

BOLETÍN MENSUAL MULTIMEDIA

(Artículos de Opinion, Documentos, Infografías, Gráficos y Videos)

ASOCIACIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE DIPLOMADOS POR EL COLEGIO DE DEFENSA DE LA OTAN (ANDC- ESP)



Mes de noviembre de 2025

Por el Cor. IM (r) Octavio Alaez Feal

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Artículos de Opinión

[Balancing maritime strategy - by Pieter Zhao](#) | Council on Gestrategy

Since late 2023, multinational operations in the Red Sea, such as [PROSPERITY GUARDIAN](#), [ASPIDES](#) and [POSEIDON ARCHER](#), have struggled to reassure commercial shipping. Warships were scarce, response times slow, and much of the burden fell to private security firms. For ASPIDES, a fraction of the planned vessels were deployed, underscoring states' reluctance to commit limited assets to missions perceived as non-traditional. These shortcomings echo earlier responses to Somali piracy, where Combined Task Forces (CTFs) 150 and 151 and the European Union's (EU) Operation ATALANTA [faced](#) similar criticism over cost, sustainability and strategic prioritisation.



This modern dilemma is not unprecedented. The need to protect commercial shipping in peacetime while preparing for major conflict has shaped maritime strategy for centuries. History shows that navies often delegated certain maritime security responsibilities to non-military or irregular actors to preserve high-end warfighting readiness.

[Ukraine's Winter War Is the World's Test — and America Can't Afford to Blink – The Cipher Brief](#) | The CIPHER by Dr. Douglas J. Davis et al

The tactical picture in Donbas is of immediate strategic urgency. Russian forces are mounting coordinated pincer operations, advancing from Pokrovsk through Kramatorsk to Sloviansk, designed to encircle and absorb the Donbas region, then push west to take Zaporizhzhia and threaten Dnipro. The fall or isolation of Dnipro would sever east–west logistical and medical corridors, producing a catastrophic collapse in Ukrainian operational tempo and resilience. That outcome would not merely alter front lines; it would force a recalibration of Europe's entire defense posture. Moreover, Moscow's likely playbook is predictable: secure territorial gains, press for an immediate ceasefire on favorable terms, and use the pause to move seasoned forces into Belarus to stage further aggression against NATO's vulnerable Suwałki corridor and the Baltic states.




Artículo relacionado

[US military withdrawing some troops from Eastern Europe | News Channel 3-12](#) | CNN by Sam Skove

[Watch List 2025 – Autumn Update | International Crisis Group](#)

For the EU, the second Trump presidency continues to shock the system. Ten months into 2025, EU institutions and member states have had to forge a path between an ever-threatening Russia and a newly revisionist United States led by President Donald Trump. Moscow's war in Ukraine continues even as the Kremlin also assails



the EU and its members with apparent drone and other military incursions; efforts to influence elections; and other actions. These aggressions require a constant evaluation of how to respond in ways that both maintain deterrence and manage escalatory risks. While Washington has not abandoned NATO, it seems intent on shedding its traditional role as both the pilot and anchor of the trans-Atlantic alliance. It's a vastly more challenging landscape than European leaders have faced in decades. But, as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed in her state of the Union [speech](#) in September, "there is simply no room or time for nostalgia. Battlelines for a new world order based on power are being drawn right now".

[Confronting China's pervasive maritime gray zone campaign - SpaceNews](#) by Lin Chauluen

China's "gray zone" activities refer to a campaign of coercive actions that are aggressive in nature but deliberately kept below the threshold of overt military conflict. These tactics, such as economic coercion, disinformation, and quasi-military harassment, aim to gradually alter the status quo and achieve strategic goals without triggering a conventional war.



China primarily executes these strategies through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy, deliberately blurring the line between civilian and military roles. The intrusion patterns manifest in several critical ways: Exploiting dual-use commercial assets; Weaponizing civilian shipping; Deceptive maritime militia activity; Layered coercive presence

Artículo relacionado

[China's 'Salami-Slicing' Strategy: How Beijing is Redrawing the Map of the South China Sea - Modern Diplomacy](#) by Adinda

[Counterpunch: NATO Must Take the Offensive - CEPA](#) by Emily Otto

NATO has invested heavily in [cyber defense since 2016](#), but most of its members remain focused on protecting national networks rather than taking the initiative. Starting in 2020, the alliance found itself in an unbalanced position: threat sharing is improving, but offense and contesting NATO's very active adversaries in [cyberspace is the responsibility of only a few](#). This gap matters because cyberspace is a [domain of constant contact](#), where passivity [cedes advantage](#).



Five years on, little has changed: NATO's cyber posture remains weak, anchored in passive defense, while a handful of states shoulder the burden of offensive operations in cyberspace.

NATO recognizes cyberspace as an [operational domain](#), but its members diverge sharply in practice. Most allies focus on network defense — fielding incident response teams and resilience frameworks built around “protection” and “security”. Few explicitly mention offensive action.

[Why NATO needs a new nuclear strategy](#) | Defense News Opinion by Karl-Heinz Kamp

Fortunately, a modern NATO nuclear strategy does not require reinventing the wheel. Instead, the concepts and procedures of the Cold War form an important foundation that can be drawn upon. However, these must be adapted to the security policy realities of the 21st century.



Russia is no longer – as the Soviet Union once was – militarily superior to NATO and has also lost its former alliance system, the Warsaw Pact. This means that rapid, expansive military advances by Russia from east to west, with which the Soviet Union once sought to reach the Atlantic in a matter of weeks, are no longer to be expected, but rather limited actions in the Baltic states, for example. Nonetheless, the use of Russian nuclear weapons on NATO territory cannot be ruled out. In a military conflict on NATO’s eastern borders, Russia could attempt to prevent both NATO troop movements from west to east and the landing of American reinforcements in Europe by attacking ports or transport hubs. Such attacks could also be carried out with nuclear weapons.

[Europe’s Deepening Security Ties with the Philippines](#) | Internationale Politik Quarterly by Bryce C. Barros

The expansion of these European ties is happening against the backdrop of the Philippines’ long-standing alliance with the United States. A US colony [until](#) 1946, the Philippines has been a [treaty ally](#) of the United States since 1951. Though this relationship ebbed in the 1990s with the [withdrawal](#) of permanent US forces, it has flowed again since 2014 with the



signing of the [Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement](#) (EDCA). The [EDCA](#) allows US troops and materiel rotational access to respond to regional contingencies. The Trump administration has stated that the US commitment to the Philippines is “[ironclad](#).” It has [doubled down](#) on US military base access and [multilateral exercises](#) in [Northern Luzon](#) and the [Bashi Channel islands](#), just south of Taiwan, as well as [Palawan Island](#) astride the South China Sea.

[The West needs to draw the line on Russian, Chinese grey-zone provocations | The Strategist](#) by Jake Thrupp

So again, where do Western governments stand on responding robustly to such tactics? At the very least they should be developing an urgent civilian-military plan for round-the-clock maritime surveillance of vulnerable undersea cable networks. This could include naval drones to monitor and guard the seabed, as well as pre-positioned cable-repair ships ready to restore connectivity.



