

BOLETÍN MENSUAL MULTIMEDIA

(Artículos de Opinión, Documentos, Infografías, Gráficos y Videos)

ASOCIACIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE DIPLOMADOS POR EL COLEGIO DE DEFENSA DE LA OTAN (ANDC- ESP)



Mes de junio de 2025

Por el Cor. IM (r) Octavio Alaez Feal

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Artículos de Opinión

[The new global arms race: who's buying, who's selling, what's at stake - GZERO Media](#) by Tasha Kheiriddin

Faced with threats from Russia, Europe has [ramped up defense budgets](#), with Poland's spending growing by 31% to \$38 billion and Sweden's by 34% to \$12 billion in its first year of NATO membership. Germany increased military expenditure by 28% to \$88.5 billion, making it the fourth-largest spender globally and rearming the nation that precipitated the two major world wars of the last century.

In the Middle East, Israel's military spending soared by 65% per cent to \$46.5 billion, the largest annual rise since 1967, amid its war with Hamas in Gaza and conflict with Hezbollah in South Lebanon. [In Asia](#), China spent 7% more on its military in 2024,



adding an estimated \$314 billion, raising fears of an imminent operation against Taiwan, which boosted its military spending by 1.8% in 2024 to \$16.5 billion. Fellow Asia-Pacific power Japan saw its military budget rise by 21% to \$55.3 billion, its largest annual increase since 1952.

[Don't Forget Resilience in European Defense](#) | The National Interest by Joh R. Allen et al

European defense will change. Hundreds of thousands of additional European troops are estimated to be needed for the eastern flank. Alongside are thousands of tanks and armored vehicles, hundreds of artillery systems, enhanced integrated air and missile defense, improved readiness, and substantially increased interoperability between and among European militaries. European defense and security rely not only on weapons systems and highly trained military personnel, but it is also the coordination of a complex network that ensures timely intelligence, reliable logistics, modernized infrastructure, and uncompromising resilience.



European and national resilience should thus be the foundation of European security. This means moving beyond a narrow concept of security dominated by military matters and embracing an agile and innovative approach by governments that sees the private sector and civil society as key stakeholders in long-term strategic planning and provides the funding and support for the private sector to take on this role.

Artículo relacionado

[No habrá Europa sin coraje y visión](#) | El Mundo por Ana Palacio

[Flailing State: The Resurgence of al-Shabaab in Somalia – War on the Rocks](#) by Ashley Jackson

Al-Shabaab's territorial gains come as Somalia is entering a period of profound political and institutional transition. With elections looming and international donor support wavering, the state is more politically exposed than it has been in years. There is an urgent need to rethink how international partners engage with Somalia. The current approach — backing a fractious, fragile central government with shrinking territorial control and minimal political leverage — is no longer



sustainable. A more realistic strategy would require shifting away from military-first frameworks and laying the groundwork for a more durable political settlement, including engagement with al-Shabaab.

[Ukraine's deep strike - Engelsberg ideas](#) by Peter Caddick-Adams

While successful military activity revolves around the word 'surprise', the key words here are 'deep strike'. This means the targets are stationed far from potential danger, in supposedly secure locations. As a result, the shock of attack affects morale as well as causing physical damage. [President Zelensky](#) and his commanders have been remarkably open in revealing the details of Operation Spider's Web, which allegedly has destroyed or damaged 41 key aircraft and took 18 months to plan. With impressive



technological innovation, swarms totalling 117 short-range drones, hidden in shipping containers and delivered to the vicinity of five Russian aerodromes by unsuspecting truck drivers, were released by remote control to video and destroy the Kremlin's strategic bomber and AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) forces. Ukraine used First Person View (FPV) drones. The operator, thousands of miles distant, operates the craft wearing goggles that fully.

[How Ukraine's Drone Strike Changed the Rules of War - The National Interest](#) by Carlos Roa

[Ukraine Says Drones Smuggled Into Russia Wiped Out Dozens Of Long-Range Bombers – Eurasia Review](#)

Ukraine says it hit dozens of long-range bomber aircraft across Russia with drones that were smuggled in wooden shipping crates carried on truck beds into the country and then launched from nearby locations.

[In comments to RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service](#), unnamed officials with the Security Service of Ukraine, known as the SBU, claimed as many as 40 bombers may have been hit in the June 1 attack.



The SBU later put out

a [statement](#) claiming 34 percent of "strategic cruise missile carriers at the main airfields of the Russian Federation" were hit in the attacks with the damages totaling some \$7 billion.

The drone operation appears to be a major embarrassment for Russia’s military and intelligence agencies — and the latest in a [series of audacious attacks that Ukraine has pulled on Russian soil](#).

Artículo relacionado

[The three punch combo behind Ukraine’s spectacular drone strike on Russia | Lowy Institute](#) by Mick Ryan

[Rethinking Combat Power: Air Superiority in the Age of Pervasive Threats - Shift Paradigm](#) | Airpower journal by Sabahat Khan

In an era of pervasive threats, air superiority faces unprecedented challenges. Rapid advancements in automation and weapons systems are transforming the battlespace, rendering traditional approaches to air superiority obsolete. Air forces must rethink combat power to maintain effectiveness in highly contested environments and be capable



of gaining access vectors to achieve air superiority in compressed timelines. Air forces must find new ways of enabling movement and maneuver to fight effectively inside adversarial weapon employment zones. Utilizing a distributed operational model leveraging low-footprint “kill webs,” air forces can create a more agile and resilient force structure to enhance force survivability and operational effectiveness. This paper emphasizes the critical role of non-kinetic capabilities, particularly electronic warfare, and the crucial role of AI in enabling multi-domain integration and allowing more superior decision-making and maneuver to “outcycle” adversaries. This strategic repivoting may, however, impose implications that are broader than currently anticipated.

Artículo relacionado

[Reshaping Air Power Doctrines: Creating AI-Enabled ‘Super-OODA Loops’ - Shift Paradigm](#) | Airpower journal

["Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Tactics Target the Baltics"](#) | Jamestown by Eitvydas

Bajarūnas

With Russia’s frontline in Ukraine nearly stagnant, Moscow’s efforts yielding limited results despite enormous casualty rates and physical destruction, and peace efforts so far have made no progress, the prospects of a prolonged conflict have become apparent.

The Kremlin is now preparing for a long battle both on the frontline and beyond.

Consequently, Russia’s use of hybrid strategies, alongside military ones, has become more evident.



The Baltic States have effectively countered Russia's continuously escalating hybrid threats through resilience and strategic cooperation with the European Union and NATO. Their ability to withstand pressure highlights their strength in defending democracy and resisting foreign interference.

