

**MODULO II**

**CURSO DE ALTO NIVEL DE LA  
POLITICA COMUN DE SEGURIDAD Y  
DEFENSA DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA.**

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**National Defense System**

The current Spanish Defense model, depicted in the National Security Strategy, which has been recently published, is the result of a strategic concept whose basics have changed little since the mid-twentieth century.

In broad terms, Spain defines itself as a middle power committed to international stability and security, with the main focus on the security and defense of Europe and the Euro-Mediterranean space, due to its geographical situation, and a priority relationship with the Americas.

Thus, during the last decades we have linked our defense to global security and stability, through NATO and EU membership, and made a clear commitment to the resolution of crises and conflicts under the umbrella of the United Nations Organization.

Spain also maintains a special relationship with the United States, based on a Cooperation Agreement on Defense which today, six decades after its signature, is more alive than ever.

However, we are well aware that to take part in these international security schemes does not guarantee our immunity against every potential threat and risk we may face.

In the essence of any multinational defense and security organization is the idea of a common threat. And it is hard to envisage such a community of interests among all members of an organization that all the risks and threats they face as individuals are the same.

This fact is explicitly acknowledged in the current Spanish National Defense Directive, issued by Prime Minister Rajoy at the beginning of his term, when it states the existence of unshared risks Spain would have to face regardless of the situation that may arise.

Crises such as that developed in Mali last year show us the need to articulate, on the basis of national capabilities, a rapid and necessarily limited response to a situation that threatens the stability in our area of interest.

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### **Geostrategic context**

During the second half of the last century, the prevailing geostrategic concept placed Spain in a second line with relation to a potential first level conflict; the confrontation between the Western and Soviet blocks.

But, the displacement of the center of gravity of international, political, economic and security relations to the Pacific Ocean and the emergence of an arc of instability stretching from the Middle East to the Atlantic coasts of the Sahel, confers us a different position today.

In the current scenario Spain holds an outpost edge or border, facing a number of second level regional conflicts. Crises which have seen the decline of its relative importance in the global context.

From a potential large conventional conflict developing in a well-defined area and affecting in a similar way all the allies, we have moved on, in a short time, to a multiplicity of nearby minor crises that require rapid and determined action to prevent a general degradation of the global situation.

The hot spot has shifted from northeast to southwest Europe and the interests of each of the partners are, therefore, affected in a very different way. But also the potential risks perceived by the different members are not the same as before.

Spain considers it necessary to build, with its nearest neighbors, a common security space in its area of direct interest in order to be able to project security and stability from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf of Guinea through the Sahel. Our security is inevitably linked to that of our neighbors and through them to the neighbors of our neighbors.

Thanks to Spain's development in recent years, the presence of Spanish interests all over the world is increasing and demands from our Defense System a greater involvement in matters that affect the stability and security of distant regions. Among them South America, for obvious reasons, deserves special attention.

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### **The European Union and NATO**

This trend in world affairs requires regional organizations, in particular NATO and the European Union, to assume a more active role.

We need also to carefully consider the relationship between the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance in order to overcome the current complementarity concept and misconceptions between the Common Security and Defense Policy and NATO, in order to achieve a more balanced relation and increased synergies.

The matter is basically political, with important implications in other domains. Therefore a clear and shared political perspective is a must.

It is essential to achieve a renewed European Global Strategy as the basis in which our Common Security and Defense Policy should be founded.

The development of a credible EU defense capability is an essential part of the deeper European integration process.

The developments of thematic and regional comprehensive strategies is also necessary to help us shape our common security and defense challenges.

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## **Defense Capabilities**

There are many factors that force us to redesign our defense system as a whole, including the growing importance of new operating domains like cyberspace, whose expansion exceeds all known limits and where national interests deserve the same level of security they have in the traditional domains.

With our allies we should seek ways to meet those requirements needed for collective defense which exceed our individual capabilities.

In this regard, the flexibility of the organizations to include the different models of collaboration existing both in NATO and in the European Union will be the key for the success of their capabilities sharing initiatives.

We deem it necessary that the EU and NATO enhance their political and strategic dialogue by developing a more intense practical cooperation. Capability development in both EU and NATO should be mutually reinforcing.