ASPI's report also highlights China's growing use of maritime militia—fishing vessels operating under direct government control—to conduct what Beijing calls the 'people's war at sea'. Since taking power, Chinese President Xi Jinping has subsidised provincial and local governments to significantly increase local fleets. These vessels are deployed in the South China Sea, alongside Chinese navy and China Coast Guard vessels, to promote Chinese expansionism.

[The Regime Change Temptation in Venezuela | Foreign Affairs](#) by Alexander B.

Downes and Lindsey A. O'Rourke

What began in early September as a series of American airstrikes on boats in the Caribbean—which U.S. officials alleged were trafficking drugs from Venezuela—now seems to have morphed into a campaign to overthrow Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro. Over the course of two months, President Donald Trump's administration has deployed 10,000 U.S.



troops to the region, amassed at least eight U.S. Navy surface vessels and a submarine around South America's northern coast, directed B-52 and B-1 bombers to fly near the Venezuelan coastline, and ordered the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group—which the U.S. Navy calls the "most capable, adaptable, and lethal combat platform in the world"—to U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility. These moves reflect a recent, broad shift in the administration's policy toward Venezuela.

[What China wants from Europe - Engelsberg ideas](#) by John Delury

That Europe is important goes without saying – in purely economic terms. The value of the total trade volume between the PRC and the European Union and United Kingdom combined last year was in the region of one trillion US dollars. But geographical distance and security calculations trump trade statistics in Beijing’s strategic mindset. Europe is far away, and Chinese foreign policy takes the ‘geo’ in geopolitics seriously. Equally important is the fact that Europe is [not a significant military power](#) in its own right. European military capacity and security policy, integrated into NATO, are understood in China as an extension of US power, and treated as such. So the first thing Europeans must keep in mind is that, at the level of grand strategy, Europe is not a priority. The United States remains the unavoidable great power that China confronts.



[Inflating Russian missile costs hides our own weapons crisis | Responsible Statecraft](#)

by Mike Fredenburg

By assuming Russian weapons have input costs similar to U.S. systems or conflating export prices with Russia’s internal costs, Western estimates produce misleading figures. These inflated costs bolster the narrative that the strain on Moscow is tremendous, while downplaying the increasing challenges for Ukraine and NATO to effectively counter Russia’s relatively inexpensive missiles and drones.



Moreover, these estimates obscure a stark reality: [due to difficulties in expanding production](#) of [prohibitively costly Western missiles](#), combined with low real-world missile interception rates, even if the U.S. and [Europe](#) sent all their air defense missiles to Ukraine, they would fall far short of being able to stop most Russian missile and drone attacks.

[Russian oil gets slippery for India-US](#) | ORF by Harsh V. Pant and Vivek Mishra


Trump's administration has made no secret of its ambition to turn America into one of the world's largest energy suppliers, especially to major consumers like India. Oil as a commodity tends to find its market, sanctions notwithstanding. The broader concern lies in the deepening rift between the US and Russia, and how the escalation of sanctions intensifies global divisions. Putin has signalled that Moscow will not yield easily. His rhetoric suggests a long game - one that bets on fatigue in Western unity and resilience of alternative energy networks, involving China and parts of the 'global south'.



Trump's renewed emphasis on sanctions reflects both his instinct for negotiation through pressure and his reluctance toward military involvement. Yet, the policy also risks collateral consequences for allies and partners. For India, this phase presents a test of its diplomatic agility. While it continues to champion dialogue and peace, its heavy dependence on imported energy remains an Achilles' heel.

[Maritime Security and Safeguarding Global Supply Chains](#) | ORF by Raisina Debates

This year, maritime security and the safeguarding of global maritime trade routes were back on the agenda of the UN Security Council. At a [high-level](#) debate convened by Greece in May 2025, Secretary-General, António Guterres, warned that oceans face mounting threats: piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, trafficking in the Mediterranean, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, and renewed instability off Somalia. Similarly, in August, the IMO Secretary-General, Arsenio Dominguez, at an open debate [called by Panama](#), commented that “threats to shipping are ever-present.”



Since the end of 2023, over 200 missile and drone attacks have been launched against shipping in the Red Sea, reducing transits by 50 percent and causing estimated monthly economic [losses of US\\$800 million](#) to Egypt. In 2024 alone, nearly [150 piracy](#) and armed robbery incidents were recorded, and 126 seafarers were taken hostage, often used as ‘political bargaining chips’. Organised crime, piracy, arms trafficking, non-state armed groups, interstate tensions, trafficking in persons, and migrant smuggling continue to converge on the maritime domain and concentrate around some of the world’s most vital shipping lanes.

[Beyond Fiber-Optic Cables: Securing Seabed Before the Next Crisis – The Diplomat](#)

by Peter Dombrowski

Most news reports of undersea threats focus on the fragile strands of fiber-optic cable that carry almost all of the world's digital traffic. The headlines are ominous: "[Espionage, sabotage and ghost tanks in the Baltic Sea](#)" and "[Financial institutions should prepare for subsea cable sabotage](#)." The repeated cutting of [Taiwan's Matsu and Penghu cables](#) show that seabed infrastructure



has become a convenient instrument of pressure in the Indo Pacific as well. But communications cables are only part of the story. A far broader array of systems now covers the ocean floor: power links, gas pipelines, offshore wind networks, deep-sea mining equipment, and new environmental sensor cables. In recent years even undersea data centers are being built because of reduced cooling costs, overall [energy efficiency](#), and lower maintenance requirements. Each node of undersea maritime infrastructure connects national economies in ways that few citizens see but that the national, regional, and global economies depend on.

[From arsenal of democracy to arsenal of resilience | The Strategist](#) by Raelene Lockhorst

In 1940, with much of Europe under fascist domination, US president Franklin Roosevelt declared that the United States must become 'the great arsenal of democracy'. US industry mobilised, producing ships, aircraft and ammunition on an unprecedented scale. That industrial power underpinned allied victory in World War II and the creation of the trans-Atlantic security architecture that followed.



Eighty-five years later, the lesson endures but the geography has changed. The Indo-Pacific is now the centre of strategic competition, and the challenge is no longer to outproduce an adversary but to outlast disruption. The contest ahead will not be won by industrial scale alone, but by industrial resilience.

[As US Ratchets Up Pressure On Venezuela, Will \(Or Can\) Moscow Help Maduro? |](#)

RFL RFE by Steve Gutterman

In 2019, the United States backed an opposition leader seeking to unseat Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro. Russia opposed the push, providing diplomatic assistance and a modicum of military support for a government that may be Moscow's most important partner in Latin America.



Maduro survived the crisis when Juan Guaidó's call for a military uprising failed and his bid for power fizzled -- a big relief for Russia and a blow to the United States, which considers Maduro illegitimate. Serving his first term at the time, US President Donald Trump had recognized Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela in January 2019.

While the circumstances are very different today, the United States is again ratcheting up pressure on Maduro.

It has built up a big military presence in the Caribbean, where it is now sending an aircraft carrier -- the USS Gerald R Ford, commonly accepted as the world's largest warship -- and has conducted numerous strikes on alleged drug-trafficking vessels, killing dozens of people.

