale processes between companies, the entry and exit of some from the military market, and availability of information in each of the years studied.

13 See Annex for the definition of the variables used.

14 Figures in Millions of $ for all tables of indicators studied.

15 The standard deviation is greater than the mean due to the existence of extreme values. Given the coexistence of companies of very different sizes and economic-financial characteristics in the defence industry and the fact that a large majority are SMEs, while a small number are large corporation, the effect obtained is a high dispersion.

N: Number of companies. CV= Coefficient of variation: defined as the quotient between the standard deviation and the mean.


TABLE 3. VARIATION RATES (STRUCTURE) PERIOD 2012-2016

Variation Rates (Structure) Period 2012-2016				
	N	Mean**	Standard Deviation**	CV
Operating Revenue (Turnover)	86	3.14	6.39	3.15
Total Assets	81	-1.13	-1.79	-0.67
Fixed Assets	78	-4.79	-8.80	-4.22
Number of Employees	78	4.01	3.24	-0.74
Fixed Assets/Total Assets	78	-1.43	-1.93	-0.51

Source: prepared internally with Orbis. ** In %

The first of the variables that can be easily identified, and which fits the definition, is that of company operating revenues or, as it is also known, turnover. Understanding its conduct can shed light on how the structure of the industry may have evolved. As expected, turnover in the years studied (2012 and 2016) has grown at an average cumulative rate of 3.14%, which leads us to believe that performance has been reversed after the crisis, causing improvement which indicates that the industry has begun to grow positively. I argue that data on the number of employees shows this to be the case. Between 2012 and 2016, volume of employment has increased by 4.01%, parallel to the increase in sales. In other words, greater company revenues have led to more people being hired. Looking at Spanish GDP data[16] in the same years show a growth of 1.85%, which helps to create a similar evolution of these two economic indicators.

All these reasons might lead us to believe that defence spending could have followed the same growth path, but below we will see that this has not been the case. Data published by the World Bank show that spending has remained practically stable (in the period 2013-2015), but comparing 2012 and 2016 highlights a clear downward trend. The years of crisis have led to a substantial reduction in such spending. As shown in figure 1:



Graph 1. Military expenditure (% of GDP). Source: World Bank based on SIPRI data

16 Nominal GDP of Spain for 2012: 1,039,052 Million Euros. Nominal GDP of Spain for 2016: 1,118,522 Million Euros. Data from the Bank of Spain.

Chaining a declining trend in economic indicators we find the following two variables to consider: fixed assets and total assets. Both reflect a company's ability to meet its obligations. In other words, if a company has a high volume of total assets, in a situation of financial problems — in which it has to face unexpected obligations — it can be expected to reduce its volume of assets and thus stay in business without being too badly affected. Assets are broken down into current assets (also known as liquid assets), those that would explain the most immediate needs and therefore cover the short term, and on the other hand, fixed assets (or non-current assets) which provide information on long-term behaviour, as the company maintains these assets for more than one accounting period.

Going back to the tables above (1, 2 and 3) and analysing what has happened for these last two variables, we can see that companies have suffered a slight fall linked to decapitalisation. The crisis has therefore implied a change in their business strategies that has led them to dispose of part of their assets in order to be able to face debts and/or unexpected cost overruns.

Finally, we must analyse the ratio between the two previous indicators. This ratio would show the percentage of fixed assets to total assets. In other words, the long-term strength of companies to meet their obligations. It has clearly decreased, as was to be expected, as the crisis may have been the trigger for reducing company assets in order to be able to continue generating business volume and not have to take other types of decisions that could lead to closure.

Financial Variables Explaining Business Conduct

As in the previous section, this section analyses the variables that explain business conduct in the defence industry using financial data from companies. Three indicators will be listed along with some of their ratios in order to enrich and help draw conclusions on the path followed in the period under study.

TABLE 4. CONDUCT VARIABLE DATA YEAR 2012.

Conduct Year 2012				
	N	**Mean**	**Standard deviation**	**CV**
Shareholder Equity	85	12,333,608.14	38,788,050.92	3.14
Shareholders Funds / Total Liabilities	87	32.96	22.98	0.70
Solvency Ratio	85	2.48	3.84	1.55
Material Cost	81	13,555,125.96	34,743,865.55	2.56
Employee Cost	83	4,951,161.91	10,183,237.67	2.06
Total Costs	87	17,343,811.97	42,542,989.85	2.45
Material Cost/Total Cost	79	58.75	24.90	0.42
Employee Cost/Total Cost	79	41.25	24.90	0.60

Source: prepared internally with Orbis

Linked to the previous point, it is inevitable to consider the role of the new Industry 4.0 concept[17] which is being implemented and in the short term seems to have significant consequences; this is demonstrated in cost data. Some statistics are given in the tables below to help understand this.

TABLE 5. CONDUCT VARIABLE DATA YEAR 2016

Conduct Year 2016				
	N	**Mean**	**Standard deviation**	**CV**
Shareholder Equity	83	12,710,204.13	33,808,903.56	2.66
Shareholders Funds / Total Liabilities	86	34.69	28.17	0.81
Solvency Ratio	83	2.43	3.54	1.46
Material Cost	81	15,489,066.97	44,652,455.78	2.88
Employee Cost	81	4,604,838.81	9,607,036.04	2.09
Total Costs	86	18,925,655.45	50,652,671.07	2.68
Material Cost/Total Cost	79	60.25	23.97	0.40
Employee Cost/Total Cost	79	39.75	23.97	0.60

Source: prepared internally with Orbis

TABLE 6. VARIATION RATES (CONDUCT) PERIOD 2012-2016

Variation Rates (Conduct) Period 2012-2016				
	N	**Mean****	**Standard deviation****	**CV**
Shareholder Equity	75	0.75	-3.38	-4.10
Shareholders Funds / Total Liabilities	75	1.29	5.22	3.88
Solvency Ratio	81	-0.52	-1.98	-1.48
Material Cost	77	3.39	6.47	2.98
Employee Cost	78	-1.80	-1.45	0.36
Total Costs	81	2.21	4.46	2.20
Material Cost/Total Cost	73	0.63	-0.95	-1.58
Employee Cost/Total Cost	73	-0.92	-0.95	-0.03

Source: prepared internally with Orbis. ** In %

Company costs are of vital importance and explain a large part of the company's performance. On average, material costs have increased while employee costs have decreased. With regard to the former, this could be viewed as normal as we have gone from a year immersed in the crisis to 2016 (after the crisis) so that requirements for

17 See Del Val Román, J.L. (2016, March). Industria 4.0: la transformación digital de la industria [Industry 4.0: the digital transformation of industry]. In *Proceedings of the Conferencia de Directores y Decanos de Ingeniería Informática, Informes CODDII.* Valencia, Spain. P. 10; and Deloitte (2017). Forces of Change: Industry 4.0. *Deloitte Insights*. Madrid. Both papers highlight the processes of industrial digitisation and how they affect cost reduction in design, operations, maintenance, etc., as well as the greater integration entailed in terms of both physical assets and human capital. A clear example is the preventive design and maintenance used in the S-80 submarine being built by Navantia.

materials are reduced as production is reduced. Employee costs can be interpreted in two ways, i.e. either the number of employees has decreased — not possible in this case, as we previously mentioned that it the number at an average rate of about 4% — or the salaries of workers have been lower.


In order to reinforce the above arguments, the ratios of these indicators to total costs show — in Table 6 — that they have increased by an average of 2.21%, i.e. the material costs have increased, but not employee costs. The latter suggests that companies are less intensive in their use of human capital, and that the importance and weight of raw materials in the cost structure of companies dedicated to the Spanish defence industry has increased[18].

How are the cost-related ratios expected to behave?

Both the ratio of material cost to total costs and the ratio of labour cost to total costs illustrate how important they are for companies. On average for both 2012 and 2016, material costs represent more than half of the total, with a slight increase of 0.63%. However, the proportion of disbursements to employees is barely 40% of total disbursements, which also confirms the decline in salaries during the crisis.

If we look at shareholder equity, we can deduce that shareholders, although not to a large extent, are confident that the economy will improve and entrepreneurs will do well, as their average contributions increased by 0.75%. We must not overlook that the ratio of equity to total liabilities grew by an average of 1.29%. In other words, since we already know that equity has remained practically stable, it follows that the quotient divisor has fallen and caused company liabilities to decrease.

One of the most outstanding aspects of the defence industry is the importance of R&D&I in its activity due to the need to generate new technologies. Although the




	2013	2014	2015
TDAE	11,6%	10,5%	10,0%
DEFENCE	10,0%	10,0%	8,0%
AERONAUTICAL	11,0%	9,5%	11,0%
SPACE	14,0%	12,0%	12,0%

Graph 2. R&D&I Investment of Total Turnover in each Sector. Source: prepared internally with TEDAE data

18 A good example of this could be carbon fibre in aircraft manufacturing. Very expensive material that fewer employees can handle and a possible increase in machinery that automates production processes.

Orbis database does not provide information on this subject, an approximation has been made with information from TEDAE that gives an approximate idea of R&D&I investments for the sectors for which information is provided in this source.

As the lines in the graph above show, the trend in R&D&I investment as a percentage of turnover is slightly downward, except in the aeronautics sector, which fluctuates in both directions, with a year-on-year growth between 2014-2015 of almost 16% — a value similar to the fall in the period from 2013 to 2014—. It remains practically constant in the year-on-year intervals in some of the sectors shown, as is the case in defence for 2013 and 2014, a sector in which 10% of turnover is earmarked for R&D&I. The situation is similar in the space sector, both for 2014 and 2015, where investment in R&D&I remains at 12% of turnover. As this is a turnover-dependent variable, figure 2 shows what happened for each of the sectors as above.



	2013	2014	2015
TDAE	9900	9400	9700
DEFENCE	5600	4800	4900
AERONAUTICAL	7400	7600	7800
SPACE	730	720	750

Graph 3. Total Turnover in Millions of €. Source: prepared internally with TEDAE data


The figures do not show very different situations between the commitment to R&D&I and the volume of turnover in the Spanish defence industry according to TEDAE data for the period between 2013 and 2015 in the different sectors. In other words, both in the space and aeronautics sectors, the growth path is practically constant, with a greater increase in the latter, as can be seen in the graph. The largest change is in defence with a cumulative average rate of change of -6.45%, reflecting the particularly negative impact it has endured.

This result is certainly logical, as investments with a high technology content are long-term and cannot be substantially modified due to the high costs the company may incur.

Finally, the importance of foreign trade in the sector must be considered. In general, exports account for a high proportion, representing 80% of total defence turnover[19].


19 DGAM (2017).

Exports represent very high percentages with an upward trend despite fluctuations in turnover. This is a consequence of the crisis as companies have shifted their focus to international clients due to the budget reduction in Spain and, additionally and positively, leads to a greater diversification of risks.



Graph 4. Defence Turnover and Exports Source: prepared internally with TEDAE data


The aeronautics sector shows no negative variation rates in either turnover or export volume. In short, although there has been no spectacular growth, year-on-year growth rates of 2.7% have been generated with an average cumulative growth of 1.3%, showing a high degree of stability.



Graph 5. Aeronautic Sector Turnover and Exports. Source: prepared internally with TEDAE data

Finally, and with much lower figures than the previous sectors, the same is true in the space sector as in aeronautics, with exports showing equivalent variation rates.

This sector is in full development as several projects are expected to increase turnover, such as the Galileo project[20] (European equivalent of the American GPS) or the Earth observation project[21].



Graph 6. Space Sector Turnover and Exports. Source: prepared internally with TEDAE data

Company performance

To close the SCP scheme of the methodology, some indicators will be used to analyse company performance. The first indicator, basic for analysing this last point, is earnings before tax. This figure provides information on the trend in an accounting year net of tax payments. In other words, it is the sum of both operating results (based on the company's main activity) and financial results.

Tables 8, 9 and 10 below show the evolution of this variable for the industry as a whole, both for the indicator explained above and for the following indicators detailed below.

20 Galileo is a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) developed by the European Union that provides navigation services: positioning and timing. The Galileo programme is of strategic importance for technical European Union independence because, until now, any user needing positioning data had to rely on services such as GPS or GLONASS, which are controlled by third countries. It is also of strategic importance from an economic perspective as the market for equipment and services that Galileo can provide is estimated to exceed €10 billion per year and will create many highly skilled jobs. https://www.inta.es/CPA/es/prs/

21 A clear example is the company Thales Alenia Space in Spain, which has participated in more than 120 Earth observation satellites, the European Copernicus programme, and for the Meteosat Third Generation (MTG) and GEO-KOMPSAT-2 meteorological satellites in South Korea, among others.

TABLE 8. PERFORMANCE VARIABLE DATA YEAR 2012

Performance Year 2012				
	N	Mean	Standard deviation	CV
Earnings before Tax	85	450,376.45	4,630,703.09	10.28
Profit per Employee	81	27.12	78.91	2.91
Profit Margin (%)	84	3.75	11.28	3.00
EBITDA	85	1,594,752.62	7,107,243.09	4.46

Source: prepared internally with Orbis

TABLE 9. PERFORMANCE VARIABLE DATA YEAR 2016

Performance Year 2016				
	N	Mean	Standard deviation	CV
Earnings before Tax	83	1,099,100.30	6,340,980.05	5.77
Profit per Employee	80	26.03	68.36	2.63
Profit Margin (%)	83	3.40	15.06	4.43
EBITDA	83	2,202,839.69	6,671,113.18	3.03

Source: prepared internally with Orbis

TABLE 10. VARIATION RATES (PERFORMANCE) PERIOD 2012-2016

Variation Rates (Performance) Period 2012-2016				
	N	Mean**	Standard deviation**	CV
Earnings before Tax	59	24.99	8.18	-13.45
Profit per Employee	55	-1.02	-3.52	-2.53
Profit Margin (%)	59	-2.44	7.50	10.19
EBITDA	62	8.41	-1.57	-9.21

Source: prepared internally with Orbis. ** In %

It is important to see how, on average, pre-tax earnings have grown dramatically by almost 25% during the period under review. This percentage is extremely high given that they barely exceeded 10% in many cases when studying the previous variables However, although growth is significant, it is similar to that of Spanish non-financial companies as a whole, as noted by the Bank of Spain[22].

On one hand, the Spanish economic outlook in 2012 was not in the best of conditions, which meant that companies dedicated to defence products were particularly

22 Mendéz and Mulino (2017).

affected, hence the result obtained. Once the economy recovered in 2016, and due to significant export capacity of companies, their growing dual nature and the increased renewal of weapon systems that were becoming obsolete — mainly maintenance — the defence industry started to improve its performance.

Comparing data indicated with the variation rate shows that in 2016 there is greater stability on average with respect to 2012. In other words, the performance of pre-tax earnings during the crisis was twice as dispersed from the average as in 2012, indicating generalised positive performance in 2016 for all companies.

Profit margin is the ratio between sales and earnings before tax, according to the definition of the database from which data have been obtained. The evolution of this ratio shows significant growth of profit compared to sales, resulting in a negative quotient growth rate between 2012 and 2016 of 2.44%.

Profit per employee is expected to have decreased, as discussed above with regard to the related indicators. In fact, its cumulative annual growth rate is -1.02%, indicating that, on average, the increase in the number of employees is higher than the increase in profits, so that the growth rate of earnings has not risen sufficiently for it to generate higher profits per employee hired. This infers that wages do not increase due to higher costs per person employed.

Finally, the last financial variable included is EBITDA. The growth shown by this variable is over 8%, which is in line with the evolution of all the performance indicators seen above, together with a sharp reduction in variability by more than one third.

A preliminary analysis of SCP relationships

Having studied aspects of structure, conduct and performance separately and having extracted some of the most important characteristics of each, all three will analysed together.

As discussed above, and as Segura (2006) has argued, relating firms' profits to the level of concentration, which reflects market power, would be enough to have a sufficient picture of the underlying relationships. In other words, a market structure variable with a performance variable.

Some papers analyse this issue using the so-called 'cost pass-through' hypothesis. In other words, since defence companies have market power due to oligopolies, they can pass on their cost increases to the price they charge the customer, i.e. the Ministry of Defence, without reducing their profit[23].

23 Rogerson (1992).

This has been verified by Fonfría and Correa-Burrows (2010)[24] when explaining the profit of Spanish defence firms based on variables associated with market power and conduct in relation to contracting variables.

In the case in question, a model has been proposed in which EBITDA, expressing company performance, depends on both structural variables (concentration and size of companies according to their sales) and behavioural variables (the importance of costs, the role of financing through shareholder equity and the solvency ratio of companies). The reason for including conduct variables is twofold. On the one hand, they are expected to provide a greater explanation of business performance and, on the other hand, given that there are no studies on the financial aspects of defence companies, we wanted to analyse the weight they may have in explaining the dependent variable.

Three models have been estimated in order to take into account the different aspects of the SCP approach. Cost variables are included in all three, as they are considered to be the key factor in defining profits. Model 1 includes sales revenue as it is the second profit-defining variable.

$$EBITDA = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \, Ingresos + \beta_2 \, Costes\ Laborales + \beta_3 \, Costes\ Materiales$$

The second model includes the concentration perspective mentioned above, but sales had to be excluded because of the high correlation.

$$EBITDA = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \, Costes\ Laborales + \beta_2 \, Costes\ Materiales + \beta_3 \, Concentración$$

The final model also includes performance variables.

$$EBITDA = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \, Costes\ Laborales + \beta_2 \, Costes\ Materiales + \beta_3 \, Concentración + \beta_4 \, C.\ Fondos\ de\ los\ Accionistas + \beta_5 \, Ratio\ Solvencia$$

In short, once estimates have been made in the three models, costs are significant and, as expected, negative. Both revenue and concentration are also significant in the models in which they are included, supporting the idea that market power is extremely important in defining profits in the defence industry; the higher it is, the greater the likelihood of high profits. However, none of the behavioural variables are significant. This result is in line with Segura (2006) since the role of concentration as market power is so important that it overshadows behavioural variables.

24 Fonfría, A. and Correa-Burrows, P. (2010). Effects of military spending on the profitability of the Spanish defence contractors. *Defence and Peace Economics*. Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 177-192.