The establishment of a new European Capability Development Plan (CDP) will be a crucial means to optimize the available resources and maximize cooperation among Member States.

There are already a number of important projects that should be considered as strong foundations upon which we should build further programs under the coordination and supervision of the European Defense Agency.

In particular those related to strategic transport and air-to-air refueling represent an example of how resources, either developed through a joint procurement program or provided as a contribution in kind by the Nations, can be handled by a common European entity and made available to all Member States.

The capability development areas that, from a national perspective, are considered as having the most promising potential for European cooperation are: unmanned Aerial Vehicles; Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Air to Air Refueling; Maritime Situational Awareness; Space; and Cyber Defense (a critical area in which to develop synergies in Research and Development and Training).

However, we must be extremely scrupulous in defining our levels of ambition in terms of military capabilities both nationally and collectively.

Given the economic situation we must prioritize our needs and take into consideration the combination of both the danger and the likelihood of the different potential crisis.

The opportunity cost implied by the unjustified allocation of great amount of resources to low probability situations would not be acceptable.

On the other hand, setting unattainable or unrealistic force goals may also cause frustration and a false sense of insecurity both at national and multinational levels, derived from the perception of a lack of capacity, which is purely theoretical since the actual needs for defense are fully satisfied.

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## **Spanish Armed Forces Capabilities**

During the last thirty years Spain has conducted a deep transformation of its Armed Forces, as a result of its participation in multinational operations, the contribution as reliable and committed partner to NATO and the Common European Security and Defense Policy and also, to some extent, by those essential requirements to cope with not shared risks.

This effort has been supported by the Spanish society, both in the moral sphere (as shown by the change experienced on how its society perceives its military) and in the material one through the defense budget.

Spain has now a solid defense system and modern and prepared Armed Forces that are suitable to its strategic location and to the role it wants to play in the concert of nations.

But far from being conformists we must continue to evolve, as the strategic paradigm which prevailed in recent decades is no longer valid.

In Spain, the adequacy of our resources to strategic context and to the current economic situation has forced us to redirect major armament programs with a dual purpose.

First, we have adapted the systems available to our current needs and not to those existing when the programs were designed, which in many cases was more than twenty years ago.

Second, we have reduced the financial burden on the Ministry's budget and the resulting damage to the incipient Spanish defense industry.

For the extraordinary effort made has not only modernized the equipment and systems of the Armed Forces but it has also created an industrial and technological base, that either directly or indirectly largely benefits the society in general.

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## **Technological and Industrial Base**

But, when discussing about Common Security and Defense within the European Union, one must always keep in mind that Defense is the ultimate remains of sovereignty. We can't ignore the exceptional nature of this Common Policy, proven by the specific treatment received throughout the years.

Only by securing every Member State's sovereignty, taking into account its own risks and menaces, will we be able to move forward the Common Security and Defense Policy.

Since the competence to determine essential defence interests rests on Member States, proposals for implementing a stronger Internal Defence market must be cautious, so as not to interfere in matters which could fall in the field of national security.

The European Institutions have a key role in supporting the Common Security and Defense Policy development by monitoring the implementation of the existing Defense Package (Defense and Security Directive and Intra Community Transfers Directive).

Further legislation is not a must at this stage. The European Institutions must resist calls for further legislation and instead they should however focus their resources on ensuring the successful application of the existing framework with a view to helping Member States derive maximum benefit from it. The European integration process in this area must emerge naturally.

They must avoid making proposals for new controls at European level regarding the ownership of strategic defense industrial assets. Member States with substantial defence industrial interests already have national control mechanisms and the added value of such a measure should be examined cautiously.

Similarly, measures that undermine export opportunities should be avoided as these are vital for the future growth of the European defense market; generally speaking offsets are, for example, an inevitable requirement of contracting authorities from non-European countries in the defense procurement market.

In this vein, some modalities of practical cooperation, such as government-to-government agreements for the provision of military equipment should be respected.

Strengthening the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base requires getting our industry supported, in particular the Small and Medium sized Enterprises, by facilitating their access to EU funds, especially those related to Research and Development.

The Defense and Security Directive and the Intra Community Transfers Directive will substantially improve the performance of the European defense market, stimulating its long term growth; but they must be given time to embed before any further changes are proposed.