

# BOLETÍN MENSUAL MULTIMEDIA

(Artículos de Opinion, Documentos, Infografías, Gráficos y Videos)

## ASOCIACIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE DIPLOMADOS POR EL COLEGIO DE DEFENSA DE LA OTAN (ANDC- ESP)



Mes de mayo de 2025

Por el Cor. IM (r) Octavio Alaez Feal

Ancien num. 6272

### Artículos

[Deep sea mining is the new front in Pacific competition | The Strategist](#) by Cynthia

When a Chinese research vessel was [spotted](#) near Australia's southern coast in late March, opposition leader Peter Dutton [warned](#) the ship was likely 'mapping undersea cables', and others expressed similar concerns. But in the subsea domain, exploitation of the seabed itself is fast becoming the frontier where influence will be exercised, rules contested and regional alliances tested.

Two recent developments highlight the rising strategic importance of the seabed, far beyond the narrow frame of cable security.



In February, the Cook Islands government signed a deal with China, granting licenses for seabed surveys. Weeks later, Vancouver-based The Metals Company (TMC) began lobbying the United States to bypass the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and issue permits for commercial seabed mining directly.


[Tapped Out: It is Time to Revisit Oil Sanctions on Russia | Royal United Services Institute](#) by Tom Keatinge

The success – or otherwise – of the G7’s efforts to reduce Russia ability to raise revenue via the sale of oil is continuously debated. On the face of it, although the market price for Urals oil has declined from a peak of close to \$100 in 2022 to \$65 today, Russia has generally maintained its pre-invasion volume of exports, albeit those sales are no longer made in G7 countries, with increased sales to India and China compensating. Western policymakers would argue their restrictions mean it is costing Russia more to export oil to these countries, thus reducing profitability and funds available for financing the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine. The KSE Institute [calculates](#) that in the period from March 2022 – January 2025, Russia has foregone an estimated \$142 billion of oil export revenue.



[Why the UK needs both Atlantic and Indo-Pacific reach](#) | ukdj by Dr. Emma Salisbury

In the Euro-Atlantic theatre, the resurgence of Russian maritime activity, grey-zone activities in the Baltic, and heightened tensions in the Arctic underscore the need for robust NATO collaboration. Key considerations include submarine warfare, maritime domain awareness, and securing critical undersea infrastructure, all of which the Royal Navy should be well-placed to contribute to. This region remains central to the United Kingdom’s (UK) collective defence obligations under NATO and to the British continuous at-sea deterrent. Simultaneously, the Indo-Pacific theatre presents challenges driven by China’s naval modernisation and expansion, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and the need to uphold a rules-based international order. The Royal Navy’s engagement through carrier strike group deployments, offshore patrol vessel basing, and AUKUS reflects a growing commitment to this region in recent years, known as the “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific.



[Security without deterrence - Brussels Signal](#) by Gabriel Elefteriu

As the geometry of international relations alters under the shockwaves emanating from the White House, old assumptions about alliances begin to fray. Like a kind of geopolitical glue, it has been US power that has held the global security system together in the broad form we have known it since 1945.



This has been a world order dominated by a US-led Western Alliance, with the “enemy’s” part played at first by the Soviet Union and now by China — with a brief Fukuyaman interlude of unipolarity after the Cold War. The deliberate and accelerated disengagement of the US from this model — i.e. the transition to substantive multipolarity — will require a fundamental recalibration of security concepts and strategies across the West, almost from first principles.

[The Future of US Bases in Europe: General \(Ret.\) Wesley K. Clark](#) by Mila Tanghe and Wesley Clark

Europe is the launchpad, really, for American global influence in most of Eurasia, and it has to be understood in that context. And now there is a Russian threat to Europe, and so these American bases are critical in providing reassurance of US commitment, and especially the linkage to the US strategic nuclear deterrent in dealing with Russia. We’re approaching a critical point in this effort to deter further Russian aggression. Ukraine is holding, but only with strong US military assistance. That military assistance has been coordinated through our facilities in Europe. Our men and women there, both in uniform and civilians, have been critical in helping facilitate the delivery of arms, munitions and other equipment to Ukraine, but also in providing reassurance to our European allies.



[Stepping up engagement in the Sahel: China, Russia, Turkey and the Gulf States](#) | Egmont Institute by Nina Wilén

Over the past five years, since the latest wave of coups began in 2020, states in the Sahel have [strategically realigned](#) and shifted external partnerships. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger suspended their security collaboration with their long-term ally, France, following their respective coups between 2020 and 2023, and demanded for the immediate withdrawal of French troops while advancing a new narrative of sovereignty. In 2023 [Mali’s regime ousted the decade-long](#), 13,000



troops-strong UN peacekeeping mission in the country, MINUSMA, while Niger expelled the EU’s two security and defense missions, one of which had been deployed since 2012. A few months later, Niger also broke off a decade-long defense [partnership with the US](#). In a

second wave of expulsion, yet [different in manner and context, Chad, Senegal](#) and Ivory Coast also suspended military collaboration with France in 2024.

[‘Historic’ US-Ukraine Minerals Deal - CEPA](#) by Alexander Kolyandr

After weeks of fierce negotiations, Ukraine and the US finally signed the “economic partnership” [deal](#) on April 30. The agreement gives the US what President Donald Trump has been seeking — almost exclusive access to Ukraine’s minerals and other natural resources — without providing Ukraine what President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had been longing for: explicit American guarantees. Yet, on closer examination, the deal is favorable to Ukraine, as it secures at least something while giving away very little, and formalizes a relationship between an independent Ukraine and the US as business partners.



[Modernization as Readiness in the U.S. Marine Corps - War on the Rocks](#) by Keenan Chirhart and Scott Humr

The Marine Corps stands at a critical crossroads, where its ability to adapt quickly to advanced threats will define its future relevance as America’s premier crisis-response force. Facing an increasingly aggressive China and Russia, the Marine Corps should see modernization as readiness by [prioritizing autonomous and unmanned systems](#) that can reduce risk and enhance marines’ ability to fight to meet these threats head-on. However, bureaucratic inertia and outdated acquisition processes threaten to undermine rapid progress, putting the service at a strategic disadvantage in a fast-evolving battlefield. Marine Corps readiness and modernization efforts are a high-stakes race to outpace adversaries, necessitating [bold congressional support](#) and a willingness to take on calculated risks.



Artículo relacionado

[Realizing America’s Drone Revolution](#) | War on the Rocks by Nathan Ecelberger

[In Yemen, Trump risks falling into an ‘airpower trap’ - Defense One](#) by Charles Walldorf

So far, the second Trump administration has launched [limited airstrikes in Somalia](#) and carried out a weeklong air campaign against the [Iranian-aligned Houthis](#) who rule most of Yemen. The president has also threatened direct strikes against [Iran itself](#) should [talks on a new nuclear deal](#) collapse.