TABLE 4. ESTIMATED MODELS. DEPENDENT

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	0.011 (0.058)	0.023 (1.093)	-0.344 (-0.946)
Revenue	5.775 (19.989)	s.e.	
Labour Costs	-1.182 (-10.904)	-0.746 (-3.999)	-1.158 (-10.333)
Material Costs	-4.801 (-19.720)	-3.427 (-8.180)	-4.728 (-18.432)
Concentration		3.676 (7.395)	5.680 (18.627)
Shareholder Equity/ Liabilities			0.054 (1.114)
Solvency Ratio			0.011 (0.230)
R2 Corrected	0.84	0.54	0.83
DW	2.021	2.048	2.138
F	137.310	29.820	66.432
No. Comments	79	79	78

Variable: EBITDA. Source: prepared internally
Note: s.e.: not included in estimate due to collinearity.

Main conclusions

After the analysis conducted in this research paper based on the SCP methodology, we can conclude that the end of the economic crisis has allowed defence industry companies to improve their performance substantially compared to other sectors[25] of the economy.

So much so that we have demonstrated that both turnover and the number of employees have increased, and this has hardly affected company solvency as they had sufficient strength in their assets to be able to face situations that arose due to the crisis in which the economy was submerged. This situation has been positively assessed by shareholders, making it possible for equity to remain stable.

Although defence spending has suffered declines, exports have been vitally important, leading to business diversification and a reorientation towards a more globalised market.

In accordance with the hypothesis on which the paper was based, the models presented and evaluated confirm that company performance does indeed largely depend

25 The sectors considered are those included the manufacturing industry according to the CNAE (National Classification of Economic Activities).

on costs and market structure, since the latter is conditioned by the existence of oligopolies and also (in some cases) monopolies. However, entrepreneurial conduct is not a basic explanatory factor.

We must not forget that the paper has some limitations, such as being unable to fully discern between military and civilian activity, as synergies in companies focused on military business are increasingly being exploited in the civilian sphere and vice versa. Also, and most difficult to analyse, is data availability, as in some of the cases data have been obtained from reports without of company-level figures that would make a better study possible.

As a result, and as a possible future line of research, a study could be carried out based on the comparative analysis of financial variables between Spanish and European industry. For the latter, analysing the most important companies at European level.

The major value-added contribution of this study may be the use of accounting-financial indicators, which have not been applied systematically to date, although much remains to be done.

Finally, two aspects related to defence industrial policy can be derived. The first is that differences between the various sub-sectors that make up the Spanish defence industry must be analysed, as market structures are also different. Secondly, since company profits depend on market structure, the changes taking place in the EU, with increased business collaboration and funding of innovative projects, will change the structure of the Spanish defence market in a few years, which will clearly affect company profits.

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ANNEX

Fixed assets See non-current assets. (Enguídanos, 2009, pág. 15).

Non-Current Assets. Economic resources intended to serve company activities on a lasting basis, including financial investments that are expected to mature, be disposed of or realised within more than one year. (Enguídanos, 2009, pág. 18)

Fixed Assets. By definition, a fixed asset is a company resource or asset that cannot be easily liquidated (i.e. converted into cash). These may be tangible or intangible resources. Examples of tangible fixed assets: company property, equipment, furniture. Examples of intangible fixed assets: patents, copyrights, logos and other company trademarks, as well as shares. (Economía, 2016)

Total Assets. Final amount of all gross investments, cash and cash equivalents, accounts receivable and other Assets as presented in the balance sheet. (http://www.investorguide.com/, s.f.).

Fixed Assets/Total Assets. Ratio of fixed assets to total assets.

Profit per Employee. Quotient of a company's net profits to the total number of its employees.

Material Cost. Costs arising from the materials necessary for a company's core business.

Employee Costs. Cost per person hired in the company.

Total Costs. Sum of the costs of all factors consumed or applied to the cost object. Total cost can be referred to both in reference to total productive resources applied to a cost object and in relation to total costs of a given category. The first case may be the total cost of production, a concept that groups together all costs applied to production, while the second case, for example, is the indirect cost of a cost section or of the company. (Enguídanos, 2009, pág. 75).

Material Cost / Total Costs. Ratio of material cost to the total costs of the company.

EBITDA. A financial indicator that seeks to measure earnings or profit achieved by a company or project, without taking into consideration taxes, financial expenses and other accounting expenses that do not involve cash outflow, such as amortisation, interest, taxes and depreciation. (Economía, 2016).

Shareholder Equity. Funds provided by investors holding shares, bonds, etc.

Total Liabilities. Total value of resources financing company assets. They must be equal to total assets.

Shareholder Equity/Total Liabilities. Ratio of shareholder equity to total liabilities held by the company.

Operating Revenue (turnover). Total revenue a company receives as a result of its activity. These revenues stem directly from economic transactions carried out by the company over a given period of time. In addition, the concept of turnover directly encompasses the total value of goods and services the company has sold and provided on a day-to-day basis.

Profit Margin (%). The positive difference an organisation expects to achieve once total revenues are reduced by total costs, always within an accounting period. In most institutions, the reference period is one year, although, depending on their needs, it can also be quarterly or half-yearly. (Economía, 2016).

Number of Employees. Volume of direct company employment during a financial year.

Solvency Ratio. One of the key metrics for measuring a company's ability to meet its debts and other obligations. Solvency ratio is used to indicate whether the cash flow, i.e. the money available to the company, is sufficient for it to meet its short and long-term debts. It also takes into account the depreciation of company assets. In other words, it measures the ability to meet all obligations and not just debts. (Economía, 2016).

Earnings before Tax. The total of the sum of the operating profit (the company's main activity) and the financial profit.

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Technological modernity and terrorist propaganda: proposal of a discursive analysis to face the messages of terrorism in the digital age

Abstract

Terrorism is a multidimensional phenomenon where communication, politics and the search for legitimacy play a decisive role. This research work tackles its study from several perspectives. Initially, it approaches the characteristics of technological modernity, where 'the digital' has colossal importance, and critically examines the phenomenology of this present, as well as its socio-political, economic and cultural implications. This creates a vantage point from which to observe the following sections from a better perspective, which examine terrorism from different positions and, finally, proposes a discursive analysis that, by synthesizing the main psychosocial mechanisms used by terrorists in their propaganda, allows us to see their dialectical tricks. The knowledge resulting from this analysis and the lessons learned in this respect constitute a fundamental support for the media and citizens in general, taking into account that the Internet makes it possible for terrorists to massively and globally distribute their messages.

Keywords

Technology, terrorism, propaganda, jihadism, social media.

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Introduction

One of the first actions the Taliban took upon retaking Afghanistan was to hold a press conference where they displayed an arsenal of fine words and conciliatory intentions[1]. Similarly, they are active on social media sharing content according to their interests. The concern for a good image is significant, because legitimacy among Afghans –crucial if the state is to be governed– and among the international community is at stake. Brutalities, such as the assassination of Mohammad Najibullah, are of little interest, at least publicly, although it is worth noting the leak to the media of a report by the Norwegian Center for Global Analyses that states that the Taliban are searching «door to door» for people who collaborated with US and NATO forces[2].

The Taliban's communication strategy has two fundamental pillars: the projection towards the traditional media (press conferences) and the creation and distribution of its own content (social networks). In the digital age, the opportunity to be fully autonomous in terms of what is generated and disseminated cannot be missed, especially when it has not required costly means for years. Previously, Al Qaeda, and above all the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)[3], used the internet as a propaganda disseminator, although each used different strategies. Without going into explanatory details, ISIL advocated violent, bloodthirsty and lurid content, while the Taliban prefer to avoid excesses and portray themselves as the guarantors of security and governance in Afghanistan, at least in the initial stages of their regime; it should not be forgotten that the situation is unstable and could degenerate into scenes of explicit public violence. Perhaps they also want to avoid being removed from some social networks that give them formidable publicity.

From this point onwards, if we want to have a better perspective, we need to read it broadly, knowing as well as possible the current historical context: network time, acceleration, hyper-speed, instantaneity, incessant stimuli... The better we know the pieces of this jigsaw puzzle, the more sense technological modernity acquires. The aim of this research is, on the one hand, to offer this necessary reading of the present in order to explain the relationship between terrorism, legitimacy, communication and digital propaganda. It is a complex task, as it involves drawing on different disciplines, as well as requiring a deep abstraction to fit the pieces of the puzzle together and extrapolate it to the workings of terrorism today. The culmination of this process is a discursive analysis based on psycho-social mechanisms that, like a lens, allow us to visualise terrorist messages and to notice their dialectical tricks, which could help to

1 Transcript of Taliban's first news conference in Kabul. *Al Jazeera* [online]. 2021. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/17/transcript-of-talibans-first-press-conference-in-kabul

2 Taliban conducting 'targeted door-to-door visits. UN document' *Al Jazeera* [online]. 2021. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/20/taliban-un-report-afghanistan-door-to-door-revenge

3 Also known as Islamic State (IS), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State (IS), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Daesh.

prevent some individuals from falling into terrorist networks when they become aware of the stratagems used.

Characteristics of technological modernity

This complex section is addressed mainly by three authors who have scrutinised the modern self and its properties: Alvin Toffler, Paul Virilio and Zygmunt Bauman. They are not the only relevant critics of modernity –Adolfo Vásquez Rocca recalls Sigmund Freud, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Lev Shestov and Franz Kafka[4]– but their choice is due to their excellent rapport: while Toffler acknowledges in *La tercera ola (The Third Wave)* (1980) that he focuses less on acceleration and more on the destinies towards which change leads, Virilio, in *El cibermundo, la política de lo peor (The Cyberworld, the Politics of the Worst)* (1997), and Bauman, in *Modernidad líquida (Liquid Modernity)* (1999), make a profound deliberation on acceleration and how it affects society. Overall, their contributions are extremely interesting in terms of the digital world around us.

Toffler[5], in a great exercise of summarising –he himself warns that his writing involves «simplifying, generalising and compressing»– identifies three disruptive changes in human history, which he calls «waves». The first came with the Neolithic revolution and lasted until the mid-17th-18th century, the second was born with the industrial revolution and by the mid-20th century was clearly established, while the third is underway and involves the advent of a society baptised in multiple forms: 'post-industrial', 'super-industrial', 'technetronics' and 'scientific-technological'. Crucially, he modifies three key aspects: the 'technosphere', which encompasses the energy, production and distribution system of a society; the 'sociosphere', or socio-family and work organisation; and the 'infosphere', which refers to the production and distribution of information. These 'inter-wave' changes generate tensions and conflicts that are captured in the expression 'super-struggle'. Today, the second and third waves resemble tectonic plates that occasionally collide and wreak havoc.

A society in the first wave uses humans and animals as energy sources, while harnessing natural mechanical energy. It is organised in extended families and, says Toffler, kinship and feudal or tribal loyalty play a strong role. Land is at the centre of life, mobility is low and the pace of life slow. Regarding communication, while face-to-face information exchange is open to all, the «newer systems used to carry information

4 Vásquez Rocca, A. (2017). La influencia de la escuela de Frankfurt en Zygmunt Bauman y Richard Rorty: de la teoría crítica a la modernidad líquida. *Nómadas. Revista Crítica de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas* [online], vol. 50, issue 1. Available at: https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/NOMA/article/view/52424/50323

5 Toffler, A. (1980). *La tercera ola*. Bogotá, Plaza & Janés.

beyond the confines of a family or village [are] essentially closed and used for social or political control purposes».

Second-wave civilisation, Toffler continues, «depends heavily on fossil fuels, factory production, the nuclear family, the corporation, general education and the media». Family, feudal or tribal loyalties are blurred by contractual ties. All of this is guided by six interrelated principles: uniformity –for proper industrial functioning one must be understood in the same weights and measures; in this respect, it seems no coincidence that the International Federation of National Standards Associations (ISA), the precedent of the International Standards Organisation (ISO), emerged in 1926, when the second wave was practically implemented–; specialisation –with the extreme of Taylorism, a method of work organisation that studies and eliminates unnecessary movement in order to increase productivity–; synchronisation –punctuality is fundamental to industry; Toffler describes the second-wave school as a place where precision timing, obedience and mechanical, repetitive work prepare the future employee, comparing the school bell, which regulates schedules within the school, to the factory siren–; concentration –grouping people from rural areas into urban centres–; maximisation –the author speaks of a 'macrophilia', not only physical (the huge factory), but also in relation to Gross Domestic Product and the need to increase it «even at the risk of ecological and social disaster»–; and centralisation –exemplified in the business or political chains of command that go up to a superintendent who, on the basis of information supplied by the lower echelons, makes decisions and transmits orders. In the dystopian world of *1984*, centralisation is so fierce that domestic repairs have to be authorised by remote committees that often delay the repair of broken glass by two years.

Toffler describes the third wave in which we are immersed as «highly technological and anti-industrial», bringing with it «a genuinely new way of life based on diversified and renewable energy sources; on methods of production that render the assembly lines of most factories obsolete; on new non-nuclear families; on a new institution, which might be called the 'electronic home'; and on radically modified schools and corporations of the future».

In *The Wealth Revolution* (2006), reviewed by Carmen Otilia Bocanegra Gastelum[6], Alvin and Heidi Toffler further develop this third wave, which is characterised by replacing «the factors of industrial production: land, labour and capital with knowledge as the primary generator of wealth», affecting «values, beliefs, family structures, political institutions, art, literature, music, education, culture and economics»[7]. Time and space are central to this transformation, the former being particularly problematic, as it can lead to severe crises through the «desynchronisation effect»; a mismatch

6 Bocanegra Gastelum, C.O. (2009) Reseña de 'La revolución de la riqueza' de Alvin Toffler y Heidi Toffler'. *Región y Sociedad* [online], vol. XXI, issue 44, pp. 241-246. Available at: https://www.redalyc.org/Artículo.oa?id=10204411

7 *Ibidem*.

between a country's basic institutions –business, civil society, families, trade unions, government bureaucracy and education system– and today's frenetic economic pace.



Image 1. While Toffler speaks of the «electronic home», Adolfo Vásquez Rocca points out that «the proliferation of personal computers in the continent's average households is drastically altering the modes of coexistence or cloistering in personal niches, workstations, or bunkers of solitary entertainment»[8]. The room-office/playroom, which, through the internet, enables communication with the rest of the planet regardless of the walls that separate the individual from the outside world[9]

Alvin and Heidi, explains Bocanegra Gastelum[10], reject that there is linear progress evolving into «a globally integrated economy and government»; on the contrary, they «see the direction of the states that drive the world economy moving with increasing power towards severe spatial upheavals in labour markets, technologies, currency and people across the globe», which will lead to «an unprecedented, totally new and strange social and economic tomorrow» with China as the superpower[11]. In short, they do not advocate an «end of history», a term developed by authors such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx or Francis Fukuyama, which can be defined by appealing to Alexandre Kojeve and his prophecy about «the replacement of «man proper», i.e. the discontented subject whose actions to change historical conditions produce «wars and bloody revolutions», by man as «an animal who is in harmony with Nature or being as it is given»»[12].

8 Vásquez Rocca, A., *Op. cit.*

9 Source of Image 1: DON, E. (2020). black flat screen computer monitor on black wooden desk photo. Unsplash [online]. Available at: https://unsplash.com/photos/LBokKgf8Vrc

10 Bocanegra Gastelum, C.O. *Op. cit.*

11 For more on international tension in this century, see: Dacoba Cerviño, F.J. (2021). Conflictividad s. XXI: los grandes suben la apuesta. *Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies* [online]. Available at: http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/2021/DIEEEA30_2021_FRADAC_Conflictividad.pdf

12 Niethammer, L., Van Laak, D. and Seigel, J. (1994). Posthistoire: Has History Come to an End? *History and Theory* [online], vol. 33, issue 2, p. 244. DOI 10.2307/2505387. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2505387

At this point it is useful to talk about acceleration. Paul Virilio[13] attaches enormous importance to speed, to the extent that he states that «it is power itself»:

«The very thing about absolute speed is that it is also absolute power, absolute control, instantaneous, that is to say, an almost divine power. Today, we have put into practice the three attributes of the divine: ubiquity, instantaneity and immediacy; total vision and total power. This has nothing to do with democracy any more, it is tyranny. Multimedia confronts us with a problem: Can we find a democracy of real time, *live*, immediacy and ubiquity? I don't think so, and those who are quick to say so are not very serious.




Image 2. Undoubtedly, the internet is the greatest exponent of instantaneity. Its global growth is unstoppable –49% of the global population was using it in 2017, up from 20% in 2007 and 2% in 1997– although there are large inter-regional differences: North America has always led the way and by 2017, 88% of its population was online, compared to 19% of people in Sub-Saharan Africa. It should be noted that there is a greater preference for mobile broadband over fixed broadband[14]

13 Virilio, P. (1997). *El cibermundo: la política de lo peor*. Madrid, Ediciones Cátedra. Pp. 18-20. ISBN 84-376-1574-7.

14 Source of Image 2: Prepared internally based on International Telecommunication Union (ITU) WORLD Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database (2021). API_IT.NET.USER.ZS_DS2_en_excel_v2_2764008.xls. *DataBank | The World Bank* [online]. Available at: https://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?downloadformat=excel and ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database (2020). ITU_regional_global_Key_ICT_indicator_aggregates_Nov_2020.xlsx. *Statistics - ITU* [online]. Available at: https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ITU_regional_global_Key_ICT_indicator_aggregates_Nov_2020.xlsx. On the definition of 'fixed broadband subscriptions' and 'active mobile broadband subscriptions' see: ICT Data and Statistics Division Telecommunication Development Bureau International Telecommunication Union (2019). The ICT Development Index (IDI): Methodology, indicators and definitions. *ITU-D ICT STATISTICS* [online]. Available at: https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/statistics/ITU_ICT Development Index.pdf

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Bauman[15] divides history into two clearly differentiated realities: heavy, solid, voluminous, condensed or systematic modernity and liquid modernity. From there, he develops a rich comparative thesis. The crowning glory of heavy modernity was Fordism, which he describes as «a site of epistemological construction on which the whole worldview was erected and which stood majestically dominating the totality of life experience». Evidenced:

«The Fordist factory [...] was undoubtedly the greatest achievement so far of a social construction tending towards order. It is not unusual for him to establish a metaphorical frame of reference for anyone trying to understand the workings of human reality at all levels».