[Border bargains only borrow time: How Europe can stop its Tunisia rot | ECFR](#) by Tarek Megeris

In early April, Tunisia reached the dark milestone of mass [show trials](#), marking its steady return to authoritarianism. Thirty-seven journalists, authors, businessmen and aid workers were given sentences spanning lifetimes for terrorism or treason charges in a [spectacle](#) lacking all due process.

For the condemned and their families, it is a tragedy in and of itself. For those vested in Tunisian rights, and Tunisia's development, it's a harsh reminder of how alone they are as the shocking spectacle was largely met with silence, even from those who once [pledged](#) to stand side-by-side with Tunisian democracy. So, this milestone also marks the EU's failure to support what was its flagship political engagement project since the 2011 Arab uprisings.

If Tunisia keeps sliding down this dark path, it will inevitably produce more difficulties in migration management; present rival powers like [Russia](#) with an opportunity for another Libya-style beachhead; and lead to a host of unpredictable yet assuredly disruptive human and security crises that accompany economic failure and political atrophy.



[Trump's space-based Golden Dome will revolutionise warfare - Brussels Signal](#) by Gabriel Elefeteriu

Golden Dome is intended to be a family of systems – some, based on the ground – but centred around a space-based architecture. It would deploy interceptors in orbit capable of being fired from space to intercept enemy missiles during their intra-atmospheric course. These are essentially airborne targets. But once the principle is established that you can target an airborne threat from orbit, a Pandora's Box opens: why not strike a ground-based target, or a naval target, from space?



This is the beginning of a new era in space warfare. For the first time, the United States has made it its policy to place weapons in space that can conduct space-to-Earth strike – effectively, and eventually, bombardment from orbit.

[The Irresistible Plan Europeans Can Offer Trump to Save NATO | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](#) by Rym Momtaz

The good news is twofold. First, the alliance has managed fluctuations in U.S. postures in the past. Second, this time, Europe’s strategic awakening means Europeans can generate many of the capabilities the United States would want to reduce in the event of a coordinated drawdown.

What’s more is that even Trump cannot compress the logistical realities the U.S. military will have to face. Beyond the surge forces sent after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, withdrawing the more

permanent U.S. capabilities in Europe will take years and cannot be accomplished in a safe and orderly manner before the end of Trump’s term. Infrastructure will need to be built wherever the American capabilities will be sent, and legal frameworks will need to be agreed with new host countries if they were to be sent to Asia for example. This gives Europeans a reasonable amount of time to step up.

Artículo relacionado

[Michael Froman: On the Future of European Security](#) | CFR by Michael Froman



[New Dimensions of Strategic Depth - by Nadia Schadlow](#) | First Breakfast

Strategic depth has always been a critical factor in war. Historically, the term mostly applied to geography. It captured the idea that the further your enemy had to physically travel to get to your government center or vital resources—what Clausewitz often referred to as a country’s “center of gravity”—the more time and space you had to adapt, recover, and counterattack. For the United States, its oceans provided strategic depth; Russia and China relied on their vast landmasses.



Technology, however, has devalued the traditional advantages conferred by strategic depth. This month a squadron of Ukrainian drones managed to achieve what Napoleon could not: deliver a [strategic blow](#) against a military target deep

within Russian territory, and thereby disrupt one of the tenets of classical warfare. Moreover, we can no longer measure strategic depth by miles alone. Digital networks, satellites, global supply chains, and geopolitical influence allow adversaries to degrade our defenses and to strengthen their ability to maneuver in ways that bypass traditional borders altogether.

[Intensificación y expansión de la amenaza yihadista en el Sahel: implicaciones para España y la Unión Europea](#) | Real Instituto Elcano por Marta Driessen Cormenzana

La violencia yihadista surgida en 2012 en el norte de Malí se ha convertido en una amenaza transnacional, caracterizada actualmente por dos tendencias principales: por una parte, la intensificación de la amenaza yihadista en los países miembros de la Alianza de Estados del Sahel, con un creciente control territorial por parte de grupos insurgentes; y, por otra parte, la expansión geográfica del terrorismo hacia las costas del golfo de Guinea.



Estas tendencias explican [la creciente preocupación de España](#) y otros socios europeos por esta región, considerada prioritaria, así como el interés por mantener su presencia en la Alianza de Estados del Sahel y reforzar la cooperación en materia de paz y seguridad con los mencionados países del golfo de Guinea.

[Syria's Foreign Fighter dilemma](#) | Foreign Policy by Rob Geist Pinfold

March was a pivotal moment in Syria's ongoing political transition for all the wrong reasons. In just a few days, [pro-government](#) militias [massacred](#) hundreds of Alawite civilians. There is a [recurrent](#) theme to [witness testimonies](#): Much of the violence and looting was conducted by individuals whose dress, language, and accents indicated that they were not Syrian.



This makes U.S. President Donald Trump's recent about-face on Syria's foreign fighters even more surprising. Trump, and President Joe Biden before him, had conditioned engagement with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa's transitional government on the latter taking action to detain or expel the thousands of foreign fighters that remained in Syria. But Trump's new envoy to the country, Tom Barrack, recently [declared](#) that the United States would drop its demand that Sharaa deport foreign fighters and tentatively endorse their integration into the Syrian army.


[With the Middle East ablaze and the world in conflict, Europe must rethink its energy strategy — now - Brussels Signal](#) by Rafael Pinto Borges

For Europe, getting out of the present situation demands a healthy sense of urgency.

First, Europe must resurrect nuclear power with the zeal of a nation at war. In this regard, France shames Germany's dogmatic, Green-led crusade against nuclear power. Small modular reactors offer new options for European nations. Likely deployable by as early as 2035, they could slash energy costs by a third, per the World Nuclear Association.

Second, coal must, at least for now, endure as a lifeline. Hastening its demise before nuclear and renewables mature is not progress — it is self-sabotage at a time of extreme geopolitical danger. As silly as it was for Berlin to kill its nuclear energy sector, reigniting its coal plants was a rare instance of wisdom.

Third, and perhaps, most heretically, Europe must end its sanctions on Russian hydrocarbons. This would not be a surrender. It would be about sanity and self-preservation.



[How Russian Coercion Diminished Deterrence and Shifted the Nuclear Balance |](#)

[Hudson Institute](#) by William Schneider

Russia has withdrawn from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which suggests that it will resume nuclear testing and will not extend New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Moreover, emerging doubts about the US commitment to global nuclear deterrence are emboldening Moscow's nuclear weapons development and deployment aspirations. And Russia's 2022 full-scale



invasion of Ukraine signaled a definitive end to the accords concerning Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity: the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements.

Most fundamentally, US policy choices since Russia's invasion have given US allies and adversaries alike reason to believe that nuclear threats are an effective means of deterring the US. The widespread recognition that the US could be deterred from taking actions otherwise in its interest set in motion a sequence of Russian initiatives that have adversely affected the credibility of US nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation aims more broadly.