Artículo relacionado

[With Military Buildup Against Venezuela, the U.S. Eyes Cuba as Well | Foreign Policy](#) by William M. LeoGrande

[A Narrow Passage, A Grand Plan: How the U.S. Aims to Strangle China's Naval Ambitions - Modern Diplomacy](#)

American military deployments in Batanes are part of a broader Pentagon strategy focused on using the Philippines' geographic position to deter or counter Chinese military actions towards Taiwan and other areas in the South China Sea. The Philippines, consisting of over 7,600 islands and vital maritime chokepoints, is essential to the "First Island Chain," which comprises territories controlled by U. S. allies, forming a barrier against China's expanding navy. Rear Admiral Roy Trinidad of the Philippine Navy stated that the archipelago serves as a crucial gateway between the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.



The U. S. aims to ensure this gateway remains secure, despite uncertainties about American security commitments under President Donald Trump. Efforts have intensified since President Joe Biden took office to strengthen defense collaboration with the Philippines.

Artículo relacionado

[Logistics is the Achilles' heel of China deterrence - Breaking Defense](#) by Eyck Freymann and Harry Halem

[Not Final, but Forward: The Abraham Accords at a Crossroads - The National Interest](#)

by Eric Alter and Nickolay Mladenov

The present ceasefire is not a final peace, but rather a pause and an immense opportunity. For Washington, it speaks to the logic of the Abraham Accords as a stabilizing architecture in a volatile region. US officials refer to expanding participation to Saudi Arabia, Oman, and other Muslim-majority countries drawn to the accords' [economic allure](#). Riyadh's calculus



has long been clear: meaningful progress toward Palestinian statehood, combined with American security guarantees and investment incentives, in exchange for normalization. The truce has cracked that door ajar.

The next stage will depend on turning normalization from an event into a longer-term web of ties, maybe an entire ecosystem. A broader, institutionalized framework, anchored in economic cooperation, infrastructure, and security dialogue, could use the current ceasefire to create an opening for a sustainable regional order. Bilateral trade between the UAE and Israel already exceeds [\\$3 billion annually](#)

[Will Trump's Nuclear Testing Order Prompt a Global Race? | Council on Foreign Relations](#)

Trump posted his message on social media just minutes before meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping for a summit expected to deal with a range of economic and security issues. Although he was about to enter a room with Xi, Trump may have had Russian President Vladimir Putin on his mind when he made the statement.



Russia announced on Sunday—in a setting meant for international audiences—that its new nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable cruise missile, Burevestnik/Skyfall, had traveled and maneuvered 7,800 miles. That system is designed to find the weaknesses in air defenses and what Trump hopes to achieve with his planned [Golden Dome project](#), a vast missile defense effort with ground and space-based interceptors.

Artículo relacionado

[A new nuclear arms race is beginning. I will be far more dangerous than the last one](#) |

The Press Reader (Copyright The Guardian) by Jessica T. Matthews

[Subs and Bounded Autonomy: The Evolving Logic of the South-US Alliance – The Diplomat](#) by Jason Cox

U.S. President Donald Trump’s late October visit to South Korea, framed as a historic breakthrough, came at a moment when both allies are redefining the balance between trust and autonomy. Washington’s long-awaited decision allowing Seoul to develop nuclear-powered submarines made headlines as a sign of growing confidence.



However, beneath the surface, the story was more complex.

No contracts have been signed, no fuel-cycle waivers have been granted, and Seoul’s industry ministry stated that it had not been briefed on the details. The “approval” was a political gesture – a signal of unity presented as strategic progress, rather than the beginning of an actual program. It reflected Trump’s tendency to connect commercial and security interests, transforming defense policy into a stage where both leaders could claim success at home.

Artículo relacionado

[As US Pacific allies eye nuclear submarines, should China be concerned? | South China Morning Post](#) by Seong Hyeon Choi

[Renewal of India-Pakistan rivalry over Afghanistan](#) | IISS by Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and Laraveys Mahmoudy

On 9 October 2025, Afghan Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi arrived in New Delhi, marking the first high-level ministerial visit to India by the Taliban regime since its return to power four years ago. This signalled the Taliban’s engagement with its large near-neighbour India amidst increased tensions with



neighbouring Pakistan and heightened Pakistan–India tensions. The announcement of the reopening of the Indian embassy in Kabul was a significant policy change for the Indian government, which had long considered the Taliban an international terrorist group and evacuated its ambassador from Kabul on 17 August 2021. Even as progress on India’s bilateral ties with the Taliban regime rests on building mutual trust and confidence, it marks a renewal of India–Pakistan rivalry over Afghanistan.

Artículo relacionado

[Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policy: From Strategic Depth to Deadlock | Geopolitical Monitor](#) by Saher Liaqat and Abu Hurrairah Abbasi

[The Three Technologies Disrupting the Global Order](#) | Project Syndicate by Daniel Driscoll and Mark Blyth

So, if you can build your military equipment for less than your opponent, you can gain a strategic advantage. But even those advantages are slipping as key technologies reshuffle military and power asymmetries. Specifically, cheap drones, phones, and solar are disrupting the global order. The most obvious example is in the military domain, where drones are allowing “weaker” countries to inflict significant damage on larger opponents. In June 1, Russia was caught completely off guard by “Operation Spiderweb,” when trucks secretly carrying [Ukrainian drones](#) unleashed their freight around Russian air bases, ultimately destroying significant numbers of Russian warplanes. Ukraine has revolutionized drone warfare and is now churning out more than [200,000](#) first-person-view (FPV) drones per month. Producing them does not require a massive military industrial complex or high capital expenditures;



[US Troop Cuts On NATO’s Eastern Flank](#) | [Royal United Services Institute](#) by Oana Longescu


In a [press release](#) remarkably devoid of details, US Army Europe and Africa described the move as part of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s ‘deliberate process to ensure a balanced US military force posture.’ It stressed that ‘this is not an American withdrawal from Europe or a signal of lessened commitment to NATO,’ but rather a sign that Europeans ‘are meeting President Trump’s call to take primary responsibility for the conventional defence of Europe.’

The Romanian defence minister Ionuț Moșteanu said in a hastily arranged [press conference](#) that Romania and its allies had been ‘informed’ of the adjustment of American troops deployed on the eastern flank. He also pointed out that that this was not a withdrawal, but rather the suspension of the rotation of a brigade that had elements in several NATO countries, including Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia.



[China's rare-earth own goal - Stabroek News](#) (Project Syndicate copyright) by Daniel Gros

In a face-to-face meeting last week, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump reached a truce in their countries' long-running trade war. Trump lowered tariffs on Chinese goods in exchange for the rollback of Chinese export controls on rare earths. Many have depicted the deal as a victory for China: by raising the specter of a rare-earth supply shortage, Xi forced the US to make concessions on tariffs. But a closer look at the numbers suggests that China is not the rare-earth juggernaut it might seem to be.