«The frozen time of the factory routine, together with the bricks and mortar of the factory walls, immobilised capital as effectively as the labour employed».

In contrast to this old world, liquid modernity is light –capital travels light, stopping «almost anywhere, and nowhere takes longer than necessary»– to such an extent that Bauman argues that if the neolithic revolution brought with it sedentarism and the consideration of nomads as inferior, liquidity is the revenge of nomadism against sedentarism. The liquid escapes between the fingers; it is difficult to maintain and constantly changes shape. Heraclitus of Ephesus' concern with incessant change –becoming– is recaptured in the expression «panta rei» («everything flows») and in the appreciation that it is not possible to bathe in the same river twice. Bauman warns: fluidity brings with it the «unholy trinity» of uncertainty, insecurity and unprotectedness, noting that «each of which generates acute and painful anguish in the ignorance of where it comes from». The effects are devastating at all levels: politics «is permanently undermined by the new global powers, equipped with the terrifying weapons of extraterritoriality, speed of movement and evasion/escape capacity»; speed moves to «the top of the list of survival values», although «it does not lead to thinking, nor to long-term thinking»; occupationally «secure jobs in secure companies turn out to be just nostalgic old wives' tales». Nor are there any skills or experiences that, once acquired, would guarantee employment, and if employment is obtained, it is not lasting»; furthermore, because beliefs, values and styles are decontextualised or uprooted, «identities become fragile, temporary and 'expired'», which causes «the weaker, poorly armed individual to seek in association with others the confirmation that allows him to compensate for his individual impotence» (interesting reflection on the recruitment and joining of extremist groups or ideas). Finally, there is a decoupling of time and

15 Bauman, Z. (1999). *Modernidad líquida*. Fondo de Cultura Económica 2015. ISBN 0-7456-2409-X.

space: 'Far', 'long time', 'near' and 'short time' used to indicate the effort it took for a human being to travel a certain distance, but with electronic speed they have lost their meaning.

Importantly, Bauman, like the Tofflers, shares the belief that there will not be an «end of history», but a turbulent period:

«Progress is no longer a temporary measure, something provisional, which would lead eventually (and shortly) to a state of perfection (that is, to a state of affairs in which everything that had to be done has already been done and no further change is necessary), but a perpetual and perhaps endless challenge and necessity».

On the basis of the above, some necessary considerations should be made. It should not be forgotten that these authors make a huge synthesis to present their ideas. Therefore, they must be read in a generalist way, knowing the vast diversity of the earth; even within a single society there may be technologically disparate regions or segments of the population for many reasons, including a voluntary reluctance to change. Thus, a case-by-case, country-by-country, region-by-region analysis would be appropriate.

In *COVID-19: El Gran Reinicio* (2020)[16], Klaus Schwab and Thierry Malleret offer an analysis that is very close to the positions seen so far. Both authors argue that today's world has three determining characteristics: 1) interdependence, i.e. the «dynamics of reciprocal dependence between the elements that make up a system», which leads to risks amplifying each other with cascading effects; 2) speed, which they blame either on progress and globalisation, generating a «culture of immediacy», or on the perception of increasingly scarce and therefore more valuable time, leading to a problem of asynchrony between policy makers and citizens; and 3) complexity, which «places limits on our knowledge and understanding of things; hence, the increasing complexity today may literally overwhelm the ability of politicians in particular and decision makers in general to make informed decisions». They go on to give a lengthy account of what the future holds, saying that automation will be a major concern and that «it is inevitable that unemployment will rise around the world». They argue that «the green economy encompasses a range of possibilities, from green energy to ecotourism and the circular economy» and go so far as to argue that «there is no point in trying to restore the *status quo* ante [since] 'hyperglobalisation' has lost all its political and social capital, and defending it is no longer politically sustainable». In any case, they do not claim the «end of history», but predict upheaval. Three key paragraphs are shown below:

«An entire generation across the globe will be determined by economic and often social insecurity, with millions of people waiting to enter the labour market in the midst of a deep recession [due to the COVID-19 pandemic]. This will mark them forever».

16 Schwab, K. and Malleret, T. (2020). *COVID-19: el gran reinicio*. Colonia/Ginebra, World Economic Forum. ISBN 978-2-940631-14-8.

«The determining factor of geopolitical instability is the gradual shift in the balance of power between the West and the East in favour of the latter, in a transition that generates tensions and, in the process, global disorder. This is reflected in what is known as the 'Thucydides trap': the structural stress that inevitably occurs when a rising power like China rivals a dominant power like the United States.

«In this new and disrupted world, defined by a trend towards multipolarity and intense competition for influence, conflicts or tensions will no longer be fuelled by ideology (with the partial and limited exception of radical Islam), but spurred by nationalism and competition for resources.

Moreover, they are committed to relativism:

In the world of international politics, if two different observers are entitled to their own opinions, that makes them subjective, but no less real and no less valid. If an observer can only understand «reality» according to the colour of the glass of their particular idiosyncrasy, this forces us to rethink the concept of objectivity. It is clear that the representation of reality depends on the position of the observer. In that sense, the «Chinese» vision and the «American» vision can coexist, with many other visions in between - and all of them real!

Both relativism and scepticism are pieces that seem to fit well into the puzzle of a fluid and uncertain world, but they carry risks. As Vicente Caballero de la Torre[17] notes, for some sophists, pioneers of cultural relativism, «reason and truth correspond to what is said and affirmed by the strongest rhetorically or physically, that is, by the one who is able to impose them». Protagoras «held that there is no difference between what things are and what we think they are at any given moment. All opinions are true as far as sensibility is concerned: there is no difference between seeming and being. The point is that some views are more useful than others. Gorgias, the initiator of solipsism, and his three theses are worth mentioning: 1) Nothing exists. 2) Even if existence exists, it is inapprehensible to humans. 3) Even if existence is apprehensible, it certainly cannot be communicated or interpreted to one's neighbors. Learn the importance of all this in a digital, hyper-fast, post-truth, post-truth world dominated by the «unholy trinity».

To conclude on a mechanistic note, the human being can be compared to a vehicle. For years, machines have been reaching speeds that are unbearable for humans, with undesirable consequences that increase the risk of accidents, such as the tunnel effect. For this reason, the authorities impose limits that restrict the power of the machine *de jure*, so that the driver does not lose too much detail and can react to any eventuality. Analogically, the subject exposed to a multitude of incessant stimuli, such as news, rumours, announcements, truths and falsehoods –which may, moreover, be difficult to verify– is like the driver who adjusts the machine to a speed for which the body

17 Caballero de la Torre, V. (2018). *Breve historia de la filosofía occidental*. Madrid, Ediciones Nowtilus. ISBN 978-84-9967-948-8.

is not prepared. It will undoubtedly miss details and may not have enough time to notice the dangers.

This review of technological modernity serves as a prism through which to observe the following sections which, focusing on security, and more specifically on terrorism and its relationship to communication and legitimacy, end by proposing a discursive analysis to help confront terrorist propaganda in the age of electronic hyper-speed, which, as examined, will be accompanied by turmoil, disorder and confusion.

Terrorism, communication and legitimacy

Terrorism[18] attacks symbolic and vulnerable targets in order to increase the psychological impact of its actions and convey a political message[19]. Consequently, the terrorist organises and executes the plans on the basis of a calculated communication strategy. Violent anarchism, which caused the first global terrorist wave in history, reached its zenith in the 1890s when prominent political and state figures, such as Marie-François-Sadi Carnot, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo and Elisabeth of Bavaria (nicknamed Sisi or Sissi), were assassinated by anarchists who moved easily across international borders[20]. This strategy was based on the doctrine of «propaganda by deed», which considered that ineffective oral and written propaganda required insurrectionary actions to achieve the desired goals. Originally these acts were intended to mobilise the illiterate masses of the Italian countryside, but when they failed to get the expected response the anarchists pivoted to individual attacks, attacking the rulers to show the weakness of the state and inspire the masses with self-sacrifice[21]. Today's terrorism, as a continuation of «propaganda by deed», targets state symbols, political opponents and the general public to cause psychological coercion[22].

18 There is no comprehensive UN treaty on terrorism and no internationally binding definition of the term. However, there is a universal legal framework or regime based on General Assembly resolutions, Security Council resolutions and international legal instruments, which are 19 multilateral conventions and protocols relating to terrorism that in practice have achieved almost universal adherence. For more information on the legal framework against terrorism, see: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2018). The Universal Legal Framework against Terrorism. *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime* [online]. Viena. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Module 2/Module_2_Spanish.pdf

19 Gearty, C. (2004). Terrorism and morality. *Whitehall Papers* [online], vol. 61, issue 1, p. 19. DOI 10.1080/02681300408523001.Availableat:https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02681300408523001

20 Rapoport, D.C. (2002). The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11. *Anthropoetics* [online], vol. VIII, issue 1. Available at: http://anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/terror/

21 Miller, M., *et al.* (2019). Anarchism - Anarchism as a movement, 1870-1940. *Britannica* [online]. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/anarchism/Anarchism-as-a-movement-1870-1940#ref750483

22 Merari, A. (1993). Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency. *Terrorism and Political Violence* [online], vol. 5, issue 4, p. 227. DOI 10.1080/09546559308427227. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546559308427227

Cowen[23] compares it to theatre, the difference being that theatre is aimed at a small, private audience, whereas terrorists do not limit their «stagings»; on the contrary, they seek the widest possible publicity.

Terrorism is also a struggle about what is legitimate, that is, what is lawful; what is true, genuine and real; what is in accordance with the law. Each side questions the legitimacy of the other. As Cook[24] notes, left-wing terrorists generally deny the legitimacy of the state and argue that violence against it is morally justified, right-wing terrorists condone violence to maintain order, while a state besieged by terrorism defends its legitimacy while delegitimising its opponent. This scenically violent, highly symbolic and deeply psychological struggle distinguishes terrorism from conventional warfare. In the latter, the critical –but not only– factors are armies, military equipment and territory, whereas resolving a terrorist conflict requires winning over morale and public opinion[25]. In this respect, Hermann Heller[26] expresses:

«Public opinion rooted in principles and doctrines constitutes one of the most substantial bonds of state unity. Especially in democratically governed states, the current situation of power becomes a relatively secure situation of power, a political *status*, thanks to the fact that a common public opinion in the form of a community of will and values has been created between the authority and the subjects.

Terrorism seeks to break the political status quo in order to impose its own through two main means: violence and argumentation. The first seeks a disproportionate state response that inflicts harm on a population prone, for underlying reasons[27], to take sides with terrorism. It is also a way of delegitimising the state, characterising it as

23 Cowen, T. (2006). Terrorism as Theater: Analysis and Policy Implications. *Public Choice* [online], vol. 128, issue 1/2, pp. 233-244. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/30026642

24 Cook, D. (2003). Legitimacy and Political Violence: A Habermasian Perspective. *Social Justice* [online], vol. 30, issue 3 (93), p. 109. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/29768212

25 Walker, D.H. (2005). Developing Metrics for the Global War on Terrorism. U.S. *Naval War College* [online]. Newport. P. 10. Available at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=15551

26 Heller, H. (1934). *Teoría del Estado*. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica 2010. Pp. 225-226. ISBN 978-968-16-5725-3.

27 These underlying causes include: a widespread perception of deprivation and inequality, especially among culturally defined groups, very rapid modernisation with social inequalities, a poor society with weak state structures and a lack of political integration leading a section of the population to believe that the political regime is illegitimate, according to Brynjar, L. and Skjølberg, K. (2004). Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature. Kjeller (Norway), Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, FFI/RAPPORT-2004/04307 [online]. Pp. 70-71. DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.3776.6882. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281274883_CAUSES_OF_TERRORISM_An_Expanded_and_Updated_Review_of_the_Literature. If a turbulent future such as the one outlined in the section on the characteristics of electronic modernity were to occur, it is possible that these underlying causes would feed on disorder, increasing the likelihood of violence.

incapable and negligent[28]. This is accompanied by a narrative, a dialectic and a story where the media play a fundamental role. Farnen[29] indicates that terrorism and the media have a symbiotic relationship because of the increased attention, potentially transformable into economic benefits, generated by violent news. Moreover, in the face of a globalised approach, terrorism commits bolder and more spectacular acts to attract attention. Borrego Sevillano[30] comments:

«The internationalisation of terrorism and the emergence of a fundamentalist religious motivation in the structures that drive and justify terrorist groups are two facts that broke the self-limitation of terrorist violence from the 1960s onwards».

But what is the current state of play on terrorism? Which ideology causes more victims and where? Answering these questions is a step that precedes any contribution to their alleviation, while targeting resources towards the most pernicious doctrine is fundamental to an optimal outcome.

Jihadism, the main driver of international terrorism

This section follows a methodology of comparison and analysis based on fatalities attributed to terrorism from 1970 to 2019, which includes perpetrators who died as a direct result of attacks. Images 3 and 4 provide this historical perspective[31].

28 Bueno de Mesquita, E. and Dickson, E. (2007). The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization. *American Journal of Political Science* [online], vol. 51, issue 2, p. 377. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4620071

29 Farnen, R.F. (1990). Terrorism and the mass media: A systemic analysis of a symbiotic process. *Terrorism* [online], vol. 13, issue 2, pp. 99-143. DOI 10.1080/10576109008435820. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576109008435820

30 Borrego Sevillano, J.M. (2016). La evolución del terrorismo salafista yihadista internacional. Doble vertiente: propaganda y ámbito de actuación. Estudio de caso: España. In: C. Navajas Zubeldia and D. Iturriaga Barco (eds.). *Siglo: V Congreso internacional de historia de nuestro tiempo* [online]. Logroño, University of La Rioja. P. 559. Available at: https://publicaciones.unirioja.es/catalogo/online/Historia_nuestro_tiempo_5/pdf/131_BorregoSevillano.pdf

31 The Global Terrorism Database of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), which is the source used for images 3, 4, 5 and 7, defines a terrorist attack as «the threat or actual use of unlawful force and violence by a non-state actor to achieve a political, economic, religious or social objective through fear, coercion or intimidation». For more information, see: GTD | Global Terrorism Database - START.UMD.EDU (2019). GTD Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables. *START.umd.edu* [online], p. 10. Available at: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf




Image 3. Terrorism fatalities from 1970 to 2019 (by region)[32]




Figure 4. Cumulative terrorist fatalities from 1970 to 2019 (by region)[33]

In the 1970s, Western Europe was the area most targeted by terrorism due to the Northern Irish conflict and the actions of, among others, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force. At the end of this decade, ETA significantly increased its number of assassinations. It is also the time of Palestinian terrorism –Black September, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine– and of the Montoneros in

32 Source of Image 3: Prepared internally based on GTD | Global Terrorism Database (2021). globalterrorismdb_0221dist.xlsx. *CHC START* [online]. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20210828160116/https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/app/uploads/_mediavault/2021/02/globalterrorismdb_0221dist.xlsx

33 Source of Image 4: Prepared internally from *ibidem*.

Argentina. In the 1980s, Central America and the Caribbean became the area hardest hit by the intensification of the Central American crisis, with the activity of groups such as the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in El Salvador and several others in Nicaragua – Democratic Force of Nicaragua, Guerrilla Army of the Poor, Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática). From 1985 to 1995 South America became one of the regions hardest hit by Peru's Shining Path, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the 19 April Movement and the National Liberation Army. During this period there was also major action by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka (South Asia) and the New People's Army in the Philippines (Southeast Asia). With regard to the Middle East and North Africa, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was enormously bloody in the early 1990s, while in Sub-Saharan Africa, Hutu extremist attacks in a context of tension over the Rwandan genocide stand out, as well as the actions of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, especially from 1982 to 1994 and from 1996 to 2002. For its part, Mozambique's National Resistance Movement caused numerous fatalities from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s.

Jihadist terrorism took off in the first decade of the 21st century with the attacks of 11 September 2001 – previously notable, without reaching the magnitude of Al Qaeda, were the Shiite Hezbollah and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). To note the ravages of the second Chechen war (1999-2009), the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, especially since 2006 –coinciding with Al Qaeda in Iraq– and the ferocity of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban Movement) since 2009. The worst came in the second decade with the rise of ISIL and the deterioration of the situation in sub-Saharan Africa, with intense Boko Haram activity since 2011 and Al Shabab since 2012. Not to mention Al-Qaeda's muscle in the Arabian Peninsula (Middle East and North Africa) since 2013. As a result, 2014 saw a peak of 44,524 deaths from terrorism. Such was ISIL's ferocity that, despite its short existence and lacking the veteran status of Al Qaeda, it is the second terrorist group with the second highest death toll attributed to it (image 5).




Image 5. The 25 terrorist groups with the highest number of attributed fatalities from 1970 to 2019. The category «Unknown» is included for information purposes[14]

34 Source of Image 5: Prepared internally from *ibidem*.

As can be seen, terrorism is changeable, both in ideology and in the regions that suffer from it («panta rei»). The proposed discursive analysis focuses on jihadism as the main current threat, but can be extended to any other discourse due to its versatility. However, before presenting it, it is useful to review how terrorism uses the internet, within the digital and hypervelocity framework that encompasses everything as if it were ether.

Jihadist propaganda online 2.0

Terrorists use the internet for various purposes: propaganda, including recruitment, radicalisation and incitement to violence; financing; training; planning, including secret communications and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT); carrying out terrorist acts, taking advantage of the logistical and anonymity advantages of the internet; and for cyber-attacks[35].

In more theoretical terms, the internet eliminates intermediaries and allows for direct communication with users. The figure of the cybernaut who consumes as well as produces appears. Many websites invite you to do so; for example, Wikipedia allows you to consume content, but also to edit it to enrich or correct it; with YouTube you consume videos created by others, but you can share your own content with the world if you wish. It is a revolution compared to traditional media, which used to be the only media that had the capacity to generate and distribute content massively (and unidirectionally). This is why they were so necessary for a publicity-hungry terrorism, which now has an environment that allows for a vast expansion of its propaganda, including its own «news agencies», such as the ISIL-linked Amaq News Agency, which under a veneer of objectivity attributed attacks and published «scoops» about the terrorist group[36].