[The Maritime Middle East And Challenges For American Strategy | Hoover Institution](#)

by Russel A. Berman

World commerce flows through these narrow passageways, including the still vital oil exports from the Gulf States. This trade remains perpetually vulnerable to hostile forces at the chokepoints, as we see now with the attacks by the Houthis from Yemen. Disruption of commerce through the maritime Middle East has the potential to destabilize economies as distant as the Far East as well as Europe. Nor would the United States be immune to the economic consequences of



commercial blockades or impediments to the flow of oil. Freedom of navigation in the region is vital to American security, and at this point, only the U.S. can guarantee it.

This large expanse from the Black Sea to Indian Ocean therefore retains great strategic significance, especially in the current era of great power competition. Any misguided policy inclination for the U.S to give up on the region, to withdraw from the Middle East and to "pivot" to China would be a disaster for American security. Power abhors a vacuum; any American departure would hand the region over to our adversaries.

Artículo relacionado

[Too Soon to Rule Out Middle East Energy Disruption](#) | CSIS by Clayton Seigle

[The Future of War Is Happening Right Now in Ukraine](#) | Hudson Institute by Aaron McLean

The raids also demonstrated that the future of war is now. To overcome Russia's advantage in distance and evade its air defenses, the Ukrainians infiltrated cheap drones in trucks, launched them remotely in close proximity to their targets, and apparently leveraged local telecom networks for control, though reportedly using some degree of autonomy as well—the details are not clear. Some of the targeted aircraft are no longer in production and are thus likely irreplaceable. The Ukrainians say the tab in damaged or destroyed equipment for the Russians is in the vicinity of \$7 billion. The cost of the attack was certainly orders of magnitude less than that—just as the effective demolition of Russia's Black Sea fleet cost much less than the destroyed assets themselves. We knew that an “anti-navy” was a feature of the modern battlefield; logically an “anti-air force” was just as plausible.



Artículo relacionado

[Ungentlemanly Robots: Israel's Operation Rising Lion and the New Way of War](#) | CSIS by Benjamin Jensen

[Fit for purpose? Reforming NATO in the age of Trump 2.0](#) | EUISS by Giuseppe Spatafora

NATO is at an inflection point, caused by a growing Russian threat to Europe and shifting American strategic priorities. With President Trump demanding steep increases in defence spending and threatening to abandon the alliance, European countries are preparing to shoulder a significantly higher share of the transatlantic burden. Beyond the headlines, the real test will lie in how NATO translates political commitments into credible military capabilities, chiefly through the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). This Brief explores how the alliance can be adapted to strengthen the European pillar of NATO, address the uncertainty over US commitments, and ensure deterrence.



[Ukraine's Operation Spider Web destroyed more than aircraft – it tore apart the old idea that bases far behind the front lines are safe](#) | The Conversation by Benjamin Jensen

Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin has leaned heavily on its deep-rear bomber bases — some over 2,000 miles from the front in Ukraine. It has paired this tactic with launching waves of [Iranian-designed Shahed attack drones](#) to keep Ukrainian cities under nightly threat.

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The Russian theory of victory is brutally simple: [coercive airpower](#). If missiles and one-way drones fall on Kyiv often enough, civilian morale in Ukraine will crack, even as the advance of Russian ground forces get bogged down on the front line.

For Kyiv's military planners, destroying launch platforms undercuts that theory far more cheaply than the only other alternative: intercepting every cruise missile in flight, which to date has achieved an [80% success rate](#) but relies heavily on Western-donated equipment coming increasingly in short supply.

Artículo relacionado

Artículo relacionado

[Ukraine's daring drone raid exposes American vulnerabilities](#) | Defense One by Charles Hamilton



[European Ministers of Defence - Save Europe, invest in mining!](#) | EUISS by Joris Teer

Raw materials are the skeleton of our manufacturing industry. Without them, there are no satellites, radar systems, communication networks, computer chips, tanks, batteries, artillery ammunition, grenades, fighter jets, drones, frigates, submarines, MRI scanners or AI chips. European companies and governments prioritised cost efficiency and just-in-time supply chains for decades. Mining fell out of fashion: no business case, too disruptive to local populations, and too much emission of CO2.




Beijing, on the other hand, increased its control over economically low value-added but strategically indispensable industries for decades. The country made no secret of its ambitions. In [Made in China 2025](#), Xi's ambitious industrial policy, the Chinese government wrote: Modern history shows that “without a strong manufacturing industry, there will be no country and no nation.” In the first year of the Covid

pandemic, [Xi called](#) on his government to ‘tighten international production chains’ dependence on China.’

[Rethinking Rules of Engagement for Space](#) | CSIS by Clayton Swope

There are several challenges to include space in ROE. First, military use of and threats from space pose complex questions about self-defense, proportionality, and necessity. Second, military actions involving space historically carry significant risks of escalation and, as a result, the authority to use counterspace weapons has been held at very high levels. Third, only a relatively small cadre of practitioners and commanders has experience with space and counterspace weapons. Given that standing ROE remain in effect no matter the specific operational plan or order, how space fits into ROE influences a critical aspect of the day-to-day operations of military forces. How supplemental ROE proscribe the use of counterspace weapons is another matter, because mission-specific ROE can address this issue on a mission case-by-case basis, rather than apply in all circumstances, so long as authorities to use counterspace weapons are delegated to the right levels.



Artículo relacionado

[Nuclear threats in space demand new diplomacy](#) | Lowy Institute by Rebecca Connolly and Saadia M. Pekkanen

[Strait talking: What’s behind China’s military drills around Taiwan](#) | ECFR by Estelle Huang

Behind China’s drills is a sequential and coordinated campaign of coercion across the western Pacific—driven by a strategic calculation that goes far beyond Taiwan. Rather than merely flexing its military muscles to its strategic rivals, Beijing is likely leveraging these exercises to test the international community’s tolerance threshold.



As Macron alluded to in Singapore, China has been [studying](#) Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine closely, adjusting its own Taiwan contingency planning as the conflict develops. Among China’s top strategic priorities is avoiding international attention on Taiwan and deterring external intervention—just as Russia has not been able to do.

[Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb Was Smart, Not Reckless - Providence](#) by Rebecca Heinrichs

the critics of Ukraine's attack are taking the wrong lessons. Operation Spider Web was not unique in Ukraine's choice of target. Ukraine had already successfully carried out a stunning attack against a Russian Millerovo Air Base [taking out](#) a Su-30SM fighter jet. The attack occurred on February 25, 2022, the same month of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.



Later that year the Ukrainians [attacked](#) Russian Engels-2 Air Base on December 5, 2022, with drones, hitting and damaging a Tu-95 strategic bomber. Then on August 19, 2023, Ukrainians used drones to destroy a Tu-22M3 bomber at Soltsy Air Base. The bombers are the same platforms that have been launching conventional cruise missiles at Ukraine. Those planes, and the runways they require, are legitimate and smart targets for Ukraine. Russia should not be left with the impression that because they are so valuable to it, and tucked away from Ukraine's border, they have sanctuary.