This turn to airpower for Trump makes sense to me. Airpower is [cheap](#) when compared with ground wars, and it usually comes with [fewer casualties](#) for those conducting the strikes. This helps explain why U.S. leaders, including Trump as a self-proclaimed “[anti-war president](#),” typically find it attractive.

But if the Trump administration is not careful, it could fall into what military strategists informally call the “[airpower trap](#).” This happens when the stated objectives of military force are too big for airpower alone to achieve, potentially leading to a face-saving escalation of conflict that could – if history is a guide – draw in ground forces from the U.S. or their local allies.

Artículo relacionado

[The Houthi conundrum](#) | Real Instituto Elcano by Andrew Hammond

[What Imperial Germany Teaches About China’s Naval Basing Ambitions | Proceedings - May 2025 Vol. 151/5/1,467](#) by Commander Chuck Ridgway, U.S. Navy (Retired)

The Kaiser’s Germany took over Tsingtao on a 99-year lease in 1898. A German squadron had operated in Asia without a base for decades; Tsingtao would become its homeport. The fishing village and old fort were soon turned into one of the finest




dockyards and nicest cities on China’s coast.<sup>7</sup> For 17 years the East Asia Squadron operated from this city and projected German influence across the Pacific.

When World War I broke out, Von Spee’s force, then on a tour of Truk and Ponape, made a run for home via South America. It defeated a British squadron at Coronel off Chile, but it was in turn destroyed in December by British battlecruisers at the Falklands. Germany’s ambition to be a power in Asia sank with the squadron.

[The Sources of American Conduct: MAGA Ideology and the EU](#) | Clingendael by Liam Klein

Every new upset leaves European policymakers dismayed, confused, and stunned. The present confusion about the recent U-turn in American foreign policy centres on one single question – or rather, a desperate exclamation: Why? Why would the United States put the existing European security architecture in jeopardy with such reckless abandon?'



It is still too early to tell which drivers prevail in the policymaking of Trump-II. Washington’s

foreign policy decisions so far follow the “duck/ rabbit” illusion pattern, in which the same image can be seen to represent radically different figures. Either Washington’s decisions are seen as instances of Trump’s zero-sum economic logic, or as omens of grander, ideologically driven ambitions. Tariffs, for example, can be viewed as a strictly economic instrument to get a “fairer deal” for the United States, or as the first phase in a destructive confrontation with America’s perceived enemies. Likewise, Trump-II’s shift on European security can be interpreted as a strategy of conservation, saving American dollars for issues the electorate cares more about, or as a dark announcement of geopolitical realignment.

[Ukraine Makes Drone Warfare History—Again – Analysis](#) | Hudson Institute by By Can Kasapoğlu

On May 2 near the Russian port of Novorossiysk, a Ukrainian Magura V7 naval drone shot down at least one Russian Su-30 fighter jet using modified AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.

Beyond its historic significance, this encounter matters for three reasons. First, it demonstrates the effectiveness of Ukraine’s asymmetric naval warfare capabilities—especially its robotic warfare systems, naval mines, and coastal anti-ship missiles—against Russian forces, namely Russia’s once-formidable Black Sea Fleet.

Second, Ukraine’s successful interception of Russian fighter aircraft showcases a significant shift in the dynamics of naval warfare and reinforces the utility of unmanned systems in modern combat. With limited resources, Ukraine has turned its USVs into effective naval air defense assets.

Third, the incident heralds the success of Ukraine’s “[FrankenSAM](#)” project. The project first sought to develop a short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system by integrating American AIM-9M Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and RIM-7 Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles into Soviet-Russian Buk air defense systems.



[El presupuesto en Defensa: ¿una oportunidad perdida?](#) | The Objective por Enrique Fojón

La implementación del compromiso internacional adquirido por el [Gobierno](#), en la Cumbre de la OTAN en Gales en 2014, para aumentar, en el decenio siguiente el presupuesto de Defensa hasta un 2% del PIB, no se gestionó. **Para su cumplimiento debería haber estado precedido por un intenso ejercicio de comunicación estratégica, haciendo de la necesidad de este**

**cumplimiento una virtud.** El Gobierno tendría que haber realizado un esfuerzo importante para compensar el déficit de atención política y ciudadana a la Seguridad y Defensa Nacional y articular una reflexión nacional sobre los parámetros estratégicos, de desarrollo de capacidades y tecnológico-industriales que deben guiar el aumento sostenido del presupuesto.



[Russia’s Plans Are Bigger Than Conflict With the West or Camaraderie With China – The Diplomat](#)

Despite the talk of an eventual peace in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin will continue to step up in countries neighboring Russia, and the West needs to be better prepared. Areas to Russia’s south and east are considered particularly important to Putin. Putin’s Look East [policy](#) was first introduced in 2012, and predates the two Ukrainian wars. In the same



year Russia [adopted](#) a critical new law, the 2012 Federal Law, which for the first time set a clear definition of the Northern Sea Route and its geographical scope. Putin's emphasis on the south can be seen in the Kremlin's ongoing ambitions vis-a-vis the North-South corridor project, otherwise known as the Iranian route, a 7,200-kilometer corridor that connects India with Russia via Iran. Like the Northern Sea Route, [part](#) of the northeastern passage connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans through the Arctic seas, the North-South corridor seeks to provide Russia an alternative to the Suez Canal and a way to sanction proof its supply chains.

[The Revenge of the JCPOA | RAND](#) by Raphael S. Cohen

Ever since [Iran's nuclear program](#) first became public, every U.S. administration has faced a dilemma—strike a likely imperfect deal or attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure and risk becoming embroiled in another Middle Eastern war. A decade ago, the Obama administration concluded that the former was the lesser of two evils. After first trying a [series of cyberattacks](#) and economic sanctions against Iran, Obama chose a diplomatic route—signing the Iran nuclear deal formally known as the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action \(JCPOA\)](#) in 2015. At its core, [Iran agreed](#) to limit its nuclear program and to allow inspections in exchange for relief from international sanctions. At the time, the JCPOA drew ire from Iran hawks, including Donald Trump. A decade later, in an ironic twist of fate, the Trump administration will face much the same choice because, although administrations have changed, the underlying challenges have not.



[Lessons From World War II to Avoid World War III](#) | The New York Times by Andrii Sybiha et al

Learning from the past is critical today, as Ukraine, the European Union and the United States work to achieve peace. Russia's war of aggression has shattered the post-World War II security architecture and the international system based on the [United Nations Charter](#) and the [Helsinki Accords](#). Its conclusion will form the foundation for a new architecture. We offer the lessons from World War II that must be taken into account if we want to create an enduring peace in Ukraine, rather than a pause before the next potentially disastrous global conflict.



Appeasing the aggressor leads to more aggression, not peace. Concessions on unlawful territorial claims are a disastrous mistake. The partition of Czechoslovakia in 1938 only fueled Nazi Germany's appetite and resulted in a global war.