Artículo relacionados

[EU baffled by mixed US-China signals on rare earths restrictions | Euractiv](#)
[Ahead of APEC, Trump Signs Flurry of Bilateral Minerals Agreements on Asia Tour | IISS](#) by Gracerin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz

[Is Belgium becoming Europe's first 'narco state'? | Euroactive](#) by Miriam Saenz de Tejada

Belgium wasn't always Europe's drug hub. Today, its ports – Antwerp, Zeebrugge, and their sprawling container terminals – move millions of tonnes of cargo, concealing tonnes of cocaine, heroin, and synthetic drugs. Their deep-water access, nonstop container traffic, and Schengen freedoms make the country a dream for traffickers – and a nightmare for law enforcement.



In Antwerp alone, drug seizures surged from [91 tonnes in 2021](#) to nearly 110 in 2022, overtaking Rotterdam and cementing the port's place at the centre of Europe's narcotics trade.

Just 45 kilometres inland, Brussels now feels the shockwaves – shootings, gang turf wars, and fear spreading through neighbourhoods such as Molenbeek and Anderlecht.

[The Impact of Evolving Threat Perceptions on the Transatlantic Alliance | Royal United Services Institute](#) by Erik Brattberg

This paper examines how shifting threat perceptions are affecting definitions of national security in the US and Europe, and considers the future implications for the transatlantic alliance. By exploring key themes such as great power competition



with China and Russia, regional crises in the Middle East and Africa, and transboundary security threats, such as climate change and pandemics, the paper looks beyond day-to-day political developments – including the current administration of President Donald Trump and current key European governments – to focus on broader, longer-term structural changes in how threats are perceived and their interaction with foreign policy interests.

[However difficult to sell, the EU must get bigger | European Union Institute for Security Studies](#) by Steven Everts

A familiar refrain in Brussels is that EU enlargement is the Union's most successful foreign policy instrument.

And, as is often the case with clichés, there is a substantial element of truth in



that. Previous enlargements have demonstrably contributed to anchoring democracy and strengthening peace and prosperity – at modest cost. Survival of the fittest and zero-sum thinking are on the rise worldwide. EU enlargement follows precisely the opposite logic: I am better off if my neighbour is also prosperous and secure.

Last week, there was much discussion about the potential accession of new countries to the EU: a group of six Balkan countries, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Turkey. The Commission released [its annual reports](#) reviewing the applicants' progress, and the leaders of the countries involved visited Brussels to make their case. Much of the discussion sounded familiar: the countries emphasised how much they had already done their homework and why a target date for accession – say, 2028 – was necessary to keep their publics motivated.

[Why Timor-Leste joined ASEAN](#) | Engelsberg Ideas by Imran Shamsunahar

Timor-Leste's journey into ASEAN has certainly been a long and torturous one. Timor-Leste had first applied for ASEAN membership in 2011, but was only granted observer status in 2022. At the 46th ASEAN Summit held in May of this year, Timor-Leste was formally granted full membership, with the accession formalised on 26 October. Timor-Leste's current president, José Ramos-Horta, an



independence leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, once quipped that it was easier to enter heaven than to enter ASEAN.

Timor-Leste's accession into ASEAN ultimately presents a diplomatic milestone for one of the world's youngest countries, having gained independence only in 2002. The entry of the small country of 1.3 million people into one of the world's most prominent inter-governmental organisations serves as an affirmation of how far Timor-Leste has come from the devastation of conflict.

[NATO needs a new Harmel Report](#) | Defense News (opinión) by David Richards and Harlam Ullman

What is needed is a 21st-century version of the 1967 Harmel Report, headed by Pierre Harmel, Belgium's foreign minister, that led the change from the alliance's "massive retaliation" strategy to "flexible response." Today, however, this report should focus on military options designed to change Putin's behavior, eventually leading to



military/diplomatic dialogue, a better understanding of each other's concerns and, importantly, the resumption of arms control negotiations.

NATO's centerpiece is Article 5, which states that an armed attack against one or more members shall be considered an attack against them all. But what constitutes an "armed attack" today? Is it cyber, disruption of underwater cables or overflights by armed fighters? What about "other measures" to affect domestic politics through influence operations or threats to use nuclear weapons? The answer is unclear, but it needs to be resolved and a consensus established, ideally on both sides.

[Egypt intends to shoulder its role and responsibilities in the Horn of Africa](#) | The Africa Report by Badr Abdelatty

Egypt's diplomatic and military moves in the Horn of Africa over the past two years have drawn notice – especially among those focused on what regional upheavals mean for freedom of navigation and [world trade in the Red Sea](#). Concern has grown as reports point to [closer coordination](#) between Somalia's Al-Shabaab and Yemen's Houthi movement, heightening the threat to regional security.




A glance at the map shows the natural geographic continuum between the Horn and the belt to its west, where two of [Egypt](#)'s core national-security axes lie – the Red Sea and the Nile basin.

Our interests that flow from this are broad and strategic. They are not, as some think, new, situational or tactical.

[The trafficking networks sustaining Russia's war of attrition - Engelsberg ideas](#) by

Munira Mustaffa

Three years into Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin faces a crisis it refuses to admit: it [cannot sustain the war using Russian soldiers](#) alone without courting political upheaval or economic collapse. Western and Ukrainian sources assess Russian casualties at [over one million](#) since 24 February 2022, with daily losses [estimated at 1,000 per day](#).



Russia has been replenishing these losses by generating [30,000 to 40,000 recruits](#) to offset these casualty rates. Russian sources cited in an [October 2025 assessment](#) claimed hundreds of thousands of Russians signed military contracts in 2025 alone, with Moscow reportedly building up reserve forces since mid-year. But the financial burden has become crushing. Russia's volunteer recruitment system, dependent on ever-increasing cash incentives, is [draining state coffers](#) and destabilising the domestic labour market through wage inflation. Mass mobilisation as an alternative remains political suicide after the September 2022 call-up triggered [an exodus of over 261,000 Russians](#).

Putin needs a third option.

[Hard Times for Soft Power | Internationale Politik Quarterly](#) by Simon Anholt

In his second term as US president, Donald Trump has continued to enact and promote a brash new global credo which holds that might is right, that the only duty of leaders is to protect their own countries' narrow self-interest, that foreigners should be repelled at the border, that climate change and the other global challenges are "fake news," and that the whole idea of a collaborative, rules-based international order is something to be jeered at.



Through his words and deeds, and his Teflon-coated impunity, Trump has granted permission to every would-be autocrat on the planet to do as they will, without consequences

Artículo relacionado

[Germany needs hard power to support global role](#) | ASPI by Christian E Rieck

[The Brain and the Bones of European Defence | IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali](#) by

Rosario Puglisi and Fernando Giancotti

While recent initiatives have aimed at boosting budgets, industrial modernisation and procurement, deterrence requires more than resources. The critical gap lies in the capacity to coherently transform investments into deployable capabilities and engage society across the continent. Two priorities are highlighted: 1) establishing a permanent European multi-domain command-and-control structure to integrate land, maritime, air, space and cyber components into coherent operational planning, coordinated with political and interagency governance; and 2) strengthening civilian preparedness, ensuring that governments, private actors and societies can respond effectively to crises and hybrid attacks. Together with the full development of military capabilities, these measures provide the foundation of Europe's strategic autonomy and the most immediate steps toward credible deterrence and resilience in a volatile international environment.