Jihadism has benefited from what is known in marketing as superfans, i.e. those cybernauts who are very loyal to the brand and enthusiastically share what is related to it. One example is Samir Khan, a US citizen born in Saudi Arabia who, from his parents' home in Charlotte (North Carolina, USA), started a major jihadist internet network –reminiscent of Toffler's «electronic home», with the office-room and play-room acquiring the status of a digital home base– consisting of blogs such as *Inshallah.shaheed* and two e-zines: *Jihad Recollections*, launched in 2009, which has the dubious honour of being the first widely known jihadist publication in English, and *Inspire*, launched

35 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013). Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes. *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime* [online]. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes/Use_of_Internet_Ebook_SPANISH_for_web.pdf

36 Callimachi, R. (2016). A News Agency With Scoops Directly From ISIS, and a Veneer of Objectivity. *The New York Times* [online]. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/world/middleeast/a-news-agency-with-scoops-directly-from-isis-and-a-veneer-of-objectivity.html



Image 6. The user @Zabehulah_M33 claims to be the «official Twitter account of the spokesperson of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Zabihullah Mujahid». Through this platform the Taliban distribute their propaganda quickly and massively, provided they are found not to be in breach of the rules, which would lead to a suspension of the profile. In this case, a video is broadcast, in which a guy, in the guise of a reporter, interviews a couple of people. On the other hand, note how machine translations help to break down language barriers, despite the inaccuracies. In short, we are talking about fundamental changes in the «infosphere»[37]

in 2010 as one of the media flagships of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula[38]. Despite his parents' efforts to stop his radicalisation, Khan moved to Yemen in 2009, where he was killed in 2011 along with Anwar al-Awlaki[39] by a controversial drone strike. His story proves that Al Qaeda has been using the internet for terrorist purposes since before the emergence of ISIL. However, the latter group was more effective in spreading its propaganda based on violence, Islamic theology and sectarianism[40]. A review of the death toll attributed to jihadist-inspired extremists[41] –Image 7– confirms this.

37 Source of Image 6: Zabihullah (..ذبـــيح الله م) (@Zabehulah_M33) (2021). *Twitter* [online]. Available at: https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1427126736026836995

38 Bunker, R.J. and Bunker, P.L. (2018). Radical Islamist English-Language Online Magazines: Research Guide, Strategic Insights, and Policy Response. *US Army War College - Strategic Studies Institute* [online]., pp. 7, 12. Available at: https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3549.pdf

39 Brown, R. and Severson, K. (2011). 2nd American in Strike Waged Qaeda Media War. *The New York Times* [online]. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/samir-khan-killed-by-drone-spun-out-of-the-american-middle-class.html

40 Badawy, A. and Ferrara, E. (2018). The rise of Jihadist propaganda on social networks. *Journal of Computational Social Science* [online], vol. 1. DOI 10.1007/s42001-018-0015-z. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs42001-018-0015-z

41 A jihadist-inspired extremist is an extremist who is apparently not in contact with the command structure of any group, but is influenced by its propaganda.




Image 7. Jihadist-inspired extremist fatalities from 1994 to 2019 (by region)[42]

From 1994 to 2013, 34 victims of jihadist-inspired extremists were recorded, most notably in 2009, when commander Nidal Malik Hasan –a follower of Anwar al-Awlaki[43]– murdered 13 people at Fort Hood (Texas, USA). From 2014 to 2019 the number of victims is 304, including 16 from the 2015 San Bernardino massacre, 50 from the 2016 Pulse nightclub massacre in Orlando, 87 from the 2016 Nice attack and 12 from the 2016 Berlin attack.

ISIL's propaganda pressure forced measures to be taken, some of which include: by Twitter, the removal of 360,000 accounts for promoting terrorism from mid-2015 to August 2016[44]; by Facebook, the use of artificial intelligence - including image matching and collaboration between the WhatsApp and Instagram platforms[45]; and by the European Union making it mandatory for data hosting service providers to remove terrorist content or block access to it in all Member States within one hour of receiving the removal order[46]. In Spain, Organic Law 2/2015, of 30 March, which amends Organic Law 10/1995, of 23 November, of the Criminal Code, on terrorist crimes, whose Article 575 «criminalises indoctrination and military or combat training or training in the handling of all kinds of weapons and explosives, expressly including passive indoctrination and training, with special mention of that which is carried out through the internet or communication services accessible to the public»[47].

42 Source of Image 7: Prepared internally based on GTD | Global Terrorism Database. *Op. cit.*

43 Brachman, J. (2021). Anwar al-Awlaki. *Britannica* [online]. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Anwar-al-Awlaki

44 An update on our efforts to combat violent extremism. *Twitter Blog* [online]. 2016. Available at: https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/a/2016/an-update-on-our-efforts-to-combat-violent-extremism

45 Hard Questions: How We Counter Terrorism. *About Facebook* [online]. 2017. Available at: https://about.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/

46 Regulation (EU) 2021/784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 on combating the dissemination of terrorist content online. *Official Journal of the European Union* [online]. 2021. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0784&from=ES

47 Organic Law 2/2015 of 30 March 2015, which amends Organic Law 10/1995 of 23 November 1995 on the Criminal Code, on terrorist offences. *BOE* [online]. 2015. Available at: https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2015-3440

In order to further explore digital counter-terrorism, the transparency reports of Twitter[48] and Facebook[49] should be mentioned as an interesting source. Those relating to Twitter are organised under three headings - 'Injunctions', 'Twitter Rules' and 'Safety and Integrity' – which in turn contain further subheadings. Facebook's can be classified under four headings - 'Enforcement', 'Legal Requirements', 'Internet Ecosystem' and 'Most Viewed Content Report: What people see on Facebook' - with relevant sub-sections. For a better understanding, see Images 8 and 9.




Image 8. Organisation of Twitter transparency reports[50]

48 Overview of reports. *Twitter Transparency Center* [online]. 2021. Available at: https://transparency.twitter.com/es_es/reports.html

49 Transparency reports. *Transparency Center - Facebook* [online]. 2021. Available at: https://transparency.fb.com/data/

50 Source of Image 8: Prepared internally based on General description of the reports, *op. cit.*




Image 9. Organisation of Facebook transparency reports[51]

In terms of Twitter content removal requests –which authorities can send from the URL https://legalrequests.twitter.com/, with https://www.facebook.com/records/login being the equivalent for Facebook[52]– the July - December 2020 report[53] notes that «Twitter received a legal demand from the Colombian National Police because seven accounts allegedly incited violent threats against national security. These accounts were involved in activities related to and affiliated with the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) and, as such, were permanently suspended under Twitter's policy against Violent Organisations». On the other hand, the January-June 2020 report[54] specifies that «Twitter received a legal complaint from the Iraqi police regarding 29 accounts allegedly affiliated with ISIS. 27 accounts were suspended for violating the Twitter Rules, but no action was taken against the remaining two accounts, as they did not violate the Twitter Rules». These two cases are paradigmatic: in the first, Twitter suspended all the accounts that had been transferred to it by the Colombian police, while in the second, two accounts were not acted against, despite the Iraqi police's instructions. In relation to Facebook, the report on content restrictions based on French local legislation from

51 Source of Image 9: Prepared internally based on Transparency reports, *op. cit.*

52 For more information, see: Law enforcement support. *Twitter Help Center* [online]. 2021. Available at: https://help.twitter.com/es/rules-and-policies/twitter-law-enforcement-support and Guidelines for law enforcement. *Security Centre - Facebook* [online]. 2021. Available at: https://es-es.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/

53 Removal requests - Jul. - Dec. 2020. *Twitter Transparency Center* [online]. 2021. Available at: https://transparency.twitter.com/es_es/reports/removal-requests.html#2020-jul-dec

54 Removal requests - January - June 2020. *Twitter Transparency Center* [online]. 2021. Available at: https://transparency.twitter.com/es_es/reports/removal-requests.html#2020-jan-jun

July-December 2020[55] notes that access to three items was restricted for alleged violation of Article 421-2-5 of the Penal Code, which punishes public apology of acts of terrorism[56]. More information and more context is needed on the profiles reported and their motives, but it illustrates how counter-terrorism is exercised on the internet and the power of these platforms. It is noteworthy that perhaps a rigorous and methodologically sound study of these transparency reports could provide relevant information; for example, an increase in requests for removal of terrorism-related content from a particular state could indicate that there is a tendency to threaten that country, suggesting that there is a growing danger to its national security.




Image 10. Facebook: Amount of content restricted in France by local law. Of particular note is the peak in July-December 2015, which was triggered by terrorism. It is due to the fact that access to an image related to the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris was repeatedly restricted, which, according to the French Central Office for Combating Crimes Related to Information and Communication Technologies (OCLCTIC), violated French laws related to the protection of human dignity[57]

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that for years jihadism has been stressing the need to use encryption to make investigations more difficult. First of all, however, it must be stressed that encryption on the internet is a thorny issue. One can point to the international declaration of 11 October 2020 signed by the governments of the UK, Australia, Canada, India, Japan, New Zealand and the US[58], which, while acknowl-

55 Content Restrictions Based on Local Law - France. *Transparency Center - Facebook* [online]. 2021. Available at: https://transparency.fb.com/data/content-restrictions/country/FR/

56 'Article 421-2-5 - Code pénal'. *Légifrance* [online]. 2014. Available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000029755573/.

57 Source of Image 10: Prepared internally based on Content Restrictions Based on Local Law - France. *Op. cit.*

58 International Statement: End-To-End Encryption and Public Safety. *Office of Public Affairs | Department of Justice* [online]. 2020. Available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety

edging that strong encryption «plays a crucial role in protecting personal data, privacy, intellectual property, trade secrets and cybersecurity», also states that «end-to-end encryption that prevents lawful access to the content of communications in all circumstances directly affects [law enforcement's] responsibilities, creating serious risks to public safety». It concludes: «While this statement focuses on the challenges posed by end-to-end encryption, this commitment applies to the full range of encryption services available, including device encryption, customised encrypted applications and encryption on embedded platforms». For its part, an EU Council resolution of 24 November 2020[59] states that «the European Union continues to support strong encryption», while calling for «maintaining the possibility for competent authorities in the area of security and criminal justice to lawfully access relevant data for legitimate and clearly defined purposes in the fight against serious and/or organised crime and terrorism».

Having presented the controversy surrounding encryption, it is worth noting that the first issue of *Inspire*[60], published in 2010, already states that one of the disadvantages of the internet is that «spies pay attention to emails, especially if you are an individual known to have a jihadist mentality»; subsequently, it proposes using a cryptographic programme called «Asrar al-Mujahideen 2.0». Similarly, the fifth issue of the ISIL-linked French-language magazine *Dar al-Islam*[61], which appeared in July 2015, contains a section entitled *Muslim safety rules* (in French *Les règles de sécurité du musulman)* which urges to follow some advice on the internet, such as the use of a virtual private network (VPN) and the Tor network. It also urges the use of TrueCrypt, an encryption software discontinued in 2014. In the ninth[62] and tenth[63] issue of *Dar al-Islam*, from April and August 2016 respectively, more advice is offered in a section called *Computer security* (in French, *Sécurité informatique*), which explains the Tor network in greater depth and details the Tails operating system, designed to protect against surveillance and censorship. In conclusion, both Al Qaeda and ISIL made a point of recommending some tools to hinder security forces. Consequently, there is some apprehension on the part of at least part of the international community about the extensive use of encryption and the effects it may have on public security; it is a debate that is likely to intensify in the future.

Finally, we are ready to tackle the last section: the proposal of a discursive analysis whose dissemination, both among communication professionals and society in general, would help to examine terrorist propaganda from a methodological prism far removed from emotional charges.

59 Council Resolution on Encryption - Security through encryption and security despite encryption. *Council of the European Union* [online]. 2020, p. 4. Available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13084-2020-REV-1/en/pdf

60 How to use Asrar al-Mujahideen: Sending & Receiving Encrypted Messages. *Inspire*. 2010, issue 1, pp. 41-44.

61 Les règles de sécurité du musulman. *Dar al-Islam*. 2015, issue 5, pp. 30-33.

62 Sécurité informatique. *Dar al-Islam*. 2016, issue 9, pp. 38-52.

63 Sécurité informatique - Deuxième partie. *Dar al-Islam*. 2016, issue 10, pp. 38-46.

Discursive analysis based on psychosocial mechanisms for examining terrorist propaganda

Schmid[64] posits the existence of three realms of reality: the real objective world, the symbolic world –mainly portrayed by the media– and the subjective world, which is a mental product of the individual. The media –and at this point social networks should be mentioned as platforms for dissemination and their users as creators of content– have a considerable influence on the interpretation of reality because the impressions they emit exceed those that a person perceives from his or her immediate environment. 'Framing' comes into play, whereby the interpretation of problems, their causes and solutions are determined by how they are formulated. Consequently, news coverage that, deliberately or not, favours the terrorist may contribute to his total or partial victory. Faced with this problem, a state may be tempted to apply censorship. This approach is feasible in authoritarian environments, where there is a great deal of control and few scruples – which is precisely why authoritarian regimes are less vulnerable to terrorism, as they have the ability to act at an early stage without concern for civil rights[65]. However, in addition to being unlawful, censorship in a democracy




Image 11. Countries with a free, partly free and not free internet, according to Freedom House's Freedom on the Net reports. This categorisation is useful to see how some states choose to further control the network and thus the «infosphere». Doing so, in addition to calling into question the quality of democracy, is technically complex and can lead to contradictory results[66]

64 Schmid, A.P. (2004). Frameworks for conceptualising terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* [online], vol. 16, issue 2, pp. 197-221. DOI 10.1080/09546550490483134. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ftpv20

65 De la Corte Ibáñez, L. (2014). Terrorism, levels of state coercion and types of government. In: De la Corte Ibáñez, L. *La lógica del terrorismo*. Alianza Editorial.

66 Source of Image 11: Prepared internally based on Freedom House's. *Freedom on the Net reports*, accessible from Freedom House, Freedom on the Net | Freedom House. *Freedom House* [online]. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net

is complicated for several reasons: the internet and the spread of smartphones make it virtually impossible to control information that travels in real time; attempts at cover-ups can have the opposite effect, fuelling interest and disclosure of what is being concealed; and censorship erodes the legitimacy of the state and elevates terrorists as «the voice of the voiceless».

Having ruled out censorship as inherently problematic, we propose an interpretative framework for terrorist discourse that helps to grasp its framing and avoid its dialectical traps. The technique has risks, since discursive analysis can degenerate into «summaries, redundant or unjustified comments, analysis of fragmentary and decontextualised quotations or a mere record of linguistic resources extracted from the corpus»[67], but it also offers great possibilities, as explained below.

This technique is based on a five-category summary of certain psychosocial mechanisms present in terrorism that outline how ideas and actions are presented and justified. These categories –defensive violence, polarisation of violence, attribution of responsibility, self-attribution of responsibility and emotive content– are exemplified by drawing on the Bin Laden manifesto *Letter to America*, originally distributed in Arabic on the radical Islamist forum Al Qalah on 14 October 2002[68]. *The Observer* published it in English on 24 November 2002, which is the version used in this paper[69]. Its interest lies in the fact that it raises and answers two questions addressed to Americans: «Why do we fight and oppose you?» and «What do we call you to do and what do we want from you? In other words, it is a missive whose main function is to justify terrorism[70]. Regarding its structure, Lawrence[71] explains:

«The opinions are presented as detailed answers to specific questions, broken down into paragraphs and sub-sections to highlight the irrefutable logic of jihad [...] Two features distinguish the letter. The first is the succinct but wide-ranging summary of what Bin Laden sees as America's political malfeasance in the Muslim world: in

67 Sayago, S. (2013). Discourse analysis as a qualitative and quantitative research technique in the social sciences. *Moebio Tape* [online], issue 49, p. 3. Available at: http://www.cintademoebio.uchile.cl/index.php/CDM/article/viewFile/30331/32134

68 Lawrence, B. (2007). *Mensajes al mundo. Los manifiestos de Osama bin Laden*. Foca Ediciones y Distribuciones Generales S.L. P. 200. ISBN 978-84-95440-90-7.

69 Bin Laden, O. (2002). Full text: Bin Laden's 'letter to America'. *The Observer* [online]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver.

70 In issue 15 of *Dabiq*, an ISIL-linked online magazine, published on 31 July 2016, there is an article with the same purpose, entitled «Why do we hate you and fight you?». It has similarities with Bin Laden's manifesto –both call for conversion to Islam, reproach the existence of legal systems not based on Shari'a and describe a sinful society that has fallen into the vices of alcohol, drugs and gambling– but also differences: *Letter to America* exposes a series of grievances that it believes are the result of US foreign policy and, as a result, adopts a mainly defensive position. However, the *Dabiq* text stresses that foreign policy is secondary to the hatred professed, with a predominantly offensive tone. For more information, see: Why We Hate You & Why We Fight You. *Dabiq*. 2016, issue 15, pp. 30–33.

71 Lawrence, B. *Op. cit.*, pp. 200-201.

Palestine, Somalia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and not least in Arab countries acting as volunteers. The second is a moral and cultural rejection of American society, which it sees as a cesspool of usury, depravity, drug addiction, gambling, prostitution and environmental destruction [...] This portrait of America follows a call for Americans to convert to Islam. However fantastic the prospect of such a conversion may be [...] the appeal has a practical function in the *umma*. Its purpose is to respond to Muslims who criticised 9/11, arguing that Al Qaeda had not offered Americans an opportunity to convert to Islam before attacking them [...] Another novel aspect is the extent to which it uses the anti-American arguments that are widely circulated in the West itself, in effect accusing the United States of failing to live up to its own rhetoric».

The categories are set out below, along with a description and a contextualised excerpt from *Letter to America*.

1. Defensive violence. It occurs when terrorism is presented as a self-protective reaction to the enemy offensive. The first thing the manifesto cites is verse 39 of Sura 22 (*Al-Hajj* or *Pilgrimage*), which accepts the lawfulness of a defensive contest: «Those (believers) who are attacked are granted permission to fight (against the unbelievers), because they have been wronged and Allah is able to give them (the believers) victory». Lawrence[72] comments on Bin Laden's texts:

   «Everything he has written is set within the framework of a reaction against aggression, for which he has ample scriptural support. Islamic jurisprudence distinguishes between offensive warfare (*harb*), a campaign of conquest launched under official leadership against the land of the wicked, and defensive struggle (*jihad*), which all Muslims must wage as an individual obligation when the *umma* is under attack.