And this is why Operation Spiderweb was unique. It was remarkable in scale and distance from Ukraine's borders but also in its use of modern technology and its guile.

[Minerals for Recognition: The Taliban's Shadow Diplomacy](#) | Geopolitical Monitor by Islomkhon Gafarov


Since the Taliban's return to power, Afghanistan's mineral and extractive industries have assumed growing strategic importance in the broader context of sustaining the country's fragile economy. The abrupt loss of access to international financial assistance, the freezing of foreign-held assets, and the enforced curtailment of opium poppy cultivation have pushed the Taliban leadership to refocus on domestic resources, particularly the country's vast mineral



reserves. Yet, there is little indication that the Taliban intend to pursue full-scale exploitation or large-scale export of these resources in the immediate term. Rather, their approach appears deliberately cautious, treating Afghanistan's natural wealth less as a means of short-term economic gain and more as a tool of political leverage and diplomatic bargaining on the international stage.

[China's Advance in Colombia in the Time of Gustavo Petro](#) | CSIS by Evan Ellis

China's advance in Colombia is significant, spanning a broad spectrum of commercial, governmental, and other activities. That advance has more to do with deepening engagement by Chinese companies with Colombia's private sector than the initiatives of President Petro. Indeed, the factor most limiting PRC engagement with Colombia in recent years has arguably been the environment of insecurity, economic malaise, and uncertainty expanded by Petro's policies;



the election of [more conservative local politicians](#), partially as a response to those policies; and the failure of Petro's proposals to China to contain concrete, realistic bases for working together. In the end, however, Petro's increased boldness in embracing China could expand the PRC's position in Colombia in ways disadvantageous to the country's businesses, national autonomy, and the strategic interests of the United States and the region.

[How Israel's Operation Rising Lion Dismantled Iran from Within: A Case Study in the Art of Deception](#) | Hudson by Zineb Riboua

The first two warnings came in July 2024 and September 2024. In July, Israel [assassinated](#) Ismail Haniyeh— Hamas's top political official and a guest of the Islamic Republic—in the heart of Tehran, demonstrating its ability to penetrate Iran's capital, bypass multiple layers of security, and execute a



precision strike without visible attribution. The second warning followed in September, when Israel [conducted](#) a sophisticated attack using explosive paggers against Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon, killing dozens and injuring thousands. This showcased its capacity to infiltrate and disrupt enemy networks. These operations sent a strategic message and served as rehearsals for something much larger. Tehran failed to grasp the significance. The regime dismissed the assassinations as internal sabotage or factional violence, refusing to entertain the possibility that a hostile state actor had executed the operation within its own territory.

Artículo relacionado

[Operation Rising Lion: The First 72 Hours](#) | RUSI by Darya Dolzikova and Matthew Savillf

[The Wagner Group Is Leaving Mali. But Russian Mercenaries Aren't Going Anywhere.](#)
- [The Moscow Times](#) | By Ryan Bauer

The June 6 [announcement](#) by the infamous Wagner Group private military company that it will end its three-and-a-half-year-long deployment in Mali is an important development in Russia's evolving mercenary landscape. Even as one Russian mercenary group is leaving, the country's presence in Africa is not going anywhere.



The Kremlin seized control of Wagner's operations, most notably in Africa, following the dramatic events of 2023. After its [short-lived rebellion](#) against Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose Kremlin was probably responsible for Yevgeny Prigozhin's death in a private plane crash, something had to be done about the organization that remained.

Wagner was essentially restructured into a new entity called the Africa Corps. So, despite Wagner's announced departure from Mali, it is unclear whether any Russian mercenaries will actually leave the country. There is a chance they will sign new contracts with the Africa Corps instead.

[The UN Ocean Conference is a critical opportunity to protect the ocean from deep-sea mining](#) | [Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank](#) by Dr. Patrick Schroder

The extent of the impact of deep-sea mining on a large scale is unknown. But [scientists have warned](#) that deep-sea mining could devastate entire ecosystems by physically destroying the seafloor and smothering marine life with plumes of sediment.



While proponents argue deep-sea mining could have the positive affect of replacing mining for critical minerals on land, it is more likely to just create a new [frontier of ecosystem degradation](#) in the deep ocean.

[How States Are Adapting to the Age of Geoeconomics](#) | IP Quarterly by Filip Medunic

Today's world is all about geoeconomics: [Economic relationships are instrumentalized to advance strategic interests](#). Trade, technology, and finance are viewed through a geopolitical power lens, blurring the line between security and economic interests.



The two main players in the arena are the United States and China. Washington spearheaded modern geoeconomics, through

its centrality in financial, information, and technology networks, and the economic heft of its huge market. Beijing has developed strategies for domestic innovation and is investing in strategic assets such as ports and specialized technology companies to hedge against critical choke points and geopolitical pressure.

[Three Alternative Approaches to Deterrence in Europe and the Indo-Pacific – War on the Rocks](#) by Luis Simón

Whether the United States defines China as a global threat or a predominantly regional one will have pervasive implications for U.S. alliance and deterrence strategy in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The second Trump and Biden administrations agree on a key fact: China constitutes the most serious and systemic challenge to U.S. power and interests. Yet, they seem to disagree on how to



characterize the nature and scale of that challenge. Whereas the Biden administration construed China as a global challenge, the Trump administration regularly emphasizes the centrality of the China threat in the Indo-Pacific. Against this backdrop, President Donald Trump’s insistence on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine to focus on China has reignited debates about the opportunity costs of supporting versus not supporting Kyiv, and how that may impinge on America’s overall strategic position vis-à-vis Beijing.

[NATO Is Doing Just Fine, Thank You](#) | New York Times by Michael E. O’Hanlon

Despite NATO’s success in winning the Cold War and remaining the most powerful community of nation-states in modern history, President Trump has openly questioned the alliance for years. He said that during his previous term, he [told](#) the leaders of NATO countries that he would “encourage” Russia do



“whatever the hell they want” against NATO members not pulling their weight in military spending. He [repeatedly questioned](#) whether the United States should honor the alliance’s mutual-defense pledge under Article V of NATO’s founding treaty — the core idea that an attack on one is an attack on all — if members who did not live up to their financial obligations were attacked.

[Cumbre de la OTAN en la Haya: el gasto en defensa](#) | El Debate por Enrique Fojón

El panorama estratégico global está cambiando dinámicamente. La Competición entre Grandes Potencias se reafirma, la disrupción tecnológica se acelera y la solidez aliada de décadas pasadas se erosiona. En estas circunstancias, la OTAN para referirse a la capacidad operativa, recurre a una métrica aparentemente simple: el porcentaje del PIB dedicado a la inversión en Defensa, una referencia atractiva, de fácil adopción y empleo en el debate público. De hecho, puede actuar como una poderosa referencia para movilizar el esfuerzo nacional y legitimar a los gobiernos para aumentar el gasto en Defensa.