Artículo relacionado

[Is Europe Too Soft to Fight?](#) | WOTR by Florence Gaub and Roderick Parkes



[The Case for Treating Drones as Ammunition](#) | WOTR by Zachary Griffiths and Jeff

Ivas

Ukraine burns through small drones like belts of ammunition — fed, fired, and reloaded. Piloted from behind the front lines, drones [hunt](#) on the battlefield. This summer, Ukraine's drone production [increased 900 percent](#) to 200,000 per month from 20,000 the previous year. Costs, too, are ammunition-



like: reconnaissance and first-person view drones cost in the [low thousands](#), akin to [120mm mortar rounds](#) and far cheaper than a \$200,000 Javelin anti-tank missile. Despite limits to [drone performance](#), the United States will certainly need more drones than it has now. Acquiring, maintaining, accounting for, and delivering drones exceeds what the U.S. Army's supply system can do.

Fortunately, the Pentagon has opened the door to a new approach. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth [stated](#) that "Small [aerial drones] resemble munitions more than high-end airplanes."

[Is The EU Edging Closer To A 'Military Schengen'?](#) | RFE RL by Rikard Jozwiak

Europe is ramping up defense spending. But one issue has largely been neglected -- how to move military equipment from one country to another as quickly as possible in the case of conflict.



A “military Schengen,” an area in which arms and troops can freely move around the bloc’s passport-free zone as easily as civilians do,

has been talked about for years. But so far it has remained elusive for both the EU and NATO, despite increased security concerns brought about by the war in Ukraine. On November 19, the European Commission will present its latest attempt to achieve this by the end of the decade.

An advanced copy, seen by RFE/RL, points out two ways to achieve this: firstly, splashing cash on hundreds of “choke points” around the continent such as rail tracks, ports, and bridges, including in EU candidates Ukraine and Moldova, which the paper considers crucial to integrate into the EU’s military transport structures.

[Commercial innovation, not government production, will win the drone war - Breaking Defense](#) by Nadia Schadlow

The central theme of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s recent [speech](#) on acquisition reform was that commercial companies and technologies are at the foundation of a strong defense industrial base and military innovation. As he [put](#) it, the department wants to harness more of [America’s cutting-edge companies](#) to focus their



talent and technologies on our toughest national-security problems. New results won’t appear overnight, but the direction launched by Hegseth is the right one. That’s why defense policymakers should be cautious about a provision now under consideration in the [2026 National Defense Authorization Act](#) (NDAA) that could undercut the dynamism we need in one of our most critical emerging defense sectors: [unmanned autonomous systems](#).

Artículo relacionado

[Vertical integration of rare Earth elements for US autonomous dominion - Breaking Defense](#) by Kevin Chen

[Russia's Intense Air Campaign in October](#) | CSIS by Yasir Atalan, Erik Tiersten-Nyman, and Benjamin Jensen

Moscow's aerial campaign appears to be entering a new phase that sees higher ballistic missile strikes, sustained Shahed salvos, lower Ukrainian intercept rates, and increasingly fragmented launch patterns driven by industrial production cycles rather than coordinated operational design. These trends show that Russia's strike campaign is now shaped more by what its factories can produce than by integrated battlefield planning. To counter this turn, Ukraine's foreign backers must undermine the illicit supply network that allows Russia, despite sanctions, to import electronic components.



[Iskander: An Improved Russian Missile Tests Ukraine's Air Defence](#) | Royal United Services Institute by Sam Cranny-Evans and Dr Sidharth Kaushal

Russia has reportedly modified its Iskander 9M723 ballistic missiles making them harder to intercept. The causes are unclear, but the impact on Ukraine is not. Recently, there have been a series of reports that Ukraine's ability to intercept the Russian 9M723 Iskander-M ballistic missile with Patriot interceptors is deteriorating. Given the sensitivities around the subject, precise reasons have not been provided although several reports have alluded to software upgrades which have allowed the Iskander to manoeuvre more effectively in its terminal phase, thus evading Patriot interceptors.



[What is Security Council Resolution 2803, and what does it mean for the Trump Gaza plan?](#) | Chatham House by Professor Marc Weller

On 17 November the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2803, endorsing the United States-backed 'Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict' – also known as President Donald Trump's 20-point plan for Gaza.

The resolution welcomes the establishment of the Trump plan's proposed Board of Peace and authorizes the Board and UN member states to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force in Gaza. The process of generating the resolution text was compressed. But its wording hides as much meaning as it gives away. In fact, the story of the adoption of the resolution reveals the tension that underlies it.



[The US](#) sought to obtain the maximum international legitimacy from [the UN](#), while trying to keep UN influence and control over the operation as small as possible. Most other members of the Council were hesitant to hand unfettered authority to the US and its implementation partners. But it appears the US has achieved much of what it wanted.

Artículos relacionados

[Peace in Gaza May Not Mean Peace in the Red Sea | Center for International Maritime Security](#) by Matt Reisener

[In War, Resolution: Israel Had No Substitute for Victory - Providence](#) by Robert G. Kaufman

[The US-Russia Peace Plan: A Colonial Deal in 28 Points](#) | IAI by Riccardo Alcaro

The US-Russian 28-point plan for Ukraine, in its current forms, is a less a peace deal than an understanding between two powers acting upon a colonialist logic.

Russia would be given more Ukraine territory than it now controls, sanctions relief, legal immunity and international rehabilitation, while Ukraine would be left more exposed to future attacks.

The US would profit from reconstruction by using Russian assets now under EU control, while Europe, forced to financially support the process, would become systemically more fragile.

Artículo relacionado

[The Kremlin Sets Its Sights on Kyiv: The Bluff behind Russia's "Peace Plan"](#) | IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali by Nona Mikhelidze



[A Lucrative Hypothetical: Mauritania and the Nigeria–Morocco Pipeline](#) | [Geopolitical Monitor](#) by Arthur Michelino

The Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline (NMGP) is a diplomatic leverage with an engineering blueprint attached. Announced in 2016, the [project](#) would run about 5,600 kilometers along the West African coast through more than a dozen states, connecting Nigerian reserves to European markets via Morocco's pipeline network into Spain. Construction is priced at around \$25 billion. European gas demand is projected to [contract](#) through the 2030s. Commissioning [before](#) 2040 looks implausible. Morocco and Nigeria continue [enrolling states](#) into memoranda of understanding, feasibility studies move slowly, and political capital accumulates around a corridor that may never carry



molecules. The NMGP functions as a framework for positioning, where countries stake claims to future optionality regardless of whether pipe ever touches seabed.

[Sudan at a Crossroads: Renewed US–Saudi Alignment and Red Sea Geopolitics](#) |

Geopolitical Monitor by Roderick Navarro

The [Sudan civil war](#) has evolved into one of the most strategically consequential conflicts in the Red Sea corridor. What began in 2023 as a contest for power between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now sits at the intersection of global maritime security, regional rivalries, and great-power competition. The [recent meeting](#) in Washington between US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman suggests that Washington is no longer willing to watch this conflict drift toward a complete geopolitical collapse. Trump’s clear statement that ending the Sudan war is now a priority signals a return of US political weight to an arena where strategic vacuums have become increasingly dangerous.