   Defensive violence is not unique to jihadism, but when contextualised, one can see why Bin Laden uses this psychosocial mechanism: apart from portraying the umma as the victim of a grievance, emphasising a defensive position brings his discourse in line with Quranic jihad, as opposed to mere offence, which is more difficult to fit in doctrinally.

2. Polarisation of violence. It happens when violence is focused on a victim, whom the aroused masses perceive as a superhuman and monstrous evil[73]. In *Letter to America*, the US is described as «the worst civilisation human history has ever witnessed», dominated by usury, drugs and immorality. Moreover, it is accused of double standards: «The freedom and democracy to which you appeal is only for yourselves and the white race; as for the rest of the world, you impose your monstrous and destructive policies and governments on them».

72 Lawrence, B. *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

73 Schwager, R. (2002). Religión y violencia. *Proyección: teología y mundo actual* [online], issue 205, p. 159. Available at: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/Artículo?codigo=253581

In this regard, it is worth studying what freedom there was in Sudan and Afghanistan during the period when they hosted Bin Laden. By taking refuge in them, it is understood that he had at least cordial relations with the ruling powers and therefore did not consider them «monstrous and destructive». For this purpose, the scores assigned to the categories «Political Rights» and «Civil Liberties» in Freedom House's *Freedom in the World* reports are used. These scores range from 1 to 7. The further away from 1, the fewer rights and freedoms the country has.

Bin Laden moved to Sudan in 1991 under the guidance of Hasan al-Turabi, a leading Muslim scholar who had already invited him to move in 1989. During his stay he «built up a large and complex network of business and terrorist enterprises»[74] which put the country under heavy pressure. Eventually, regime changes took place and supporters of President Omar Hasan Ahmad al Bashir displaced Turabi's supporters[75]. Bin Laden finally left the African country in May 1996. From 1991 to 1996 Sudan scored the worst possible score –7 out of 7– on both political rights and civil liberties. On the other hand, during Bin Laden's time in Afghanistan (1996-2001), which coincides almost entirely with the Taliban's Islamic Emirate, the country scored the worst possible score –7 out of 7– on political rights and civil liberties.

Bin Laden's discourse is therefore incongruous: it polarises violence towards the US, accusing it of maintaining «monstrous and destructive governments», while he resided for years in two countries with serious problems of rights and freedoms. Although this inference is interpretable as an ad hominem, Walton[76] notes that occasionally ad hominems are valid arguments, as this case appears to be, where objective data exposes an inconsistency between the terrorist argument and the circumstances of its author. It can be said that polarisation is a mechanism that is difficult to dismantle: it is a violent collective experience where aggression is diverted towards a single victim, who is held responsible for any crisis, and it is hoped that with his sacrifice, at last, there will be peace over the threatened community; it is a gregarious instrument, to such an extent that for René Girard «human societies are fundamentally held together by the mechanism of the enemy or by the mechanism of the scapegoat»[77].

3. Attribution of responsibilities. It occurs when facts are imputed to actors with limited or no competence. *Letter to America* justifies the attacks on the Ame-

74 Comisión Nacional de Investigación (2004). *11-S. El informe: extracto del informe final de los atentados terroristas*. Ediciones Paidós. P. 79. ISBN 978-84-493-1688-3.

75 *Ibidem*, p. 84.

76 Walton, D.N. (1987). The ad Hominem argument as an informal fallacy. *Argumentation* [online], vol. 1, p. 317. ISSN 0920427X. DOI 10.1007/BF00136781. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00136781

77 Schwager, R. *Op. cit.*, p. 158.

rican people because, as a constitutional federal republic, they are responsible for everything the state does:

«It is the American people who pay the taxes that fund the planes that bomb us in Afghanistan, the tanks that pound and destroy our homes in Palestine, the armies that occupy our lands in the Persian Gulf and the fleets that ensure the blockade of Iraq. These tax dollars are given to Israel to continue attacking us and penetrating our lands. So the American people are the ones who fund the attacks against us, and they are the ones who oversee the spending through the candidates they elect [...] They cannot be innocent of all the crimes committed».

Yasir Qadhi[78], theologian and Islamic scholar at the East Plano Islamic Center in Plano (Texas, US), dismantles this reasoning on the grounds that the American people as a whole are not foreign policy experts and it is therefore irrational to attribute responsibility to them[79]. According to a joint report by Gallup, the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Geographic Society[80] based on a survey of 2,486 adults aged 18 and older on the role of the US in the world, geography, foreign policy and demographics, «Americans exhibit considerable gaps in their knowledge of geography and international issues», with evidence indicating that «they are no more informed today than they were 30 years ago, despite increasing educational attainment».

4. Self-attribution of responsibilities. This happens when the terrorist speaks on behalf of others, setting himself up as the spokesperson «of the people», «of the umma», «of the repressed», etc. *Letter to America* uses the first person plural to symbolise a single voice of the entire community of Islamic believers: «Why do we fight and oppose you?», «you have attacked us and continue to attack us», «you have attacked us in Palestine»... Inquiring into the question, there are doctrinal differences within jihadism. Bin Laden, unlike ISIL, was more permissive about what is considered *umma*: according to the National Commission of Inquiry, he «seemed willing to include almost any corner of the Muslim world in the [Al Qaeda] confederation», to the extent that «the relationship between Al Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that divisions between Shia and Sunni did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in carrying out terrorist operations»[81]. In contrast, ISIL maintains

78 *Dabiq* issue 14, published on 13 April 2016, singles out several Western imams considered apostates («kufr») and calls for their assassination. Among them is Yasir Qadhi, accused of defending the US legal system to the detriment of Sharia. For more information, see: Kill the Imams of Kufr in the West. *Dabiq*, issue 14, pp. 8-17.

79 Should we listen to Anwar al-Awlaki? - Sh. Dr. Yasir Qadhi. *YouTube* [online]. 2014. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EyYb8GdFqn4

80 GALLUP, National Geographic Society and Council on Foreign Relations (2019). U.S. Adults. Knowledge About the World. *Council on Foreign Relations* [online], pp. 43-47. Available at: https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/NatGeo_CFR_US Knoweldge.pdf

81 Comisión Nacional de Investigación. *Op. cit.*, p. 83.

an uncompromising position towards the Shiites. Its precursor, al-Qaida in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawahiri, used a tactical brutality that worried Ayman al-Zawahiri that sectarian atrocities –including attacks during religious processions, on mosques and at Shia shrines– delegitimised them and undermined popular support, and he advised abandoning them: «The mujahedin movement must avoid any action that the masses do not understand or approve of»[82]. Therefore, when one or another jihadist speaks in the name of the umma, they may not be referring to the same set of people.

5. Emotional content. As Costalli and Ruggeri[83] note, insurgent organisations «tend to institutionalise events that can trigger individual emotional responses in order to build their own legitimacy as effective representatives of grievances». In his communiqués, Bin Laden often reminisces about the Soviet-Afghan war, where the USSR was unable to quell the mujahedin insurgency. In *Letter to America*, he says: «If you do not respond, your fate will be that of the Soviets who fled Afghanistan to face military defeat, political decay, ideological collapse and economic bankruptcy». Appealing to a «glorious» past is a source of attraction and morale, but it can be a trap for the terrorist: the war in Afghanistan, like the 1993 battle of Mogadishu, had certain characteristics that differ markedly from other scenarios. Bin Laden's eagerness to repeat these achievements may have led him to underestimate adversaries, such as the Persian Gulf Arab states, with very different particularities.

As can be seen, this discursive analysis is powerful in that it allows us to identify instruments of persuasion that are difficult to appreciate with the naked eye, although it must always be accompanied by a context. It is also flexible: it allows for more categories if they are applied with some precautions, e.g. avoiding redundancies.

Conclusion

Technological modernity implies substantial and rapid changes in many areas: socio-political, economic, labour and security-related. The Internet, as an exponent of instantaneity, deserves constant monitoring. This analysis certifies that social networks have changed the way we communicate, mainly because the former consumer has gained the role of producer, with the advantages and disadvantages that this entails. Terrorism is no stranger to this scenario and takes advantage of digital platforms to spread its messages and gain followers and legitimacy, among other objectives. Tack-

82 Al Zawahiri, A. (2005). Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi. *Federation Of American Scientists* [online], p. 5. Available at: https://fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/letter_in_english.pdf

83 Costalli, S. and Ruggeri, A. (2017). Emotions, Ideologies, and Violent Political Mobilization. *PS: Political Science & Politics* [online], vol. 50, issue 4, p. 926. Available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/0BA3CAB2F8B0C63ACB764B5709AED13F/S1049096517000993a.pdf/introduction.pdf

ling it requires joint action by a range of actors, including state authorities and the social networks themselves, accepting that there will occasionally be divergent views, for example, in judging whether a post should be removed. In addition, the debate on encryption and its possible limits has the elements to grow in the future, especially if its criminal use increases and the discussion moves into the public arena.

Nevertheless, it is possible to address digital terrorism by teaching how to interpret and combat its propaganda, since, regardless of the format in which it is presented, it follows psychosocial mechanisms –identified in this paper in five categories– that are noticeable if one is aware of them, although some of these mechanisms are powerful and need to be countered by involving society as a whole, as is the case with the polarisation of violence. At the very least, the proposed path should be explored, considering that terrorists are spreading their messages massively and globally and, moreover, there are multiple warnings of a turbulent and uncertain future that could strengthen hostile actors and (further) disorientate society. In this regard, it is worth remembering that although the intense terrorist wave that caused tens of thousands of deaths in the second decade of the 21st century has subsided, vigilance must not be lowered, as jihadism remains active in structurally weak regions that could become the territories of other ISIL.

In short, «electronic speed» is beneficial in many ways, but its handicaps must be understood and dealt with if it is not to lead to derailment due to speeding. As far as terrorism is concerned, the effect of its abundant propaganda needs to be minimised, with an emphasis on erasing and blocking it, as well as providing intellectual tools to confront it.

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Technological sovereignty and smart power of the European Union in an unstable geo-political context: the African scenario as an example of application

Abstract

The debate on the scope of the concept of technological sovereignty, and especially its implications, has gained momentum in the context of the European Union (EU) to guarantee the principle of «strategic autonomy», which has become a crucial common political piece to strengthen the bloc's position in the world. However, its political and aspirational nature, albeit abstract in its concreteness, has not been translated into defined objectives in time, space and opportunity. The article frames the discussion in the conditions of geopolitical instability that pervade international dynamics and discusses the rationality of the notion of 'smart power' as the key option for the EU in the context of implementing its strategic autonomy. On this basis, it analyses the EU and China's presence in Africa and its possible impact on the future evolution of European strategic autonomy.

Keywords

Technological Sovereignty, Smart Power, European Union, China, Africa

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Introduction

Technological sovereignty in the context of strategic autonomy

The redrawing of balances between world powers has geopolitical ramifications that spill over into economics and international affairs, unfolding in the form of military, industrial, technological and digital web competition[1]. The uncertainty caused by these dynamics provides the basis for discussing theoretically and empirically a consistent analytical framework to address the prospects for the European Union (EU) in the coming decades.

Technological sovereignty, understood as having the capacity to make decisions affecting the development and use of advanced technologies without unilateral dependence on other actors, is considered a key factor in increasing the strategic autonomy of a state or federation of states. This allows it to make unconditional choices in many policy areas affected by the evolution of Articul and its widespread diffusion in society[2]. From the opposite direction, without sufficient political will to obtain strategic autonomy, it does not seem possible to achieve the appropriate level of technological sovereignty. Ultimately, a strong and coherent long-term policy determination is required to forge partnerships and invest selectively in both key enabling and emerging technologies.

In practice, this dual commitment implies deciding on multiple interrelated dimensions that affect the international positioning of states, both individually and as part of a coalition. To this end, the application of a variety of policy instruments is indispensable, but in an integrated manner ensuring that they are closely linked and aligned towards concrete objectives. Success will depend on the ability to define, adapt and maintain both perspectives and versatile long-term strategies, combined with the appropriate scientific and technological capacity to attract allies to one's objectives, which may sometimes require assertive attitudes in the international arena.

The debate on the consequences of the concept of technological sovereignty, but especially its implications on public and private actors, has gained momentum in the

1 Petricevic, O. and Teece, D.J. (2019). The structural reshaping of globalization: Implications for strategic sectors, profiting from innovation, and the multinational enterprise. *Journal of International Business Studies*; Ortega, A. (2020). La carrera entre EE. UU. y China y el futuro de las relaciones transatlánticas. *Documento de trabajo 12/2020*. Real Instituto Elcano; Mori, S. (2019). US Technological Competition with China: The Military, Industrial and Digital Network Dimensions. *Asia-Pacific Review*, 26:1, 77-120; Kaplan, R.D. (2019). A new cold war has begun. *Foreign Policy*, 7 January. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/a-new-cold-war-has-begun/

2 Fiott, D. (2018). Strategic autonomy: towards 'European sovereignty' in defence? *Brief issue* 12. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), November. Available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%2012__Strategic%20Autonomy.pdf

EU context framed by the principle of 'strategic autonomy' which became a key common policy piece to strengthen the European position in the world[3]. Strategic autonomy is a central concern of the bloc's policy-makers, expanding its boundaries from defence and security to new economic and technological issues. The core of the idea of 'autonomy' has been described by the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy as a process of political survival of the EU capable of acting as a 'global actor' and as an expression of the will of the European Commission chaired by Ursula van der Leyen to act as a Geopolitical Commission'[4].

The Community strategy aims to retain its leading role in scientific development while increasing its role in enabling and emerging technologies, while preserving the values and principles of their ethical use in society. In this sense, the concept of 'open strategic autonomy' expresses the synthesis between the ability to make one's own decisions, and to shape the world around it through leadership and commitment to maintaining the highest level of international cooperation in science and technology[5].

However, the term technological sovereignty must translate its political and aspirational nature, albeit abstract in its concreteness, into defined objectives in time, space and opportunity. Tindermans[6] notes that European regulations rule out the creation of monopolies centred on public or controlled companies acting as 'national champions' as has been attempted in the past. Also, lack of resources makes self-sufficiency illusory, especially in a globalised world. In that perspective, he proposes a more pragmatic approach in which the EU should avoid using technological sovereignty as a fuzzy global notion and instead promote a precise definition that leads to specific goals. Franke and Torreblanca stress the need to weigh the «geopolitical implications and geopolitical power elements of technology» to the extent that the economic perspective has tended to ignore them[7]. Leonard and Shapiro underline as a condition for upholding multilateralism without abandoning rules or leaning towards protec-

3 Borrell, J. (2020). Why European Strategic Autonomy Matters. *A Window on the World - Blog by HR/VP*. Dec. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu; Anghel, S., *et al.* (2020). On the path to strategic autonomy. The EU in an evolving geopolitical environment. *EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service*. PE 652.096 – September. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/652096/EPRS_STU(2020)652096_EN.pdf

4 European Commission (2020). State of the Union 2020: Building the world we want to live in: A Union of vitality in a world of fragility (16/09/2020). Brussels, Belgium; Borrell, J. (2020). *Op. cit.*

5 European Commission (2021). Global Approach to Research and Innovation. Europe's strategy for international cooperation in a changing world. Brussels, Belgium.

6 Tindermans, P. (2020). Technological sovereignty: from the hype to the real questions. *Science Business,* 29 Sept. Available at: https://sciencebusiness.net/technology-strategy-board/viewpoint/technological-sovereignty-hype-real-questions

7 Franke, U. and Torreblanca, J.I. (2021). Geo-tech politics: Why technology shapes European power. *Policy Brief*, 15 July. *European Council on Foreign Relations*. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/publication/geo-tech-politics-why-technology-shapes-european-power/

tionism, that Europeans «[push] for new rules that would allow them to act against countries that undermine the international system»[8].

In this regard, it is reasonable to note that even if the right policy tools were available, but in isolation, the ability to articulate them into a coherent 'package', implement them and then monitor their effectiveness would not be straightforward. Thus, even if the chosen policy package could harmoniously concert several instruments to avoid undesirable side-effects within the targeted technological domain, its indirect impact is broader and could persist over time in society, as history has shown.

However, technological sovereignty cannot be seen solely as a 'defensive term' aimed at reducing technological dependence, as it was understood in the second half of the last century. It is now used in a broader sense, where mutual influence in other policy areas reflects the central role technology plays in modern societies as part of the concept of strategic autonomy at both national and international levels, and its influence on the structuring of technological alliances between countries (see figure 1).




Figure 1. Relationship between strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty (Source: prepared internally)

The new dimension that is gaining momentum in this century is the emergence of the relevance of the dominance of technology in international affairs as part of visions of national interests. The significance of the above consideration is not limited to the use of advanced technology when it is incorporated into products and systems deployed to fulfil their operational function (in armaments, cyber security, high value-added exports, etc., where performance is highly dependent on digital tools), but also to gain superiority, control of technological knowledge, know-how for the devel-

8 Leonard, M. and Shapiro, J. (2020). Sovereign Europe, dangerous world: Five agendas to protect Europe's capacity to act. *Policy Brief* 1. *European Council on Foreign Relations*, December. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/publication/sovereign-europe-dangerous-world-five-agendas-to-protect-europes-capacity-to-act/

opment of advanced products, and rules to be accessible by third countries as a goal to achieve global competitiveness in the future. Mastering emerging technologies is the key to building future dominance.

This raises a number of questions: What does technological sovereignty mean and imply when used in the EU? What are the policy instruments at its disposal to implement its strategy in a global context? How can they be combined? How can it act in third countries or regions in direct competition with other major technological powers?

The article is organised as follows. It begins by framing the debate on technological sovereignty in the context of the geopolitical instability affecting the international scene. It then discusses the concept of 'smart power' as a strategic option and its articulation with three levels of technological sovereignty. It then analyses the framework of European technological sovereignty and smart power in the African context in which other major technological powers such as China interact. Finally, it presents the implications of this approach and a set of concluding remarks.