Pero por sí sólo, este instrumento es estructuralmente frágil e insuficiente, ya que prescinde fundamentalmente de las complejidades del campo de batalla actual corriendo el riesgo de malgastar recursos valiosos, ya sea por obsoletos o inadecuados.

Artículo relacionado

[El presupuesto en Defensa ¿Una oportunidad perdida?](#) | El Debate por Enrique Fojón

[Canada and Britain's new Strategic Defence Review](#) | Council on Geostrategy by Alexander Lanoszka

The second, and related, common challenge facing the two allies relates to keeping the Atlantic Ocean free and open, and securing certain maritime approaches to it. To this end, Britain and Canada are both acquiring Type 26 frigates, although the Royal Canadian Navy does not expect to receive its entire first batch before the 2030s. Still, it is not enough and, while neglecting to mention its Canadian counterpart, the Review recommends that the Royal Navy should shift towards a 'mix of crewed, uncrewed and increasingly autonomous surface and sub-surface vessels and aircraft; and developing next-generation capabilities such as SSN [nuclear-powered] attack submarines via the trilateral AUKUS partnership.'



[U.S. enters Israel's war with Iran, striking 3 Iranian nuclear sites - Los Angeles Times](#)

by Sam Mednick , Aamer Madhani and David Rising

Early Sunday morning Israel alerted the public of an Iranian missile launch and urged people to take shelter. Iranian has been firing missile barrages at Israel since the war began but they have decreased in size as Israel targets Tehran's missile launchers. The Islamic Republic may also be keeping some arms in reserve.



The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran confirmed that attacks took place on its Fordo, Isfahan and Natanz sites, but it insisted that its work will not be stopped. Iran said there were no signs of radioactive contamination at the three locations and no danger to nearby residents.

[Intelligence, Strategy, and the Israeli-Iranian War – War on the Rocks](#) by Joshua

Rovner

Israel's argument for U.S. intervention rests on the same claim as Israel's stated reason for launching the crippling strikes against Iranian military infrastructure and security leadership: that Iran was and perhaps still might be going nuclear. U.S. intelligence agencies [disagree](#). In March, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard reported that Iran was not on the verge of building nuclear weapons, and that there was no indication that Iranian policy had changed. This was consistent with intelligence estimates going back to the George W. Bush administration, which concluded that Iran had shelved its weapons program even though it continued to seek to improve its work along the nuclear fuel cycle.



Artículo relacionado

[Israel's attack and the limits of Iran's missile strategy](#) | IISS by Fabian Hinz

[The Israel-Iran Conflict and the Oil Market: Strategic Consequences | Royal United Services Institute](#) by Dan Marks

Iran's capability to close the Strait appears intact, but at present is most useful as a deterrent. The regime is under pressure, has lost domestic air dominance and has limited conventional options, potentially leading Iranian leaders to resort to other levers. But this weakness has emboldened hawks in the region and the US to push harder for an end to Iran's nuclear programme and to weaken the regime. Iran will not want to give them an excuse to act.



Should the US begin attacks on Iran this calculus could rapidly change. Disruption of oil exports through the Strait would put pressure on the US and Israel to end the conflict, both from within the US and internationally. But closure of the Straits would bring further international condemnation of Iran and damage its relationships with China, which imports much of its oil through the Strait. Israel and the US may respond by increasing the intensity of strikes.

[Lessons in the limits of airpower - Engelsberg ideas](#) by Peter Caddick-Adams

Print and broadcast media have been full of discussions of the B-2 missions to destroy Natanz and Fordow without doing the basic maths to conclude that GBU-57s were barely able to penetrate to the tunnels at Natanz, let alone those at Fordow, and with no attention taken of the facilities' eight-yard protective concrete ceilings, hence multiple



munitions being used. Around 30 US Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from the submarine USS Georgia, cruising in the Gulf region, were also used. But there's more. Satellite imagery picked up trucks removing equipment beforehand from both areas, which may include some enriched material. Given that the trigger for Israel's [kinetic action](#) in this lightning war was the destruction of Iran's nuclear capabilities, I would not wish to pack up and return home for tea and medals without ascertaining in person that these facilities, their delicate equipment, and associated uranium, have been put beyond use – forever. That requires ground-based Battle Damage Assessment by special forces or trained observers.

[La Gran Estrategia estadounidense y el realismo en el siglo XXI ¿declive o hegemonía?](#) | IEEE por Gonzalo Rodriguez Suances

El enfoque del realismo en relaciones internacionales sostiene que los estados deben enfrentar la realidad tal como es, fuera de convenciones liberales, tratados o acuerdos que puedan dar falsas esperanzas para la paz. Desde esta perspectiva, los estados se encontrarían inmersos en la búsqueda de un equilibrio de poder para garantizar su seguridad y supervivencia, por lo que la guerra siempre puede constituir un recurso necesario para devolver puntualmente ese equilibrio. En el contexto actual, la evolución del entorno estratégico y el conflicto de Ucrania han impulsado una reconfiguración defensiva los estados y una mayor conciencia de la posibilidad de la guerra. La llegada de la nueva administración Trump ha reforzado estas tendencias con la retirada de su paraguas militar y la adopción de una política exterior unilateral centrada exclusivamente en intereses nacionales. Este enfoque, alejado de la cooperación internacional y en un mundo multipolar donde China y Rusia buscan reforzar su soberanía y asegurar una posición dominante, refleja una pérdida de poder relativo de EEUU que podría vulnerar su seguridad nacional y cuestionar su posición hegemónica.



[Interview with the Spanish Chief of Defence, Admiral Teodoro López Calderón](#) | NDC

To improve and modernize our defence capabilities, I have focused my efforts on three main lines of action. The first priority is to ensure that the military capabilities currently available are adequately prepared for high-intensity combat, as their use may be required at short notice. As a second priority, we need to generate capabilities that are needed for today's and tomorrow's operating environments. Alongside these two priorities, and given the importance of "information superiority", it is also essential to strengthen our capacity to collect, analyse and disseminate information. These efforts will enable us both to increase our ability to deter our adversaries and to become more agile and decisive, thereby gaining the upper hand when confronted. Thirdly, as part of the ongoing transformation process, we must address continuous improvements that will further enhance our capabilities, taking advantage of new, emerging and disruptive technologies. This will enable us to achieve not only technological superiority and adequate interoperability with our Allies, but also confrontational superiority. Moreover, all this must be based on what is known as multi-domain action, which, as you know, seeks to achieve the integration and synchronization of the actions of all state branches, in order to achieve all the necessary effects on the adversary.