[Un nuevo comienzo de las relaciones franco-alemanas para Europa](#) | El País por Emmanuel Macron y Friedrich Merz

Frente a la guerra en nuestro continente, la feroz competencia mundial, la aceleración del cambio climático y tecnológico y la amenaza de guerras comerciales globales, hemos acordado una agenda completa para replantear nuestra relación y fortalecer Europa. Queremos que nuestra asociación sea más estratégica y operacional y que genere resultados para nuestros conciudadanos y para la Unión. Queremos llevar la coordinación y el reflejo franco-alemán a su máxima expresión para lograr una Europa más soberana, centrándonos en la seguridad, la competitividad y la convergencia.



[US invasion of Panama was first step toward the 'forever wars'](#) | Responsible Statecraft by Richard Hinman

Strategically, however, the invasion of Panama has not aged as well. In hindsight, it seems policymakers drew a series of suboptimal initial lessons from this venture, which were then amplified by the much larger 1991 Gulf War.

U.S. leaders were seduced by the low casualties, domestic popularity, and quick success achieved first in Panama, and then repeated in DESERT STORM. These two operations enabled a strategic recalculation of the perceived costs and benefits of military action and elevated the relative attractiveness of military options. Even before the 9/11 attacks, the greater policymaker demand for “kinetic” solutions throughout the 1990s led to a dramatic spike in military activity.



Artículo relacionado

[La peligrosa obsesión de Trump con el canal de Panama](#) | The New York Times by Will Freeman

[Why the U.S. Can't Peel Russia From China - The National Interest](#) by Yvonne Chiu

The failure of the Western strategy of Wandel durch Handel (German for “change through trade” with authoritarian powers) has led some political analysts to seize on engineering a second [Sino-Soviet split](#) in order to bring the Russian wolf back into the fold. For all Russia’s wrongs, they believe that Moscow [distracts](#) us from the real problem—[Beijing](#)—so they conclude that it would be better to cut a deal that prys Russia from its Chinese ally and frees American resources to counter the China challenge.



While Russia does [chafe](#) at its [dependence on China](#), that does not make Russia ripe for picking. The seductiveness of a grand bargain belies several realities: the United States cannot pry Russia from China, the United States will not then “pivot to Asia” with freed-up

resources, and those resources would be insufficient to deter or out-compete China. In the long run, this “reverse Nixon” strategy would only strengthen Russia and reflect a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of the relationship between authoritarian regimes.

[Fortifying the Baltic Sea - NATO's defence and deterrence strategy for hybrid threats](#) | Nato Review by Klaudia Maciata

The Alliance's focus has particularly shifted towards the region since the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO (which has led some to nickname the Baltic Sea '[NATO's lake](#)'). The changed security environment requires a more proactive response from NATO following recent incidents of damage to undersea communication and energy cables, cyber attacks on major European ports, 'shadow fleet' ships from hostile states, coordinated information threats and Russia's continued full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine. In response, NATO has adopted a 'deterrence by denial' posture, encapsulated by the strategic logic of 'repel, don't expel'. This strategy emphasises the need to proactively deter aggression by stepping up the Alliance's military presence in the region and underscoring that any attack will be met with a swift and robust response, as opposed to reacting to an attack once it's too late to thwart.



[¿Debe volver a España el Servicio Militar Obligatorio?](#) | El Debate por el Almirante<sup>®</sup> Rodriguez Garat

En una democracia es importante cuantificar el apoyo popular al Servicio Militar. Pero también lo es identificar las dificultades prácticas de su hipotética reimplantación. Dos décadas después de su abrupto final, hay tres problemas que siguen pendientes de resolver: la participación de la mujer; la necesidad de crear una prestación sustitutoria que tenga contenido real y no dé ventaja a los objetores; y, por último, el diseño de un marco jurídico claro que de verdad castigue la insumisión.



Con todo, no se debe empezar las casas por el tejado. Si de verdad queremos plantearnos la vuelta de la «mili» habría que empezar por clarificar cuál sería su propósito.

[Keep the Fires Going: What the Kingdom of Denmark's Leadership Means for the Arctic Council](#) - Center for Maritime Strategy by Ava Moore

In a ceremony on May 12th, 2025, the Kingdom of Denmark will assume the chairship [sic.] of the Arctic Council. This transition is routine, occurring every two years as the responsibility rotates through the eight Arctic states. However, this month the change also comes at a time when the region—and especially the Kingdom's territory of Greenland—is mired in fresh geopolitical tensions. What will the next two years bring? A chairship with Greenland in the



lead could strengthen the position of Arctic Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic Council, but the war in Ukraine and foreign policy upheaval in the U.S. will restrict the council's activities and add uncertainty to its future.

[The Montreux Paradox: How a Ukraine Ceasefire Could Set the Stage for Escalation in the Black Sea - War on the Rocks](#) by Aron Lund

Although a durable peace remains improbable, the conflict could conceivably shift into a new normal, in which fighting is interspersed with talks and truces, and where both sides exploit pauses to rearm.

Interestingly, Turkey isn't just a facilitator of the emerging diplomacy, but also an influential actor in its own right. If some form of sustained de-escalation were to occur, the area in which new force build-ups could happen most rapidly may be the Black Sea,

where Turkey has since 2022 barred warships from entering, citing the [Montreux Convention](#).

Policymakers now need to prepare for the possibility that Ankara would react to a longer-term ceasefire by lifting those restrictions, allowing the Russian Navy to surge into the Black Sea — and potentially setting the stage for future escalation.



[Navigating Political Crisis and Conflict in Mozambique: Quad's Interest and Strategy - Foreign Policy Research Institute](#) by Raghvendra Kumar

[Conflict re-emerged in 2017](#) with the rise of an Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado, led by Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a (ASWJ) —also known as al-Shabaab or ISIS-Mozambique.

The insurgency [began with an attack on Mocimboa da Praia in October 2017](#). Since then, the conflict has [claimed](#) over 4,000 lives and displaced approximately 800,000 people. While fundamentally different in origin and character from earlier conflicts, this insurgency is deeply rooted in structural inequality, poverty, oppression, marginalization, and deprivation caused by

corrupt elites. [Many citizens blame](#) the discovery and mismanagement of valuable resources, particularly natural gas and rubies, for exacerbating the insurgency and fueling terrorism in the province.



[Kashmir's forgotten war goes global](#) | Engelsberg Ideas by Suzanne Raine

Of all the misnomers, 'frozen conflict' signally falls short as a description of the situation in Kashmir since the partition of India in 1947. The UK, which bears historic responsibility for the unresolved division, is also uniquely close to the conflict since a significant number of Pakistani Kashmiris are UK citizens or dual nationals. This latest outbreak of hostilities was always going to happen; until a



resolution is found, Kashmir will continue to inspire and foster terrorist acts and remain one of the core grievances in the Islamist narrative. It will define and disrupt not only the relationship between Pakistan and India but also between the other states of South Asia.

Artículo relacionado

[India's Kashmir Dilemma | Internationale Politik Quarterly](#) by Thorsten Benner

[The Five Keys of Donald Trump's Grand Strategy - The National Interest](#) by Arthur Herman

President Trump's [campaign](#) to end [Houthi attacks](#) on shipping in the Red Sea highlights an issue every American grand strategist needs to focus on, in and out of the administration: which superpower will ultimately control the key strategic choke points for world maritime trade, the United States or China?