Documentos

[Securing Space Superiority: U.S. Deterrence Options in a Two-Rival Threat Environment](#) | CSBA by Katherine E. Dahlstrand



In *Securing Space Superiority*, CSBA Senior Fellow Katherine E. Dahlstrand

[Collective defence: The Strategic Defence Review and capability gaps in a changing NATO](#) | Council on Geostrategy



Report
Strategic Defence Unit
No. 2025/21
October 2025

Collective defence: The Strategic Defence Review and capability gaps in a changing NATO

European NATO’s force posture is undergoing its most significant

argues that the United States cannot treat the space threats from China and Russia in isolation and must instead be prepared to deter or counter both simultaneously. She examines Chinese and Russian space doctrine and investments, establishing that these U.S. adversaries have significant space and counterspace capabilities. Dr. Dahlstrand then analyzes the ways in which the two countries' efforts in space could interact to pose concurrent challenges to the United States. To compete and deter in this two-rival space environment, Dr. Dahlstrand contends that the U.S. Space Force (USSF) should adopt a more proactive approach and match efforts at deterrence by denial and resilience with investments in counterspace capabilities.

development for several decades, with the addition of Sweden and Finland as members as well as large increases in defence investment across the alliance. In particular, European members of NATO have expanded their land forces considerably, though these still face issues related to integration, readiness and enablers. European naval power, however, is still made up of older vessels, or vessels designed for low-intensity operations rather than peer naval conflict. Given these factors, European NATO faces a number of gaps in the following capabilities: Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD); Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD); Counter-Uncrewed Aerial Systems (C-UAS); contested logistics; Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW); nuclear arsenals; and a number of gaps within the defence industrial base (particularly in complex weapons production).

[The northern frosts: The EU should contain and unpower Russia in the Arctic | European Union Institute for Security Studies](#) by Ondrej Ditrych



[The Proposal for an EU Space Act: An Italian Perspective | IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali](#) by Karolina Muti et al

The Proposal for an EU Space Act: An Italian Perspective
 KAROLINA MUTI, ANDREA CIELLO, SERGIO MARCHESI AND MICHELA FIORESI

The proposal for an EU Space Act arises in response to the growing economic, technological and strategic significance of outer space, as well as the rapid evolution of the European and global space markets, characterised by the increasing role of private actors, and represents an important step toward a European space regulatory framework. The European Commission aims to harmonise the regulatory framework governing European space activities and ensure compliance with high standards of safety, sustainability, resilience and data protection. However, the proposal raises significant political, economic, legal and industrial concerns, and risks to undermine competitiveness and innovation in the European space economy by imposing a complex administrative burden and compliance costs. Finding the legal form of a regulation, rather than a directive, would not allow the necessary flexibility in a sector characterised by different national regulations and a high and widespread degree of unpredictability. In contrast, a directive would provide greater adaptability and would favour a constructive approach similar to that adopted with the GDPR and CBPR directives.

1. The EU Space Act in the global and European context: Strategic implications

1.1. The EU Space Act emerges in the context of the growing strategic importance of space for the European Union, both as an economic and technological sector and as a critical domain for the Union's security and defence, as well as for the resilience of European critical infrastructures. In recent years, the rapid evolution of the space market, characterised by the emergence of new private actors, accelerating technological innovation and increasing global competition, has prompted the EU to embark towards a common regulatory framework.

1.2. The European Commission proposes that, in addition to the one hand, to ensure a specific regulatory framework for all European space operations and those operating within the EU, thereby guaranteeing the proper functioning of the internal market in line with the principle of subsidiarity; on the other hand, to ensure that space activities adhere to high standards of safety, sustainability, resilience and data protection. It is essential that the EU maintains competitiveness and innovation as priorities in this process. The Space Act should be collected to support competitiveness, open strategy, autonomy and innovation, not only in the long term but also in the short and medium term.

1.3. Furthermore, the Space Act is presented as a stage in which the EU seeks to strengthen its strategic autonomy, reducing dependencies on third countries – including in the space sector – within a viable and credible international context where non-established alliances may

Karolina Muti is Senior Research Fellow in the 'Defense security and space' programme at IAI. Andrea Ciello is Junior Researcher in the 'Defense security and space' programme at IAI. Sergio Marchesi is Professor of Space Law and Director Professor of International Law at Sapienza University of Rome. Michela Fioresi is Vice President of IAI. The document was prepared in August and September 2023 through consultations between the IAI team and representatives from academia, the research and academic community and the industrial sector.

Countering Russia's malign activities in the Arctic is a shared priority also with partners like Canada and the UK, with whom the EU is seeking to deepen ties. Whereas NATO, as the primary security provider for the Western Arctic states, has been boosting awareness and contingency planning vis-à-vis the growing Russian threat in the Arctic, the EU also has tools to strengthen collective security. In addition to sharing experience and developing a joint response to Russia's hybrid tactics, the EU can also contribute to the evolving security picture, for example through the provision of imagery intelligence from SatCen. Finally, hand-in-hand with its more ambitious sustainable development role, the EU can also contribute to regional security in the Arctic by performing a trustworthy normative role, firmly opposing any threats to the sovereignty of the Arctic states – whatever their origin. With the notion of the Arctic as an 'exceptional' region free of geopolitical conflict now more distant than ever, the EU should take a credible stance in defence of global international law and the inadmissibility of actions that undermine its core principles.


The proposal for an EU Space Act arises in response to the growing economic, technological and strategic significance of outer space, as well as the rapid evolution of the European and global space markets, characterised by the increasing role of private actors, and represents an important step towards defining a European space regulatory framework. The European Commission aims to harmonise the regulatory framework governing European space activities and ensure compliance with high standards of safety, sustainability, resilience and data protection. However, the proposal raises significant political, economic, legal and industrial concerns, and risks to undermine competitiveness and innovation in the European space ecosystem by imposing considerable administrative burdens and compliance costs. Finally, the legal form of a regulation, rather than a directive, would not allow the necessary flexibility in a sector characterised by different national regulations and a high and widespread degree of unpredictability.

[The bear and the bot farm: Countering Russian hybrid warfare in Africa | ECFR](#) by Will Brown



Russia has made significant inroads in Africa—particularly in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic and Mali—deploying military operations that, while

[Future of Conflicts - A Vision of What Is to Come](#) | NATO Defence College by Nicolas Minvielle et al



The future has never seemed so uncertain and complex. Technological transformation, accelerated innovation cycles, geopolitical upheaval, social and

limited in scope, are often devastating for local civilian populations.

At the same time, Moscow has developed a powerful propaganda machine that taps into existing antipathy towards Europe, particularly France, to push African governments closer to its foreign policy objectives.

Europeans have no genuine, resolute partner in Africa today. Most governments and elites are skilfully hedging their bets between Europe and Russia.