The Technology Sovereignty Framework: Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic

Global value chains have grown so much in the last three decades because they have generally brought significant benefits. Their side-effects, dependence and interdependence, therefore seemed to be seen as an acceptable condition for their realisation. However, assuming a global scenario in which economic dynamics and trade flows are implemented according to an economic logic isolated from geopolitics and security is impossible to sustain[9].

The concept of technological sovereignty is still under debate due to the complexity of matching it with the prevailing theoretical frameworks on innovation[10]. State intervention aimed solely at correcting market failures, productive outsourcing associated with boosting economic competitiveness or transitions towards sustainability presuppose multilateral behaviour and international trade based on stable and consensual rules, which is not always the case.

If one accepts as a starting point the two principles enunciated by Edler et al: *1) international fair trade increases efficiency, and 2) international cooperation in innovation allows mutual learning for the benefit of all*, the implementation of technological sover-

9 Hobbs, C. (2020). Europe's Digital sovereignty: from rulermaker to superpower in the age of US-China rivalry. *Essay Collection, ECFR/336, European Council on Foreign Relations*.

10 European Union (2021). An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy: Open Strategic Autonomy; Schot, J. and Steinmueller, W.E. (2018). Three frames for innovation policy: R&D, systems of innovation and transformative change. *Research Policy*, 47(9), pp. 1554-1567.

eignty measures in all sectors should be economically efficient to succeed[11]. However, economic logic is not the only logic to be taken into account when crises erupt, as the crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic has shown. Indeed, strategic autonomy decisions were taken in contexts where the usual economic logic was not sufficient, but the pressure from citizens to find solutions was high.

With the COVID-19 pandemic, the problem of access to essential healthcare materials suddenly emerged in all EU countries. Many governments decided to implement a wide range of standards to secure critical supplies at additional cost and, if necessary, with large debts. The supply of masks, gloves and protective equipment (classified as 'low-tech'), or of fans and ultraviolet light purifiers ('medium-tech') was 'easily' solved in a few months by increasing local production to meet social demand, even if they were not efficient solutions sustainable in the long term. However, other high-tech products such as vaccines or specific anti-virus drugs were much more difficult to develop and deliver.

Indeed, advanced countries and large companies funded dozens of R&D projects to develop efficient vaccines and other pharmaceuticals with highly innovative approaches. As a result of this research effort, in less than a year, six vaccines were approved by health regulators and dozens more are on the way. The conventional cycle from scientific research to product was extraordinarily shortened in the face of a serious problem, as has happened on other occasions as demonstrated by the disruptive technological developments during the two world wars of the 20th century.

The geopolitical problem of health was highlighted by the 'battle of the vaccines' in which the great powers sought to secure supplies for their nationals through imports or domestic production through new or reinterpreted legislation. However, the wide access to them by less developed countries, even if they had manufacturing facilities serving large pharmaceutical companies, was not resolved.

The so-called 'vaccine diplomacy'[12] has produced winners and losers not only in terms of approved developments and their procurement capacity, but also with health effects in terms of the percentages of people immunised among countries with serious logistical problems in their distribution.

11 Edler, *et al*. (2021). Technological Sovereignty as an Emerging Frame for Innovation Policy - Defining Rationales, Means and Ends. EU-SPRI Conference. June.

12 Deng, C. (2020). China Seeks to Use Access to Covid-19 Vaccines for Diplomacy. *Wall Street Journal,* 17 August. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-seeks-to-use-access-to-covid-19-vaccines-for-diplomacy-11597690215; Campbell, J. (2021). Vaccine Diplomacy: China and SinoPharm in Africa. *Council on Foreign Relations*. 06 January. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/blog/vaccine-diplomacy-china-and-sinopharm-africa; Palacián de Inza, B. (2021). The second wave of COVID-19 in Africa: A catastrophe? *Analysis Paper 08/2021, IEEE Bulletin 21* (January/March). Spain, Ministry of Defence. Pp. 152-161. Available at: https://publicaciones.defensa.gob.es/media/downloadable/files/links/b/o/boletin_ieee_21.pdf

Access to these critical inputs and other medical devices, as well as recent proposals to waive patents for a limited period, became issues of international policy, not just public health. In all cases, scientific and technological knowledge, as well as the availability of high-tech products to provide medical treatment to millions of people, was used as a coercive or negotiating mechanism aimed at strengthening the positions of each state at both the national and international level.

The emergence of these processes is explained by intangible (knowledge) and tangible (industrial capacities) assets, but also by countries' political priorities. The distribution of vaccines, developed mainly in the United States, the European Union, China and Russia, became part of the geopolitical strategy in third states, as demonstrated by the vaccination situation in Africa in 2021 as a result of agreements reached by many African countries with some of them.

The case of China's activity in Africa is particularly relevant. China offered COVID-19 vaccines to Nigeria and other African countries «first [and] free of charge». In December 2020, Beijing offered to build a coronavirus vaccine logistics centre in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, while vaccine production centres are located in Egypt and Morocco. Both countries, as well as South Africa and Egypt, will soon have the infrastructure and capacity for 'fill and finish' vaccines from Pfizer and Johnson & Johnson. But gaining technological sovereignty in this field means controlling the whole process as countries like South Africa and Senegal are trying to do, and that requires more time and scientific and technological know-how.

The EU warned that it was not possible to rely on negotiations with multiple suppliers of emergency health equipment or pre-procurement of non-EU manufactured vaccines (at least in the volume needed) through many independent regional and national authorities. The need to establish a common procurement procedure and address logistical problems was clear to policy makers, despite initial failures and lack of experience in implementation[13]. Lessons were analysed and some policy and budgetary measures were taken to increase European health technology sovereignty for the future, but no immediate response was possible.

Health is just one area among many where technology plays a key role in finding solutions, and where future crises may again require planned action.

Moving towards smart EU power

In the above context, the EU has been discussing how to maximise its technological power and how it could be applied to strengthen its global position in science and technology in a globalised world while maintaining its principles and values. More

13 European Commission (2020). Commission Decision of 18.6.2020 approving the agreement with Member States on procuring Covid-19 vaccines on behalf of the Member States and related procedures. Brussels.

specifically, it seeks to maximise its technological sovereignty in the current situation, where its main line of external action is constrained by its relative power vis-à-vis other countries, the confluence of interests of the various EU partners in areas where they retain competences, and the need to preserve or reinforce broader commercial, knowledge and military alliances in a context where unanimity among 27 member states is difficult to use with the risk of missed opportunities and delayed adoption of key decisions.

Hard power and soft power are terms commonly used to reflect the way in which a country can impose its views on other countries using a broad set of political tools (assertive or otherwise). Hard power and soft power are not entirely independent terms and have coexisted over the years in strategic policymaking, depending on context, capabilities and the relative national situation vis-à-vis other countries. These concepts also apply to large multinational corporations that make decisions (many of them backed by the governments of the host countries) that affect (positively or negatively) millions of citizens in the many countries where they operate.

The shortcomings of the two approaches (hard and soft power) led to the emergence of the concept of «smart power» as a more effective and plausible option for dealing with conflicts where countries are closely interlinked simultaneously in several domains[14]. Within the EU, the relevance of implementing smart power strategies in the components of the science and technology system has increased dramatically in 2020-2021 to cope with the disruption of global chains due to geopolitical tension, natural disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic. Countries were aware of the subtle interplay of policy areas and the need to employ holistic policies as defined in the European green pact[15]. In this perspective, how could the EU employ instruments of smart power to enhance its technological sovereignty? The following section addresses this issue.

Implementation of the smart power concept in the EU

The EU has been considered a major global economic power with a well-developed internal market of over 400 million citizens with relatively high purchasing power. It is also a region of the world where the most advanced technologies were deeply adopted by society, nurtured by both domestic and foreign manufacturers with high rates of imports and exports, taking advantage of a well-educated population to accelerate innovation processes.

14 Nye, J. (2009). Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 4, July/August.

15 European Commission (n.d.). Research and Innovation for the European Green Pact', Strategy 2020-2024. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/research-and-innovation/strategy/strategy-2020-2024/environment-and-climate/european-green-deal_es

However, the lack of a single foreign policy or common defence capability, despite efforts since 2015 to do so, makes it difficult to act with one voice in global conflicts. The EU was built on the basis that a large part of its common defence and related policies (clearly on the hard power side) is subordinate to NATO, even if there is no full membership correspondence with the 27 EU members[16]. In any case, the EU assumed that a common defence was not necessary to sustain the development of emerging technologies or to secure supplies in the global value chains on which its growth model was based.

Moreover, individual member states retain responsibility for foreign affairs in line with their own individual interests because the effectiveness of the EU's intergovernmental pillar is, in practice, conditioned by the lack of mandatory unanimity of the 27 member states' position, which is a precondition for action. Many EU Council resolutions, after intense negotiations to reconcile divergent positions, resulted in generic statements on the main issues without profound practical consequences, or simply collapsed for lack of agreement. The debate on the advantages or disadvantages of maintaining unanimity in foreign policy has been going on for years in the EU Council, and it does not seem possible to initiate a reform of the EU treaties in the short term that would change this situation. In this sense, the EU's problems in adopting strong and consensual positions are similar to those found in the UN Security Council in adopting a clear resolution in many global conflicts, which undermines its ability to address urgent conflicts.

Despite this context, Europe became a strong regulator with a lasting influence on international markets[17]. Historically, EU regulations designed to operate in the European market or to export/import goods to/from the EU to protect European citizens have conditioned the behaviours of third countries and companies.

Well-known examples of this effect are the REACH regulation[18] in the chemical sector or, more recently, the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation). These initiatives have inspired similar regulatory processes in other countries beyond the need for access to the European market, as they are considered appropriate, balanced and adjustable. Moreover, many large companies and exporting countries around the world have preferred to use European legislation, even if it is more restrictive than the national equivalent, rather than manage several for different markets; simply forget-

16 Laborie Iglesias, M. (2017). The time for European Defence. *Opinion Paper 92/2017*. Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, 6/09/2017. Available at: https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2017/DIEEEO92-2017_Defensa_UE_MLI.pdf; 47; Csernatoni, R. (2020). EU Security and Defense Challenges: Toward a European Defense Winter? *Carnegie Europe*, 11/06/2020. Available at: https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/06/11/eu-security-and-defense-challenges-toward-european-defense-winter-pub-82032

17 Bradford, A. (2020). The Brussels effect. How the European Union rules the world. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978 0190088583.

18 REACH: Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemical Substances. Available at https://osha.europa.eu/es/themes/dangerous-substances/reach

ting access to the European market in order to focus on less regulated markets was not an option for most of them.

This regulatory capacity is part of the impact of the EU's 'soft power' in the world, but it is not the only one. The effort in development policy cooperation, where the EU is one of the most important donors (the economic resources allocated to this policy, when the Community budget is added to the contributions of the Member States, are much higher than the amounts contributed by other powers for the same objective)[19]; also, the opening up of European higher education institutions (for example, by extending the ERASMUS+ mobility programme to other countries outside the EU) should be framed within this concept. It also adds to the cultural dimension, where European humanities, such as literature and art, are cornerstones of the EU's visibility in the world (even if measured in terms of non-European tourists each year and the difficulty of managing a single language with a multiplicity of activities promoted by different EU Member States).

In this context, European policy makers have progressively assumed that long-term prosperity is clearly conditioned by their ability to exercise a leading position in the 'global technology battle'. This means managing the influence of technological powers that condition the introduction of their own products on the European market. In some key advanced technologies, such as mobile telephony, artificial intelligence, microelectronics, satellite constellations, robotics, or biotechnology, where both industrial competitiveness and high quality public services depend to a large extent on other countries having taken the lead in the last decade or being close to it.

In such cases, the EU should compete with other countries to share leadership within the framework of large industrial partnerships. Even in the areas mentioned above, such as development cooperation or higher education, technological leadership is essential to deploy European technology solutions in third countries. However, the lack of a single 'European technological voice' resulting from the weaknesses mentioned above could jeopardise the individual efforts of Member States and European companies.

The open question that has been raised at the highest decision-making level in the EU over the past three years is to what extent policy instruments –hard and soft power– can be combined in practice as necessary ingredients to improve Europe's positioning in global scenarios dominated by scientific and technological advances.

The common use of terminology borrowed from the military (i.e. battle, domination, winners and losers, technological weapons, conquered markets, defensive measures) to describe a commercial and mercantile competition to access and dominate high-tech markets might seem excessive, but it reflects a common underlying sentiment: the objective pursued is not just to sell or buy products and services in search of

19 For details see International Partnerships. European Commission. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/home_en

market shares; it goes beyond that to reaffirm the role technology plays in a globalised world to ensure the long-term prosperity of the EU and its society. The bloc has responded to this challenge by taking almost simultaneous decisions in several areas: a redefinition of the global research cooperation schemes[20] and the eligibility conditions for Horizon Europe 2021-2027[21] based on the motto «as open as possible, as closed as necessary», the introduction of strategic autonomy concerns in the new industrial and digital policies linked to the recovery and resilience funds of the «Next generation» programme, and the reinforcement of science diplomacy in member states when dealing with other countries in cooperation with the European Commission to suggest some of them[22].

In this context, technology is not only seen as relevant for driving innovation, but also because it plays a wider role in international affairs. As an example of this view, the European Parliament declared in June 2021, as part of the EuroHPC Joint Undertaking regulation, that high-performance computing (HPC), in which the EU competes strongly with other countries, is a «*strategic asset to safeguard the Union's innovation capacity and strategic autonomy and to foster economic growth*». Note that here, both innovation and economic growth are linked to strategic autonomy in a «deep-tech» area where several technologies must be tightly integrated.

Even as high-level policy debates and positions progressively focus on emerging technologies to ensure long-term competitiveness, ways to impose national views are not based on hard power measures, as the combination with other types of more effective tools to win technology battles is available. The use of a 'hard' policy instrument such as 'sanctions' adopted by countries or international organisations has evolved to deny control, trade or access to key technologies when applied to some countries, and is not only based on economic decisions (e.g. tariffs), movement of people (e.g. labour visa policies) or criminal decisions by appealing to the International Criminal Court.

Moreover, an additional element has gained prominence: the main driver for the development of emerging technologies comes from civilian rather than defence efforts (except in some niche areas, the volume of investments and the size of the markets make civilian use the most relevant driver in the development of emerging technologies). Defence policy definition is generally addressed separately from science and technology policies, although the development of dual-use technologies is a mainstream for advanced military systems as the only way to achieve superiority, and government

20 European Commission (2021). Global Approach to Research and Innovation. Europe's strategy for international cooperation in a changing world. Brussels, Belgium.

21 International Service Facility (2021). International Cooperation in Horizon Europe: Participation and Novelties. April 2021. Available at: https://horizon-ncp.eu/sites/default/files/2021-05/ISF_2%C2%Bowebinar_HE_International%20Cooperation%20strategy%20and%20novelties_0.pdf

22 SFIC (2021). Survey Analysis on Science Diplomacy. Strategies, Activities and Actors of EU Member States and Associated Countries. *SFIC Task Force Science Diplomacy. Strategic Forum of International Cooperation*. May.

defence agencies seek their applicability with dedicated funding. Closer approaches are being explored, such as the approval of the European Defence Fund[23] in the context of the EU's strategic autonomy to complement civilian Horizon Europe funds.

Levels of technological sovereignty

Simple awareness of the relevance of technological sovereignty is not sufficient for action; a pragmatic and measurable action plan needs to be defined and implemented in the areas where policy actions can intervene. A country's weaknesses can come from many different directions, and strategies to improve technological sovereignty must be tailored to its constraints.

From the research carried out by the authors of this article, it is clear that there are multiple possible «areas of intervention» in which a state's specific situation could range in a given technology from self-sufficiency to no self-sufficiency at all. Figure 2 sets out the identified areas of intervention grouped into three levels of strategic autonomy.

- Level 1: strategic autonomy to access raw and processed materials and associated logistics. It reflects the autonomy to access the necessary materials when and where they are needed.
- Level 2: strategic autonomy to develop technological components and systems. It reflects self-sufficiency in the development of advanced and competitive high-tech products and services for the global market.
- Level 3: strategic autonomy to ensure a level playing field. It reflects the self-reliance to push (together with other allies) for a set of fully agreed principles and values to establish the rules of a global market subject to shared rules based on broadly agreed international agreements.

These are not independent levels and success in increasing the desired strategic autonomy will depend on wise interaction at all levels with policy measures tailored to each priority technology area. Note that the main elements in figure 2 are subdivided into several «intervention areas», as the associated policy measures can be very different.

Furthermore, the above-mentioned levels influence each other depending on the chosen technological area. It is not possible to act proactively in shaping the market structure (e.g. by pushing for a new industry standard or long-term technology alliances) if the industrial fabric is very weak, which could reflect inherent difficulties in

23 European Commission (2021). EU defence gets a boost as the European Defence Fund becomes a reality. 29 April. Brussels. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_2007




Figure 2. Areas of intervention vs. level of technological sovereignty. Source: prepared internally

accessing the science and technology base. The same is true for efforts to push forward standard-setting processes whose free adoption by third countries should be based on non-binding shared values and principles.

The EU case is clearly an example of the successful impact of data regulation in other countries, even if the objective in other countries was not just to enter the EU market. The EU can offer examples of unsuccessful impacts of its regulation of artificial intelligence, simply because the industrial effort and market position were not the same. Each of these is briefly described below.

Level 1. Autonomy to obtain and dispose of the materials and components needed to develop technological products when and where needed.

The strategic autonomy objective of this level is to ensure access to natural resources (in many cases, they do not exist locally, and their availability depends on agreements with third countries) in the required quality and volume, the capacity to process them for industrial use, and to transport them to/from the place of origin to their destination when and where they are needed by industry and society. International conflicts exacerbated by long and dangerous trade routes for consumer goods led to countless inter-state clashes. This situation is repeated with international flows of raw materials, live stocks and technological components.

The major powers have attempted to increase their self-sufficiency at this level through a myriad of economic and political measures supported by trade agreements signed with many countries and organisations around the world. Today, the problem is not only accessing raw materials, but also obtaining the processed elements (e.g. at the chemical level of purity) needed for advanced manufacturing of components un-

der stable conditions, which must protect natural resources through a combination of appropriate regulations and technologies.