This issue was underlined a week earlier when President Trump began pressing for giving American ships free access to the [Suez Canal](#) as well as the Panama Canal—a move that infuriated the usual critics. They were

quick to accuse him of arrogance and overreach, not to mention historical ignorance, since, unlike the Panama Canal, the United States played neither a role in building nor owning the Suez.

On the contrary, I would argue Trump's Suez démarche reveals a shrewd grasp of grand strategic planning. The United States must have ready access to both maritime chokepoints for its commercial vessels and also its navy, both in order to protect U.S. trade and to stay ahead of our global competition with China.

[Europe in the Indo-Pacific](#) | Council on Geostrategy by Peter Dombrowski and Kevin Rowlands

if the UK does have to fight, threats are global, so responses must be global too. Russia is a Pacific nation. The People's Republic of China is increasingly active in the Euro-Atlantic. We talk about the indivisibility of theatres, and I think that is right. I'm reminded that one of the first major naval actions of World War I, a conflict most people would think of as European in origin and military focus, was not on the seas around Europe, but in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Chile. Do we really think a future conflict would be geographically constrained? Britain needs to be familiar with potential operating environments.



There are many other points which could be made, from treaty commitments, to burden sharing, to freedom of navigation operations, to capability development and integration, even to the retention of people, but I'll leave those for others.

[The dissolution of the PKK could transform Turkey's domestic politics and foreign policy](#) | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank by Galip Dalay

Post-PKK Kurdish politics can be transformative because resolution of the Kurdish issue requires a reimagining of Turkish citizenship and nationhood that includes and accommodates Kurdish identity.



Although the Kurdish issue is not the sole source of Turkey's democratic crisis – this has many roots – it is the most potent in terms of duration and depth. One outcome has been the over-centralization of the state and public administration alongside numerous regressive laws concerning freedom of expression, and political parties and activities. The idea of 'Kurdish separatism' and PKK violence have also made Turkish society more accepting of the state's undemocratic measures. The PKK's dissolution could in the medium to longer term lead to a less securitized political and public sphere. Removing the long shadow of this conflict will be good for Turkish democracy.

[Deterrence Doesn't Fly in Space: Nuclear Weapons in Outer Space as a Threat of Force - Lieber Institute West Point](#) by Louisa Handel-Mazzetti

A nuclear weapon in outer space could, with a single [detonation](#), [disable](#) thousands of satellites. The resulting disruption would cripple global communication, navigation, and financial systems, undermining not only international security, but also the daily functioning of societies worldwide. To put it bluntly, if a significant portion of satellites was destroyed, you might not even be able to read this post.



This post will examine whether the stationing of a nuclear weapon in outer space could constitute a “threat of force” under international law and is therefore inherently illegal.

[Space is the new frontier of geopolitics - spiked](#) by Dr. Norman Lewis

Last month, this ambition took a significant step forward when Amazon’s [Atlas V rocket](#) lifted off from Cape Canaveral, Florida, carrying the first 27 satellites of what the company plans to be more than 3,000. This marked the start of [Project Kuiper](#), whose goal is to expand internet access to the roughly three billion people worldwide currently without it.



Project Kuiper is ambitious and inspirational, yet Amazon is not the only private venture seeking to reach the stars. In fact, it is playing catch-up to its main rival, Elon Musk’s SpaceX, and its satellite branch, [Starlink](#), which already has [more than 7,000 flat, car-width satellites](#) in Earth’s orbit and plans to add some 30,000 more.

[10 New AI Challenges—and How to Meet Them](#) | Foreign Policy by Bhaskar Chakravorti

First, large language models often “hallucinate” and return with false, often bizarre, information. The hallucination rate of major AI models ranged from [0.7 to 29.9 percent](#) on April 29, according to a “hallucination leaderboard”. The problems get worse when AI uses “reasoning systems”. Second, AI is prone to reinforcing preexisting biases: Image generators play back racial and gender stereotypes, and predictive algorithms may raise barriers to those already disadvantaged.



Third, AI models aren’t transparent about how algorithms are developed, the source and quality of training data, or the makeup of the development teams. Medical imaging presents a compelling illustration of a dilemma because of this “black box” feature: While neural networks are good at detecting disease markers in patient scans, they may [fail to offer](#) a clear reasoning.

[Military Revolutions from the Spanish Tercio to First-Person View Drones](#) | War on the Rocks by Antonio Salinas and Jason P. Levay

[By some estimates, 60 to 70 percent of casualties](#) in Ukraine now come from drones — cheap, disposable first-person view drones piloted from miles away. They dive into trenches, slip through windows, and snake into hatches of armored vehicles. The battlefield’s oldest insurance policy — cover, concealment, or courage might save you — is collapsing. This isn’t a tactical shift — but rather the start of a military revolution, tearing apart the old rules of war. It is not waiting for written doctrine to reveal it, but is



being etched by the murderous fire in the drone-choked skies above the front lines in Ukraine.

What is unfolding is more than a new tactic — it is a systemic rupture in the conduct of modern warfare

### [PRC and Russia Operationalize Strategic Partnership - Jamestown](#)

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia advanced operational bloc-building at their May 2025 summit, issuing dense agreements and three joint statements that laid out a shared strategic vision across defense, technology, law, and multilateral governance. The summit marked a shift from symbolic reaffirmation to functional coordination, particularly in sectors under U.S. scrutiny, including artificial intelligence, energy, cross-border payments, and legal standards for international order.



The joint statements portrayed the PRC-Russia partnership as a normative response to U.S. hegemony, invoking World War II memory, defending sovereign development rights, and opposing Western-led institutions and coercive measures.

### [Iran and Ethiopia have a security deal – here's why they signed it](#) | The conversation by Eric Lob

Ethiopia and Iran [signed](#) a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on 6 May 2025. Under it, their national police agencies will cooperate on security and intelligence. This will include combating cross-border crime, sharing intelligence and building capacity. They will also share experiences and training. For Iran, the MOU marks a significant step towards strengthening relations with a regional power that's strategically located in the Horn of Africa.



Tehran has been using its [security apparatus and military capabilities](#) to establish and expand political and economic ties with countries in Africa. This has included [drone transfers](#) to the Ethiopian government that helped it turned the tide of the [Tigray war](#), a separatist struggle in the country's north that took place from 2020 to 2022.

[The Italian Job: Navigating between the UK, the EU and Trump | IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali](#) by Luca Cinciripini


Amid the transatlantic rift in the first months of the second Trump administration, Italy and the United Kingdom are seeking to position themselves as ‘transatlantic bridges’, drawing either on long-standing alliances or ideological affinities, to keep channels of dialogue open on shared challenges. However, this balancing act carries significant risks, particularly for Italy. The UK, no longer bound by European Union membership, enjoys greater autonomy in its dealings with the United States, although it risks undermining efforts to reset its relationship with the EU. Rome’s more ambiguous positioning between Washington and Brussels, by contrast, could weaken the EU’s unity at the negotiating table, eroding the coherence of its external action and contributing to internal fragmentation. Ultimately, bilateral initiatives by London and Rome may well serve to reinforce transatlantic cohesion – or to deepen its divisions and weaken the foundations of the EU.