[Europe's Forthcoming Sahel Strategy: A Limited Role in a Multipolar Region - International Centre for Defence and Security](#) by Eric Hall



Successive coups in the central Sahel—Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—dismantled over a decade of European engagement. These countries expelled Europeans and instead invited Russian forces—first the Wagner Group, now the Africa Corps—while deepening ties with states such as Iran and North Korea. Looking ahead, Europe's strategy should be recalibrated around realistic objectives. In the near term, this means maintaining a limited presence to track security and political trends. Europe must also plan for a multipolar Sahel in which Russia plays a sustained role in the security sphere, and where Europe's own role will be more limited, selective, and focused on areas of genuine interest alignment.

environmental pressures, and a multitude of trends and events are creating a sense of urgency to think about tomorrow, lest we be left behind. A wealth of academic research addresses this need to consider the future: "The current historical context, characterized by multiple and interdependent crises, underpins a shared curiosity, interest, and even anxiety about the future and its challenges"

[A narrow Pacific waterway is at the heart of U.S. plans to choke China's vast navy](#)

| Reuters by Karen Lema et al



The U.S. has deployed troops and anti-ship missiles into the northern Philippines as part of almost continuous, joint war drills throughout the country. One goal is to block the Bashi Channel and deny Chinese warships access to the Pacific Ocean if Beijing launches an attack on Taiwan. As a former Philippine military chief told Reuters: You can't invade Taiwan if you don't control the northern Philippines.

This year's exercises revealed how the U.S. and its Philippine ally intend to use ground-based anti-ship missiles as part of efforts to deny the Chinese navy access to the Western Pacific by making this waterway impassable in a conflict, Reuters reporting shows.

[Humiliation and Transformation: The Islamic Republic After the 12-Day War - Foreign Policy Research Institute](#)



The 12-Day War between Iran and Israel in June 2025 exposed critical weaknesses in the Islamic Republic's military, strategic, and ideological frameworks, marking a turning point for the regime. The Iranian government's failure to achieve its political and military objectives undermined the regime's credibility, revealed the limits of its deterrence, and intensified internal debates about its future. This paper examines the war's causes, conduct, and consequences, analyzing its impact on Iran's governance, ideology, and regional standing. I argue that the conflict accelerated the regime's loss of strategic coherence, prompting increased repression, a nationalist pivot, and institutional restructuring, while leaving Iran vulnerable to future crises.

[Finding the balance: Russia, the South and the future of Spain's defence](#) | Real Instituto Elcano by Luis Simón

[Europe-Russia: Balance of Power Review](#)

| IFRI by Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzege et al



Economic fronts

Russia has managed to maintain its macroeconomic stability, but is now heading toward a very damaging stagflation in the medium term. The country is investing almost exclusively in the war effort.

Defense and security

Completely bogged down in Ukraine, Russia is waging a war of attrition at the cost of considerable losses. In doing so, it maintains a confrontational stance with the European countries that support Ukraine. Moscow places the nuclear factor at the heart of its escalation logic in order to inhibit them. Political systems and societal resilience Decision-making is concentrated by Vladimir Putin, whose current mandate runs until 2030. Enduring, Russian society has settled into the war which, according to the official discourse, is intended to favor the emergence of new elites.

[Industrial Policy, Asian Miracle](#) | Journal of Economic Perspectives by Style Reda Cherif and Fuad Hasanov



Amid the prospect of greater investment and attention being paid to the defence sphere, Spain needs to find a balance between Euro-Atlantic solidarity and attending to its own strategic priorities. This means prioritising ‘fungible’ or multipurpose initiatives and capabilities. Such a prioritisation should yield a twofold reward: adding value to Spain’s national defence and creating political and diplomatic capital within the frameworks of both NATO and the EU. The direction that defence spending takes cannot be solely determined either by numbers or by economic, social or industrial objectives. Otherwise, there is a risk of putting the cart before the horse. The revival of Spanish defence will only be sustainable if it is based on strategic and national security criteria. This requires greater investment in ‘strategic culture’ and in fomenting an intellectual infrastructure that inculcates knowledge of defence and strategy matters in Spain.

[EU-NATO Cooperation in the Arctic Region | IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali](#)
by Luca Cinciripini and Pier Paolo Raimondi



We decipher the riddle of the meteoric rise of the Asian Miracles—Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, and Japan before them—in the second half of the twentieth century. We argue that the secret of their success lies in the specific type of industrial policy focused on technology and innovation. This overarching policy focused on exports of sophisticated products by domestic firms while fostering fierce domestic competition and accountability for the support received. The successful implementation of this policy depended on a particular type of institutions—a leading agency with a distinct institutional design and a mandate to develop sophisticated industries. The experience of the Asian miracles provides a blueprint for developing economies to achieve rapid convergence with advanced economies.

[Ocean of stakes: The Western Indian Ocean’s complex maritime order | European Union Institute for Security Studies](#)
by Lizza Bomassi and Rosella Marangio



For the EU and NATO, the Arctic presents a multidimensional security challenge that transcends military concerns, encompassing energy, environmental and governance dimensions. While NATO reinforces its defence posture, the EU may contribute with diplomatic, economic and regulatory tools, creating both overlaps and complementarities. Effective coordination between the two institutions, along with like-minded partners such as Canada, Norway, and the UK, is essential to prevent escalation, foster sustainable resource management and enhance cooperative governance.



Europe's prosperity relies on maritime routes extending into the Western Indian Ocean. Chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, along with key transit corridors like the Mozambique Channel, underpin its economic lifelines and global connectivity. Despite naval patrols, development programmes, and diplomatic engagement, Europe's presence in the region remains diffuse. Regional structures such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct suffer from uneven policy implementation across countries, littoral states face capacity constraints, and competition among external and regional actors in the Horn and the Gulf exacerbates fragmentation.

[Deep Precision Strike: Europe's Quest for Long-range Missile Capabilities](#) | IISS by Douglas Barrie, Zuzanna Gwadera and Fabian Hinz



[Warm waters: The Caribbean between counter-narcotics operations and the prospects of regime change](#) | European Union Institute for Security Studies by Giuseppe Spatafora



In response to a deteriorating strategic environment and the removal of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty constraints, a number of European states are now looking to buy or develop strike systems designed to hold an adversary's forces at risk at long range, known as 'deep precision strike' (DPS) capabilities. One development related to this ambition, the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA), is an initiative by select NATO members aimed at determining the defence requirements for, and supporting the joint development of, conventionally armed DPS capabilities and enabling technologies, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

This Caribbean deployment marks the most significant shift in US defence policy since Trump took office. The strikes form part of a broader foreign policy experiment under Trump 2.0, in which the Americas appear to be the 'laboratory' of the administration's most audacious ideas: that the US should expand its territory; or that it can interfere in the domestic politics of other countries – whether to support or undermine their governments. Earlier this year, Trump made threats of territorial expansion into Greenland, Panama and Canada, and controversially renamed the Gulf of Mexico 'Gulf of America'.