A relevant sub-level of strategic autonomy is the logistics required to transport them to their destination, which implies not only the use of sophisticated technologies (e.g. robotic cranes in ports to reduce time, underwater pipelines, liquid or gas container ships, GPS tracking, offshore logistics and also to guarantee data traffic through space infrastructures, or high-capacity land and submarine cables), but also to guarantee security to international routes where in some geographical areas it could imply a coordinated military intervention. In this context, economic and technological support for the construction of (or specific facilities in) advanced ports, airports or rail infrastructure is now used as a battleground between major powers willing to invest substantial amounts, even beyond their borders, to ensure the resilience of their supply chains.

One prominent area where both access to natural resources and logistics are closely linked is sustainable fisheries. The use of sophisticated technologies to sustainably harvest living natural resources such as fisheries, even when they are located in disputed territorial waters, has been a source of international conflict for decades.

The evolution of the major powers in the protection of their fisheries became a geopolitical issue in some geographical areas where the predatory behaviour of certain countries has led not only to a problem of depletion, but also of international enforcement[24]. Fishing technology has evolved into large vessels with on-board manufacturing capacity which expands the problems. It is not only about the regulatory «maximum tonnage» approach, but also about the development and acceptance of sophisticated technologies that allow the processing of catches, eventually affecting marine biodiversity, and securing the biosphere's diversity in the long term.

Level 1 Technological sovereignty issues	Sub-level 1 Raw materials	Sub-level 2 Logistics	Geopolitical implications	Key emerging technologies examples
Protection of natural resources	Wood, fish, Agro-food. Maximum surface areas for crops in protected areas	Transportation from the source to the trade routes	Biomass preservation Compliance with climate change agreements	Fishing for endangered species. Gas/oil extraction Protected areas of the Amazon
Access to raw materials	Mining or rare earths	Hazardous materials transport conditions	Commodities are found in areas with weak governance	Lithium for electric batteries Uranium mining
International law	Environmental legislation Paris Agreement	Hazardous materials transport conditions Fissile material	Mutual enforcement of rules Regulation of space	Ban on the use of chemical fertilisers in the agri-food sector for EU markets
Trade route protection	Drug trafficking routes	Free movement in international waters	Fighting piracy	Agreements on the Panama or Suez Canal. Atalanta Mission
Generation and off-shore logistics	Energy harvesting	International power grids	Offshore wind energy fields	International waters storage
Digital links	Not Applicable	Submarine cables	Protection of key submarine links	Bella Programmme
Trade agreements	Certification to market products based on extraction techniques	Import/export tariffs	Effective implementation of agreements	Restrictions on dual-use items
Key emerging technologies affected at level 1	Mineral or living resource identification (e.g. satellite imagery)	Tracking of cargo shipping Robotics for container handling	Multiple sourcing from state-owned enterprises Competing technologies	GPS/Galileo Unmanned ports. Starlink or One Web

Table 1. Natural Resources and Processing Infrastructure Issues (level 1). Source: prepared internally

24 Grare, F. (2021). Fish and Ships: Chinese Fishing and Europe's Indo-Pacific Strategy. *European Council on Foreign Relations*. Policy Brief. August. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/Fish-and-ships-Chinese-fishing-and-Europes-Indo-Pacific-strategy.pdf

Table 1 reflects the main issues of layer 1 and its sub-layers from a technological sovereignty perspective.

Level 2. Autonomy to develop advanced technology products.

Even when Level 1 is fully guaranteed, countries need to be able to generate technology components and systems with the highest level of strategic autonomy, working together with partners, if necessary, to complement their capabilities. To achieve this, they need to secure access to the technological foundations of the key technologies required (e.g. intellectual property rights, know-how, skilled labour and sophisticated machinery) and to the relevant data (e.g. large volumes of user information, and the deployment of high-capacity digital links) needed to increase self-sufficiency in the process of manufacturing advanced systems.

It includes, in order to be competitive in international markets, the mastery and deployment of a set of enabling technologies (e.g. mobile communication networks and internet services) together with having the right digital skills in the workforce and the population at large.

This level can be broken down into two main sub-levels: the component and system manufacturing sub-level and the system research and development sub-level. These sub-layers have very different implications for achieving a given level of technological sovereignty. The former provides the means to manufacture individual components and systems, but not to design them, which is linked to R&D activities and requires greater skills and access to the technology base.

The approach of separating design from manufacturing processes is used by many companies to outsource manufacturing capabilities to other countries in search of cheaper prices or less stringent regulations, while keeping design capabilities in-house. Indeed, one of the sources of the current problems of the technologically advanced countries lies in weaknesses at the manufacturing level (even if they have managed to maintain their R&D capacity) based on voluntary decisions by the private sector to outsource these capabilities to other countries in search of greater efficiency and lower manufacturing costs. In the event of a crisis, this decoupling has shifted the problem to the supply chain.

The second sub-level provides the capability to design and develop advanced products and services with strong links to universities and research centres, as well as sophisticated equipment for rapid prototyping. In the last two decades, large companies have decoupled this sub-layer from the previous one, including geographically, creating more dependencies on supplies from third countries.

Today, a large set of the living 'technology wars' between technological powers are related to the control and dominance of emerging technologies (e.g. advanced semiconductors, 5G, artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous vehicles) in search of better positions in the global market, even if other layers should also be controlled. This domain is not only a Level 1 problem, but also a way to increase resilience at Level

2 when supported by public-private industrial partnerships strongly driven by public administrations.

Table 2 reflects the main issues of level 2 and its sub-levels from a technological sovereignty perspective.

Level 2 Technological sovereignty issues	Sub-level 1 Manufacture of components and systems	Sub-level 2 Research and development of systems	Geopolitical implications	Key emerging technologies examples
Large-scale research facilities	Research into new materials and devices as a basis for new components	Research on new basic principles and state-of-the-art developments	Multilateral agreements for construction and operation. Concentration of facilities in advanced countries ITER (nuclear fission)	ISS (International Space Station) EBRAINS (brain) Participation in the ESFRI roadmap
Prototyping facilities	3D printing of components. In-situ maintenance of small components. High performance computing	3D printing of large systems (e.g. houses, vehicles). High performance computing	Innovation ecosystem development. Acceleration of production	New market entry
Data Management	Digital links. Large servers	Digital links Cloud systems Knowledge graphs	Data hosting security	European cloud
Technology demonstrators	Nano-manufacturing facilities	Facilities to accelerate the adoption of emerging systems	Faster deployment of advanced technologies	Copernicus. Desalination plants. Digital innovation centres
Manufacture facilities	Move towards fully automated production	Battery or semiconductor gigafactory	Outsourcing Working conditions Problems of technology transfer	Tesla in Berlin. Semiconductor foundries
Assembly plants	Solar cells. Semiconductors. Vaccine production	Electric vehicles. Solar panels	Less sophisticated model for third countries	Conventional vehicle plants. OEMs. "Fill and finish" vaccines COVID-19
Qualified researchers and technologists	Skilled people in production sites (mainly engineers and data scientists). Digital skills	Qualified researchers linked to industry. Digital skills	Brain drain Brain circulation Code of conduct for recruitment Digital gap	EU Charter for recruitment. Industrial doctorates
High-tech start-ups and venture capital	Specialised venture capital firms	Corporate risk investments	Business incubators. Public-private co-financing schemes. International expansion	Neurolink Hyperlink Moderna Google Ventures
Key emerging technologies affected at level 2	Nanotechnology. 4D printing. Quantum bits. Graphene. RNA vaccines	Internet of things. Robotics. Artificial intelligence. Autonomous vehicles	Intellectual Property Rights suspensions	Quantum computing

Table 2. Issues related to R&D Systems and System/Component Manufacturing (Level 2). Source: prepared internally

Level 3. Autonomy to impose or create a level playing field for technology product markets.

Level 3 refers to the ability to create or access international markets for the advanced technology products and services mentioned in Level 2 to reach end-users on fair terms worldwide, facilitating global growth. In many cases, it involves the creation and adoption of international standards and regulations supported by international bodies, as well as the political will to both implement and enforce them.

The expansion of globalisation in the last decade has highlighted the growing relevance of Level 3 issues. Both world powers and smaller countries compete (sometimes cooperate) in international bodies and third countries to impose their views and interests with broader perspectives than a single industry could afford. Many long-term geopolitical strategies put in place by major powers (e.g. elements of China's Belt and Road initiative, industrial standards on emerging technologies, tariffs on critical components, or even ethical guidelines such as on the use of AI) are examples of policy measures framed by Level 3 concerns.

In particular, this level relates to the rules needed to define a sustainable market structure (e.g. through competition rules to prevent market abuse), the definition of industry standards to facilitate the development of high-tech products with international allies to enter other markets, and the definition and implementation of import/export regulatory frameworks applying the precautionary principle. The rules are gen-

erally related to sanctions regimes whose application at the international level is also a source of governmental conflict.

Finally, the need to share a set of common principles and values with other stakeholders around the world to frame technological self-reliance is included as a distinctive level. This level promotes the definition of specific policy measures to ban technological products from places/countries that do not comply with environmental or human rights conditions in manufacturing processes (e.g. high levels of pollution, use of children in manufacturing plants, freedom of research). From the EU's point of view, these aspects are more relevant as prerequisites for participation in Community or Member State international research and innovation programmes.

Table 3 reflects the main issues of Level 3 and its sub-levels from a technological sovereignty perspective.

Figure 2 could be applicable to specific countries at a specific time in history for specific technologies. The position of any country is very dynamic and evolves very rapidly in the case of emerging technologies, forcing competing states to regularly review their options and use new policy instruments to meet their technology sovereignty objectives.

Level 3 Technological sovereignty issues	Sub-level 1 Shared principles and values	Sub-level 2 Regulatory framework	Sub-level 3 Market structure	Geopolitical implications	Key emerging technologies examples
Research freedom	Bonn Declaration	Conditions for R&D programmes	Working conditions	Researchers' protection. Visa policies	Afghanistan investigators' request
Reciprocity	Mutual opening of R&D programmes	Calls for public programmes	Opening of international contests	Asymmetric negotiations	Horizon Europe Partnership
Standars and Regulations	Support to official standardisation bodies	De jure and de facto technical standards	Single market regulation	Big business imposes industry standards	5G Standards AI Guidelines
Open Science	Open access to public research results	Open licences	Impact on the publishing sector	Power concentration in large companies	Access to clinical trials of COVID-19 vaccines
Data privacy	Protection of users' personal data	Use of personal data in digital services	Open digital platforms	Citizens' vigilance Cybersecurity	GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) Control of AI algorithms
Market competition rules	Level playing field	Transition from national to supranational regulations	Mergers and acquisitions Oligopolies	Tariffs Precautionary Principle	EU competition rules towards a single market
Patents	Public access to proprietary information	Protection of property	Patent trolls	Triadic patents	European patents
Protecting diversity	Non-discrimination principle	Mobility programmes	Minority presence in decision-making bodies	Protection of women and children	Women in Science
Science diplomacy	Alignment with the objectives of international relations	Signature of international science and technology agreements	Multilateral agreements Participation in international organisations	Science and Technology Counsellors in Embassies Principles for international agreements	SESAME (synchrotron in Jordan)

Table 3. Issues related to principles/values, regulatory framework and market structure (level 3). Source: prepared internally

Figure 3 shows a snapshot in which two fictitious countries (A and B) have different levels of autonomy for a given technology. Country A has a weaker position in Stratum 1, but the situation is reversed in stratum 3. The analysis of this model suggests that, in order to modify the current weaknesses in some time interval, each of these countries will have to proceed with the implementation of priority actions (highlighted with blue arrows). It will do so by employing a set of policy instruments that act on the necessary layers depicted in figure 2 (see p. 12).

It is pertinent to note that while in this example the countries will operate in different layers (1 and 3 respectively), in other cases competition at the same level is not

only possible, but in fact occurs with many emerging technologies of broad impact (5G networks). On the other hand, when considering another technology, the relative capabilities between A and B could change dramatically, requiring different policy measures. This approach is also relevant when a major technological power develops its strategy of cooperation with another country (or group of countries) to open markets for its technologies.




Figure 3. Comparison between countries A and B in relation to one technology. Source: Prepared internally

EU technological sovereignty and smart power in the African context

This section applies the conceptual approach developed in the previous sections to the African scenario. Figure 4 shows a subjective view of how the EU cooperates with continental countries at the levels represented in the figures above to improve their relative position. It is important to note certain issues that were considered in the development of the map. Firstly, only a few interactions are incorporated for the purpose of exemplifying their diversity. Secondly, interventions have different weights for the EU (in the graph exposed by the thickness of the lines) when large geographical areas are used (see black circles). Thirdly, each area of the continent that has been differentiated needs to be studied in greater detail, taking into account the peculiarities of each country and its economic situation.

In some cases, the EU's rationale is strongly conditioned by access to natural resources, while in other cases the motivations reflect historical and economic ties of member states. Other reasons for intervention, such as security (e.g. in the Sahel zone), are not stated because they are not directly related to technological sovereignty, although they may condition the implementation of actions at other levels such as those mentioned above. For example, the Maghreb area is very relevant for the EU in the framework of its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), where specific funds




Figure 4. Priorities for EU technological sovereignty in the African context. Source: Prepared internally

have been allocated to the region to promote its stability and socio-economic growth. In addition, the European Commission launched a set of initiatives around the Research and Innovation Framework Programmes in cooperation with Member States to strengthen their national innovation systems.

However, the EU is not the only technological power with the capacity to influence the continent. Both China and the United States, and to some extent Russia as well, use Africa as a position of strength to advance their own interests using technology as leverage. All these technological powers use a wide range of instruments, adapted to specific technologies and local conditions. Indeed, the specificities of China's strategy need to be explored in greater depth because it is more complex than a superficial approach would suggest. On this basis, it is necessary to align the objectives of EU-related actors in order to avoid gaps that turn into disadvantages.

The public-private conflict of interest can be illustrated by statements made to Reuters by Orange's CEO in June 2021: «*France will avoid using equipment from Chinese suppliers when developing Europe's 5G networks, but the company sees no problem working with Huawei in Africa [...] [They] have invested in Africa while European suppliers have hesitated*»[25]. The aim is to implement a dual security strategy with different effects in the EU and in third countries. Economic logic and geopolitics do not always go hand in hand.

Another area in which the EU wishes to strengthen its position in Africa is space, where it intends not only to stimulate the use of its Galileo navigation system, but also to take advantage of the Copernicus system to obtain observation data that it can make available to African countries (its use for detecting forest fires or discovering

25 Reuters (2021). Orange sees role for Huawei in 5G Africa rollout. 29 June. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/orange-sees-role-huawei-5g-africa-rollout-2021-06-29/

aquifers is very relevant and constitutes a key tool for development cooperation and climate change monitoring). Africa has also collaborated with the European Union through the Joint Africa Programme Office (JPO) for an EU-Africa partnership to introduce GNSS/EGNOS services in Africa for all types of applications, with a focus on the aviation sector as a driver.

Similarly, communications satellites provided by the European Space Agency and various EU member states can offer rural internet access connectivity that is also much needed in many African countries, although the costs are high[26], pending services offered by low orbit satellite constellations where the EU is lagging behind and other initiatives (such as Starlink in the US)[27] can take advantage of easier regulatory guidelines and targeted financial support[28].

Regarding China's role on this continent, it is necessary to analyse the background with data (with greater or lesser reliability), the objectives and needs of both parties (understanding that Africa is complex and diverse), but also to note the multidimensionality and temporality of the former's strategy[29]. For reasons of space and the focus of this article, only a few points will be addressed, although it is pertinent to mention that the general projection of business, politics and 'soft power' is intertwined with its defence and security focus.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, China's rate of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa has increased at a rate of 25% per year. FDI reached $2.96 billion in 2020, with an estimated cumulative stock of $47.35 billion. Private Chinese companies account for 90% of all firms investing in the mainland, and 70% of the value of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), but state-owned enterprises dominate in the energy, transport and resources sectors, and in relative terms make the largest investors by value[30].

The model is mainly greenfield investment[31]. In fact, few projects are carried out in the form of joint ventures or through mergers and acquisitions. Most companies

26 The European Space Agency will contribute its telecommunications satellites to the Sway4edu project, designed to improve life in rural Africa. This initiative will seek to develop a technology platform to support farmers, teachers and voters in various regions of the continent. Available at: https://blogthinkbig.com/satelites-africa

27 Company offering high speed internet and low latency broadband. See https://www.starlink.com/

28 Starlink, the satellite internet constellation being developed by SpaceX, is targeting coverage of Africa in late 2021 and 2022. Only Nigeria can expect launch by the end of 2021, while other African countries such as South Africa should have access to the Starlink satellite internet service by 2022. Available at: https://africanews.space/starlink-satellite-internet-target-africa-coverage-late-2021-2022

29 China-Africa Business Council (2021). Market Power and Role of the Private Sector, Chinese Investment in Africa. Beijing. P. 15. Available at: http://www.focac.org/eng/zgqytzfzbg/t1904028.htm

30 Yu, S. (2021). Why substantial Chinese FDI is flowing into Africa. *LSE Blog*. Available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/04/02/why-substantial-chinese-fdi-is-flowing-into-africa-foreign-direct-investment

31 *Greenfield* investment dominates the scene in the case of Africa. This increases the benefit to the host state, among other reasons, by generating employment.

choose to set up subsidiaries with independent legal personality instead of agencies, representative offices and branches. In the territory, the generation of employment and modern infrastructures implies a win-win link between both parties. In 2015, they agreed to cooperate on railways, roads, regional aviation networks and projects for the industrialisation of the continent. Likewise, the launch of the *Digital Silk Road* in the same year gave ICTs great centrality, including some African countries within the priorities of this initiative.

Multidimensionality refers to disaggregating the various spheres that constitute the link that goes far beyond the commercial level. An example to illustrate the point. In 2018, 16% of foreign students in China came from Africa. This placed the Asian country in second place as a recipient after France. It also pledged to offer 50,000 scholarships by 2021. According to the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Huawei's collaboration with African universities has enabled thousands of university students to obtain ICT certification from the company. The company has signed cooperation agreements with more than 250 universities in 14 sub-Saharan countries to establish academies to grant the certifications.