Documentos

[Report to Congress on Russian Military Performance - USNI News](#)



Since 2022, Congress has supported Ukraine's defense against Russia's renewed invasion through enacting five supplemental appropriations measures that have provided assistance to Ukraine. Members may consider the Russian military's condition and performance as they evaluate the state of the war, assess the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions on Russia, evaluate the Russian military's prospective reconstitution and longer-term threat to U.S. and European security, and deliberate about whether to appropriate further military or other assistance for Ukraine.

[The European Union's strategic approach to the Black Sea region](#) | European Commission



The Black Sea is an area of significant geostrategic importance, bridging Europe to Asia, with untapped potential for economic development, strategic transit routes especially for access to energy resources and critical raw materials. Its critical importance is underscored by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine that has shaken the foundations of the rules-based international order and exposed the vulnerabilities of European and regional security. It has plunged regional security to its lowest point since the Cold War and calls for a robust, coordinated EU response. In this evolving geopolitical landscape, with the Black Sea region at its core, the EU is stepping up with a comprehensive approach with the aim of supporting the democratic resilience of a region vital to Europe's stability and prosperity and asserting our interests.


[A U.S. Peace Plan for Ukraine - Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft](#) by George Beebe and Anatol Lieven



A successful settlement is possible along these lines:

- In exchange for the West and Ukraine's acknowledgement that Ukraine will not be part of the NATO alliance, Russia accepts Ukraine's eventual E.U. accession, contingent on the constitutional enshrinement of rights for the Russian minority in Ukraine and Ukraine's postwar upholding of the democratic process.
- Russia accepts a Western-armed, trained, and maintained Ukrainian military force capable of deterring and defending against any new invasion (accompanied possibly by a ban on Ukraine's possession of long-range missiles). In return, the United States should enter into talks with Russia on a new version of the New Strategic Arms Treaty, New START, as well as committing to a new version of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, INF.

[Atomic Advantage](#) | CNAS by Constanza M. Vidal Bustamante



One of the most consequential national security contests now unfolds on battlefields invisible to the naked eye—across the faint radiofrequency signals of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and within the quantum states of individual atoms. At stake are America's positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities, the foundation for precise geolocation, trajectory planning, and time synchronization across military, civilian, and commercial domains. For decades, the U.S.-invented GPS has served as the backbone of the world's PNT, but the system's inherent vulnerabilities have come into stark relief as adversaries increasingly jam and spoof its weak signals and build weapons to take down its satellites. GPS interference already undermines military operations and disrupts up to thousands of commercial flights daily; broader attacks could trigger catastrophic mission failures and widespread disruption of critical infrastructure, inflicting economic losses exceeding \$1 billion a day.

[The Maritime Economy and 21st Century Confrontation](#) | IISS by Nick Childs



Maritime economy protection begins with homeland defence, including at coastal installations such as ports and energy terminals, as well as offshore and more distant critical maritime and undersea infrastructure and shipping. This involves an integrated and layered defence.

A balanced strategy of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment is required. Strategy must also be flexible, to take account of the different characteristics of the maritime economic network and the threats it faces, including the fact that not all maritime chokepoints are equal

[Strengthening Security in the Baltic Sea Region](#) | DIIS



This report provides a strategic assessment of Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany in the context of escalating geopolitical threats in the Baltic Sea region. It analyses how each country has recalibrated its defence posture – through adjustments to military spending, modernisation, enhanced civil preparedness, and NATO integration – while leveraging distinct strategic advantages. Finland and Sweden, anchored in their ‘total defence’ traditions, have significantly enhanced military and societal resilience, marking a historic reconfiguration of regional security through NATO accession. Denmark has reinforced its Arctic and Baltic defences, prioritised rapid deployment capabilities and reinforced transatlantic ties. Germany, under its *Zeitenwende* policy, is advancing military modernisation despite persistent resource constraints and bureaucratic inertia

[The Hunt for Economic Security: The Role of Navies in Deterring Threats to the Maritime Economy](#) | IFRI by Olivier SCHMITT and Louise TUMCHEWICS



Navies suffer from inherent limitations when deterring threats to the global maritime economy: their global presence and permanence limits their credibility in terms of deterrence, their focus usually set on immediate deterrence, implementing deterrence by punishment in and from the naval domain is difficult and costly. There are several factors that could help navies mitigate those constraints:

- Increased reliance on multirole platforms for standard naval operations;
- Better burden-sharing between actors, allies and partners, navies and the civilian sector;
- Strategic integration of unmanned systems (UAVs, UUVs, USVs) to create mass.

[Quantity Has a Quality of its own](#) | CNAS by Elena Grossfeld



Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian intelligence operations have shifted toward a mass scale approach, focusing on sabotage, intelligence collection, and influence efforts. This transformation is driven by Russia's expanding operational demands, even as it is constrained by mass expulsions of intelligence officers and the urgency to ramp up operations. In response, Russian intelligence has prioritized quantity over quality, relying on multiple cheap, inefficient, and nonprofessional resources. Sheer numbers compensate for inefficiency, and anonymity provides an added layer of plausible deniability. A key driver of this shift has been the Kremlin's efforts to undermine Western support for Ukraine,

[DETECTING CHINA'S USE OF FORCE IN THE SPACE DOMAIN](#) | CNA by Kevin Pollpeter et al




This report examines the evolving deterrence dynamics between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the space domain. During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence helped maintain the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, and it remains a cornerstone of U.S. defense policy today. However, for reasons both geopolitical and technological, the ability of any country to deter another from attacking its space assets is being called into question. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is acquiring and developing a range of counterspace capabilities and related technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground based lasers, and co-orbital satellites, as well as the space surveillance capabilities that enable their use. The use of these weapons against the U.S. space architecture could threaten U.S. military superiority by undermining the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that enable the U.S. military to operate in the Indo-Pacific and project power globally.

[Full article: Trump's Century of Days](#) | Survival by Steven Simon



In scarcely 100 days, Donald Trump's presidency already seems to be in its 100th year by virtue of scores of executive orders and extortionist demands, defiantly illegal manoeuvres, dramatic reversals of long-validated strategic principles, the rejection of firm scientific knowledge and economic experience, and the denial of a 100-year-old consensus on the inescapable need for an administrative state. His apparent objective of returning the United States to the Gilded Age seems unsustainable in light of Americans' core grievances of middle- and working-class neglect. Meanwhile, however, the emerging view is of a country sliding toward competitive authoritarianism along contemporary Hungarian lines via a 'prerogative state' unburdened by laws and deploying veiled but plain presidential incitements of political violence against the non-compliant. Even if the damage his second term is doing to America's stability, integrity and standing is remediable, the process could take decades.