Artículo relacionado [Meloni’s US Dilemma: Balancing Ideology and Strategic Interest | IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali](#) by Riccardo Alcaro



[Report to Congress Hypersonic Missile Defense - USNI News](#) by Sam LaGrone

The maneuverability and low flight altitude of hypersonic weapons could challenge existing detection and defense systems. For example, most terrestrial-based radars cannot detect hypersonic weapons until late in the weapon’s flight due to line-of-sight limitations of radar detection. This leaves minimal time for a defender to launch interceptors that could neutralize an inbound weapon. Figure depicts the differences in terrestrial-based radar detection timelines for ballistic missiles versus hypersonic weapons.



[The Silent Siege: China’s Port Takeover Strategy and What It Means for U.S. Influence in the Americas - Modern Diplomacy](#) by Dr. Nady Helmy

China’s growing influence in the ports of South and Latin America, known as “Washington’s backyard,” is China’s first and most obvious goal in controlling Latin American ports. This is to create more markets for its products and companies, given that Latin America represents a huge consumer market for China, with a population of more than 700 million. In addition, China



seeks to obtain natural resources at the best possible price and with a steady flow of goods from South American ports. China also seeks to expand the scope of its Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, to include Latin American countries that occupy a pivotal position in international shipping traffic.

[Shifting sands: Hedging strategies in Sahel- Maghreb relations | European Union Institute for Security Studies](#) by Rosella Marangio

The boundaries dividing the Maghreb and the Sahel have never looked so porous.

Geography and history have long tethered North Africa to its southern hinterland. But a recent spate of coups and shifting diplomatic alignments has drawn the two regions into an even more intricate web of entanglements – albeit under markedly different terms.

Globally, the US is cutting development aid but maintains strategic security ties in the region, particularly with Morocco. Russia remains engaged in the region, although its presence is increasingly contested locally.

In the central Sahel, regime changes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have upended long-standing foreign policy alignments. The trio's rejection of more traditional partners such as France and the US in favour of alternatives – most notably Russia – has shifted the balance of power and redrawn the region's diplomatic map.



[New bridges across the Channel? The promise and limits of the EU-UK reset | European Union Institute for Security Studies](#) by Luigi Scazzieri

Ever since the EU and the UK agreed the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) in December 2020, the focus of their relationship has been on its implementation. This has often been challenging, especially in relation to border arrangements in Northern Ireland. The EU-UK summit in London on 19 May marks the start of a new phase in the relationship: the focus is no longer on implementation but rather on deepening cooperation, both in security and defence and in the economic realm.

The conclusion of a Security and Defence Partnership (SDP) is one of the summit's headline achievements. The TCA contained very few provisions for cooperation on security after former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson opted to abandon negotiations in this area.



[China's geopolitical dominance game in the South China Sea | The Strategist](#) by Euan Graham

Southeast Asian analysts and security practitioners know that the regional security environment is deteriorating, but they remain reluctant to acknowledge the source of the problem head-on. Some have convinced themselves that great-power competition between the US and China is their primary security challenge, rather than domination by the latter. This manifests in a collective view that conflict avoidance is ASEAN's primary security objective, more than order preservation—though these are not necessarily mutually exclusive aims. Nowhere is this more evident than in the South China Sea. In geopolitical terms, the South China Sea is best thought of as an arena. The core game within this arena is between China and Southeast Asia. Beyond access to seabed resources and any intrinsic significance of the sea itself, China's strategic purpose is to establish dominance over Southeast Asia through repeated conditioning



[Autonomous Weapon Systems: No Human-in-the-Loop Required, and Other Myths Dispelled](#) | WOTR by Michael C. Horowitz

An autonomous weapon system is a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by an operator. A semi-autonomous weapon system is something like the precision-guided weapons of today. Most prominently, the policy requires that, for some kinds of autonomous weapon systems, senior Defense Department leaders have to do two extra rounds of review, on top of the usual checks all weapon systems go through. This happens once before the system is approved to enter the acquisition pipeline and again before it's used in the field. The reviews use a simple checklist, based on rules that already exist, to make sure any proposed autonomous weapon system works as it should and follows U.S. law.



[Why Turkey's Development of Stealth Fighter Jet Should Alarm the Region and the World](#) | Modern Diplomacy by Ankit K

In 2016, Ankara announced the launch of its Turkish Fighter (TF-X), a stealth, twin-engine, all-weather air superiority fighter plane, rechristened as the KAAN project, which is part of a wider initiative intended to reduce Turkey's dependence on foreign imports for its defense industry. At the start of the 2000s, Turkey relied on imports for 80% of its defense requirements, a figure that has now been reduced to around 20%. With that, Ankara is increasing both its resilience and control over its armed forces, mitigating the risk of a foreign country, most likely the U.S., being able to exert pressure on its military decision-making.



The KAAAN fighter jet project is therefore part of this defense overhaul, with the aircraft intended to replace Turkey's American-made F-16 fleet.

## Documentos

[Steadfast Defender 24: Exercising NATO's evolving strategy for deterrence and defence](#)  
| FOI by Emelie Moregård



From January to May 2024, NATO conducted its largest military exercise since the end of the Cold War. Steadfast Defender 24 was a multinational exercise series, incorporating 14 associated exercises and involving 90,000 participants from all member nations, marking a historic milestone in NATO's military exercise activities. Over the years, NATO's military exercises have evolved in line with the alliance's strategy for deterrence and defence. As the global security landscape has changed, NATO's deterrence and defence strategy has shifted to emphasise a forward presence on the eastern flank combined with the capability for rapid reinforcement. NATO's military exercises have reintroduced training for large-scale warfare in Europe, with Steadfast Defender 24 serving as a prime example.

[Militarisation of the Baltic Border](#) | DIIS by Veronika Slakaityte and Izabela Surwillo.



This report provides a critical analysis of NATO's north-eastern flank – Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – as a vital bulwark against evolving Russian threats. It examines how the four countries have transitioned from post-Soviet vulnerabilities into pivotal contributors to NATO's collective defence through unprecedented military modernisation, strategic infrastructure development and societal resilience. Shaped by their history of external domination and the pressing need to counter regional threats, these countries have integrated NATO forces and operationalised total defence strategies. All four states have well exceeded NATO's 2% GDP defence spending benchmark and are aiming for 5% and above in the coming years. Enhanced deterrence frameworks, including NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence and joint regional capabilities, have fortified the region's capacity to counter conventional and hybrid threats. Despite these advancements, critical gaps in civil defence infrastructure and resource mobilisation remain. This

report analyses the region's indispensable role in NATO's deterrence- by- denial strategy and offers actionable recommendations to address vulnerabilities, ensuring sustained readiness and the Alliance's long-term security posture.