Temporality means detecting continuities and changes in the Sino-African relationship, especially in the last two decades. In addition, analyse short-term actions with a rationale that is differentiated from medium-term actions. This involves characterising each of them and then identifying where the economic and geopolitical dimensions converge.

The *China-Africa Business Council's Report on Chinese Investment in Africa* notes that Chinese private companies are moving into a third stage characterised by 'putting down roots in Africa' with its attendant derivations (in the past the strategy was 'going to Africa' and then moved to 'setting up in Africa'). Clearly, US and European companies will experience a decline in both relative market share and absolute unit sales. However, the fulfilment of the new phase objective can have much more far-reaching consequences.

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which 46 African countries have joined, has heavily increased foreign trade investments, FDI, loans and aid, but has recently added a national security and defence dimension[32]. Although trade and investment precede BRI, its geopolitical role is undeniable. South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Egypt and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are the five main trading partners. In terms of products, the volume of trade in mineral products, machinery and equipment, and base metals (iron and steel, copper, aluminium, etc.) and base metal products occupy the top three positions.

This is not to assert that there are no cases of turnkey contracts or to ignore China's interest in the continent's natural resources. In any case, it is necessary to delve into the

32 Nantulya, P. (2021). Reshaping African Agency in China-Africa Relations. *African Center for Strategic Studies*, 2/02/2021.

details, as it is through these that the most significant dangers to Europe's interests can be detected. In this respect, a strategy can be observed whose most obvious content is mainly economic and in which the continent constitutes a platform that guarantees level 1 technological sovereignty while at the same time a region of growing relevance at Level 2 (complementary to both Asia and Latin America). However, based on the available information, Tugendhat and Voo's study warns of the possible articulation between the Digital Silk Road (DSR) and future internet governance through the push for standards and regulations, both of which are relevant to China's global technological ambitions. Indeed, digital technologies occupy a 'critical role' for the RSD[33].

Access to critical raw materials and food, as well as their processing (in many cases) and movement to ports (road and rail construction contribute to displacement) is translated into localised initiatives both in those countries identified as resource-rich which are described as «*Enablers in economic diversification*» (Nigeria, Angola, the Republic of Congo, Zambia, Ghana, Algeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo), and in those resource-poor countries where infrastructure is developed, and which are described as «*Enablers of industrialisation and modernisation*» (Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania)[34].

The objectives do not seem to be exhausted there, as factories are being set up to compensate for the increase in China's labour force, in particular labour-intensive processing companies that outsource production to Asia and increasingly to Africa because of low labour costs. Likewise, the promotion of the Information and Communications Technology industry, vis-à-vis the control of cyberspace and access to the internet, are central aspirations for the Chinese government, which find in some authoritarian governments on the African continent a support base to promote related regulatory frameworks[35].

The analytical framework proposed in previous sections allows for the disaggregation of China's actions to identify the interlinkages that exist between many of the activities. This does not imply asserting a degree of seamless coordination on the part of all actors (large companies, SMEs, credit institutions and banks, diplomatic personnel and political authorities), but neither does it imply a perspective that reflects on the issue as if it were a set of isolated projects. This is key to assessing the current and potential impact on European technological sovereignty.

33 Tugendhat, H. and Voo, J. (2021). China's Digital Silk Road in Africa and the Future of Internet Governance. *Working Paper No. 2021/50. China Africa Research Initiative*. Washington DC, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. Available at: http://www.sais-cari.org/publications

34 The ranking is from the *China Investment in Africa Report*. See Footnote 26.

35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2015). Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China at the Opening Ceremony of the Second World Internet Conference. Wuzhen, China, 16 December. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov. cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1327570.shtml

Figure 5 presents the countries in which the largest volume of Chinese investment in Africa is concentrated. The classification into three groups of countries is that given in the above-mentioned report of the Business Council.




Figure 5. China's presence/investments in Africa. Source: prepared internally based on the classification used in the Sino-African Business Council 2021 report

Although there are many important initiatives that could be included, a selection of projects of various characteristics classified according to levels of technological sovereignty is sufficient to reveal how Sino-African relations should be analysed from a comprehensive perspective.

In relation to level 1 of technological sovereignty, investments are identified that objectively guarantee access to resources, but also to their processing for industrial use, as well as the development of infrastructures (ports, roads, railways) that facilitate their transfer. The following selection of projects illustrates this point:

a) Ningxia Tianyuan Manganese Industry Group: Mineral processing and resource cooperation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ghana.

b) Hengtong and Huawei Marine: Deployment of 12,000 km of submarine cable to connect China, Pakistan, Djibouti, Kenya and along the coast of East Africa to South Africa.

c) China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC): investment to develop a deepwater port in Lekki (Nigeria) under the BOOT model, which means build, own, operate and transfer (BOOT) with a 45-year franchise.

Level 2 identifies investments that indirectly contribute to Chinese autonomy in advanced technologies, but which in turn generate employment and consumption in African countries, acting as an enabler for other ventures.

a) BAIC Group and Hisense Group: installation of an automotive manufacturing line in Port Elizabeth and construction of a white goods industrial park in Cape Town, South Africa.

b) China-Egypt Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone TEDA Suez and Photon Engine: New construction materials, petroleum equipment, high and low voltage equipment and machinery manufacturing; production of pure electric buses in Egypt and providing manufacturing technologies and related new energies.

c) China Road and Bridge Corporation: The Nairobi-Mombasa section (470km) is the first phase to link the port city of Mombasa with the western border town of Malaba. A map shows the proximity to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

At level 3, related to the market structure and regulatory framework, the strong presence in the telecommunications infrastructure of Huawei (it built around 50% of Africa's 3G networks and 70% of its 4G networks and is present in 20 African countries) and ZTE, allows them to influence the companies themselves, but also other players in the Chinese innovation ecosystem. Such is the case of the proposal for a new internet protocol under consideration by the International Telecommunications Union, which, according to critics, would lead to a more centralised and top-down control of the internet, which could even reach users, with implications for security and human rights. The initiative is driven by a range of actors[36] and was endorsed by 11 countries on the continent. The evidence so far reveals minority public and formal support, but the voting system of the technical standards and norms bodies –one country, one vote– could be a Chinese asset in the global leadership contest if it can persuade at least the Digital Silk Road constituency.

A comparison of Figures 4 and 5 shows an overlap between the priority regions for the EU and the countries where the presence of the Asian country is most important on the African continent. Not all EU-China relations in Africa can and should be confrontational, but there is room for cooperation in science and technology. There must be a focus on global challenges such as climate change or the protection of biodiversity, and also on ensuring that the exploitation of natural resources does not lead to negative environmental consequences. In these contexts, awareness-raising in African countries is essential, beyond long-term benefits. From 2007, when the EU began to

36 Huawei Technologies, China Unicom, China Telecom, China Mobile, Tsinghua University, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). Received public endorsement from Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

consider a cooperation strategy with China in Africa, to the present day, the context has changed significantly. As early as 2009, a trilateral dialogue was postulated, but it has proved to be very slow[37]. Interest does not seem to be joint, and except in very specific areas (e.g. support for African universities) it does not seem easy to find areas of trilateral cooperation. It is therefore relevant to continuously assess the evolution of this presence both to promote areas of collaboration and to anticipate potential conflicts.

Conclusions

While the concept of strategic autonomy has connotations more or less confined to security and defence issues, the notion of technological sovereignty is an essential pillar for analysing the EU's global positioning in the coming decades. Moreover, it has become a key element in a much broader perspective for the assessment of strategic autonomy. Excessive technological dependence on external assets and resources could imply difficulties, or at least constraints outside the EU framework, in defining national strategies for key enabling and emerging technologies.

Multiple possible 'areas of intervention' have been identified in relation to the specific situation of a state in relation to a given technology. In view of the heterogeneous problems inherent to the issue, the authors of this article have proposed a three-level classification. Level 1 linked to access to raw and processed materials and associated logistics; Level 2 related to the capacity to develop technological components and systems; and Level 3 linked to ensuring a level playing field in the international market for goods and services.

However, only a small number of geopolitically relevant countries are likely to be able to secure level 3, while having weaknesses in level 1 because they lack direct access to natural resources. Indeed, a significant number of states are not even able to reach Level 1 because they lack the resources or because they choose to preserve their natural environment, avoiding manufacturing processes with harmful environmental consequences on their own territory and opting instead to purchase them from abroad. Indeed, at a given time and for a given technology, not all countries can have an influence at all levels. The proposed approach therefore provides a framework for an actor to make an assessment of their situation. On this basis, it can define the actions it deems appropriate to sustain or improve its position.

The implementation of the elements of technological sovereignty set out in the article applies not only to the territory of a country or group of countries such as the EU, but also to its interaction with third countries. The example of Africa has been

37 Alden, C. and Sidiropoulos, E. (2009). Africa-China-EU Cooperation in Africa. Prospects and Pitfalls. *Policy Notes 2009/11. SPECIAL ISSUE on the EU Africa Partnership Strategy*. The Nordic Africa Institute. ISSN 1654-6695 ISBN 978-91-7106-660-2.

chosen to show this impact. China's presence in Africa offers a relevant environment for analysis because it affects and conditions European technological sovereignty at the three levels described in this paper, albeit at different scales. It also implies an objective decrease in the margins of strategic autonomy in the medium term. The case also allows us to theoretically refine the scope of the concept of technological sovereignty and to disaggregate it. In addition, it argues for the need to explore its articulation with the notion of smart power.

In the next decade, Africa's prosperity and development is a major objective for asserting Europe's technological sovereignty in its confrontation with other powers at all three levels; it is not just a question of access to raw materials, there is much more at stake. Therefore, studying China's actions in Africa is a fundamental exercise in rethinking a comprehensive EU policy package towards the continent that goes beyond development cooperation and designs initiatives in innovation and education, such as the extension of ERASMUS+, association with the Horizon Europe programme, and increasing the number of student scholarships.

In short, the definition of policy packages framed within the concept of smart power to ensure the appropriate level of technological sovereignty, and thus to strengthen strategic autonomy, is a top-level objective for the EU. Its implementation at the global level will require a specific analysis of each technological system, seeking to strengthen alliances that ensure open strategic autonomy.

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
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Book review

FIGHT AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS).

Sagrario Morán Blanco, Editorial Tirant lo Blanch, 2021.

ISBN 978-84-1378-146-4 (381 pages).



The Universe is a closed system where matter and energy, space and time, are governed by causal principles that seek stability and harmony at all times. When one of these forces breaks the system, the model reacts strongly to seek a new equilibrium. Humanity is no stranger to this scheme, because it forms part of its machinery and, unequivocally, its intimate universe and its relationship with the natural environment also follows the same principles.

Thus, we are shaken by extreme situations, we live with anguish the eruption of the volcano of La Palma, while the World Health Organization tries to put a date on the end of the pandemic caused by SARS-CoV-2, and states look for ways to consolidate the still precarious economic situation.

But it is not only our relationship with the environment that provides us with countless examples of situations of unrestrained violence and tragic developments that were previously unimaginable. Man's desire to dominate the earth has led him to create the *technosphere*, to suffocate the earth's living envelope, the biosphere, with its technological layer. And his desire to dominate the will of others has created situations more abominable than those which he calls natural.

The sense of astonishment at the Taliban takeover of Kabul International Airport by the Taliban, ending the so-called 'war on terror' launched 20 years ago by US President George W. Bush, forces us to reflect on the dramatic situations to which this apparently irrepressible desire to exercise a power that appears omnipotent to our eyes leads us.

The unique book by Rey Juan Carlos University professor, Sagrario Morán Blanco, is a cry to the four winds denouncing what seems to be leading us to another tragedy foretold, 'the war on drugs' declared 50 years ago by another US president, Richard Nixon. A bloody struggle that is ongoing today and which she recounts in detail, focusing on the region where, perhaps most virulently, a cruel and degrading ecosystem has been created. A profound, courageous analysis, aided by the author's vast knowledge of Human Security and International Relations and Law, which goes beyond a detailed analysis of the situation, with a wealth of data to support her analysis, and also investigates, in great detail, the different possible solutions, with the vision of a paradigm shift that will allow new strategies to open the way to resolving the problem.

The book, of course, by this great researcher, explores in detail all the strategies applied, studying them with honesty and from all possible points of view. She also, as we have said, extensively develops the new visions that are opening up, trying to overcome a situation anchored in despair and violence.

Strategy, as the well-remembered Miguel Alonso Baquer would say, is 'the saying of a doing', where means, lines of action and objectives are intertwined. Therefore, if these are not achieved, the strategies, which only have a *raison d'être* if they achieve the objectives set, must be modified. Whether it is the means to be used, the lines of action to be pursued, or their purpose, the objectives to be achieved, if these prove to be unattainable.

Sagrario Morán's indispensable book, in the words of its prologue, the professor and researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and president of the National Human Rights Commission in Mexico between 1999 and 2009, José Luis Soberanes Fernández, is clearly pertinent, her text becoming, in her own words, a breath of fresh air; and I would also point out, a declaration of humanity, intelligence and humility.

In 381 pages, the author unravels a reality that seems ever-present, although perhaps, because of its long duration, it is assumed to be inevitable, sadly embedded in the international landscape as a human accident impossible to change. The book is divided into two distinct parts of similar size.

The first part, entitled: 'Drug trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean: causes, connections with other crimes and consequences' offers an extraordinary introduction of nearly 40 pages, in which the author masterfully describes the challenge that organised crime poses for states, judiciously positioning drug trafficking as one of the most violent, cruel and profitable vectors for traffickers among the myriad groups operating outside the law, all with a common nexus: to weaken the structure of the state and undermine the reputation of its institutions. Based on the definition of this phenomenon adopted in 2000 by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention), she establishes four criteria that in her opinion define it: numerical, a minimum of three members; spatial, its local nature and transnational effect; lucrative, with a purpose associated with financial or material gain; and criminal, with a premeditated objective of committing a serious crime. Thus, in her effort to conceptualise the phenomenon in the area studied, she develops what she considers to be its three essential characteristics: its transnational nature; the diversification of its manifestations; and its capacity to establish alliances and links with certain sectors of all spheres of the state, whether political, police, economic or judicial.

She goes on to discuss drug trafficking as the primary expression of organised crime in the region, with a special mention of the need for cooperation, and the work done by the OAS, in its 'Hemispheric Plan of Action'. The interesting introduction ends with the development of the two substantial factors that foster drug trafficking in the region: poverty, inequality and the socio-economic context; and the weakness of state institutions.

The continuation of the text, which immerses us like the best script of a tragedy foretold, analyses, through more than 100 pages, the most outstanding aspects of its evolution, the consequences for the region, with a special section on corruption, as one of its usual after-effects, followed by violence and insecurity. A drama which, although it officially began in 1971, took on the proportions of a major clandestine business in 1989, with the end of the Cold War. According to UN data, production and cultivation alone generates around 300,000 jobs in the Andean region and, in Colombia, coca cultivation in 2019 extended to around 212,000 hectares.

Other highlights include:

The survival of its structure despite the arrest of its leaders is due to its capacity for regeneration and diversification, with an unequalled ability to mimic a monster with

a thousand faces that relies on a universe of criminal forms that feeds on the fragility of the state. In the words of the author: «a worldwide network with multiple branches that penetrate countries to engage in different illicit activities»...

Corruption, as a major contributing factor in its development and ability to challenge state institutions. While corruption cases increase exponentially, impunity grows in a business that is capable of creating parallel structures, with infiltration of legal systems and real control of territories, outside of state administration.

The proliferation of *maras* and gangs, and the recruitment of increasingly younger boys and girls, creating an ecosystem of violence and high criminal activity, leading to the highest homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in the world, in a context of declared war in what is considered a governmental and regional failure. At this point, the author offers two interesting reflections on the relationship between violence and disinterest in democracy, and between violence and inequality.

The second part, entitled: 'Cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean: the essential work of the Organisation of American States (OAS)', analyses in detail the cooperative structure that has been created, going back to the decade 1970-1980, as well as the strategies that this organisation and its member states have put into action. Following the three basic rules of security studies: timeliness, precision and relevance, the author does not turn a blind eye to any of the most controversial actions, and thus reviews the 'iron fist' state policies and their consequences, the militarisation of the police and the involvement of the army, domestic legislation and the issue of impunity, with penal reform and the adoption of new laws and institutions, and a special mention of US intervention. A long and dramatic path that leads her to conclude with the need to address the structural causes of the phenomenon and not the effects of its expansive dynamics.

In the search for new strategies to change the current failed trend, the author explores in detail two essential lines of action: inter-state and multilateral cooperation, and a paradigm shift, with the decriminalisation of cannabis use and cultivation.

The first line of action incorporates four levels of ongoing cooperation: inter-state cooperation between Latin American states and with other extra-regional actors; the implementation of specific plans; cooperation within Latin American integration schemes and the Ibero-American community of nations –the proposals of Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador during the sixth Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) still resonate–; and cooperation between Latin America and other regions.

With regard to the second, since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the idea that drug trafficking can no longer be tackled in the traditional way has begun to take hold. In this context, the Global Commission on Drug Policy (GCDP) was created and issued a conclusive report, June 2011, which stresses the need to promote a substantial paradigm shift in global drug policy and which begins with the famous sentence: «the global war on drugs has failed.» In this sense, the author rightly reflects on two areas in particular: the improvement of health systems, and the decrim-

inalisation of the consumption and trade of drugs such as marijuana. She concludes this section by studying the cases of Uruguay and the position of other countries and the third stage, 2016-2020, of the OAS in the fight against drug trafficking, which she describes as «new impulses».

The author concludes by encouraging us to address the eradication of illicit drug trafficking with three concrete proposals: a real commitment by states to reduce demand through specific prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and social inclusion programmes; the implementation of public policies that are comprehensive and holistic in nature, addressing structural causes as well as risk factors from a human rights-based approach; and that the OAS become a forum for the articulation of consensus around innovative initiatives that leave behind the prohibitionist logic that has prevailed in recent decades as the only formula for combating drug trafficking.

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