[The Strategic Defence Review 2025 - Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad - GOV.UK](#)



The SDR's vision for UK Defence: Move to warfighting readiness—establishing a more lethal 'integrated force' equipped for the future, and strengthened homeland defence. Engine for growth—driving jobs and prosperity through a new partnership with industry, radical procurement reforms and backing UK businesses. 'NATO first'—stepping up on European security by leading in NATO, with strengthened nuclear, new tech and updated conventional capabilities. UK innovation driven by lessons from Ukraine—harnessing drones, data and digital warfare to make our Armed Forces stronger and safer. Whole-of-society approach—widening participation in national resilience, and renewing the Nation's contract with those who serve.

[Usage, effectiveness and recent trends of FPV-drones in the Russian invasion of Ukraine based on published combat footage](#) | FOI by Arvid Carlstedt & Mikael Lyth



FPV-drones, or FPV's as they are often called, are named from the method that is used by the operator controlling the drone, where the operator has a first-person-view from the camera mounted on the drone that feeds the on-board video to a set of goggles or a monitor. These drones have previously been used in private and commercial settings with applications such as recreational racing and professional cinematography. Their ability to perform extremely quick accelerations and general agility in the air, enabled by a lack of stabilisation performed by the on-board avionics, puts high demands on the operator. This sets FPV's apart from the more commercially available multi-rotor drones with their relatively simple control setup and stabilisation.

[Report to Congress on Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programs - USNI News](#)



Along with support for a network of allied groups across the Middle East, Iran’s missile programs have been central to the regime’s apparent efforts to compensate for its conventional military shortcomings by developing asymmetrical capabilities. These two lines of effort have often overlapped, as Iran has provided missiles to external partners, including U.S.-designated terrorist organizations.

[More or Less? European Defence Engagement in the Indo-Pacific in the Second Trump Administration](#) | IISS by Ben Schreer



This report assesses European defence engagement in the Indo-Pacific in the context of US President Donald Trump’s second term in office. While European powers will refocus on defending the Euro-Atlantic, they will continue to engage militarily in the Indo-Pacific with a particular emphasis on defence-industrial cooperation.

[Friends with benefits: Assessing Russian-Chinese military exercises](#) | NATO Defence College by Narantsatsral Enkhbat



China-Russia joint strategic air patrols and naval manoeuvres near U.S. territory in the Pacific have become a growing trend, serving as geopolitical messaging. China is likely to become more involved in maritime security and power projection in

[Can France lead? European security in times of transatlantic crisis](#) | FIIA by Barbara Kunz




The evolving landscape of global defense cooperation has brought the transatlantic relationship between the United States (US) and Europe into sharp focus. As geopolitical tensions rise and the threat environment becomes

the Arctic, as evidenced by its Coast Guard's manoeuvres with Russia in the Northern Pacific.

Russia conducts military drills and manoeuvres with China in the South China Sea (and potentially in the Taiwan Strait) to show support to China on territorial issues.

more complex, the question of how Europe can best ensure its security while navigating its relationship with the United States has become paramount. This double feature report offers two contrasting views on the dynamics of US-Europe defense industrial relations, highlighting the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for both parties.

[Arsenal of Democracy: Myth or Model? Lessons for 21st-Century Industrial Mobilization Planning | CSBA](#) by Tyler Hacker



A protracted war between the United States and China would create immense demands for munitions, requiring production to be grown far beyond surge capacity. These demands have led to calls for the United States to mobilize its defense industry and rapidly expand munitions production, with policymakers and commentators hearkening back to the nation's role as the "Arsenal of Democracy" in World

[A Neglected Region? The Strategic Value of the South Atlantic](#) | The Washington Quarterly by Zeno Leoni et al




Recent scholarship has tangentially drawn attention to the centrality of the South Atlantic maritime order and how these regions relate to the Indo-Pacific, the nexus of contemporary great power rivalry. [Footnote2](#) Yet as we argue in this article, the South Atlantic remains neglected at the level of grand strategy. Despite this maritime order being in its own backyard, Washington has singularly failed to provide a comprehensive policy

War II. What would industrial mobilization look like in the 21st century, and how can the Department of Defense prepare for expanded production requirements?

outlook for the South Atlantic. This appears to be a glaring omission given that the stability of the South Atlantic order is more relevant than ever at a time of reemerging rival geopolitical blocs, loosely led by the United States and China. Moreover, the South Atlantic is an indispensable shipping route and abundant in natural resources and thus has consequences for the global economy.

[Cognitive Domain: The Role of EDTs from Situational Awareness to Situational Understanding](#) | Open Library by Dr. Georgios Nounesis
Documento relacionado
[Quest for Interoperability in the Age of Emerging Disruptive Technologies](#) - | HCSS, Hans Horan, Sofia Romansky and D

[NATO and European Defence during the Trump Administration: A Stocktaking](#) | Istituto Affari Internazionali by Alessandro Marrone



Integrating EDTs into military operations revolutionizes Situational Understanding and is critical to decision making and mission success. These advancements in information management and

Figure 2 | Defence spending by NATO countries in Europe as percentage of GDP



Donald Trump's administration has approached NATO with two key priorities: increasing defence spending among member states, and decoupling the fate of Ukraine from that of the

communications technologies significantly influences command capabilities. EDTs have a pivotal role in enhancing data collection, processing, and analysis, thereby enabling military organizations to counter effectively misinformation, desinformation, and malinformation, as well as cognitive biases and information overload.


Atlantic Alliance by pursuing a settlement with Russia to end the conflict. Meanwhile, Moscow continues its war of aggression, aimed not only at occupying the neighbouring country but at altering the European security architecture to the detriment of both NATO and the European Union. The combination of these two elements – the Russian threat in the east and the shift in American strategic posture in the west – has led European countries to take unprecedented decisions regarding investment in their own armed forces also by using EU financial toolbox. However, there are no real plans for a European defence, either militarily or politically, and NATO remains the best available framework for the deterrence and defence of Europe vis-à-vis the Russian threat through a stronger European leadership in the Alliance.

Infografias


[Is flying still safe?](#) | CNN




[Ukraine Is Rebuilding its Energy Grid As Russia War Continues](#) | Bloomberg



[Data-infrastructure gap: data centres and AI preparedness in the Middle East | IISS](#)



[Seis mapas para entender la importancia de Irán en la industria mundial del petróleo - Mapas de El Orden Mundial - EOM](#)



[Mapping Israel's expanding air attacks across Syria | Conflict News | Al Jazeera](#)



[Comparing the Size and Capabilities of the Russian and Ukrainian Militaries | Council on Foreign Relations](#)



[The race to sanction Russia's growing shadow fleet](#) | Brookings




[How Ukraine's Operation "Spider's Web" Redefines Asymmetric Warfare](#) | CSIS




[How Ukraine carried out daring 'Spider Web' attack on Russian bombers](#) | BBC



[Diplomacy: China's head-of-state and defence diplomacy](#) | IISS



[Freedom Flotillas: A history of attempts to break Israel's siege of Gaza | Israel-Palestine conflict News | Al Jazeera](#)



[Critical infrastructure: China's protection of critical maritime infrastructure | IISS](#)

A guide to China's critical maritime infrastructure (CMI) protection | IISS


CMI sectors protected by the Chinese navy and coast guard

- Telecommunication cables
 - Research and surveillance vessels
 - Submarines
- Energy
 - Destroyers and frigates
- Trade
 - Destroyers and frigates
- Food and mariculture
 - CCG patrol ships


At the Two Sessions in March 2025, the CCP demonstrated its focus on building resilience towards domestic and global risks. Policies were announced to 'defuse risks step by step' and create 'positive interactions' between high-quality development and greater security in the economic, financial, energy and food sectors.