[Strategic Snapshot: Global Competition in Critical Minerals and Rare Earth Elements - Jamestown](#)



In response to rising U.S. tensions, China's draft regulations aim to centralize oversight across the rare earths supply chain, introducing production quotas, environmental rules, export controls, and tracking systems to ensure strategic resource management.

China faces internal pressures despite dominating global production, including environmental pushback, inefficient resource use, and declining output, prompting regulatory reforms and increased imports to meet high-tech and defense sector demands. Western nations are actively seeking alternatives to Chinese rare earths by funding new facilities and diversifying sources, as China's past export restrictions and strategic use of rare earths spark international supply chain realignments.


[Unpowering Russia: How the EU can counter and undermine the Kremlin | European Union Institute for Security Studies](#) by Ondrej Ditrych and Steven Everts



We argue that Europe needs to chart a new course to navigate what is likely to be a drawn-out confrontation. To guide the EU's policies, the paper offers a balanced assessment of Russia's strengths but, crucially, also its vulnerabilities, which the EU can exploit to disable Russia's efforts to inflict harm.

Focusing on five key regions – China, the Indo-Pacific, the Southern Mediterranean, the Western Balkans and Sub-Saharan Africa – the authors also examine critical domains such as Russia's hybrid warfare tactics, the Kremlin's red line playbook, and the notorious 'shadow fleet'.

The conclusion is clear: Europe is not powerless, but it has not yet converted its multiple strengths into decisive action. To unpower Russia, the EU must think and act in terms of power – and have the courage to use it.



This open access book is an ambitious study about how to use comparative methods to analyze contemporary military strategy in the maritime domain. Based on the three strategic concepts of area denial, sea control and power projection, this book analyzes the intensive conventional capabilities of six major powers' military strategies. These include the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, the so-called 'sea powers,' and Russia, China and India, which are usually recognized as 'land-powers.' Through the analysis, this book aims to accomplish the following main objectives:

1. To reconsider the basic concepts of maritime military strategic studies, which have not changed for almost one hundred years.
2. To verify the six major powers' long-term military strategic objectives



New tariffs announced by the Trump administration and threats of retaliation by the European Union have set the stage for an all-out economic clash. While a negotiated solution that would reduce some of the initially proposed tariffs remains possible, it is clear that the transatlantic economic relationship is in a new era.

Transatlantic trade tensions have returned with force. Since taking office in January, United States President Donald Trump has reimposed 25% tariffs on steel and aluminium imports, introduced additional duties on car imports from all countries, and threatened 20% 'reciprocal' tariffs on all trading partners, including the European Union. EU member states have been sharply affected by these measures, prompting strong reactions in most capitals and making it likely that a full-scale transatlantic trade war will occur in the coming months.

[NATO 2027: EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP WILL BE KEY TO DETERRENCE AGAINST RUSSIA](#) | Atlantic Council



NATO faces a growing threat from a resurgent Russia capable of hybrid and kinetic aggression across the Northeast Corridor—from Finland, the Baltic region, and Poland to the Black Sea. Currently, NATO’s defense posture relies heavily on U.S. military support for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), strategic lift, command and control (C2), and the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. With the United States increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific region and committed to burden sharing, and with growing calls for European strategic autonomy, NATO must be able to deter and respond to threats as a unified entity—one not effectively dependent on U.S. warfighting capability and capacity. Regardless of spending levels, NATO must shift from a national-centric approach to an Alliance-wide mindset. This requires a shared engineering and analytics methodology to optimize defense resource allocations with a focus on speed, precision, and collaboration.

[Defending Europe Without the United States: Costs and Consequences](#) | IISS by Ben Barry



The objective of the study is to inform European policymakers’ thinking about the military, financial and defence industrial implications of closing key military gaps.


To inform the European defence policy debate, the study assumes that by mid-2025 the war in Ukraine has ended with a ceasefire agreement and that the US government has indicated that it will begin the process of withdrawing from NATO. Declaring its need to prioritise the Indo-Pacific theatre, the US also commences to remove equipment, stocks, supplies and military personnel from Europe. The IISS does not assume this scenario to be inevitable, but it is a helpful construct to clarify policy and capability decisions for European governments today.

Against this background, the study first assesses Russia’s ability to reconstitute its forces after the fighting in Ukraine ends.

[ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN | USMC](#)

Documento relacionado

[UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY | USMC](#)



The United States Marine Corps (USMC) recognizes artificial intelligence (AI) as a transformative technology to enhance decision advantage in the evolving landscape of modern warfare. The USMC AI Implementation Plan (AI IPlan) was developed in response to the publication of the USMC AI Strategy as a critical component of executing the 39th Commandant's Planning Guidance to leverage "advances in artificial intelligence to enhance decision making at the tactical edge." This plan aligns with key directives, including those outlined in Force Design, the Department of the Navy (DON) Data and AI Weaponization Strategy under development, the Department of Defense (DoD) Data Analytics and AI Strategy, and the Executive Order 14179 on AI.

[Russian Mercenary and Paramilitary Groups in Africa: Examining Changes and Impacts Since the Wagner Rebellion | RAND](#)



Although Russia has sought to capitalize on its ambiguous relationships with mercenaries to ignore international norms, Moscow has taken public and direct control over these groups in countries in Africa. Russian mercenaries have operated a nimble expeditionary force, seemingly unencumbered by international rules of war, which has bolstered authoritarian regimes in Africa at the expense of the civilian populations' and the countries' overall security.

The authors describe how Russia's armed presence in Africa has changed from mid-2023 to September 2024. The authors identify where Russian mercenaries have presences in Africa, what types of activities they perform, and the resulting implications of mercenaries' use for African governments, economies, and civilian populations.

[What a Success Story Looks Like: Top U.S. Priorities for the June 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague | The Heritage Foundation](#)



ISSUE BRIEF  
No. 5379 | MAY 16, 2025

What a Success Story Looks Like:  
Top U.S. Priorities for the June  
2025 NATO Summit in The Hague

Jordan Embree and Wilson Beaver

The United States is forced by strategic necessity to shift some vital strategic resources from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, as China presents an unparalleled near-term challenge to American security. Luckily, the United States has wealthy and competent NATO Allies in Europe that can provide most of the conventional deterrence in theater. Setting targets of 3.5 percent across the Alliance, with funding wisely allocated to the most pressing capability gaps, is an outstanding first step toward deterring aggression in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

[How accurate is forecasting of military technologies? | NDC by Alexander Kott and Philip Perconti](#)



This paper is concerned with a particular type of technology forecasting: the long-term forecasting of military technology. Military procurement institutions use technology forecasts to determine what system development and procurement efforts should be undertaken and funded to optimize the future value of the resulting technology to those who would have to fight in a future war. If the forecast is wrong, the military may end up fighting an enemy who possesses weapons of superior technology. While most technology forecasts (performed for business purposes) are short-term (1-5 years), the technology forecasts for the military are often mid-term (6-10 years) or long-term (11-30 years).