[Collective Seapower: NATO's New Maritime Strategy - Foreign Policy Research Institute](#) by Emma Salisbury



NATO has finally unveiled its new [Alliance Maritime Strategy](#), refreshing a document that had not been publicly updated since 2011. While high-level strategy texts of this kind tend not to be riveting reads, the new strategy stands out in its sense of renewed urgency. It not only frames the

[Redundancy, Resiliency, and Repair: Securing Subsea Cable Infrastructure](#) | CSIS by Erin L. Murphy



Subsea fiber-optic cable infrastructure is critical for all aspects of modern daily life, providing access to the internet as well as delivering the data that underlies communications, e-commerce, financial transactions, telehealth, and e-education systems. Amid the AI revolution, demographic shifts, ever-increasing digital

maritime domain as a decisive front in our era of revived great-power competition but also centers maritime power as the backbone of NATO’s ability to “fight tonight” and “fight tomorrow.” At its core, the strategy acknowledges that the oceans are the global commons of competition. Sea lanes, undersea cables, pipelines, and ports no longer serve merely as trade and communications arteries—they are strategic pressure points.


connectivity, and intensifying geopolitical tensions, disruptions to these networks, coupled with high regulatory barriers, carry far greater economic and security consequences than ever before. This study identifies the roles and responsibilities of key public and private sector stakeholders, assesses the threats and challenges to building redundancy to maintain a secure cable network, and provides actionable recommendations for all relevant actors to enhance the resiliency of subsea cable infrastructure.

[Defence Industrial Outlook 2025](#) | FOI by Anton Hammarstedt et al



This outlook consists of two parts: a recurring section providing a global defence industrial outlook, and a thematic section studying the integration of the European defence industry over the last two decades. Within the global defence industry, the United States holds a nearly unparalleled position in terms of industrial size, scope, and sophistication. China has not yet caught up, but has significantly narrowed the capability gap. Russia has retained a broad scope, but achieves a lower level of sophistication. The combined European defence industries are highly advanced and broad in scope, but lack sufficient scale. The European

[Rusia y su instrumento militar Una visión geopolítica, estratégica y operacional del poder militar ruso](#) | IEEE por el Cor. ET



Este trabajo aborda la visión geopolítica, estratégica y operacional del poder militar ruso, en un entorno de competición caracterizado por la cada vez mayor importancia que otorgan algunos estados, Rusia en particular, a un instrumento con capacidad de disuadir e imponer.

En este documento de investigación se estudiará el papel de Rusia en las relaciones internacionales y la geopolítica, tanto desde la perspectiva occidental como autóctona, continuando por la estrategia, tanto general como militar de Rusia, contando con la visión transatlántica y la propia rusa, para finalizar con un análisis del instrumento

Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) remains deeply shaped by national preferences and a reluctance towards large-scale integration, leading to duplicated efforts.

militar desde su arte operacional, conceptualizando los instrumentos que lo caracterizan, como la batalla en profundidad, las operaciones profundas, los conceptos maskirovka, desinformatsia y control reflexivo y su capacidad nuclear, para ofrecer una visión completa de un poder militar que resulta clave para la influencia rusa en las relaciones internacionales.

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
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
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
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
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


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


Gráficos


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
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


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

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
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Sudan's Darfur at risk of new genocide

Fears of genocidal violence gripping Darfur once again are rising after the famine-stricken town of al-Fashir is overrun by the rebel paramilitary **Rapid Support Forces**, with hundreds feared dead.

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) backed by UAE. Leader **Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo**, known as **Hemetti** (right), declares investigation into "violations" committed by his soldiers. Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by **Abdel Fattah al-Burhan** (left), is backed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye.

Al Fashir: 15-month siege of city


El Geneina: 2023 massacre unpunished

Over two years of war has triggered the world's largest humanitarian crisis, with 12 million displaced and more than 25 million in need of aid.

Sources: Reuters, BBC, ISW. Pictures: Getty Images. © GRAPHIC NEWS



[Chinese FDI in Hungary | Rhodium Group](#)



[China's aircraft carrier fleet | Graphic News](#)

China's aircraft carrier fleet

China's largest and most advanced aircraft carrier has entered service, enabling Beijing to enhance its naval power in the Indo-Pacific region.

FUJIAN: Designed and built entirely in China. Full-length flat flight deck with three electromagnetic catapults, similar to system on latest U.S. carrier, **USS Gerald R. Ford**. System enables launch of heavier and larger fixed-wing aircraft.

Unlike U.S. nuclear-powered carriers, Fujian is conventionally powered.

SHANDONG: First indigenous-built aircraft carrier. Length: 305m. Flight deck: 14,700 sq m (80 percent size of U.S. Nimitz-class carrier).

LIAONING: Commissioned 2012. First aircraft carrier reused hull of former Soviet carrier. Length: 305m. Flight deck: 14,700 sq m (80 percent size of U.S. Nimitz-class carrier).

Displacement: 65,000 tonnes | Speed: 31 knots (57km/h) | Crew: 2,000 (est)

Displacement: 60,000 tonnes | Speed: 29 knots (53km/h) | Crew: 1,950

Sources: Bloomberg, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Reuters. © GRAPHIC NEWS

[U.S. upgrades Caribbean base | Graphic News](#)

U.S. upgrades Caribbean base

The U.S. military is refurbishing a long-abandoned former Cold War naval base in the Caribbean as it continues to assemble forces for an anti-drug operation that could include action inside Venezuela.

Infrastructure Improvements at former Roosevelt Roads Naval Station (left) in Puerto Rico suggests base is preparing to host larger number of fighter jets and cargo planes.

U.S. AIR AND NAVAL ASSETS IN THE CARIBBEAN (approximate locations as of Oct 31)

PUERTO RICO (U.S.)

Former Roosevelt Roads Naval Station

Forces en route

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Key to symbols:



- Aircraft carrier
- Amphibious assault ship
- Cruiser/destroyer
- Littoral combat ship
- Attack submarine
- Special operations ship
- Support ship
- F-35 fighter jets
- Reaper drones
- V-22 transport aircraft
- KC-130 refueling tankers
- C-17 cargo transports
- Upgraded military base or civilian airport

Sources: Reuters, USNI News. Picture: Newscom. © GRAPHIC NEWS

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Pakistan to launch first Chinese submarine

The Pakistan Navy expects its first Chinese-designed submarine to enter active service in 2026, bolstering Beijing's bid to counter regional rival India and project power toward the Middle East

HANGOR-CLASS: Variant of Type 039A (Yuan-class) attack submarine operated by Chinese Navy

Displacement: 2,800 tonnes

Length: 76m

Range: 1,400km+

\$5bn deal will see Pakistan receive eight boats by 2028, four built in China and four in Pakistan

Crew: 38, plus additional capacity for eight special forces personnel

Powerplant: Four CHD620 diesel engines. Maximum surface speed: 17 knots

Armament: Six 533mm tubes for cruise missiles, anti-air missiles


PAKISTAN SUBMARINE FORCES COMPARED (as of 2025)

Category	Pakistan	India
Attack submarines	5	17
Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines	2	0
Midget submarines	3	0


*Third vessel undergoing sea trials

Sources: Baid Maritime, Naval Technology, NTI, Reuters. © GRAPHIC NEWS

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
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


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