China modernised its capabilities for protecting CMI from such risks over a number of years, tasking the China Coast Guard (CCG) and other PLA services with safeguarding its global interests – particularly those dependent on the maritime domain.

[EU-US trade: facts and figures - Consilium | European Council](#)



[EU-China trade: facts and figures - Consilium | European Council](#)




[The World According to Xi Jinping - Lowy Institute](#)



[Iran hit back. But can it deter Israel? | Financial Times](#)




[Mapping the conflict between Israel and Iran | Reuters](#)




[How China's rare earth leadership can impact US defense procurement | SCMP](#)



[What ballistic missiles does Iran have in its arsenal? | FDD](#)




[Israel-Iran conflict: How ballistic missiles work and where can they reach? | Israel-Iran conflict News | Al Jazeera](#)



Gráficos


[Defense spending in the Indo-Pacific | CSIS](#)



[China-Russia-Iran joint exercises | CSIS](#)

Date	Name	Type	Details
December 27-30, 2019	Marine Security Belt 2019	Trilateral	China and Russia held joint naval exercises with Iran in the northern part of the Indian Ocean, the first iteration of this series of naval exercises.
January 18-20, 2022	Marine Security Belt 2022	Trilateral	After two years of absence, China joined Russia and Iran in joint naval exercises in the northern Indian Ocean, which focused on anti-air, counter-piracy, and high-seas maritime operations.
March 15-18, 2023	Marine Security Belt 2023	Trilateral	China and Russia held joint naval exercises with Iran in the Gulf of Oman.
March 11-15, 2024	Marine Security Belt 2024	Trilateral	China and Russia held joint naval exercises with Iran near the Gulf of Oman, which focused on expanded anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and anti-air targets simulating unmanned air vehicles.
Mid-July, 2024	Interaction 2024	Multilateral	China and Russia held joint live fire counter-terrorist drills in northern Jiangsu, China with all Shanghai Cooperation Organization member nations, including Iran.
March 9-11, 2025	Marine Security Belt 2025	Trilateral	China and Russia held joint naval exercises with Iran near the Gulf of Oman, focused on live-fire drills, damage control, and joint search and rescue operations.


[Gas & Oil Infrastructure in Iran | Geopolitical Futures](#)




[Suspected Russian Activity in the Black Sea Region | @ACLEDINFO](#)




[Iran's air defences | Financial Times](#)



[Share of global arms sales | CSIS](#)




["Spider web" redefine la Guerra asimetrica | Graphic News](#)




[US-Russia-Ukraine negotiaton objectives | Stratfor](#)




[Iran's growing stockpile of highly enriched uranium | Strator](#)



[Como EE.UU podría romper el dominio chino sobre el suministro de litio](#) | FT




[La cúpula dorada de EE.UU](#) | ABC




[Tracking U.S. Navy and PLA Navy Carrier and Amphibious groups](#) | @ianellisjones




[Collective Dependency](#) | EUISS




[Israel ataca instalaciones nucleares en Irán](#) | El Mundo




[Spiderweb](#) | FT data



[The Islamic State Somalia Province's global financing network](#) | ISW



[Somalia-Yemen Arms Smuggling Network in the Gulf of Aden](#) | CT




[US five and sixth fleet as of 17 June 2025](#) | @ianellisjones




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

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
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[Air requirements cost | IISS](#)

Air requirements cost (USD millions)


Platform type	Example	Requirement	Unit cost, low	Unit cost, high	Total cost, low	Total cost, high	Note
Fighter/ground-attack aircraft	F-35 Lightning II	400	120	190	48,000	76,000	Estimate based on value published in last seven years
Blue water fleet/long anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft	P-8 Poseidon	15	200	320	3,000	4,800	Estimate based on contract values and flight hours in last five years
Airborne early warning and control	E-20 Hawkeye E-1A Wedgetail, Growler	4	350	700	1,400	2,800	Estimate based on contract values published in last 20 years
Electronic intelligence/signals intelligence	Boeing RCAS/SU-56, Sentinel	8	500	600	4,000	4,800	Estimate based on contract values published in last 15 years
Attack helicopter	AH-1Z Viper, AH-64 Apache, AH-66 Apache	200	40	60	8,000	12,000	Estimate based on contract values published in last five years
ASW helicopter	AW101, AW139, Sikorsky MH-60R Seahawk, Sikorsky HO4S	15	40	60	1,400	2,100	Estimate based on contract values published in last five years
Heavy transport helicopter	CH-47 Chinook	50	40	100	2,000	5,000	Estimate based on contract values published in last five years
Medium transport helicopter	UH-60M Blackhawk, Sikorsky S-700	200	30	45	6,000	9,000	Estimate based on contract values published in last 15 years
Medium attack/long endurance combat/intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) helicopter	Boeing AH-64E Apache	50	30	60	1,500	3,000	Estimate based on contract values published in last five years
Utility/transport/air-to-air refueling (AAR)	UH-60M Blackhawk, Sikorsky S-700	1,200	0.5	0.8	600	960	Estimate based on official and reported values published in last five years
Active radar homing AAM	AIM-120 AMRAAM, AIM-9X Sidewinder, Meteor	1,500	1	2	1,500	3,000	Estimate based on official and reported values published in last five years
Anti-air cruise missile	Evoset, LRASM, NGM	200	2	3	400	600	Estimate based on official and reported values published in last five years
Anti-radiation missile	AGM-88 HARM	400	1.5	2	600	800	Estimate based on official and reported values published in last five years
Land-attack cruise missile	AGM-129 ACMR, Storm Shadow, Tomahawk, JASSM, JASSM-ER, JASSM-DR, JASSM-CEP, JASSM-ER, JASSM-DR, JASSM-CEP	3,000	2.5	3	7,500	9,000	Estimate based on official and reported values published in last 12 years

Source: Military Balance, IISS; IISS.com; press releases, budget documentation, media reports


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
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
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
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
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
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
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[The Massive Ordnance Penetrator \(MOP\) | Financial Times](#)



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
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
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