[Anatomía del esfuerzo español en defensa - CESEDEN](#) por el General de División (r), ET, DEM Juan Carlos Domingo Guerra



En la cumbre de la Alianza Atlántica de Cardiff (2014), las naciones aliadas alcanzaron un acuerdo por el que se comprometían a aumentar el gasto de

[From Punishment to Denial: Stabilizing Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula - Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft](#) by James Park



Deterrence by denial aims to minimize the success of an act of aggression, building up defense capabilities and overall military resilience. Such an approach offers a level of

defensa en términos reales, hasta alcanzar el 2 % del PIB en el plazo de una década (2024). Establecido ese criterio, alterado profundamente el equilibrio estratégico como consecuencia de la invasión rusa de Ucrania y la drástica modificación de las líneas maestras que orientaban la política exterior estadounidense, este artículo analiza el esfuerzo español en defensa, cuánto se gasta y en qué se gasta, lo que ayudará a deducir el impacto que todo ello tiene en la posición de España en Europa y en las capacidades reales de sus Fuerzas Armadas.

flexibility, proportionality, and predictability that is not possible with deterrence by punishment and its strict threat of massive retaliation. Aspects of denial in the U.S.–South Korea alliance would include enhancing Seoul’s basing infrastructure and missile defense, reshaping the alliance’s joint exercises program to emphasize defensive functions, and a retaliatory posture based on proportionality.


To maximize stability in their deterrence relationship with North Korea, the United States and South Korea should also vigorously pursue diplomacy and arms control negotiations, based on realistic goals and expectations that drop the demand for immediate North Korean denuclearization.

[Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency | CNAS](#) by Jacob Stokes et al



A contingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. This report explores how states beyond the United States and Taiwan would respond to a major Taiwan contingency. It defines a major Taiwan contingency as a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as the near-term objective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the report examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the

[China Maritime Report No. 46: China's Fishermen Spies: Intelligence Specialists in the Maritime Militia](#) | CMSI by Ryan D. Martinson




Collecting and reporting maritime intelligence is a core mission of China’s maritime militia. Militia forces help fill in “blind spots” (补盲) for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and enhance its situational awareness. They are widely dispersed in the waters of greatest strategic and operational importance to Beijing, available in large numbers, extremely familiar with the operating environment, and, the PLA believes, less provocative than other military instruments. • Militia forces that specialize in intelligence collection are organized into “maritime reconnaissance” (

approaches of countries across the region and the world.

海上侦察) units. Located in China's coastal provinces, autonomous regions, and provincial-level cities, these units likely number in the hundreds. Militia vessels dedicated to intelligence collection are often called "information boats" (信息船).

[DeepSeek's release of an open-weight frontier AI model](#) | Strategic Comments



On 20 January 2025, coincident with the inauguration of United States President Donald Trump, the Chinese company DeepSeek released its 'R1' reasoning large language model (LLM). The model's impressive performance – nearly on par with the world's most expensive and best-performing models – and the lower training costs incurred during development generated vigorous debate about whether China had closed the gap with the US on artificial intelligence (AI), which Washington seeks to preserve and expand. Many in the AI community did not think China could produce such a capable model, particularly in the face of robust American export controls. Some commentators questioned whether export controls were likely to contain further Chinese progress, particularly given that the returns on improving LLMs through scaling – making the models larger and more complex, in part by using more data and more


[Defending Europe's Skies](#) Clingendael by Tony Lawrence et al



Russia's war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of effective air and missile defence for the protection of both units on the battlefield, and energy and other critical military and civilian infrastructure behind the front lines. A supporting coalition of states has stepped up to supply Ukraine with a variety of air and missile defence systems, from anti aircraft guns, through short-, medium-, and long-range ground-based missile systems, to fighter aircraft. Even so, President Zelenskyy's calls for more air defence systems and ammunition have been frequent throughout the war. The supporting states have been unable or unwilling to fully meet Ukraine's needs. Even before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, air and missile defence had long been recognised as a critical capability shortfall throughout Europe, but NATO Allies and EU Member States had not acted to rectify this situation.

computing power during training – may be diminishing.

[Lessons in Learning | CNAS](#) by Josh Wallin  
Documento relacionado  
[Safe and Effective | CNAS](#) by Josh Walin



Although claims of a revolution in military affairs may be overhyped, the potential for artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy to change warfare is growing every year. Countries are deploying drones that can guide themselves semi-autonomously into targets, while AI is improving the efficiency of targeting workflows in militaries around the globe. The dangers from these systems are real and significant. Addressing these risks, whether from individual systems or groups of them, is essential in taking full advantage of the benefits these technologies promise.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has a long history of safely developing and deploying crewed systems, but AI and autonomy introduce new roadblocks.


[Russia and China in the Indo-Pacific: China's Use of the Instruments of Power - Foreign Policy Research Institute](#) by Robert E. Hamilton and Christopher Primiano




This report, the second of five in the series, analyzes China's use of the instruments of power to build its influence and advance its interests in a region it sees as vital to its future. We use a modified version of the DIME framework (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments) here, with the modification being that we do not analyze the information instruments separately. Even in an information environment as controlled as China's, the state has multiple ways to shape the information space—some official and some unofficial, some acknowledged and others unacknowledged. Given these facts, a separate examination of the information instrument is beyond the scope of this report.

# Infografias

[Inside North Korea's vast operation to help Russia's war on Ukraine](#) | Reuters graphics



[Power across layers of cyberspace](#) | IISS



[Trump's tariffs: How much of a typical US household is made in America?](#) | Interactive News | Al Jazeera



[Trump 100 days: tariffs, egg prices, Ice arrests and approval rating – in charts](#) | Trump administration | The Guardian



[In hot water: CK Hutchison's ports deal risks being dunked](#) | SCMP




[India-Pakistan conflict: How it disrupted air traffic](#) | Reuters Graphics



[An inventory of Foreign Drones in Sudan's Civil War](#) | Critical Threats



[Explicación visual | Cómo funciona el sistema eléctrico que colapsó con el apagón](#) | Diario Sur



[Ni linternas ni comida en lata: estos son los productos más buscados en Amazon tras el apagón | Diario Sur](#)




[The Houthi's Red Sea Attacks Explained | Crisis Group](#)



[What are India and Pakistan's military and nuclear capabilities? | Interactive News | Al Jazeera](#)



[Animated maps show US-led attacks on Yemen | Interactive News | Al Jazeera](#)




[India vs Pakistan: a military comparison - Naval Technology](#)



[Visual Overview of America's Economic Statecraft Toolkit | FDD](#)



[At the Doorstep: A Snapshot of New Activity at Cuban Spy Sites](#) | CSIS



[Scenarios That Could Define 2035](#) | CSIS



[Insights for Future Conflicts from the Russia-Ukraine War](#) | CSIS digital report



[Trump in the Middle East: How much are US-Gulf investments worth?](#) | Donald Trump News | Al Jazeera



[Criminales apuestan por narcosubmarinos para traficar cocaína](#) | Insight Crime

**Buque totalmente sumergible**

Mayo 2025 | Fuente: CIMCON. | Gráfico: Juan J. Restrepo

Este tipo de narco-submarino es uno de los más difíciles de detectar. Con un diseño cilíndrico, está construido para la total inmersión, minimizando su visibilidad. No ha habido incautaciones de embarcaciones totalmente sumergibles en el mar, aunque varias han sido descubiertas en tierra en diferentes etapas de construcción.

Queda totalmente sumergido

8 a 10 toneladas de cocaína es su capacidad de carga

Sistema de enganche: Puede ser remolcado por una embarcación de superficie o navegar a su propia velocidad.

La mayor parte de la carga va en la proa


6-10 nudos por hora (11,1 a 18,5 km por hora) es la velocidad típica del buque

3 personas (Nunca incautaron FSV en el mar, por lo que no se encontraron tripulaciones)

insightcrime.org


\* Estas ilustraciones son ejemplos; los diseños y tamaños varían debido a su construcción artesanal

[Where does the EU's gas come from? - Consilium](#)







[Estructura digital común europea | La Razón](#)




[Situación en la franja de Gaza | Le Monde](#)



[Debilidad europea sin el paraguas de EE.UU. | El Mundo](#)



[PLA incursions into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone \(ADIZ\) in 2025 continue to run significantly higher than 2023 and 2024. | @ianellisjones](#)



[¿Es chino el iPhone o es Americano? | @delasheras](#)






[EL TAURUS KEPD-350, UN MISIL A LA ALTURA DE LAS GRANDES POTENCIAS | El Mundo](#)



[The world's nuclear powers](#) | Visual Capitalist

[Global Car Production](#) | @Civixplorer


[Inside the cargo of one of the first ships to confront a sudden and steep 145% tariff rate brought on by Trump's ongoing trade war with China.](#) | Bloomberg




[America's shipbuilding sector is sinking under the weight of China's maritime dominance.](#) | Hudson

[El mapa del sistema eléctrico ibérico - Mapas de El Orden Mundial - EOM](#)


[U.S Threat Assessment](#) | Geopolitical Futures



[China bolster presence on India border](#) | Geopolitical Futures




[Global Energy Trends](#) | Geopolitical Futures



[Centrality of the Black Sea Region](#) | Council on Geostrategy




[PKK dissolves](#) | Geopolitical Futures




[NATO in Afghanistan](#) | NATO




Last night, Trump claimed that "The United States is paying close to 90% of the costs of protecting Europe" but the data proves that the US is paying less than 12% of the costs of protecting Europe. | IISS




[Spain's nationwide blackout this week may offer warnings to other countries, as rising electrification and clean energy sources place new demands on power grids around the world.](#) | Bloomberg




[Radiografía del Aster 30, el misil interceptor que sirve de blindaje para Ucrania ante los ataques rusos](#) | @ftdata



[China y Estados Unidos frente a frente en el Pacífico](#) | @InfoVanguardia




[Muslim population in the Balkans](#) | @Civixplorer



[Russia's north-south corridor](#) | The Diplomat

**Russia's North-South Transport Corridor Map of Routes and Connections**

The Iranian route, also known as the International North-South Corridor (INSTC), is a Russian-led transport corridor project that seeks to connect India to Europe via Iran and Russia, bypassing the Suez Canal.




[Senkaku Islands](#) | The Japan News

**Japanese Govt on High Alert after Chinese Aircraft Intrusion into Territorial Airspace near Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Pref.**




[U.S. Navy Fleet Geographic Distribution](#) | @ianellisjones



[La disputa de Cachemira](#) | EOM



[Global Trade Review and Outlook](#) | Geopolitical Futures





[U.S. Interests in the Red Sea Region](#) | CT

**Sudan's Civil War: Global Stakes, Local Costs** April 2025 CT

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have fought a civil war in Sudan since April 2023. Countries such as Iran, Russia, and the UAE are fueling the war to the detriment of U.S. interests in the Red Sea.


**US Interests in the Red Sea Region**

- Secure Key Maritime Routes for Global Trade
- Counter Rivals like Iran and Russia
- Boost Regional Security and Counterterrorism
- Strengthen Regional Partnerships


Turkey	Egypt	UAE	Iran	Russia
<b>Supports: SAF</b> Objectives: • Secure mining and port deals • Counter the UAE Areas of Cooperation: • Provides Turkish drones and missiles • Offers to mediate ceasefire deal	<b>Supports: SAF</b> Objectives: • Control spillover of conflict and refugees into Egypt • Counter the UAE and Ethiopia Areas of Cooperation: • Provides Turkish drones • Trained SAF pilots	<b>Supports: RSF</b> Objectives: • Increase port investments and port trade • Reinforce RSF military partnership Areas of Cooperation: • Provides arms and drones • Hosts RSF financial infrastructure	<b>Supports: SAF</b> Objectives: • Secure a Red Sea naval base to support Yemen Houthis attacks in the Red Sea • Increase trade Areas of Cooperation: • Provides Iranian drones • Signed trade agreements	<b>Supports: SAF</b> Objectives: • Secure a Red Sea naval base to bolster logistics in Africa • Project power in the Red Sea • Gain mining and port deals Areas of Cooperation: • Provides weapons • Signed new mining and oil deals

Kathryn Tyson and Liam Kerr at the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. www.criticalthreats.org

[Russian drone and missile strikes on Ukraine](#) | ISW




[To diversify its economy, Saudi Arabia Plans Trillions of Dollars on Spending on Mega Projects](#) | Bloomberg




[As Syria enters a fragile political transition, Israel and Turkey are asserting competing strategies—Turkey backing the new regime, Israel reinforcing border control and striking military targets](#) | The Economist Intelligence Unit



[US Carrier Strike Groups + ARGs](#) | iej



[La súbita subida en la Rambla del Poyo](#) | El Pais



## Videos

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[Romania carries out NATO drills in Black Sea region](#) | FRANCE 24 English



[Yemen's Houthis hit Tel Aviv airport with hypersonic missile; Israel vows response](#) | Al Jazeera



[Estrategia de Seguridad Marítima de 2024 \(ESMN 24\)](#) | Armada



[Una llamada de atención sobre la defensa europea](#) | Armada



[Manuever Warfare is More Than Rapid Movement](#) | USNI



[Israeli attack on Hodeida: Houthis vow to respond to escalation with escalation](#) | Al Jazeera



[China's Drone Production Pacing Threat Over the U.S.](#) | WSJ



[A Neglected Indo-Pacific Military Posture](#) | WSJ



[U.S., China and the Showdown Over Diego Garcia Military Base](#) | WSJ Coordinates



[Why is Israel intervening in Syria amid Druze tensions?](#) | FRANCE 24 English



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[Chinese troops take part in Russian Victory Day parade](#) | SCMP



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